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	Abstract		 This	 thesis	addresses	 the	existential	 challenges	and	opportunities	posed	by	 religious	 diversity.	 It	 argues	 that	 philosophical	 engagements	with	 diversity	misrepresent	and	obstruct	 full	engagement	with	 it.	The	 thesis	reconceptualises	diversity	 from	 a	 Kierkegaardian	 perspective,	 sensitive	 to	 the	 existential	dimensions	of	religion	and	focused	on	religious	commitment.		Drawing	 on	 features	 of	 Kierkegaard’s	 description	 of	 religious	 faith,	particularly	 uncertainty,	 risk,	 paradox	 and	 transcendence,	 it	 proposes	 that	 an	authentic,	 Christian	 response	 to	 religious	 diversity	 is	 one	 of	 unbounded	commitment.	 It	 is	 unbounded	 in	 that	 it	 is	 an	 absolute,	 boundless	 commitment	and	deep	fidelity	to	God’s	revelation,	but	entails	a	venturing,	boundary-crossing,	radical	 openness	 to	 finding	 this	 in	 sites	 of	 offence.	 Deep	 engagement	 with	religious	 others	 goes	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 faith	 in	 Christ	 as	 well	 as	 expressing	fundamental	 truths	 about	 the	 human	 situation	 itself.	 A	 concluding	 sketch	 is	provided	of	how	deep	interreligious	encounter	can	be	achieved	through	indirect	communication	focused	on	the	character	of	the	participants.			
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CHAPTER	1	
INTRODUCTION:	READING	KIERKEGAARD	IN	A	CONTEXT	OF	RELIGIOUS	
DIVERSITY	
	
1.1.	Thesis	and	Methodology	(1.1.a)	Thesis	Diversity	 within	 and	 between	 religions	 is	 an	 abiding	 phenomenon	 that	necessitates	 and	provides	 opportunities	 for	 deep	philosophical	 and	 theological	reflection.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 on	 the	 existential	 challenges	 and	opportunities	 posed	 by	 religious	 diversity	 (RD)	 to	 Christians	 who	 must	 face	agonistic	questions	in	constructing	and	living	out	identities	in	a	diverse	context,	in	 relation	 to	 religions	 that	make	absolute	and	exclusive	 claims	while	having	a	sense	of	their	universal	significance	beyond	their	own	borders.		My	 thesis	 revolves	 around	 three	 core	 arguments.	 First,	 I	 argue	 that	philosophical	engagements	with	RD	have	misrepresented	the	nature	of	diversity	by	 viewing	 it	 as	 an	 objective	 problem.	 This	 impairs	 a	 full	 engagement	 with	diversity	and	occludes	a	range	of	solutions	to	the	challenges	it	presents.	I	provide	an	alternative	framework	based	on	an	existential	understanding	of	religion	and	analysis	 of	 commitment,	 reconceptualising	 the	 debate	 from	 a	 Kierkegaardian	perspective	that	is	more	sensitive	to	how	religious	identity	is	experienced	from	the	inside	and	bound	up	with	ways	of	being	in	the	world.	Second,	 I	 draw	 on	 central	 features	 of	 Kierkegaard’s	 description	 of	religious	 faith,	 such	as	uncertainty,	 commitment,	 and	paradox,	 to	 construct	my	own	 approach	 to	 the	 existential	 challenge	 of	 RD.	 This	 approach	 offers	 fertile	resources	 for	understanding	the	agonistic	situation	of	Christians	navigating	the	tensions	 between	 fidelity	 and	 openness	 in	 the	 face	 diversity.	 I	 argue	 that	
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Christians	 can	 engage	 authentically	 in	 open	 and	 faithful	 ways	 with	 religious	others,	 proposing	 an	 approach	 of	 unbounded	 commitment.	 This	 approach	 is	unbounded	in	that	it	is	an	absolute,	boundless	commitment	and	deep	fidelity	but	entails	a	venturing,	boundary-crossing	openness.	 It	 is	aware	of	 its	own	finitude	and	 uncertainty	 and	 acknowledges	 the	 paradoxical	 nature	 of	 the	 divine	 as	manifesting	 in	 unexpected	 places.	 On	 this	 basis,	 I	 show	 that	 deep	 engagement	with	religious	others	is	not	simply	necessitated	by	the	religiously	diverse	context	but	goes	to	the	heart	of	Christian	devotion	and	is	the	most	authentic	expression	of	 faith	 in	 Christ,	 wherein	 transformation	 is	 achieved	 through	 encounter	 with	divine	 grace	 in	 the	 other,	 as	 well	 as	 expressing	 fundamental	 truths	 about	 the	human	situation	itself.	Third,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	prioritisation	of	 interpersonal	 relationships	over	theory	 can	 aid	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 interreligious	 encounter,	 deep	encounter	 and	 exchange	 occurring	 across	 religious	 boundaries	 through	 how	participants	relate	to	each	other.		(1.1.b)	Methodology	My	thesis	engages	with	the	challenge	of	diversity	from	the	perspective	of	a	 Christian	 philosophy	 of	 religion,	 aiming	 to	 offer	 a	 convincing	 philosophical	position	 that	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	 deep	 theoretical,	 existential,	 and	 practical	engagement	 with	 RD.1 	While	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 existential	 challenge,	 my	conviction	 is	 that	 engaging	 in	 this	 way	 provides	 resources	 for	 Christian	theological	reflection	that	can	reinvigorate	Christianity	 in	a	context	of	diversity	
																																																								1	Christianity	informs	my	own	position,	Kierkegaard’s	position,	and	Western	philosophy	of	religion,	but	it	is	hoped	that	my	thesis	will	also	provide	insights	for	non-Christians.	
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by	 calling	 it	 to	 deep	 engagement	 with	 diversity	 while	 also	 affirming	 the	authenticity	of	its	own	approach.	My	 philosophical	method	 is	 postmetaphysical	 and	 utilises	 concepts	 and	approaches	informed	by	existential	phenomenology.	The	focus	is	on	religion	as	it	relates	 to	 features	of	 subjectivity	and	embodied	ways	of	being.	 Its	 aim	 is	 to	be	descriptively	sensitive	to	these	features,	offering	an	exploration	of	religiousness	and	 diversity	 as	 it	 is	 experienced	 from	 the	 inside	 of	 religious	 identity.2	It	 also	offers	 existential	 and	 pragmatic	 critiques	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ways	 of	 being	facilitated	 by	 different	 approaches	 to	 diversity,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 developing	 an	authentic	response	to	the	challenges	of	RD.		A	 dialogue	with	 Kierkegaardian	 texts	 is	 employed	 to	 develop	 a	 unique,	Kierkegaardian	inspired	approach	to	RD.	These	have	been	chosen	as	the	basis	for	my	position	because	they	explore	existential	 features	of	religion	as	 it	relates	to	the	 person	 and	 are	 focused	 on	 descriptive	 accuracy	 and	 authenticity.	Kierkegaard’s	 understanding	 of	 religion	 offers	 a	 fuller	 alternative	 than	 the	dominant,	reductive	engagements	with	diversity	in	philosophy	of	religion,	yet	it	is	 not	 usually	 considered	 in	 the	 debate.	 I	 aim	 to	 present	 an	 approach	 that	 is	recognisably	Kierkegaardian,	is	persuasive	for	Christian	philosophers	of	religion,	and	which	also	provides	fecund	resources	for	engaging	with	RD.	This	chapter	defines	key	terms	regarding	RD,	explains	my	methodology	in	approaching	the	Kierkegaardian	corpus,	and	outlines	the	direction	of	the	thesis.	
																																																									2	The	following	terms	are	used	broadly	in	the	thesis,	unless	described	in	more	detail.	Subjectivity	is	used	to	refer	to	the	person’s	ability	to	phenomenalise	being,	particularly	their	own	being,	in	unique,	interpretative	ways,	from	the	inside.	The	phrase	ways	of	being	is	used	to	refer	to	the	ways	in	which	people	live	out	their	core	existential	commitments	through	their	values,	beliefs,	and	identities.	Selfhood	is	used	to	refer	to	the	condition	of	being	a	self,	particularly	in	relation	to	constituting	identity	by	coordinating	the	dialectical	tensions	of	their	being.		
	4	 	
1.2.	Scoping	the	Question	of	Religious	Diversity	The	 dominant	 problematization	 of	 RD	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 is	challenged	 in	 later	 chapters,	 but,	 for	 orientation	 in	 the	 debate,	 the	 following	definitions	are	used.	Religion	is	defined	as	a	way	of	interpreting	and	being	in	the	world	that	makes	reference	to	something	taken	as	ultimate	or	as	having	ultimate	importance.3	This	is	an	expansive	definition,	including	socio-cultural	structures;	textual	and	oral	bodies	and	traditions;	sets	of	practices	and	norms;	and	personal	beliefs,	practices,	and	identities.	This	definition	is	a	provisional	heuristic	tool	to	orient	the	analysis,	rather	than	a	prescriptive	claim	about	the	nature	of	religion.				RD	refers	to	the	existence	of	different	structures	that	can	be	categorised	as	religious.	Many	such	structures	offer	what	appear	to	be	incompatible	claims,	accounts,	and	ways	of	being.	Many	assert	their	own	exclusive	truth	and	may	have	developed	in	contradistinction	from	other	such	structures	in	a	supersessionist	or	antagonistic	 way.	 RD	 includes	 interreligious	 diversity,	 diversity	 of	 different	religions,	and	 intrareligious	diversity,	differences	within	bodies	 that	 identify	as																																																									3	This	definition	has	been	chosen	for	several	reasons.	First,	it	coheres	closely	with	the	definition	offered	by	a	range	of	Kierkegaardian	texts	(see	Chapter	2).	Second,	it	is	the	definition	offered	by	many	of	the	philosophers	and	theologians	engaged	in	the	debate	over	RD	[See,	for	example:	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	
Religious	Pluralism	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	2005),	p.	18.	Peter	Byrne,	‘A	Philosophical	Approach	to	Questions	about	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Religious	
Diversity,	p.	37.	John	Hick,	‘The	Next	Step	beyond	Dialogue’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	
Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	5.	Paul	F.	Knitter,	‘Is	the	Pluralist	Model	a	Western	Imposition?’	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	
Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	37.	Ninian	Smart,	‘The	Philosophy	of	Worldviews,	or	the	Philosophy	of	Religion	Transformed’.	In,	Thomas	Dean	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	Truth:	
Essays	on	Cross-Cultural	Philosophy	of	Religion	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York,	1995),	p.	19.	Though	Hedges	does	not	use	the	term,	the	definitions	he	offers,	by	referring	to	an	afterlife	and	guiding	norms,	are	compatible	with	this	definition.	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	
Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions	(London:	SCM,	2010),	p.	78.]	Third,	this	focuses	on	the	central	problem	in	religious	diversity:	when	ultimate	but	apparently	inconsistent	claims	are	made.	Fourth,	while	there	may	be	bodies	that	are	best	characterized	as	religions	that	do	not	make	such	ultimate	claims	[Suzanne	Owen,	‘The	World	Religions	Paradigm	Time	for	a	Change’.	Arts	and	
Humanities	in	Higher	Education,	Vol	10,	Issue	3,	pp.	253	–	268.	(2011)],	religions	that	do	make	such	claims	provide	a	paradigmatic	case	of	diversity	because	ultimate	claims	are	likely	to	be	exclusive.	
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the	same	religion.	While	there	are	many	examples	of	difference,	because	they	are	concerned	with	ultimacy,	religions	may	offer	competing	interpretations	that	are	viewed	 as	 ultimately	 important	 and	 authoritative	 in	 the	 identities	 of	 their	adherents.	The	primary	case	of	RD	is	the	difference	between	such	interpretative	schema,	as	Byrne	observes,	‘different	religions	contain	competing	accounts	of	the	character	 of	 the	 metaphysically	 and	 axiologically	 ultimate	 reality	 and…of	 the	character	of	the	ultimate	good	human	beings	can	attain	through	relation	to	this	reality.’4	RD	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 for	 philosophers	 of	 religion.	 Byrne	identifies	 four	 preoccupations. 5 	It	 raises	 epistemological	 questions	 about	accounts,	 truth-claims,	 and	 knowledge:	 are	 claims	 exclusive,	 how	 is	 doxastic	disagreement	 to	 be	 handled,	 and	 how	 is	 one	 to	 decide	 on	 which	 accounts	 to	accept?6	This	 is	 particularly	 problematic	 given	 that	 religions	 may	 provide	 the	criteria	by	which	claims	are	 legitimated,	such	that	 legitimisation	criteria	reflect	the	 same	 diversity	 as	 religious	 claims.7	It	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	religion	 and	 RD.	 It	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 ultimate,	which	 is	likely	be	the	primary	site	contested	by	religions.	It	raises	moral	questions	about	the	relationship	between	religion	and	the	human	good,	such	as	how	competing	
																																																								4	Peter	Byrne,	‘A	Philosophical	Approach	to	Questions	about	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	30.	Further	examples	of	difference	include:	different	values	and	practices;	different	texts,	traditions,	institutions	and	authorities;	different	accounts	of	and	beliefs	about	the	universe,	the	divine,	the	afterlife,	salvation,	and	human	condition.		5	Peter	Byrne,	‘A	Philosophical	Approach	to	Questions	about	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	29.	6	David	Basinger,	Religious	Diversity:	A	Philosophical	Assessment	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2002),	vii.	7	Kevin	Meeker	and	Philip	L.	Quinn,	‘Introduction:	The	Philosophical	Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	Meeker	(eds.),	The	Philosophical	Challenge	of	Religious	
Diversity	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	p.	2.	
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soteriological	claims	are	to	be	navigated,	how	one	is	to	deal	with	competing	sets	of	religious	values,	and	whether	religions	can	contribute	to	human	flourishing.8		Christian	theological	questions	posed	by	RD	include	how	diversity	is	to	be	accounted	 for	 within	 a	 Christian	 framework,	 in	 relation	 to	 claims	 about	 the	revelatory	and	soteriologically	normative	status	of	Christ.9	It	raises	missiological	questions	 about	 how	 Christianity	 should	 approach	 other	 religions	 and	 their	adherents,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 dialogue,	 evangelism,	 and	 obligations	 to	love. 10 	At	 a	 deeper	 level,	 it	 has	 profound	 implications	 for	 Christian	 self-understanding,	and	can	be	an	occasion	for	reformulating	Christian	doctrines.	RD	also	raises	existential	questions	about	how	one	 is	 to	relate	 to	others	and	constitute	one’s	identity	in	relation	to	the	diverse	options.	Many	people	find	encounter	with	diversity	to	be	damaging	to	the	integrity	of	their	identity	and	the	strength	of	their	conviction,	pluralisiation	contributing	to	secularisation	and	loss	of	 belief. 11 	That	 this	 occurs	 even	 amongst	 those	 who	 are	 not	 engaged	 in	
																																																								8	A	fifth	feature,	neglected	by	many	philosophers	of	religion,	are	the	implications	of	diversity	for	philosophical	methodology:	how	are	philosophers	to	engage	with	the	wealth	of	data	provided	by	religions,	both	methodologically	and	in	relation	to	their	objectives,	particularly	when	the	focus	of	philosophy	of	religion	in	the	West	has	been	on	Christianity.	David	Cheetham,	‘Comparative	Philosophy	of	Religion.’	In,	David	Cheetham	and	Rolfe	King	(eds.),	Contemporary	Practice	and	
Method	in	the	Philosophy	of	Religion	(London:	Continuum,	2008),	pp.	101-116.	9	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin,	‘Editors’	Introduction’.	In,	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin	(eds.),	The	Question	of	Theological	Truth	(Amsterdam:	Rodopi,	2012),	pp.	9-10.		10	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	16	and	p.	6.	John	Hick	and	Paul	F.	Knitter	(eds.),	The	Myth	of	Christian	Uniqueness	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	1987),	vii.	And,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	
Pluralism,	ix.	And,	Gavin	D’Costa,	‘Christianity	and	the	World	Religions:	A	Theological	Appraisal’.	In,	Gavin	D’Costa,	Paul	Knitter	and	Daniel	Strange	(eds.),	Only	One	Way?	(London:	SCM	Press,	2011),	p.	3.	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	Uniqueness	Reconsidered	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	1990),	viii.	11	‘If	there	is	more	than	one	sacred	canopy	present	in	society…they	cannot	both	(or	indeed	all)	be	true….	The	next	question	is	unavoidable:	could	it	be	that	there	is	no	ultimate	truth	at	all...?	[P]luralism	erodes	the	plausibility	structures	generated	by	monopolistic	religious	institutions	in	so	far	as	it	offers	alternatives.’	[Grace	Davie,	The	Sociology	of	Religion	(London:	Sage,	2007),	p.	53.	See	also:	Peter	L.	Berger,	‘Secularization	and	De-Secularization’.	In,	Linda	Woodhead,	Paul	Fletcher,	Hiroko	Kawanami	and	David	Smith	(eds.),	Religions	in	the	Modern	World	(London:	Routledge,	2002),	p.	296.]	On	the	existential	dimension	of	this,	see:	Mark	S.	McLeod-Harrison,	
Repairing	Eden:	Humility,	Mysticism	and	the	Existential	Problem	of	Religious	Diversity	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2005),	p.	13.	
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theological	 reflection,	 indicates	 that	 this	 is	 an	 existential	 problem	 that	 arises	from	 everyday	 encounters	 between	 people	 as	 much	 as	 a	 theoretical	 problem	arising	from	consideration	of	conflicting	truth-claims.	Diversity	 poses	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 philosophy:	 has	Western	philosophy	 operated	 within	 a	 logic	 of	 identity	 that	 excludes	 difference?	 How	should	philosophy	engage	with	alterity	 in	 the	 light	of	 this	 challenge?12	Stewart,	Schmidt-Leukel,	 Plantinga,	 and	 Griffiths	 claim	 the	 central	 question	 for	philosophers	 of	 religion	 is	 how	 many	 religions	 mediate	 salvific	 truth.13	This	preoccupation	 has	 had	 a	 decisive	 influence	 in	 shaping	 the	 typology	 of	approaches	to	RD	and	it	will	be	argued	that	this	is	one	of	the	primary	problems	with	philosophical	engagements	with	diversity.	The	 dominant	 typology	 of	 positions	 classifies	 positions	 based	 on	 the	number	of	religions	viewed	as	being	true	and	saving.14	Exclusivism	asserts	that	
																																																								12	On	the	accusation	that	philosophy	has	been	totalising	and	thus	exclusionary,	see	Levinas’	claim	that,	‘The	philosophical	discourse	of	the	West	claims	the	amplitude	of	an	all-encompassing	structure	or	of	an	ultimate	comprehension.	It	compels	every	other	discourse	to	justify	itself	before	philosophy.’	[Emmanuel	Levinas,	‘God	and	Philosophy’.	In,	Adriaan	T.	Peperzak,	Simon	Critchley	and	Robert	Bernasconi	(eds.),	Emmanuel	Levinas:	Basic	Philosophical	Writings	(Indiana:	Indiana	University	Press,	1996),	p.	129.]	Recovering	alterity	is	the	heart	of	the	range	of	continental	approaches	that	can	be	characterized	as	philosophies	of	alterity.	[Todd	May,	‘Philosophies	of	Difference’.	In,	John	Mullarkey	and	Beth	Lord	(eds.),	The	Bloomsbury	Companion	
to	Continental	Philosophy	(London:	Bloomsbury,	2009),	pp.	93-108.]			13	Robert	B.	Stewart,	‘Can	Only	One	Religion	Be	True?	Considering	This	Question.’	In,	Robert	B.	Stewart	(ed.),	Can	Only	One	Religion	Be	True?	Paul	Knitter	and	Harold	Netland	in	Dialogue	(Minneapolis:	Fortress	Press,	2013),	p.	3.	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	
Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	19.	Alvin	Plantinga,	‘A	Defense	of	Religious	Exclusivism’.	In,	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	Meeker	(eds.),	The	Philosophical	
Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	172.	Paul	J.	Griffiths,	Problems	of	Religious	Diversity	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2001),	pp.	7-12.		14	This	was	introduced	by	Race,	is	defended	by	Schmidt-Leukel,	and	is	described	as	the	‘classical	typology’	by	Hedges.	[Alan	Race,	Christians	and	Religious	Pluralism:	Patterns	in	the	Christian	
Theology	of	Religions	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	1982).	And,	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	
The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism	.	And,	Paul	Hedges,	
Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	17.	See	also:	Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	Christian	Approaches	to	Other	Faiths	(London:	SCM,	2009),	vii.]	
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one	religion	is	exclusively	true	and	saving.15	Inclusivism	asserts	that	one	religion	is	 superior	 in	 terms	 of	 truth	 and/or	 salvation,	 but	 many	 other	 religions	 are	‘included’,	 as	 having	 some	 degree	 of	 access	 to	 these.16	Pluralism	 asserts	 that	many	 religions	 have	 parity	 in	mediating	 truth	 and	 salvation.17	These	 positions	are	nuanced	and	critiqued	in	later	chapters.			 This	 thesis	aims	to	provide	a	convincing	Kierkegaardian	position	on	RD,	focused	on	the	existential	challenges	but	applicable	to	some	of	these	questions.	It	does	not	position	 itself	within	 the	 typology	and	constructs	a	different	 typology	and	 approach,	 rejecting	 the	 importance	 of	 some	 of	 the	 central	 questions	identified	above	and	engaging	with	RD	at	a	deeper	level.	To	present	 a	 full,	 convincing	position,	 the	 thesis	 aims	 to	understand	RD	while	avoiding	metaphysical	or	ultimate	claims.18	It	aims	to	convince	Christians	by	 drawing	 on	 Christological	 themes	 and	 values	 of	 love.	 Above	 all,	 it	 aims	 to	incorporate	 the	 subjective	 dimension	 of	 religious	 devotion,	 which	 has	 been	overlooked	by	 the	 classical	 view,	 to	 facilitate	deep	and	authentic	 interpersonal	relationships	in	a	context	of	pervasive	RD.	
	
																																																									15	See,	for	example,	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	
Religions,	pp.	20-22.	Daniel	Strange,	‘Exclusivisms’.	In,	Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	
Christian	Approaches	to	Other	Faiths,	p.	5.	Plantinga	defends	exclusivism.	[Alvin	Plantinga,	‘A	Defense	of	Religious	Exclusivism’.	In,	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	Meeker	(eds.),	The	Philosophical	
Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity,	pp.	172-192.]	16	Paul	J.	Griffiths,	Problems	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	57.	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	p.36.	D’Costa	defends	this	approach.	[Gavin	D’Costa,	‘Christ,	The	Trinity,	and	Religious	Plurality.’	In,	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	Uniqueness	
Reconsidered,	pp.	16-29.]	17	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	26.	Hick	defends	such	an	approach.	[John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion	(London:	Macmillan,	1989).]	18	The	criteria	chosen	as	key	to	the	persuasiveness	of	my	approach	are	influenced	by	Knitter’s	criteria	for	a	successful	response,	but	I	propose	my	own	as	Knitter	remains,	to	a	great	extent,	within	the	classical	view	of	diversity.	Paul	F	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	Religions	(New	York:	Orbis,	2002),	pp.	1-2;	pp.	109-111.	
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1.3.	Methodology	in	Approaching	the	Kierkegaardian	Corpus		 This	 section	 positions	 my	 approach	 to	 the	 Kierkegaardian	 literature.	 It	positions	 my	 descriptive-thematic	 approach	 in	 relation	 to	 dominant	methodologies	 in	Kierkegaardian	scholarship.	 It	outlines	 the	problem	posed	by	the	fragmentation	of	the	authorship	and	proposes	a	solution	through	a	detailed	consideration	of	 its	nature	alongside	Kierkegaard’s	 self-interpretations.	Finally,	it	 explains	 my	 use	 of	 the	 spheres	 of	 existence	 as	 grounding	 an	 existential	exploration	 of	 selfhood,	 particularly	 with	 a	 view	 to	 living	 out	 religiousness	 in	authentic	ways.			(1.3.a)	Typology	of	Approaches		 My	 thesis	 focuses	on	 the	writings	of	 Climacus	 and	Anti-Climacus,	which	are	a	part	of	Kierkegaard’s	authorship	and	are	interpreted	as	pursuing	particular	authorial	 projects	 and	 presenting	 a	 wealth	 of	 material	 for	 philosophical	engagement	 with	 religiousness.19	The	 authorship	 presents	 a	 range	 of	 different	styles,	 genres,	 and	 perspectives,	 and	 the	 interpretation	 of	 it	 entails	 numerous	
																																																								19	The	Kierkegaardian	corpus	comprises	three	main	groups	of	texts.	I	follow	Michael	Strawser’s	formal	categorisation	of	these	as	it	is	a	useful	schema	and	is	in	conformity	with	Kierkegaard’s	own	comments.	[Michael	Strawser,	Both/And:	Reading	Kierkegaard	From	Irony	to	Edification	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	1997),	xxiii.]	The	group	referred	to	as	‘the	authorship’	is	composed	of	the	works	published	from	Either/Or	in	1843	to	For	Self	Examination	in	1851.	The	works	published	from	1843	to	1848	are	acknowledged	by	Kierkegaard	as	‘the	whole	authorship’	(PoV,	p.	289),	and	the	same	books	up	to	1846	are	acknowledged	by	Climacus	(CUP,	pp.	251-300)	and	Kierkegaard	(CUP,	p.	625).	Also	included	are	the	books	published	between	1848	and	1851,	which	Kierkegaard	saw	as	a	continuation	of	the	authorial	program	described	in	CUP	and	PoV.	The	second	group	is	composed	of	unpublished	completed	texts	and	texts	not	acknowledged	by	Kierkegaard	as	part	of	‘the	authorship’.	These	include	‘pre-authorship’	works	and	publications	from	Kierkegaard’s	student	days,	unpublished	complete	works,	and	Kierkegaard’s	‘post-authorship’	polemic	against	the	Danish	church,	published	in	pamphlets	and	newspaper	articles.	The	third	group	comprises	Kierkegaard’s	journals	and	notebooks,	letters,	and	incomplete	works	left	in	the	form	of	notes.		
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problems,	 necessitating	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 defensible	 methodology. 20 	Four	approaches	have	dominated	scholarship.21		 (1.3.a.i)	 Biographical-psychological	 approaches	 utilise	 the	 details	 of	Kierkegaard’s	 life	 to	 interpret	 the	corpus.	22	Kierkegaard’s	writings	are	partly	a	response	to	his	life	and	struggles,	‘[Kierkegaard’s]	writings	are	so	closely	meshed	with	 the	 background	 details	 of	 the	 author’s	 life	 that	 knowledge	 of	 this	 is	indispensable	 to	 their	 content.’23	However,	 this	 approach	 will	 not	 be	 pursued	because	 it	 can	 overlook	 the	 philosophical	 and	 theological	 content	 of	 the	authorship,	 as	 Taylor	 observes,	 ‘Scholarship…becomes	 an	 elaborate	 detective	game	 of	 trying	 to	 discern	which	 passages	 of	 the	 pseudonyms	 actually	 refer	 to	Kierkegaard	 himself.	 In	 such	 investigations,	 the	 theological	 method	 and																																																									20	Hence	Mannheimer	calls	it,	‘bafflingly	complex’.	Ronald	J.	Manheimer,	Kierkegaard	as	Educator	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1977),	xv.	21	This	typology	remains	relevant,	as	demonstrated	by	Barrett’s	continuing	use	of	it	to	categorise	American	receptions	of	Kierkegaard’s	work.	This	typology	is	outlined	in:	David	R.	Law,	
Kierkegaard	as	Negative	Theologian	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1993),	p.	3.	Law	is	building	on	the	typologies	offered	by	Henriksen	and	Taylor	[Aage	Henriksen,	Methods	and	Results	of	
Kierkegaard	Studies	in	Scandinavia:	A	Historical	and	Critical	Study	(Copenhagen:	Ejnar	Munksgaard,	1951),	pp.	11-12.	Mark	C	Taylor,	Kierkegaard’s	Pseudonymous	Authorship:	A	Study	of	
Time	and	the	Self	(Princeton	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1975),	p.	26.]	Lee	C.	Barrett,	‘The	USA:	From	Neo-Orthodoxy	to	Plurality.’	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Kierkegaard’s	International	
Reception,	Tome	III:	The	Near	East,	Asia,	Australia	and	the	Americas	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009)	pp.229-269.		22	Henriksen	identifies	this	as	the	dominant	approach	in	Scandinavian	scholarship	up	to	1851.	[Aage	Henriksen,	Methods	and	Results	of	Kierkegaard	Studies	in	Scandinavia:	A	Historical	and	
Critical	Study,	p.	12.]	Early	proponents	included	Thompson	and	Haecker;	it	is	continued	in	recent	scholarship	by	biographies	on	Kierkegaard	such	Garff’s,	which	utilises	Kierkegaard’s	life	to	support	an	interpretation	of	the	corpus.	[Josiah	Thompson,	The	Lonely	Labyrinth:	Kierkegaard’s	
Pseudonymous	Works	(Carbondale:	Southern	Illinois	University	Press,	1967).	Theodor	Haecker,	
Kierkegaard	the	Cripple	(London:	Harvill,	1948).	Joakim	Garff,	Kierkegaard:	A	Biography,	Trans.	Bruce	H	Kirmmse	(Princeton	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005).]	Garff’s	biography	is	used	to	support	his	earlier	contention	that	the	corpus	cannot	be	seen	as	a	unity	or	its	theology	taken	seriously,	portraying	Kierkegaard	instead	as	an	actor	who	adopts	and	discards	numerous	facades	throughout	his	life.	[Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In	Jonathan	Reé	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	
Critical	Reader	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1998),	pp.	75-102.]	Many	introductory	works,	even	by	commentators	who	do	not	otherwise	adopt	this	approach,	consider	Kierkegaard’s	life	and	its	relation	to	the	corpus.	[An	early	example	is	James	Collins,	The	Mind	of	Kierkegaard	(Chicago:	Henry	Regnery	Company,	1953).	A	more	recent	example	is	Michael	Watts,	Kierkegaard	(Oxford:	Oneworld	Publications,	2003).]	23	Alistair	Hannay,	Kierkegaard:	A	Biography	(Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	2001),	i.	Kierkegaard	supports	this	approach	by	positing	an	essential	and	intimate	connection	between	an	author’s	‘written’	and	‘lived’	communications	(PoV,	p.	57).	
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philosophical	 ideas	 are	 forgotten.’ 24 	Indeed,	 one	 reason	 that	 Kierkegaard	employed	pseudonyms	was	 to	 confront	 the	 reader	directly	with	 the	 content	of	the	works	and	detach	biographical	issues	from	them	(CUP,	pp.	625-630).		(1.3.a.ii)	 Historical-comparative	 approaches	 aim	 to	 understand	Kierkegaard’s	thought	by	its	context	 in	the	history	of	 ideas	and	alongside	other	thinkers.25	This	 includes	 charting	 the	 concepts	 and	movements	 that	 influenced	Kierkegaard	and	his	influence	over	later	movements.26	While	this	approach	helps	to	clarify	the	meaning	of	concepts	employed	by	Kierkegaard,	it	will	not	be	used	as	my	primary	methodology.	The	conceptual	 content	of	 the	authorship	bears	a	problematic	 relationship	 to	 its	 predecessors,	 borrowing	 much	 but	 also	 using	concepts	 in	 innovative	and	subversive	ways,	such	that	 it	 is	difficult	 to	establish	when	Kierkegaard’s	employment	of	these	is	in	earnest.27	The	texts	must	be	given	
																																																								24	Mark	C	Taylor,	Kierkegaard’s	Pseudonymous	Authorship:	A	Study	of	Time	and	the	Self,	p.	15.	A	further	problem	is	that	the	primary	sources	for	this	approach	are	problematic;	Kierkegaard’s	employment	of	pseudonyms	and	obfuscating	literary	devices	makes	it	difficult	to	identify	reliable	autobiographical	data	in	the	authorship	and	he	asks	that	they	not	be	identified	with	his	own	views	(CUP,	pp.	625-630).	For	arguments	on	the	unreliability	of	Kierkegaard’s	journals	and	signed	works,	particularly	relating	to	their	editorial	treatment,	see:	Joakim	Garff,	‘“To	produce	was	my	life.”	Problems	and	Perspectives	within	the	Kierkegaardian	Biography’,	trans.	S.E.Ake.	In,	N.J.Cappelørn	and	J.Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited	(Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	1997),	pp.	75-93.	25	This	is	the	approach	underlying	the	series	Kierkegaard	Research:	Sources,	Reception	and	
Resources	edited	by	Jon	Stewart,	which	traces	the	influences	on	Kierkegaard’s	thought	from	the	ancient	world	through	to	his	impact	on	the	history	of	ideas	and	subsequent	movements	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2007-1011).	Recent	anthologies	devote	as	much	space	to	the	influences	and	impact	of	Kierkegaard	as	to	Kierkegaardian	ideas	and	literature.	See,	for	example:	Jon	Stewart	(ed.),	A	Companion	to	Kierkegaard	(Chichester:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2015).	John	Lippitt	and	George	Pattison	(eds.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Kierkegaard	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013).	26	As	an	example	of	the	former,	which	relates	him	to	Hegelianism,	see:	Mark	C	Taylor,	Journeys	to	
Selfhood:	Hegel	and	Kierkegaard	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2000)	and	Jon	Stewart	(Ed.)	Kierkegaard	and	his	Contemporaries:	The	Culture	of	Golden	Age	Denmark	(Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	2003).	Since	existential	philosophy	and	Neo-Orthodox	theology	were	significant	movements	that	claimed	influence	from	Kierkegaard’s	works	and	introduced	many	English	language	scholars	to	Kierkegaard,	understanding	Kierkegaard	through	the	lens	provided	by	these	movements	was,	for	several	decades,	the	dominant	way	of	approaching	Kierkegaard.	[Lee	C.	Barrett,	‘The	USA:	From	Neo-Orthodoxy	to	Plurality.’	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Kierkegaard’s	
International	Reception,	Tome	III:	The	Near	East,	Asia,	Australia	and	the	Americas,	pp.	231-235.]	27	This	is	evident,	for	example,	in	the	unresolved	issue	of	Kierkegaard’s	relations	to	Hegel.	M.G.	Piety	cites	various	scholars	in	support	of	her	view	that,	‘despite	the	fact	that	their	terminology	is	similar,	Kierkegaard	and	Hegel	were	very	differing	sorts	of	thinkers…[and]	when	Kierkegaard	uses	what	appear	to	be	Hegelian	terms,	these	terms…have	another	meaning’	[M.G.	Piety,	Ways	of	
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careful	analysis	to	determine	Kierkegaard’s	own	use	of	the	concepts	in	order	to	be	compared	with	other	concepts	or	applied	to	later	debates.		(1.3.a.iii)	 Literary	 approaches	 apply	 literary	 critical	 tools	 to	 the	 form	of	the	works	in	order	to	explicate	the	meaning	of	the	texts	as	literary	productions.	It	has	been	adopted	by	deconstructionist	readings	that	focus	on	the	literary	devices	utilised	to	displace	textual	meaning.28	Such	approaches	can	provide	helpful	tools	for	 understanding	 textual	 devices,	 but	 by	 themselves	 they	 provide	 insufficient	resources	 for	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	 conceptual	 content	 of	 the	 authorship.	Indeed,	 most	 deconstructionist	 interpretations	 deny	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	conceptual	 analysis	 given	 the	 form	 of	 the	 authorship,	 ‘The	 meanings	 that	 are	available	 exist	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 displacements,	 the	 deferrals,	 and	 the	supplements.’29	For	this	reason	I	will	not	adopt	this	approach,	though	I	will	deal	with	it	as	a	challenge	to	my	thesis.	(1.3.a.iv)	 Descriptive-thematic	 approaches	 attempt	 a	 descriptive	 and	conceptual	 analysis	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	works.	 They	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	main	 groups:	 descriptive	 approaches	 that	 aim	 to	 elaborate	 the	 content	 of	particular	 works,	 and	 thematic	 approaches	 that	 aim	 to	 identify	 and	 analyse	particular	themes	running	through	the	corpus	or	structures	underlying	it.30		
																																																																																																																																																														
Knowing:	Kierkegaard’s	Pluralist	Epistemology	(Waco:	Baylor	University	Press,	2010),	p.	6.],	whereas	Jon	Stewart	regards	Kierkegaard	as	partially	derivative	of	Hegel	in	the	concepts	he	uses.	[Jon	Stewart,	Kierkegaard’s	Relations	to	Hegel	Reconsidered	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003).]	28	For	example,	Louis	Mackey,	Points	of	View:	Readings	of	Kierkegaard	(Tallahassee:	Florida	State	University	Press,	1986)	and	Roger	Poole,	Kierkegaard:	The	Indirect	Communication	(Charlottesville:	University	Press	of	Virginia,	1993).	29	Roger	Poole,	Kierkegaard:	The	Indirect	Communication,	p.5.	30	For	examples,	see:	C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	“Fragments”	and	“Postscript”:	The	Religious	
Philosophy	of	Johannes	Climacus	(Atlantic	Highlands:	Humanities	Press,	1983);	Gregor	Malantschuk,	Kierkegaard’s	Thought,	trans.	Howard	Hong	and	Edna	Hong,	(Princeton	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1971);	Amy	Laura	Hall,	Kierkegaard	and	the	Treachery	of	Love	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002);	Peder	Jothen,	Kierkegaard,	Aesthetics	and	
Selfhood:	The	Art	of	Subjectivity	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2014).	
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	(1.3.b)	Approaching	the	Kierkegaardian	Authorship	My	 thesis	 adopts	 a	 descriptive-thematic	 approach	 as	 the	 most	appropriate	 for	 a	 philosophical	 appreciation	 of	 the	 texts.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	close	 understanding	 of	 their	 content,	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 texts	 produced	 by	 the	pseudonyms	Climacus	(PF	and	CUP)	and	Anti-Climacus	(PiC	and	SuD),	drawing	on	 the	 wider	 authorship	 only	 to	 illuminate	 these.	 It	 attempts	 a	 thematic	description	 of	 the	 concepts	 that	 emerge	 from	 them	 in	 order	 to	 construct	 a	coherent,	Kierkegaardian	position	that	can	then	be	applied	to	RD.		These	 texts	 are	 not	 considered	 authoritative	 or	 as	 most	 closely	representing	 Kierkegaard’s	 views,	 but	 are	 chosen	 because	 they	 contain	 a	thoroughly	developed	position	on	the	nature	of	religiousness	and	provide	a	clear	structure	 for	 analysis.31	They	 are	 particularly	 pertinent	 for	 engaging	 with	 RD	because	they	expound	religion	in	relation	to	existential	structures,	emphasise	the	necessity	of	subjectivity	and	risk	for	faith	and,	as	will	be	shown,	are	responding	to	 exclusivist	 views	 of	 Christianity.	 These	 texts	 provide	 fertile	 resources	 for	engaging	with	diversity	and	can	be	understood	as	a	 concerted	effort	 to	engage	with	alterity	as	the	basis	for	religious	life.																																																									31		I	follow	Perkins,	Westphal,	and	Cappelørn	in	regarding	the	two	pseudonymous	characters	as	closely	connected,	with	‘Anti’	signifying	Anti-Climacus’	developing	from	rather	than	rejecting	Climacus	and	presenting	an	intensification	and	dialogue	with	Climacian	themes	rather	than	a	revocation	of	them.	Westphal,	for	example,	argues	that	Anti-Climacus	maps	out	Religiousness	C,	thereby	understanding	it	as	fitting	into	the	agenda	and	framework	provided	by	Climacus.	[Robert	L.	Perkins,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Anti-Climacus	in	His	Social	and	Political	Environment’.	In,	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	Practice	in	Christianity	(Macon:	Mercer	University	Press,	2004),	p.	275;	Merold	Westphal,	‘Kenosis	and	Offense:	A	Kierkegaardian	Look	at	Divine	Transcendence’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	26;	Niels	Jørgen	Cappelørn,	‘The	Movements	of	Offense	Toward,	Away	From,	and	Within	Faith:	“Blessed	is	he	who	is	not	offended	at	me”’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	95].	Further	weight	is	given	to	this	choice	of	texts	by	SuD	having	been	originally	penned	as	a	signed	work;	Evans	regards	them	as	close	to	Kierkegaard’s	own	views.	[C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	Fragments	and	Postscript:	The	Religious	Philosophy	of	Johannes	
Climacus,	p.8.]	However,	the	question	of	whether	they	reflect	Kierkegaard’s	own	views	is	not	pursued	in	the	thesis.		
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	(1.3.c)	Fragmentation	and	Indirection	in	the	Authorship	This	methodology	entails	two	contentious	assertions:	that	the	texts	evince	a	 conceptual	 content	 and	 that	 this	 is	 formulated	 in	 a	 sufficiently	 coherent	manner	to	permit	thematic	analysis.	 I	will	 justify	these	assertions	in	relation	to	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	corpus	and	Kierkegaard’s	interpretations	of	it.			(1.3.c.i)	Fragmentation	in	the	Authorship		The	authorship	is	fragmented	into	two	primary	groups	of	literature:	the	pseudonymous	and	signed	texts,	each	of	which	is	itself	fragmented	into	a	diverse	body	 of	 texts,	 and	 all	 of	which	 threaten	 to	 be	 irreconcilably	 distant	 from	 their	author.	 A	 primary	 fragmenting	 factor	 is	 Kierkegaard’s	 claim	 that	 the	pseudonyms	are	distinct	 characters,	with	 their	own	worldviews,	 concerns,	 and	personalities;	 each	 provides	 axiomatic	 starting	 points	 for	 the	 elaboration	 of	distinct	 life-views	 (CUP,	 pp.	 625-626).	 The	 pseudonyms	 frequently	 operate	 in	different	 genres,	 identify	 unique	 concerns,	 and	 often	 criticise	 one	 another,	providing	 no	 single	 perspective	 but	 only	 fragmentary	 and	 often	 incompatible	perspectives	 on	 various	 themes. 32 	No	 position	 in	 the	 authorship	 is	 easily	identifiable	 with	 Kierkegaard’s	 and	 the	 authorship	 precludes	 his	 ability	 to	
																																																								32	No	clearer	progress	can	be	made	by	focusing	on	the	signed	works	as	they	are	similarly	fragmented	and	do	not	present	a	unified	perspective.	While	Kierkegaard’s	signed	discourses	present	a	somewhat	more	unified	picture,	occupying	the	same	genre	of	upbuilding	discourse	and	exhibiting	many	structural	and	conceptual	commonalities,	they	are	fragmented	by	the	development	of	this	conceptuality	over	the	course	of	the	different	discourses	and	by	the	corresponding	degree	of	‘religiosity’,	in	terms	of	their	conceptuality,	ascribed	to	them	by	Kierkegaard	[Compare,	for	example,	the	categorisation	of	them	on	PoV,	p.	9,	PoV,	p.	30	and	CUP,	p.	256].	Barrett	demonstrates	the	different	authorial	voices	employed	in	WoL	and	JFY.	[Lee	C.	Barrett,	‘Authorial	Voices	and	the	Limits	of	Communication	in	Kierkegaard’s	Signed	Literature:	A	Comparison	of	Works	of	Love	to	For	Self-Examination	and	Judge	For	Yourself!’.	In,	R.	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	For	Self-Examination	and	Judge	For	Yourself!	(Macon	GA:	Mercer	University	Press,	2002).]	
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interpret	the	pseudonymous	texts	from	an	authoritative	authorial	position	since	the	 texts	 are	 the	 products	 of	 the	 distinct	 pseudonyms,	 ‘Thus	 in	 the	pseudonymous	books	there	is	not	a	single	word	by	me.	I	have	no	opinion	about	them	except	as	a	third	party’	(CUP,	p.	626).	PoV	extends	this	to	the	signed	works	and	the	authorship	itself	(PoV,	p.	33).		Furthermore,	 various	 devices	 of	 indirection	 are	 used	 in	 the	 works	 that	makes	it	difficult	to	produce	coherent	interpretations	of	them.	The	pseudonyms	often	refuse	to	give	clear	definitions	of	key	concepts	and	when	they	do	these	are	frequently	 supplemented	 with	 strings	 of	 definitions	 that	 compete	 with	 one	another	or	never	 reach	 a	 final	 definition.	Many	discussions	 and	definitions	 are	also	ironic,	with	the	aim	of	subverting	the	concepts	presented.		(1.3.c.ii)	Kierkegaardian	Interpretations	of	the	Authorship	In	tension	with	the	authorship’s	pervasive	fragmentation	is	Kierkegaard’s	preoccupation	 with	 interpreting	 it	 as	 a	 coherent	 project.	 Three	 main	interpretations	 are	 offered:	 Climacus’,	 ‘A	 Glance	 at	 a	 Contemporary	 Effort	 in	Danish	 Literature’	 (CUP,	 pp.	 251-300),	 Kierkegaard’s,	 ‘FORKLARING’	 (CUP,	 pp.	625-630),	 and	 The	 Point	 of	 View	 for	 My	 Work	 as	 an	 Author. 33 	These	interpretations	concur	in	identifying	the	fragmentation	as	an	essential	feature	of	the	 authorship	 and	 explaining	 it	 as	 an	 authorial	 strategy	 that	 indicates	 an	underlying	coherence.	Kierkegaard’s	 ‘FORKLARING’	maintains	 that	 the	 fragmentary	 and	multi-perspectival	 nature	 of	 the	 authorship	 is	 essential	 to	 its	 production	 and	 the																																																									33	It	is	possible	to	add	a	fourth	interpretation:	Om	min	Forfatter-Virksomhed.	It	is	my	view,	however,	that	this	presents	a	summarised	form	of	the	interpretation	offered	in	Synspunktet	for	
min	Forfatter-Virksomed,	with	omissions	simply	to	avoid	some	of	the	complications	and	inconsistencies	Kierkegaard	identified	in	the	longer	work.	
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meaning	 of	 the	 individual	 texts.	 It	 has	 the	 aim	 of	 constructing	 the	 distinct	pseudonymous	 life-views	 and	 existence-possibilities,	 provoking	 subjective,	existential	engagement	with	these	and	pursuing	a	wider	strategy	of	reflecting	on	personhood,	 ‘read[ing]	 through	 solo,	 if	 possible	 in	 a	 more	 inward	 way,	 the	original	 text	 of	 individual	 human	 existence-relationships…handed	 down	 from	the	fathers.’	(CUP,	pp.	629-630)	Climacus	similarly	sees	fragmentation	and	indirection	as	essential	to	the	corpus:	 its	 concern	 with	 subjective	 truth	 and	 appropriation	 necessitates	 a	method	that	engages	the	reader	in	a	maieutic	fashion	rather	than	communicating	objective	 propositions	 (CUP,	 p.	 68).	 He	 also	 identifies	 an	 underlying	 common	theme	 of	 the	 distinct	 works:	 the	 development	 of	 human	 selfhood,	 which	 is	charted	 in	 a	 trajectory	 through	 the	 various	 existence-possibilities	 sketched	 by	the	 pseudonyms,	 ‘That	 subjectivity,	 inwardness,	 is	 truth,	 is	my	 thesis;	 that	 the	pseudonymous	 authors	 relate	 themselves	 to	 it	 is	 easy	 enough	 to	 see’	 (CUP,	 p.	281).	 	Fragmentation	 serves	 this	 purpose	 by	 mapping	 out	 distinct	 existential	possibilities,	 ensuring	 these	 cannot	 be	 taken	 as	 parts	 of	 a	 coherent,	 objective	system	but	must	be	engaged	with	and	appropriated	subjectively.	The	question	of	selfhood	cannot	be	resolved	through	Kierkegaard’s	authorial	‘solutions’,	but	only	by	the	free	choice	of	the	reader,	‘Thus	it	is	left	to	the	reader	to	put	it	all	together	by	himself’	(CUP,	p.	298).	Jansen	offers	a	concise	summary	of	this	procedure,	‘the	placing	 together	 of	 dialectical	 contrasts	 without	 offering	 any	 explanation	 that	may	 influence	 the	 recipient’s	 interpretation…place[s]	 the	 recipient	 before	 a	
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riddle	he	or	she	has	 to	solve…by	self-consciously	appropriating	 the	message.’34	While	 the	 texts	 represent	different	existence-possibilities,	 these	are	engaged	 in	dialogue	with	one	another	on	key	questions	about	how	one	is	to	 live,	construct	identity,	and	form	relationships.35		In	addition	to	this	unifying	dialogue,	Climacus	sees	the	works	as	coherent	by	 their	 sketching	 stages	 in	 the	 development	 of	 authentic	 selfhood,	 such	 that	there	 is	 openness	 between	 the	 different	 perspectives.	 The	 corpus	 does	 not	produce	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 irreconcilable	 perspectives	 but	 rather	 establishes	 a	dialogue	 between	 them	 in	 which	 problems,	 questions,	 and	 concepts	 raised	 in	earlier	stages	are	critiqued,	resolved,	or	developed	in	later	stages	(CUP,	p.	253),	with	a	view	to	 facilitating	authentic	selfhood	 for	readers,	particularly	authentic	Christian	religiousness,	‘The	pseudonymous	authors	and	I	along	with	them	were	all	 subjective….	 That	 subjectivity,	 inwardness,	 is	 truth,	 that	 existing	 is	 the	decisive	 factor,	 that	 this	was	 the	way	 to	 take	 to	Christianity,	which	 is	precisely	inwardness,	 but,	 please	 note,	 not	 every	 inwardness,	 which	 was	 why	 the	preliminary	stages	definitely	had	to	be	insisted	upon—that	was	my	idea.’	(CUP,	pp.	282-283)	While	 this	 is	 only	 Climacus’	 interpretation,	 this	 makes	 it	 all	 the	 more	significant	because	he	aspires	to	the	fragmentation	and	indirection	evident	in	the	authorship	yet	also	claims	to	be	pursuing	a	unifying	agenda.	PF	and	CUP	possess	the	 inter-textual	 relationships	 Climacus	 ascribes	 to	 the	 other	works,	 critiquing																																																									34	Nerina	Jansen,	‘Deception	in	Service	of	Truth:	Magister	Kierkegaard	and	the	Problem	of	Communication’.	In,	R.	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	Concluding	
Unscientific	Postscript	to	‘Philosophical	Fragments’	(Macon	GA:	Mercer	University	Press,	1997)	p.121.	35	For	example,	EOI	advocates	the	avoidance	of	marriage	and	pursuit	of	seduction	as	features	of	aesthetic	existence,	while	EOII	critiques	this	position,	advocating	marriage	as	the	pinnacle	of	the	ethical	life;	later	works	evaluate	the	religious	life	as	requiring	the	renunciation	of	marriage	(CUP,	pp.	298-299).	
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them	and	utilising	conceptual	tools	developed	in	them	with	a	view	to	facilitating	authentic	selfhood	and	religiousness.36			PoV	 similarly	posits	 fragmentation	between	 the	different	 life-views	 as	 a	strategy	in	the	service	of	a	singular	intention	to	address	the	same	religious	issue	throughout	 the	 disparate	 texts,	 that	 of	 achieving	 authentic	 Christian	religiousness	(PoV,	p.	23).	This	was	necessary	to	address	the	various	life-views	of	his	 contemporaries	 and	 to	 raise	 the	question	of	 religiousness	 as	 a	 distinct	 and	authentic	existence-possibility	in	a	way	that	facilitated	subjective	appropriation	(PoV,	pp.	41-43).	For	this	reason,	Kierkegaard	claims	that	the	authorship	must	be	read	 as	 a	 dialectical	 or	 dialogical	 whole	 in	 order	 to	 appreciate	 the	 range	 of	options	and	critiques	being	presented	(PoV,	p.	77)	and	engage	with	the	process	of	developing	authentic	religious	selfhood	through	these	(PoV,	p.	31).37		This	does	not	mean	that	the	distinct	perspectives	should	be	homogenised	to	a	single	or	religious	meaning,	because	the	fragmentation	is	 itself	essential	 to	their	distinct	meanings	 (PoV,	p.	9;	p.	24).	Kierkegaard’s	assertion	 is	 that,	while	the	aesthetic	works	have	distinct	and	autonomous	meanings,	the	aesthetic	works	take	on	new	meaning	in	the	context	of	the	dialogue	of	the	wider	authorship.	By	raising	 the	 religious	question	within	 the	aesthetic	 sphere,	Kierkegaard	posits	 a	correlation	 between	 the	 issues	 and	 categories	 encountered	 in	 the	 aesthetic-ethical	 and	 religious	 spheres.	 The	 pseudonymous	 works	 are	 not	 passing	moments	in	the	transition	to	the	religious	sphere	but	are	vital	in	introducing	and																																																									36	This	is	evident	from	the	location	of	the	interpretation,	midway	through	CUP	and	the	discussion	of	subjectivity,	its	inclusion	here	indicating	an	attempt	on	Climacus’	part	to	utilise	the	conceptual	resources	provided	by	the	foregoing	authorship	in	relation	to	key	concepts,	including	subjectivity	and	faith,	and	to	establish	his	own	relation	to	them.	Westphal	makes	the	same	observation,	claiming,	‘the	reviews	are	not	an	interruption	of	his	argument	but	an	important	supplement	to	it.’	[Merold	Westphal,	Becoming	a	Self:	A	Reading	of	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript	(West	Lafayette:	Purdue	University	Press,	1996),	p.	130.]	37	Hence	he	claims	his	interpretation	could	not	have	been	firmly	established	prior	to	CUP,	before	the	dialogical	interrelationships	of	the	texts	were	firmly	established	(PoV,	p.	23).	
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exploring	 concepts,	 questions	 and	 perspectives	 that	 are	 also	 developed	within	the	 religious,	 and	all	of	 these	perspectives	are	 related	 to	 the	wider	question	of	how	to	live	out	authentic	selfhood.	To	sum	up,	these	interpretations	consistently	assert	that	the	authorship	is	essentially	 fragmented	 between	 the	 distinct	 texts	 and	 life-views.	 This	fragmentation	 does	 not	 preclude	 coherence	 in	 the	 authorship,	 which	 is	predicated	 as	 its	 basis.	 The	 interpretations	 assert	 that	 the	 fragmentation	 is	existential,	 formulating	 and	 exploring	 distinct	 life-views	 and	 existence-possibilities	from	the	inside;	maieutic,	aiming	to	provoke	subjective	rather	than	objective	 engagement;	 dialogical	 and	 critical;	 and	 upbuilding,	 presenting	 the	stages	on	the	way	to	authentic	selfhood	and	Christian	religiousness.38	The	works	must	be	compared	and	contrasted	as	 fragments	within	a	wider	whole	 that	will	enable	 readers	 to	 enter	 into	 dialogue	 with	 and	 between	 the	 different	perspectives	on	the	question	of	how	they	are	to	live.		(1.3.c.iii)	Fragmenting	Perspectives	Rejected	The	 validity	 of	 fragmenting	 and	 unifying	 interpretations	 can	 now	 be	assessed.	Fragmenting	perspectives	share	three	tenets:	the	form	and	content	of	the	 authorship	 thoroughly	 fragments	 it	 into	 a	 body	 of	 incompatible	 texts;	 this	fragmentation	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 texts	 and	 any	 attempt	 to	overcome	 it	 misrepresents	 them;	 the	 texts	 must	 be	 analysed	 as	 autonomous	units	and	no	coherent	concepts	can	be	derived	from	them.39	
																																																								38	Jacob	Golomb	offers	a	similar	list	of	the	maieutic	procedures	of	the	corpus.	Jacob	Golomb,	‘Kierkegaard’s	ironic	ladder	to	authentic	faith’.	In,	Daniel	W.Conway	(ed.),	Søren	Kierkegaard:	
Critical	Assessments	of	Leading	Philosophers,	Volume	1	(London:	Routledge,	2002),	pp.	99-104.	39	This	approach	is	shared	by:	Roger	Poole,	Kierkegaard:	The	Indirect	Communication	and	Roger	Poole,	‘“My	wish,	my	prayer”:	Keeping	the	Pseudonyms	Apart.	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	J.	Stewart	
	20	 	
	 As	an	example,	Poole	argues	that	the	form	of	the	authorship	and	its	use	of	indirect	 communication	 fragments	 it	 into	 a	 plethora	 of	 competing	 and	incompatible	perspectives.40	First,	 he	 argues	 that	 the	works	 share	no	universal	themes	 and	 their	 subject	 matters	 are	 often	 unrelated.	 Second,	 he	 argues	 that	when	 they	 appear	 to	 expound	 similar	 concepts,	 these	 concepts	 are	 radically	different	 because	 they	 are	 formulated	 within	 distinct	 life-views	 and	conceptualities,	 ‘incommensurability	 of	 concepts,	 even	 though	 they	 may	 be	mediated	by	the	same	word,	emerges	as	the	most	striking	markers	of	difference	across	these	pseudonymous	works.’41	Third,	the	texts	deconstruct	themselves	by	continually	supplementing	the	meaning	of	key	concepts	within	the	same	text.42	The	 texts	 do	 not	 offer	 a	 basis	 for	 a	 singular	 exegesis	 but	 rather	 aim	 to	 create	aporia,	 confounding	 readers	 and	 subverting	 the	 concepts,	 ‘The	 text	 pullulates	with	ambiguities,	paradoxes,	oxymorons,	apparent	self-contradictions…the	effect	on	 the	 reader	 is	 one	of	 ever-growing	 incomprehension.’43	Poole	 concludes	 that	
																																																																																																																																																														(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited;	Louis	Mackey,	Points	of	View:	Readings	of	Kierkegaard;	Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In,	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader;	Della	Rae	Zurick,	‘The	Artificial	Søren	Kierkegaard:	A	Question	of	Authorial	Authority’.	In,	P.	Houe,	G.	D.	Marino	and	S.	H.	Rossel	(eds.),	Anthropology	and	Authority:	Essays	on	Søren	Kierkegaard	(Amsterdam:	Rodopi,	2000);	Geoffrey	A.	Hale,	‘“Fragmentary	Prodigality”:	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Language	and	Authority’.	In,	P.	Houe,	G.	D.	Marino	and	S.	H.	Rossel	(eds.),	Anthropology	and	Authority:	Essays	on	Søren	
Kierkegaard;	and	Johan	de	Mylius,	‘Kierkegaard	om	sit	“system”.	Regnskabet.	Pseudonymerne	og	den	ikke	eksisterende	forfatter’.	In	Birgit	Bertung,	Paul	Müller,	and	Fritz	Norlan	(eds.),	
Kierkegaard:	Pseudonymitet	(Copenhagen:	C.	A.	Reitzels	Forlag,	1993).	40	Roger	Poole,	Kierkegaard:	The	Indirect	Communication,	p.	1.	41	Roger	Poole,	‘“My	wish,	my	prayer”:	Keeping	the	Pseudonyms	Apart.’	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	J.	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited,	p.	161.	For	example,	he	points	out	that	B,	Johannes	de	Silentio,	and	Climacus	all	deal	with	‘the	ethical’,	but	that,	while	they	use	the	same	term,	each	has	an	irreconcilably	different	understanding	of	it,	‘The	same	word,	the	ethical,	used	in	different	works	and	in	different	conceptual	frameworks,	is	not	capable	of	an	univocal,	stable,	definition.	The	term	is	context	dependent.’	[Roger	Poole,	‘“My	wish,	my	prayer”:	Keeping	the	Pseudonyms	Apart’.	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	J.	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited,	p.	162.]	42	For	example	the	presentation	of	the	concept	‘repetition’	in	Rep	constantly	modifies	the	concept,	establishing	numerous	competing	definitions	of	repetition,	such	that	the	actual	meaning	of	‘repetition’	is	deferred	without	conclusion	and	a	univocal	interpretation	is	precluded.	The	same	is	claimed	of	‘spirit’	in	SuD	and	‘faith’	in	CUP.		43	Roger	Poole,	Kierkegaard:	The	Indirect	Communication,	p.	100.		
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unifying	 approaches	 misunderstand	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 texts. 44 	The	 only	relationship	between	 the	works	 that	Poole	 is	willing	 to	 accept	 is,	 ‘a	 relation	of	significant	tension’:	their	relationship	is	that	they	are	opposed.45			 Since	 they	 assert	 coherence,	 Kierkegaard’s	 interpretations	 present	 a	problem	 for	 fragmenting	 perspectives.	 Fragmenting	 perspectives	 thus	 cite	evidence	for	rejecting	these	interpretations	and	claim	that,	by	offering	yet	more	incoherent	 perspectives	 on	 the	 corpus,	 they	 intensify	 the	 fragmentation.	 Garff	and	Mackey	identify	the	following	reasons	for	rejecting	these	interpretations.		They	 claim	 there	 is	no	 single	Kierkegaardian	 interpretation,	but	 at	 least	four.46	They	claim	that	the	preoccupation	with	supplementing	his	interpretations	supports	the	case	that	no	single	interpretation	of	the	authorship	is	possible	and	that	 it	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 series	 of	 interpretations	 that	 demand	 yet	 more	interpretations. 47 	However,	 Kierkegaard	 does	 not	 offer	 a	 series	 of	 self-interpretations,	 since	 the	 first	 is	 offered	 from	 Climacus’	 perspective	 and	 the	fourth,	On	My	Work	as	an	Author,	is	a	‘truncated	version’	of	PoV.48	There	are	only	two	 distinct	 Kierkegaardian	 interpretations,	 ‘FORKLARING’	 and	 PoV	 and	Kierkegaard’s	 attempt	 to	attain	greater	 clarity	does	not	 invalidate	 these	unless	they	are	established	to	be	inconsistent.	
																																																								44	Roger	Poole,	‘“My	wish,	my	prayer”:	Keeping	the	Pseudonyms	Apart’.	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	J.	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited,	p.	157.	45	Roger	Poole,	‘“My	wish,	my	prayer”:	Keeping	the	Pseudonyms	Apart’.	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	J.	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited,	p.	162.	46	Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In,	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader,	pp.	77-79.	47	This	is	evident,	they	claim,	even	within	single	interpretations,	such	as	PoV.	For	example,	after	the	main	body	of	the	text	of	PoV,	it	includes	an	Epilogue,	a	Conclusion	(attributed	to	a	poet),	a	Supplement,	and	a	Postscript.	[Louis	Mackey,	Points	of	View:	Readings	of	Kierkegaard,	p.	163.]		48	This	was	written	because	of	Kierkegaard’s	decision	not	to	publish	PoV.	See:	Howard	Hong’s	introduction	to	Søren	Kierkegaard,	The	Point	of	View	(Princeton	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1998),	xviii.	
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	 Garff,	Mackey,	Zurick,	and	Mylius	attempt	to	demonstrate	inconsistencies	between	PoV	 and	 ‘FORKLARING’.49	They	 claim	CUP	does	not	 affirm	PoV’s	 view	that	 the	 pseudonymous	 texts	 are	 part	 of	 a	 maieutic,	 religiously	 motivated	strategy,	 ‘Climacus	 seems	 neither	 interested	 in	 pseudonymity	 as	 a	 maieutic	strategy	 nor	 to	 have	 any	 idea	 that	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	 religious	 author’s	dissimulating	form	of	presentation.’50	Rather,	they	claim	Climacus	interprets	the	indirection	 as	 a	 polemic	 against	 objectivity,	 and	 ‘FORKLARING’	 sees	 it	 as	 a	literary	 device	 necessary	 for	 generating	 independent	 life-views.51	Thus	 they	assert	that	while	CUP	posits	indirection	as	an	end	in	itself,	PoV	posits	it	as	merely	a	dispensable	mode	of	 communication	necessary	 to	achieve	a	 religious	end,	 ‘In	the	 first	 instance	 the	 pseudonymity	 is	 to	 be	 taken	 absolutely,	 in	 the	 second	
																																																								49	Garff	cites	two	other	arguments	that	I	will	not	consider	in	detail	because	they	go	beyond	the	nature	of	pseudonymity,	but	these	can	be	similarly	shown	to	be	invalid.	First,	he	claims	that	PoV’s	list	of	‘authorial	works’	omits	books	like	The	Two	Ages.	Far	from	invalidating	his	interpretation,	this	supports	Kierkegaard’s	contention	that	those	he	lists	serve	a	specific	authorial	strategy:	the	works	omitted	from	the	list	are	omitted	because	they	do	not	serve	the	same	strategy.	[Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader,	pp.	80-81.]	Second,	Garff	cites	Kierkegaard’s	decision	not	to	publish	PoV,	arguing	that	this	was	motivated	by	Kierkegaard’s	recognition	of	the	disparity	between	his	‘empirical	self’	and	the	‘textual	self’	posited	in	this	text	[Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	
Critical	Reader,	p.95.]	As	evidence,	he	cites	Kierkegaard’s	comments	in	his	journal,	‘“The	Point	of	View	for	My	Work	as	an	Author”	must	not	be	published,	no,	no!’	[Søren	Kierkegaard,	Papirer	X:1	A	78,	p.62.	[Hong,	VI:	6327,	p.108]]	In	this	entry,	Kierkegaard	states	this	is	because:	it	makes	him	seem	‘extraordinary’	or	‘heroic’,	insufficiently	emphasising	his	personal	sense	of	sin	and	guilt;	it	is	too	personal;	and	it	would	disrupt	the	indirection.	Garff	omits	the	latter	points,	which	contradict	his	use	of	the	passage.	They	indicate	that	Kierkegaard’s	decision	not	to	publish	derived	from	his	recognition	that	it	was	too	accurate	and	personal	and	because	it	penetrated	the	indirection	too	accurately	and	could	thereby	disrupt	it.	Hence,	his	decision	not	to	publish	it	did	not	derive,	as	Garff	claims,	from	Kierkegaard’s	recognition	of	its	disparity	from	his	authorial	work	but	rather	because	it	unveiled	his	unifying	project	too	deeply	and	prematurely.	Hence	in	the	same	entry	Kierkegaard	claims,	‘The	book	itself	is	true,	and	is,	in	my	view,	masterly.	But	a	thing	like	that	can	only	be	published	after	my	death….	No,	a	thing	like	that	one	finishes,	puts	it	away	in	a	desk,	sealed	and	marked:	to	be	opened	after	my	death.’	[Søren	Kierkegaard,	Papirer	X:1	A	78,	p.64.	[Journals	and	Papers	VI:	6327,	p.	109]]	50	Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader,	p.	79.	51	Johan	de	Mylius,	‘Kierkegaard	om	sit	“system”.	Regnskabet.	Pseudonymerne	og	den	ikke	eksisterende	forfatter’.	In,	Birgit	Bertung,	Paul	Müller,	and	Fritz	Norlan	(Eds.),	Kierkegaard:	
Pseudonymitet,	p.	24.	
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instance	as	a	provisional	screen’.52	They	also	argue	that	‘FORKLARING’	precludes	the	 position	 adopted	 by	 PoV	 because	 the	 latter,	 ‘seems	 to	 assert	 his	 authorial	authority	 to	 determine	 the	 meaning	 of	 his	 works’,	 in	 contravention	 of	 the	former’s	 limitations	 of	 his	 interpretative	 power,	 wherein,	 ‘Kierkegaard	renounces	every	connection	with	his	pseudonyms’.53			 It	 can	 be	 shown	 that	 this	 argument	 is	 fallacious	 and	 that	 Kierkegaard’s	interpretations	 are	 compatible,	 with	 PoV	 anticipated	 by	 the	 earlier	interpretations.	 In	 CUP,	 Climacus	 and	 Kierkegaard	 explain	 indirection	 as	employed	 by	 the	 corpus	 to	 provoke	 existential	 engagement	 with	 Christianity	(CUP,	p.	17;	p.	300).	Furthermore,	PoV	does	not	revoke	the	pseudonymous	status	of	 the	 works	 affirmed	 by	 FORKLARING.	 Both	 attribute	 the	 same	 role	 to	Kierkegaard	as,	‘author	of	the	authors’	(CUP,	p.	627),	and	arranging	the	different	perspectives	 as	 a	 ‘duplexity’	 (PoV,	 pp.	 29-30)	 so	 as	 to	 facilitate	 a	 dialogue	between	distinct	perspectives	that	are	not	his	own.	Neither	makes	claims	about	the	 internal	 meanings	 or	 content	 of	 these	 works.	 It	 is	 rather	 offered	 as	 an	interpretation	of	 the	 structure	of	 the	authorship	and	 the	 inter-textual	meaning	generated	by	viewing	it	as	a	dialogue,	as	Kierkegaard	observes,	‘I	indeed	do	not,	in	 the	 writings	 on	 my	 authorial	 work,	 talk	 directly	 about	 the	 pseudonyms	 or	identify	myself	with	the	pseudonyms,	but	merely	show	their	importance	for	the	maieutic.’	54	At	 most	 there	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 emphasis	 between	 the	 different	interpretations.	
																																																								52	Aage	Henriksen,	Methods	and	Results	of	Kierkegaard	Studies	in	Scandinavia:	A	Historical	and	A	
Critical	Study,	p.9.	53	Della	Rae	Zurick	‘The	Artificial	Søren	Kierkegaard:	A	Question	of	Authorial	Authority’.	In,	Paul	Houe,	Gordon	D	Marino	and	Sven	Hakon	Rossel	(eds.),	Anthropology	and	Authority:	Essays	on	
Søren	Kierkegaard,	p.	164;	pp.	165-166.	54	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Papirer,	Volume	X:3.	A	258,	p.	191.	[Journals	and	Papers	VI	6654,	p.338].	
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Fragmenting	approaches	fail	to	understand	the	dialogical	unity	posited	of	the	 authorship	 by	 all	 three	 interpretations,	 which	 see	 fragmentation	 and	indirection	 as	 motivated	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 initiate	 a	 dialogue	 with	 the	 readers	about	questions	of	selfhood.	While	the	distinct	perspectives	are	formulated	with	their	 own	 life-views,	 this	 does	 not	 preclude	 dialogue	 between	 them	 about	 the	same	concepts,	even	if	it	is	purely	negative.	The	tension	between	them	appealed	to	by	Poole	is	indicative	of	such	a	dialogue:	disagreement	requires	shared	subject	matters.	Hence	his	claim	that	their	view	of	the	ethical	differs	because	they	have	different	appraisals	of	what	it	demands	of	human	existence	fails	to	see	that	they	are	 in	 a	 coherent	 dialogue	 about	 this	 issue.55	Poole	 also	 fails	 to	 see	 that	 the	unresolved	definitions	of	concepts	in	the	works	is	the	means	of	their	open-ended	dialogical	 interrelationship:	 supplement	 allows	 them	 to	 be	 compared	 to	 each	other	as	well	as	eliciting	subjective	responses	from	the	reader.	These	 approaches	 misrepresent	 the	 authorship	 by	 reading	 it	 as	 proto-deconstructionist.	Garff	and	Hale	claim	that	Kierkegaard	embraced	the	limits	of	language	and	critique	of	logocentrism,	denying	the	ability	of	any	text	to	present	a	unified	perspective	or	be	interpreted	as	having	a	single	meaning.56	As	evidence,	Garff	 cites	 Climacus’	 criticism	 of	 ‘the	 Honorable	 Gentleman’s’	 variations	 in	expressing	 his	 beliefs,	 ‘the	 problem	 is	 not	 that	 ‘the	Honorable	Gentleman’	 said	
																																																								55	Roger	Poole,	‘“My	wish,	my	prayer”:	Keeping	the	Pseudonyms	Apart’.	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	J.	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Revisited,	pp.	160-162.	56	Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In,	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader,	p.	82.	Geoffrey	A.	Hale,	‘“Fragmentary	Prodigality”:	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Language	and	Authority’.	In,	P.	Houe,	G.	D.	Marino,	and	S.	H.	Rossel	(eds.),	Anthropology	and	Authority:	Essays	on	Søren	
Kierkegaard.	
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something	he	did	not	mean,	but	rather	that	he	meant	something	he	could	not	say,	which	is	why	he	always	ended	up	saying	something	other	than	what	he	meant.’57			 However,	 their	 textual	 evidence	 that	 Kierkegaard	 held	 these	deconstructionist	 views	 of	 language	 is	 derived	 from	 misinterpretations	 of	 his	pseudonymous	works	that	are	also	projected	on	the	whole	authorship.	Hale	cites	the	 pseudonymous	 representative	 of	 aesthetic	 despair	 in	 EOI. 58 	Moreover,	Climacus	does	not	claim	that	‘the	Honorable	Gentleman’s’	predicament	is	derived	from	his	inability	to	give	linguistic	expression	of	his	meaning	but	rather	from	his	existential	 embodiment	 being	 at	 variance	 with	 his	 expression,	 such	 that	 his	subjective	existence	deconstructs	his	objective	position.	Walsh	makes	this	same	point,	 noting	 Climacus’	 concern,	 ‘is	 not	 with	 the	 interpretation	 of	 a	 text	 but	rather	with	its	appropriation	in	the	life	of	a	believer.’59	The	 limits	 of	 communication	 asserted	 by	 Kierkegaard	 and	 the	pseudonyms	 in	 all	 of	 these	 cases	 are	 existential,	 linked	with	 embodiment	 and	appropriation,	 not	 linguistic.60	Kierkegaard	 uses	 indirection	 as	 a	 method	 of	facilitating	 honest	 and	 responsible	 engagement	 with	 existential	 possibilities,	through	 which	 the	 reader	 is	 brought	 to	 personal	 truth	 and	 a	 decisive	commitment	 to	 authentic	 selfhood,	 rather	 than	 playfully	 suspending	 meaning	
																																																								57	Joakim	Garff,	‘The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author’.	In	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(eds.),	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader,	p.	77.	58	Geoffrey	A.	Hale,	‘“Fragmentary	Prodigality”:	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Language	and	Authority’.	In	P.	Houe,	G.	D.	Marino,	and	S.	H.	Rossel	(eds.),	Anthropology	and	Authority:	Essays	on	Søren	
Kierkegaard,	pp.	180-181.		59	Sylvia	Walsh,	‘Reading	Kierkegaard	With	Kierkegaard	Against	Garff’.	Søren	Kierkegaard	
Newsletter	Number	38.	July	1999.	The	Kierkegaard	Library,	St	Olaf	College.	21	September	2005.	<http://www.stolaf.edu/collections/kierkegaard/newsletter/issue38/38002.htm>	Paragraph	3.	60	Hence	the	journal	entry	Hale	cites	is	quoted	out	of	its	context,	in	which	Kierkegaard’s	claim	to	be	a	pseudonym	is	qualified	to	mean	that	the	texts	present	an	ideal	of	Christian	existence	that	he	himself	does	not	embody.	Hence	it	is	not	presented	as	limiting	his	interpretative	control	over	meaning,	about	which	he	comments,	‘No	one	can,	like	I,	illuminate	the	structure	of	the	whole’,	but	rather	of	indicating	that	he	does	not	personally	embody	what	the	texts	do	communicate.	[Søren	Kierkegaard,	Papirer	X:2	A	89,	p.	69.	[Journals	and	Papers	VI	6505,	p.232]]	
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and	 commitment.61	This	 is	 admitted	 by	 Norris,	 an	 advocate	 of	 deconstruction,	who	notes	that,	 ‘Kierkegaard	carries	deconstruction	only	to	the	point	where	 its	strategies	 supposedly	 come	 up	 against	 an	 undeconstructible	 bedrock	 of	authenticated	 truth.’62	A	 deconstructive	 reading	 jeopardises	 this	 advocacy	 of	authenticity,	fundamentally	misrepresenting	the	authorship.			(1.3.c.iv)	Unifying	Perspectives		 Unifying	perspectives	 fall	 into	 four	main	groups:	 (U1)	 those	 that	posit	 a	coherent,	 systematic	 unity	 in	 the	 content	 of	 the	works;	 (U2)	 those	 that	 assign	interpretative	 authority	 to	 a	 particular	 part	 of	 the	 corpus	 and	 use	 it	 as	 the	hermeneutical	 key	 to	 the	 rest;	 (U3)	 those	 that	 posit	 an	 underlying	 conceptual	structure;	and	(U4)	those	that	posit	a	unifying	methodology	underlying	the	texts.		As	 an	 example	 of	 (U1),	 Sponheim	 claims	 that	 there	 are	 several	 unifying	theological	 ‘rhythms’	 that	 recur	 throughout	 the	 corpus	 and	 that	 provide	conceptual	 focal	 points	 around	 which	 the	 texts	 revolve	 and	 of	 which	 they	provide	 a	 systematic	 exploration. 63 	Since	 the	 distinct	 perspectives	 are	 an	essential	 component	 of	 the	 authorship’s	 meaning,	 this	 approach	 fails	 to	 do	justice	to	the	fragmentation	evident	in	it.		As	an	example	of	(U2),	Hartshorne	assigns	interpretative	authority	to	the	signed	 and	 Anti-Climacus	 texts.64	He	 argues	 that	 these	 lack	 fragmentation	 and																																																									61	This	argument	is	supported	by	Hall,	who	sees	Kierkegaard	as	using	the	authenticity	of	existence	as	a	measure	of	truth,	whereas	deconstruction	sunders	existence,	meaning	and	truth.	He	argues	that	the	‘sundered’	view	of	communication	is	critiqued	as	an	expression	of	aesthetic	despair	and	disengagement	in	EOI	as,	‘de-spirited	sensuality…spirit	sundered	from	its	true	place,	its	world,	others,	its	own	body.’	[Ronald.	L.	Hall,	Word	and	Spirit:	A	Kierkegaardian	Critique	of	the	
Modern	Age	(Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1993)	p.189.]	62	Christopher	Norris,	The	Deconstructive	Turn	(London:	Metheuen,	1983),	p.	88.	63	Paul	Sponheim,	Kierkegaard	on	Christ	and	Christian	Coherence	(London:	SCM	Press,	1968),	p.	5.	64	M.	Holmes	Hartshorne,	Kierkegaard:	Godly	Deceiver:	The	Nature	and	Meaning	of	His	
Pseudonymous	Writings	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1990).	As	other	examples,	see:	
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provide	a	coherent,	Christian	perspective	from	which	to	interpret	the	rest.	Kingo	similarly	adopts	this	approach,	claiming	that	‘religious	upbuilding’,	as	explicated	in	 the	 upbuilding	 discourses,	 provides	 the	 unifying	 ‘orienting-perspective’	 for	interpreting	 all	 texts	 in	 the	 corpus. 65 	This	 understates	 the	 degree	 of	fragmentation	 operative	 in	 the	 signed	 works,	 which	 often	 present	 different	perspectives.66	It	 also	devalues	 the	pseudonymous	works	and	 their	exploration	of	 concepts	 that	 are	 prerequisites	 of	 developments	 in	 the	 signed	works.67	The	unity	 this	 imposes	 is	 a	 reductive	 unity	 that	 does	 not	 explain	 the	 deeper,	dialectical	coherence	Kierkegaard	and	Climacus	posit	of	the	authorship.		(1.3.d)	My	Approach:	Dialogical	Coherence	and	Kierkegaard	as	a	Philosopher	of	Authentic	Selfhood		The	 perspective	 adopted	 by	 this	 thesis	 is	 a	 fusion	 of	 (U3)	 and	 (U4).	 It	views	 the	 authorship	 as	 fragmented,	 but	 posits	 a	 unifying	 strategy	 in	 the	trajectory	 of	 the	 authorship	 that	 is	 also	underpinned	by	 a	 number	 of	 concepts	and	 structures.	 The	 authorship	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 dialogue	 between	 genuinely	distinct	 perspectives	 but	 on	 shared	 subject	matters.	 To	 this	 end,	 Climacus	 and																																																																																																																																																															Eduard	Geismar,	Lectures	on	the	Religious	Thought	of	Søren	Kierkegaard	(Minneapolis:	Augsberg	Publishing	House),	p.	42.	Louis	Pojman,	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophy	of	Religion	(San	Francisco:	International	Scholars	Publications,	1999),	p.	12.	65	‘Orienteringspunktet’.	Anders	Kingo,	Den	opbyggelige	tale	(Copenhagen:	G.E.C.Gad,	1987),	p.	137.	66	Pattison	warns	against	any	such	reduction	of	the	authorship	to	an	authoritative	religious	perspective,	pointing	out	that	the	use	of	left	and	right	hand	imagery	in	the	corpus,	which	in	PoV	seems	to	favour	the	religious,	is	ambiguous.	Climacus,	for	example,	argues	for	choosing	the	left	over	the	right	if	the	right	is	understood	as	leading	to	fixture	or	hubris	in	truth-claims	(CUP,	p.	106)	[George	Pattison,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Hands.’	In	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.)	International	Kierkegaard	
Commentary:	The	Point	of	View	(Macon	GA:	Mercer	University	Press,	2010),	pp.	104-116.]	67	Michael	Strawser	demonstrates	this	convincingly,	claiming	that,	‘the	aesthetic	is	present	in	the	religious’.	Michael	Strawser,	Both/And:	Reading	Kierkegaard	from	Irony	to	Edification,	p.	179.	An	example	of	this	failure	is	Hartshorne’s	treatment	of	CUP,	which	he	interprets	as	a	covert	deconstruction	of	subjective	self-actualisation	in	favour	of	grace	and	faith.	He	fails	to	recognise	the	important	positive	function	of	the	text	in	mapping	out	a	process	of	development	that	leads	to	religious	existence,	including	its	reflections	on	grace	and	faith.	[M.	Holmes	Hartshorne,	
Kierkegaard:	Godly	Deceiver:	The	Nature	and	Meaning	of	His	Pseudonymous	Writings,	p.	43.]		
	28	 	
Anti-Climacus’	texts	have	been	chosen	because	of	their	dialogical,	thematic,	and	conceptual	relationship	to	each	other.	Two	conceptual	structures	are	key	to	the	unity	underpinning	their	distinct	perspectives.		(1.3.d.i)	The	Spheres	of	Existence	In	conformity	with	a	number	of	commentators,	I	identify	the	theory	of	the	stages,	 ‘stadier’,	 or	 spheres	 of	 existence,	 ‘Existents-Spærer’	 as	 providing	 an	underlying	structure.68	The	authorship	aims	to	map	out,	through	the	spheres	of	existence,	 various	 ways	 of	 being	 and	 constituting	 personhood	 in	 the	 human	situation.69	These	 spheres	 express	 whole	 life-views	 and	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	world,	 ‘existence-possibilities’,	 grounded	 in	 existential	 commitments	 (CUP,	 p.	253).	 These	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 different	 texts	 so	 as	 to	 draw	 readers	 into	dialogue	 with	 and	 between	 them	 on	 how	 they	 are	 to	 constitute	 their	 own	personhood,	particularly	with	a	view	to	living	out	authentic	selfhood	in	response	to	the	human	situation.70																																																										68	Climacus’	exegesis	of	the	authorship	in	terms	of	the	spheres	is	provided	in	‘A	Glance	at	a	Contemporary	Effort	in	Danish	Literature’	(CUP,	pp.	251-300).	See	also:	Gregor	Malantschuk,	
Kierkegaard’s	Thought,	p.	6.	And:	Mark	C.	Taylor,	Kierkegaard’s	Pseudonymous	Authorship:	A	Study	
of	Time	and	the	Self.	69	My	use	of	the	term	personhood	relies	on	Hannay’s	claim	that	personhood	and	‘personal	truth’,	in	an	age	threatened	by	spiritlessness,	are	the	best	ways	to	describe	the	concern	of	Kierkegaard’s	contemporaries.	This	is	supported	by	Kierkegaard’s	claim	that	the	authorship’s	aim	is	to	facilitate	personal	appropriation	in	response	to	a	universal	challenge,	‘to	read	through	solo,	if	possible	in	a	more	inward	way,	the	original	text	of	individual	human	existence-relationships’	(CUP,	pp.	629-630).	For	Hannay’s	justification	of	the	preference	of	the	term	personhood	over	a	range	of	alternative	terms,	see:	Alastair	Hannay,	‘Kierkegaard	on	Commitment,	Personality,	and	Identity’.	In,	Edward	F.	Mooney	(ed.),	Ethics,	Love,	and	Faith	in	Kierkegaard	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2008),	p.	52.	70	It	is	common	to	identify	several	main	spheres,	such	as	the	aesthetic,	ethical	and	religious,	but	this	is	to	be	avoided	because	it	homogenises	the	perspectives	in	a	way	that	impairs	the	fragmentation	of	the	authorship.	The	list	of	seven	spheres	outlined	by	Climacus	is	not	definitive	but	includes	more	than	Kierkegaard’s	homogenisation	of	them	into	three:	immediacy,	finite	common	sense,	irony,	ethics,	humour	and	Religiousness	A	and	B	(CUP,	pp.	531-532).	This	is	not	unique	to	Climacus:	Pojman	lists	at	least	nine	that	emerge	in	the	corpus.	[Louis	Pojman,	
Kierkegaard’s	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	29.]		Thus,	it	should	not	be	taken	as	a	reductive	approach	to	human	ways	of	being.	Furthermore,	the	various	spheres	are	presented	and	evaluated	differently	in	different	Kierkegaardian	works,	such	that	the	perspectivism	they	convey	is	intrinsic	
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This	 approach	 attributes	 several	 levels	 of	 coherence	 to	 the	 authorship.	First,	it	posits	the	unity	of	subject	in	the	disparate	works	as	attempts	to	map	out	particular	 life-views	 with	 a	 view	 to	 constituting	 personhood.	 Second,	 it	 posits	relationships	 between	 the	 texts,	 in	 that	 they	may	 occupy	 similar	 life-views	 or	may	develop	concepts	raised	in	different	spheres,	positively	or	critically.	Third,	it	posits	a	coherent	dialogue	over	the	course	of	the	authorship.			The	 evidence	 supports	 this	 approach.	 Whatever	 their	 other	preoccupations,	 the	 texts	 have	 a	 relation	 to	 the	 question	 of	 personhood;	 and	some	 general	 life-views,	 such	 as	 the	 aesthetic,	 ethical,	 and	 religious,	 recur	throughout	the	corpus.	This	approach	explains	the	necessity	of	fragmentation	in	the	corpus	and	 is	 compatible	with	Kierkegaard’s	 interpretations,	which	posit	 it	as	motivated	by	the	desire	to	explore	such	possibilities.		Three	 distinct	 elements	 are	 discernable	 in	 Climacus’	 analysis	 of	 the	spheres:	(S1)	the	commitment	itself,	(S2)	indications	of	how	the	commitment	can	be	 subjectively	 appropriated	 and	 lived	 out,	 and	 (S3)	 how	 this	 is	 incorporated	into	 living	 out	 an	 authentic	 response	 to	 the	 human	 situation	 and	 constituting	selfhood.71	These	are	evident	in	Climacus’	explanation	of	the	task	of	constituting	authentic	 selfhood	 as	 entailing	 subjective	 appropriations	 of	 the	 universal	identities	 the	 spheres	 present	 (CUP,	 p.	 73)	 in	 responding	 authentically	 to	 the	human	situation,	‘To	subjective	reflection,	truth	becomes	appropriation…and	the																																																																																																																																																															to	the	model	itself:	even	the	understanding	of	the	model	of	the	spheres	occurs	from	within	the	perspective	provided	by	one’s	sphere.	Hence	this	approach	should	not	be	seen	as	privileging	the	religious	texts:	each	sphere	is	evaluated	from	within	other	spheres,	such	that	it	is	not	possible	to	achieve	an	authoritative	perspective	that	is	not	relative	and	partial.	This	suggests	that,	rather	than	providing	a	neat	map	of	the	stages	of	human	development,	these	provide	fragmented	and	eclectic	depictions	of	various	ways	of	being:	‘sketches’	that	are	important	for	the	Climacian	and	Kierkegaardian	projects	and	evaluated	from	their	own	perspectives.	The	term	‘sketch’	is	taken	from:	Peder	Jothen,	Kierkegaard,	Aesthetics	and	Selfhood:	The	Art	of	Subjectivity,	p.	169.	71	The	significance	of	these	will	not	be	fully	explained	in	this	chapter,	but	it	provides	the	basis	for	discussions	in	subsequent	chapters.	
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point	is	to	immerse	oneself,	existing,	in	subjectivity.’72	This	is	further	illuminated	by	 Anti-Climacus’	 claim	 that	 the	 human	 condition	 involves	 two	 competing	factors:	 the	 infinite	 possibilities	 and	 capacities	 of	 agency	 and	 imagination	alongside	the	finite	limitations,	contingency	of	identity,	and	necessary	features	of	finite	 human	 existence	 (SuD,	 p.	 13),	 all	 of	 which	 must	 be	 dialectically	incorporated	in	a	self-relation	in	authentic	selfhood.73		(S1)	 The	 different	 spheres	 depict	 universalised	 and	 entire	 ‘life-views’	(CUP,	 p.	 80):	 sets	 of	 possibilities	 and	 resources	 that	 inform	ways	 of	 being	 and	developing	 personhood.	 Each	 sphere	 provides	 an	 idealised	 set	 of	 possibilities	and	 is	 autonomous	 and	 total,	 in	 that	 it	 expresses	 a	 full	way	of	 being.	They	 are	defined	 and	 distinguished	 from	 each	 other	 by	 central,	 core	 commitments	 that	provide	‘psychological	consistency’	in	how	they	shape	the	rest	of	a	person’s	way	of	 being	 (CUP,	 p.	 625).	 Defining	 commitments	 include:	 ‘disclosure’	 and	 ‘duty’,	which	constitute,	 ‘the	 life	of	 the	ethical’	 (CUP,	p.	258;	p.	267);	and	 ‘depression’,	which	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 and	motivates	 its	 pursuit	 of	 diversionary	desire	and	pleasure	(CUP,	p.	253).	Each	sphere	can	have	a	distinct	set	of	criteria	for	decision-making,	different	ways	of	 interpreting	experience,	different	values,	moods	and	experiences,	existential	struggles	(CUP,	p.	625),	ways	of	configuring	
																																																								72	CUP,	p.	192.	‘Virkelighed’,	actuality,	is	used	to	signify	the	concrete	nature	of	existence	as	a	processual,	eventful,	and	temporal	reality,	particularly	linked	to	subjective	activity	in	transforming	subjectivity	in	relation	to	one’s	context	(CUP,	p.	339).	This	interpretation	is	supported	by:	Julia	Watkin,	Historical	Dictionary	of	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophy	(Lanham:	Scarecrow	Press,	2001),	p.	12.	73	The	reasons	for	this	are	not	clearly	stated	by	the	pseudonyms,	who	are	content	with	a	phenomenological	exploration	of	the	spheres.	Piette	sees	it	as	a	result	of	the	emergence	of	communal	living,	in	which	the	person	has	to	adopt	a	‘minimal’	modality	through	which	they	curtail	their	capacity	for	endless	subjective	creation	and	allow	stable	cooperation	with	others	by	adopting	certain	structures	as	normative	and	constructing	identities	from	the	limited	range	of	possibilities	provided	by	these	social	and	cultural	norms.	[Albert	Piette,	‘Existence,	Minimality,	and	Believing’.	In,	Michael	Jackson	and	Albert	Piette	(eds.),	What	is	Existential	Anthropology?	(Oxford:	Berhahn	Books,	2015),	p.	191;	p.	209.]		
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relationships	(CUP,	p.	266;	p.	294),	and	foster	different	personality	traits	(CUP,	p.	296).74	(S2)	 Persons	 exist	 in	 finite	 and	 deterministic	 contexts	 that	 impose	limitations	and	necessity	on	their	existential	activity.	The	very	resources	that	can	be	used	to	constitute	personhood	must	be	drawn	from	the	limited	environment	in	which	 they	 live,	 ‘His	concrete	self…has	necessity	and	 limitations,	 is	 this	very	specific	being	with	 these	natural	capacities,	predispositions,	etc.	 in	 this	specific	concretion	 of	 relations,	 etc.’	 (SuD,	 p.	 68)	 It	 also	 includes	 identities	 and	characteristics	 that	 one	 may	 have	 inherited	 from	 one’s	 situation,	 such	 as	 the	cultural	norms	and	structures	of	society.	Their	abilities	are	also	limited,	such	that	they	 cannot	 achieve	 all	 of	 the	 possibilities	 that	 are	 imagined	 in	 the	 idealised	spheres.	 Their	 local	 existential	 context	 means	 that	 they	 will	 face	 specific	challenges	and	have	certain	predetermined	possibilities.	The	general	features	of	the	 spheres	 will	 be	 lived	 out	 and	 appropriated	 in	 how	 they	 are	 expressed	 in	these	contexts.		(S3)	Human	persons	are	always	engaged	in	negotiating	these	polarities	of	their	 being,	 as,	 ‘that	 child	 who	 is	 begotten	 by	 the	 infinite	 and	 the	 finite,	 the	eternal	 and	 the	 temporal,	 and	 is	 there	 continually	 striving’,	 the	 various	 forces	being	ineliminable	and	thus	entailing	a	continual	task	of	constituting	subjectivity	by	how	one	relates	the	tensions.75	Thus,	for	Climacus,	subjectivity	is	not	a	given	
																																																								74	These	include	features	such	as:	‘good	and	evil,	brokenheartedness	and	gaiety,	despair	and	overconfidence,	suffering	and	elation,	etc.’	(CUP,	p.	625)	the	‘hiddenness’	of	the	aesthetic	and	‘openness’	of	the	ethical	(CUP,	p.	254),	self-responsibility	and	choice,	an	appropriative	internalisation	of	existential	orientations	like	doubt	(CUP,	p.	255),	humour	or	faith	(CUP,	p.	271).		75	CUP,	p.	92.	This	view	of	authentic	personhood	as	a	dialectical	structure	of	relational,	self-relational,	subjective	activity	that	holds	together	elements	in	tension	is	echoed	by	Anti-Climacus	in	SuD	(SuD,	pp.	13-14),	which	presents	authentic	selfhood	as	the	task	of	embodying	the	infinite	and	the	finite	in	the	concrete	situation	of	actuality	(SuD,	p.	30).	This	interpretation	is	supported	by:	Arthur	Krenz,	‘The	Socratic-Dialectical	Anthropology	of	Søren	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript’.	In	
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but	 something	 that	 is	 developed	 through	 agency	 and	 the	 appropriation	 of	 the	existential	structures	of	the	distinct	spheres	(CUP,	p.	254).76	This	can	be	seen,	for	example,	 in	 how	 a	 single	 identity	 is	 subjectively	 expressed	 and	 moulded	 by	different	people	who	share	a	cultural	identity	or	by	the	same	person	in	different	situations,	 as	 Piette	 observes,	 ‘Humans	 possess	 a	 special	 skill	 for	 modalizing	their	presence	by	constantly	injecting	nuances,	by	creating	mixtures	of	being,	by	fluidly	shifting	between	modes	and	situations’.77		This	duality	of	the	human	condition	has	two	significant	consequences	for	personhood.	 First,	 all	 personhood	 is	 agonistic,	 alienated,	 and	 split.78 	Every	sphere,	 including	Christian	existence,	 revolves	 around	 core	 existential	 conflicts	that	arise	 from	living	out	their	core	commitments	 in	the	existential	situation	of	the	person,	 ‘the	 comic	 is	present	 in	every	 stage	of	 life…because	where	 there	 is	life	 there	 is	 contradiction,	 and	 wherever	 there	 is	 contradiction,	 the	 comic	 is	present.’79	These	never	 find	resolution	within	 the	sphere,	each	sphere	entailing	an,	 ‘agony	 when	 existence	 is	 confused	 for	 them’	 (CUP,	 p.	 264).	 As	 examples,	Climacus	 identifies	 the	 ‘cleft’	 in	 the	 aesthetic	 sphere	 of	 EOI	 caused	 by	 its	experience	of	pain	and	depression	(CUP,	p.	252-253)	and	pursuit	of	diversionary	desire;	and	 the	 ‘collision’	between	ethical	obligation	and	 the	 infinite	passion	of	faith	in	FaT	(CUP,	p.	259).	The	nature	of	this	conflict	and	how	it	is	confronted	and																																																																																																																																																															Poul	Houe,	Gordon	Marino	and	Sven	Hakon	Rossel	(eds.)	Anthropology	and	Authority:	Essays	on	
Søren	Kierkegaard,	pp.	17-26.	76	George	Pattison,	The	Philosophy	of	Kierkegaard	(Chesham:	Acumen,	2005),	p.	38.	77	Albert	Piette,	‘Existence,	Minimality,	and	Believing’.	In,	Michael	Jackson	and	Albert	Piette	(eds.),	
What	is	Existential	Anthropology?,	p.	190.	78	This	is	why	Anti-Climacus	claims	that	despair,	‘tvivlelsen’	is	universal:	because	all	persons	are	in	doubt	in	this	hopeless,	heart-broken	and	desperate	situation	(SuD,	p.	16).	On	‘tvivlelsen’	as	doubt,	desperation	and	brokenness,	see:	Dansk-Engelsk	Ordbog,	ed.	by	Hermann	Vinterberg	and	C.	A.	Bodelsen,	(Copenhagen:	Gyldendal,	1998),	p.	2298.	79	CUP,	pp.	513-514.	This	is	in	conformity	with	Anti-Climacus’	view	of	the	person	as	defined	by	a	central	cleft	between	the	finite	and	the	infinite	(SuD)	and	subverts	the	Hegelian	idea	of	the	subject	as	emerging	through	a	dialectic	as,	for	the	pseudonyms,	it	never	finds	synthesis	or	completion	as	it	always	remains	in	process.	
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appropriated	 in	 the	 sphere	 is	 the	 defining	 struggle	within	 each	 sphere,	 ‘not	 in	annulling	 the	 misunderstanding	 but	 in	 enthusiastically	 willing	 to	 endure	 it’,	(CUP,	 p.	 268)	 and,	 though	 it	 is	 never	 resolved	 in	 the	 sphere,	 it	may	 impel	 the	individual	to	enter	into	other	spheres,	wherein	the	conflict	may	be	intensified	or	overcome	 only	 to	 be	 replaced	 with	 new	 struggles.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	Climacus	 equates	 the	 deepest	 inwardness	 with	 the	 deepest	 suffering,	 passion	and	strenuousness	(CUP,	p.	385).	The	formation	of	authentic	selfhood	is	thus	an	agonistic	 process	 of	 becoming	 (CUP,	 p.	 86),	 coterminous	 with	 the	 life	 of	 the	person	and	of	which	alterity	is	an	irrevocable	feature	as	the	person	strives	to	live	out	their	internal	fragmentation	through	relations	to	others.		The	ways	of	being	described	in	the	spheres	are	fragmented,	complex,	and	multifarious,	as	are	the	relationships	between	them.	Agency,	although	it	plays	a	vital	 role	 in	 commitment	 and	 appropriation,	 is	 only	 a	 component,	 alongside	passion,	 imagination,	and	deterministic	 factors,	such	as	the	existential	situation	in	which	one	finds	oneself.	The	attempt	to	construct	subjectivity	will	always	be	a	provisional,	 strenuous,	 artful	 activity	 and	any	 reductive	view	of	 the	 spheres	or	their	 relationships	must	 be	 avoided;	 readers	must	 experiment	 for	 themselves,	guided	 by	 the	 pioneering	 explorations	 of	 the	 texts,	 rather	 than	 assuming	 a	predetermined	outcome	or	 that	 they	can	be	easily	adopted	and	dispensed	with	as	acts	of	will.80	
																																																								80	Hence	Climacus	remarks	about	Christianity,	‘what	life-development	is	the	condition	for	properly	embracing	Christianity.’	(CUP,	p.	292)	Jothen	rejects	Derrida’s	interpretation	of	the	spheres	on	the	grounds	that	it	over	emphasises	will	and	agency,	presenting	a	reductive	view	of	subjectivity.	[Peder	Jothen,	Kierkegaard,	Aesthetics	and	Selfhood:	The	Art	of	Subjectivity,	p.	4.]	
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The	presentation	of	 the	 spheres	 incorporates	 evaluations	of	 the	 various	ways	 of	 being	 with	 a	 view	 to	 facilitating	 authentic	 selfhood.81	Hence	 Climacus	enquires	 into,	 ‘what	 it	means	to	exist	sensu	eminenti’	 (CUP,	p.	385),	and	asserts	that,	‘subjectivity,	inwardness,	is	truth’	(CUP,	p.	281),	indicating	that	his	aim	is	to	uncover	 the	way	 of	 being	 that	 facilitates	 living	 out	 authentic	 selfhood	 as	 one’s	personal,	subjective	truth	in	the	context	of	the	human	situation.		Authenticity	 within	 a	 sphere	 involves	 subjectively	 appropriating	 and	incorporating	the	 infinite	possibilities	and	capacities	 in	the	context	of	 the	finite	situation	 and	 the	 limitations	 and	 resources	 it	 provides:	 living	 out	 one	 of	 these	identities	uniquely	and	subjectively	in	response	to	the	existential	challenges	one	faces,	 such	 that	 it	 becomes	 subjectively	 true.	 Hence	 the	 self	 is	 described	 as	‘angular’	 and	 authenticity	 entails	 living	 out	 and	 grinding	 these	 identities	 into	shape	 through	 subjective	 appropriation	 (SuD,	 p.	 33).	 The	 spheres	 provide	 the	possibilities	 that	 authentic	 selfhood	 lives	 out,	 like	 raw	material	 that	 the	 skilful	sculptor	is	able	to	shape	into	art.82	One	is	able	to	exercise	agency	in	relating	to	or	moving	between	 these	 ‘existence-relations’	 (CUP,	p.	251;	p.	630);	 they	are	also	
																																																								81	My	interpretation	concurs	with	Pattison’s	claim	that,	‘subjectivity	is	not	a	capacity	we	simply	possess’.	(p.	38).	This	requires	my	interpretation	distinguish	between	the	existential	context,	which	Climacus	calls	‘actuality’,	and	subjectivity.	While	subjective	appropriation	is	necessitated	by	the	existential	context,	it	is	not	the	default	position	of	human	activity	in	the	way	that	the	embodied,	existential	context	is:	all	human	activity	is	embodied	and	existential,	even	if	it	aims	to	obfuscate	this	in	objective	abstraction,	but	not	all	human	activity	is	subjective.	Climacus	presents	subjectivity	as	a	task	that	must	be	actualised	by	the	person:	a	task.	These	are	linked,	in	that	the	existential	context	demands	a	personal,	individual,	creative	response	in	which	one	acknowledges	the	necessity	of	anxious	choice,	but	the	latter	is	not	guaranteed,	and	much	of	culture	and	human	activity	is	aimed	at	diversion	from	the	necessity	of	this	strenuous,	self-creative	task,	such	as	the	aesthetic	sphere	of	Either/Or	I.	Hence	Kierkegaard	describes	the	development	of	subjectivity	as	being	a	development	of	the	universal	human	situation,	‘a	person	becomes	that	which	he	is	essentially	regarded	to	be	(a	horse,	if	it	is	trained	and	the	trainer	has	good	sense,	becomes	precisely	a	horse).’	[Søren	Kierkegaard,	Papirer	VIII:2	B	82	[Journals	and	Papers	I	650,	p.	279]	This	also	indicates	that	the	advocacy	of	subjectivity	is	not	the	advocacy	of	passivity	in	simply	adhering	to	one’s	relative	position	but	rather	requires	a	process	of	existential	development	on	the	part	of	the	subjective	thinker.	82	I	owe	this	metaphor	to:	Peter	Mehl,	Thinking	Through	Kierkegaard:	Existential	Identity	in	a	
Pluralistic	World	(Chicago:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2005),	p.	88.	
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subjective	 and	 relative	 in	 that	 they	 are	 appropriated	 in	 various	ways	 by	 those	who	live	them	out.	Climacus	refers	to	this	as	‘double-reflection’	(CUP,	pp.	73-80),	in	which	a	universalised	set	of	possibilities	and	 identities	becomes	subjectively	instantiated.83		
																																																								83	Hannay	notes	that	the	pseudonyms’	conception	of	authentic	selfhood	can	be	interpreted	in	two	ways:	(i)	As	a	revisionist	Hegelian	approach,	which	sees	reality	as	composed	of	opposites	that	the	subject	must	navigate	and	bring	together	in	identity;	here,	its	difference	to	Hegel	is	simply	in	positing	a	different	identity,	religiousness,	as	the	authentic	way	to	achieve	this	cohesive	identity.	(ii)	As	a	‘deficit/fulfilment	project’	(p.	49),	in	which	personhood	is	encountered	as	lacking	and	is	composed	by	finding	and	living	out	a	commitment	capable	of	overcoming	this	deficit	and	fulfilling	the	project	of	authentic	personhood;	this	is	achieved	by	the	absolute	commitment	of	faith.	[Alastair	Hannay,	‘Kierkegaard	on	Commitment,	Personality,	and	Identity’.	In,	Edward	F.	Mooney	(ed.),	Ethics,	Love,	and	Faith	in	Kierkegaard,	pp.	48-49.]	The	core	question	is	whether	authenticity	is	achieved	through	(i)	unity,	cohesion	and	identity	or	(ii)	remains	within	an	agonistic	dialectic	that	it	lives	out	in	authentic	ways.	Authenticity	as	unity	of	selfhood	is	supported,	for	example,	by	Connell,	who	claims	that	a	‘positive	synthesis’	of	selfhood	is	achieved	in	Christian	and	ethical	spheres.	[George	B.	Connell,	To	Be	One	Thing:	Personal	Unity	in	Kierkegaard’s	Thought	(Macon	GA:	Mercer	University	Press,	1985),	p.	186.]	Many	narrativists,	like	Davenport,	similarly	claim	that	cohesive	identity	is	achieved	through	the	regulative	principles	of	‘wholeheartedness’	or	‘volitional	unity’	[John	J.	Davenport,	‘The	Virtues	of	Ambivalence:	Wholeheartedness	as	Existential	Telos	and	the	Unwillable	Completion	of	Narratives’.	In,	John	Lippitt	and	Patrick	Stokes	(eds.),	Narrative,	Identity	and	the	Kierkegaardian	Self	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2015),	p.	153.],	which	bring,	‘our	central	commitments’,	into	a,	‘complex	form	of	coherence’,	that	he	terms,	‘unity’	(p.	155).	Although	Davenport	accepts	that,	for	Kierkegaard,	such	unity	is,	in	its	fullest	sense,	eschatological,	this	is	achieved	through	this-worldly	wholeheartedness,	not	in	a	deus	ex	machine	event	(p.	159).	Davenport	rejects	the	priority	of	the	idea	of	‘lack’	in	this	process	(pp.	154-155)	on	the	grounds	that	identity	involves	living	one’s	commitment	in	a	wholehearted	way	rather	than	as	a,	‘completion	of	a	‘lack’’	(p.	155).	The	interpretation	offered	here	favours	(ii),	because	the	subject	is	defined	by	lacuna	and	its	project	is	to	find	authentic	personhood	outside	of	itself	in	its	relationships	to	others.	This	interpretation	also	incorporates	features	of	(i),	because	the	lacuna	of	‘spiritlessness’	and	project	of	constituting	selfhood	are	marked	by	the	contexts	of	fragmentation,	collision	and	paradox.	Authentic	selfhood	entails	embodying	and	living	out	the	tensions	and	paradoxes	of	the	human	situation,	not	fleeing	them	or	negating	them	in	synthetic	identity	and	it	is	for	this	reason	that	authentic	religiousness	is	described	as	‘pathos-filled	and	dialectical…because	passion	is	the	very	tension	in	the	contradiction’	(CUP,	pp.	385-386).	I	concur	with	Lippitt	in	seeing	narrative	wholeheartedness	as	a	repressive	act	that	fails	to	acknowledge	and	live	out	the	ambivalence	of	the	human	situation	[John	Lippitt,	‘Forgiveness	and	the	Rat	Man:	Kierkegaard,	‘Narrative	Unity’	and	‘Wholeheartedness’	Revisited’.	In,	John	Lippitt	and	Patrick	Stokes	(eds.),	Narrative,	Identity	and	the	Kierkegaardian	Self,	p.	133.]	and	with	Helms’	emphasis	on	narrative	unity	as	hoped	for	but	perpetually	suspended,	‘The	task	of	a	self…is	in	hope	to	anticipate	convergence	and	fulfilment	–	that	is,	eucatastrophe	–	until	the	last	possible	moment.’	[Eleanor	Helms,	‘The	End	in	the	Beginning:	Eschatology	in	Kierkegaard’s	Literary	Criticism’.	In,	John	Lippitt	and	Patrick	Stokes	(eds.),	Narrative,	Identity	and	the	Kierkegaardian	Self,	pp.	122-123.]	Indeed,	the	view	of	the	person	as,	like	an	author,	bringing	a	unity	to	his	body	of	work	fails	to	appreciate	the	fragmentation	of	the	author	him/herself:	the	author	is	not	an	autonomous	creator.	This	coheres	with	Climacus’	view	that	the	process	of	becoming	never	ends	for	the	living	person,	such	that	unity,	identity	and	the	security	of	coherence	are	never	achieved:	it	is	a	strenuous	task	one	can	never	move	beyond,	‘Existence	is	the	spacing	that	holds	apart;	the	systematic	is	the	conclusiveness	that	combines’	(CUP,	p.	118),	and	that	continually	produces	failures	that	require	continual	recourse	to	grace	(PiC,	p.	67).	This	also	fits	with	the	Hegelian	context	and	conceptuality	of	CUP	and	SuD,	rather	than	the	teleological	Aristotelian	view	of	authenticity	as	fulfilling	human	nature	or	Frankfurtian	narrative	unity.	Yet	this	does	not	support	
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Climacus	 and	 Anti-Climacus	 contend	 that	 authenticity	 involves	integrating	 the	 infinite/finite	 polarities	 of	 human	 existence	 into	 a	 dialectical	identity	 that	 lives	 out	 both.	 Since	 the	 resources	 actualised	 in	 personhood	 are	provided	by	 the	 social	 context,	 authentic	 relationships	 are	 integral	 in	pursuing	authentic	selfhood,	as	Evans	observes,	‘What	makes	the	self	a	self	is	a	“criterion,”	a	goal	or	end	by	which	the	self	measures	itself.	However,	that	criterion	or	sense	of	 an	 ideal	 self	 is	 given	 in	 and	 through	 relations	 with	 others….	 [It]	 is	fundamentally	 a	 matter	 of	 coming	 to	 understand	 for	 oneself	 the	 ideals	 of	selfhood	that	are	embedded	in	the	language	and	institutions	of	a	society,	so	that	one	 can	 consciously	 pursue	 those	 ideals	 for	 oneself.’84	Conversely,	 inauthentic	existence,	 marked	 by	 despair,	 is	 particularly	 characterised	 by	 inauthentic	relationships	with	others.85	Climacus	 and	 Anti-Climacus	 associate	 authenticity	 with	 the	 religious	sphere.86	Christian	 religiousness	 is	 considered	 as	 the	 most	 authentic	 way	 of	
																																																																																																																																																														Hannay’s	view	that	SuD	supports	Hegelian	unity	of	selfhood.	Rather,	SuD	subverts	and	and	short	circuits	Hegelian	unity	through	Hegel’s	own	structures:	the	dialectical	emergence	of	consciousness	from	nothing.	It	also	explains	the	relationship	between	lacuna	and	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	human	situation:	what	is	lacked	is	the	possibility	of	identity	that	the	emergence	of	dialectical	consciousness	occasions.		84	C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Who	is	the	Other	in	The	Sickness	unto	Death?	God	and	Human	Relations	in	the	Constitution	of	the	Self’.	In,	C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard	on	Faith	and	the	Self:	Collected	
Essays	(Waco:	Baylor	University	Press,	2006),	p.	271.	This	is	supported	by	Collins’	argument	that	the	authorship	is	immersed	in	dialogue	with	a	range	of	literary	figures	and	movements	as	part	of	his	exploration	of	authentic	and	inauthentic	selfhood,	‘The	ideals	and	personages	they	celebrate	provide	him	with	multiple	glints	of	human	selfhood,	different	ways	in	which	to	realize	our	potential	for	becoming	selves.’	[James	Collins,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Imagery	of	the	Self’.	In,	Joseph	H.	Smith	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Truth:	The	Disclosure	of	the	Self	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1981),	p.	55.]		85	This	interpretation	is	supported	by	numerous	texts	in	the	early	authorship,	such	as	EO	and	SoLW,	which	sketch	various	relationships	that	are	characterized	by	despair.	This	leads	Elrod	to	define	despair	in	relation	to	its	social	dimensions.	[John	W.	Elrod,	‘The	Social	Dimension	of	Despair’.	In,	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	The	Sickness	unto	
Death	(Macon:	Mercer	University	Press,	1987),	p.	109.		86	The	possibility,	suggested	by	my	preceding	exegesis	of	the	spheres,	that	one	can	live	out	any	sphere	authentically,	such	as	being	an	authentic	aesthete,	is	not	recognised	by	most	interpreters,	who	accept	the	argument	of	PoV	that	the	authorship	advocates	Christian	existence.	The	perspectivism	advocated	in	Chapter	2	precludes	such	an	approach.	As	was	also	noted	above,	evaluations	are	made	from	within	the	perspective	of	a	sphere,	such	that	no	objectively	true	
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responding	to	the	human	situation.	Indeed,	Anti-Climacus	argues	that	the	person	only	 exists	 as	 an	 authentic	 self	 in	 relation	 to	 God	 (SuD,	 p.	 16).87	Similarly,	Climacus	 argues	 that	 a	 way	 of	 being	 is	 authentic	 when,	 as	 in	 Christianity,	 it	entails	an	absolute,	passionate	commitment	to	an	absolute,	in	the	context	of	the	human	 situation	 defined	 by	 finitude,	 temporality,	 and	 incapacity;	 this	commitment	 is	 strenuous	 and	 uncertain	 because	 the	 individual	 lacks	 the	guarantees	 to	 support	 such	 a	 commitment;	 it	 is	made	 through	 an	 existentially	transforming	 faith.	 This	 is	 seen	 as	 both	 authentically	 religious,	 because	 it	provides	 a	 central	 role	 for	 faith,	 and	 as	 the	 most	 authentic	 response	 to	 the	agonistic	 nature	 of	 the	 human	 situation.	 While	 this	 may	 reflect	 their	deterministic	 religious	 context,	 it	 does	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 spheres	 can	 be	assessed	from	how	they	facilitate	response	to	the	serious	existential	challenges	facing	human	persons.			(1.3.d.ii)	Dialogical	Method	Given	 the	 impossibility	 of	 extricating	 oneself	 from	 one’s	 life-view	 and	one’s	 own	 agonistic	 nature,	 all	 identities	 are	 fragmented,	 relative,	 and	perspectival.	By	presenting	 life-views	 in	 this	way,	 the	authorship	aims	 to	draw	readers	into	the	process	of	engaging	with	them	subjectively.	A	dialogical	model	fits	 the	 texts	 and	 claims	 of	 CUP	 and	 PoV,	 since	 this	 does	 not	 see	 the	 textual																																																																																																																																																															conclusions	can	be	reached	about	the	value	and	viability	of	different	spheres.	This	is	also	supported	by	the	texts	themselves.	EOI,	for	example,	maps	out	various	strategies	for	maintaining	the	purity,	erotic	energy	and	perpetuity	of	the	aesthetic	sphere,	such	as	seduction	and	the	rotation	method,	thereby	providing	an	image	of	the	authentic	aesthete.	Since	this	thesis	is	focused	on	RD,	it	is	not	necessary	to	consider	the	viability	of	non-religious	ways	of	being	further	here,	though	the	discussion	does	have	important	consequences	for	the	meaning	of	Kierkegaard’s	work	and	its	wider	significance	beyond	religion.		87	This	is	similarly	Evans’	interpretation.	Although	he	sees	personhood	as	requiring	the	relation	to	others	in	a	social	context,	it	is	ultimately	only	achieved	by	divine	assistance.	[C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Who	is	the	Other	in	The	Sickness	unto	Death?	God	and	Human	Relations	in	the	Constitution	of	the	Self’.	In,	C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard	on	Faith	and	the	Self:	Collected	Essays,	p.	271.	
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perspectives	 as	 univocal	 but	 as	 distinct	 participants,	 dialogically	 related	 by	considering	 similar	 themes	 from	 different	 perspectives. 88 	This	 also	 draws	readers	into	dialogue	with	and	between	the	perspectives	on	the	question	of	how	they	are	to	respond	to	the	existential	challenge	of	constituting	personhood,	 the	task	 being,	 ‘to	 draw	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 selves	 and	 stages	 into	 a	 meaningful	pattern.’89		 My	 thesis	 utilises	 a	 dialogical	 approach,	 treating	 Climacus	 and	 Anti-Climacus	as	distinct	writers	discussing	related	themes.90	This	follows	the	method	advocated	by	Cappelørn	and	Deuser,	attempting	 to	construct	an	understanding	of	the	concepts	from	the	bottom	up,	rather	than	presupposing	a	unifying	system,	‘the	 corpus…must	 build	 itself	 up	 from	 the	 individual	 texts.’91	My	 thesis	 also	enters	 into	 dialogue	 with	 their	 positions	 and	 brings	 them	 into	 dialogue	 with	others	 to	 develop	 resources	 for	 engaging	with	 RD	 and	 living	 out	 an	 authentic	way	 of	 being	 in	 response	 to	 it.	 This	 approach	 is	 particularly	 apposite	 for	
																																																								88	Sinnett	notes	that	this	fits	with	the	critical	approach	the	pseudonyms	take	to	each	other,	thereby	retaining	the	fragmentation	that	characterizes	the	authorship,	‘[the]	two	sides	not	only	do	not	confirm	each	other,	but	are	in	rather	spectacular	conflict	with	each	other.’	[M.	W.	Sinnett,	
Restoring	the	Conversation:	Socratic	Dialectic	in	the	Authorship	of	Søren	Kierkegaard	(St	Andrews:	Theology	in	Scotland,	2000)	p.11.]	For	comparable,	dialogical	approaches	see,	for	example:	George	Pattison,	Kierkegaard’s	Upbuilding	Discourses:	Philosophy,	Literature	and	Theology	(London:	Routledge,	2002);	W.	Glenn	Kirkconnell,	‘The	Elegant	Unity	of	Kierkegaard’s	Authorship.’	In	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.)	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	The	Point	of	View,	pp.	377-390.	Pattison	notes,	for	example,	that	Fear	and	Trembling	and	the	accompanying	
Upbuilding	Discourses	offer	different	portrayals	of	Abraham,	and	both	involve	discussions	of	‘silence’	in	the	presence	of	the	divine.	Kirkconnell	identifies	recurring	themes	that	are	the	basis	for	inter-textual	dialogue	in	Either/Or,	Fear	and	Trembling,	Repetition	and	the	accompanying	Upbuilding	Discourses,	such	as	the	focus	on	trial	in	relation	to	‘inner	being’	and	the	consideration	of	happy	love	achieved	through	seduction	(EOI),	marriage	(EOII),	which	are	criticised	as	‘recollection-love’	by	Rep	in	its	support	of	‘repeated-love’	but	this	similarly	fails	as	it	is	assessed	by	the	upbuilding	discourse.	89	Edward	Mooney,	Selves	in	Discord	and	Resolve:	Kierkegaard’s	Moral-Religious	Psychology	from	Either/Or	to	Sickness	unto	Death	(London:	Routledge,	1996)	p.2.	90	For	this	reason,	when	citing	or	discussing	a	text,	it	will	be	attributed	to	the	particular	pseudonym.	Where	I	occasionally	use	the	word	‘Kierkegaardian’	it	should	be	taken	as	shorthand	for	the	pseudonymous	views	that	I	am	outlining.	91	Hermann	Deuser	and	Niels	Jørgen	Cappelørn,	‘Perspectives	in	Kierkegaard	Research’.	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn	and	H.	Deuser	(eds.),	Kierkegaard	Studies	Yearbook:	1996	(Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	1996),	p.12.	
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responding	 to	 RD:	 by	 presenting	 an	 irresolvable	 dialogue	 between	 irreducible	perspectives,	 the	 authorship	 provides	 prime	 resources	 for	 engaging	 with	religious	diversity	itself,	and	my	dialogue	with	these	opens	this	out	to	advocate	deep	existential	engagement	with	others	as	integral	to	authentic	selfhood.			
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1.4.	Kierkegaard	and	Religious	Diversity	(1.4.a)	Literature	Protracted,	 Kierkegaardian	 treatments	 of	 RD	 are	 offered	 by	 Fehir	 and	Connell.92	Both	identify	Kierkegaardian	resources	for	addressing	RD,	drawing	on	themes	 like	 subjectivity,	 paradox,	 and	 uncertainty	 to	 circumvent	 problematic	questions	 of	 conflicting	 truth-claims.93	I	 concur	 with	 Connell’s	 proposal	 that	 a	Kierkegaardian	approach	incorporates	both	faithfulness	and	openness	 in	a	way	that	 embraces,	 ‘specific	 religious	 convictions	 and	 texts…[yet]	 opens	 up	 those	specific	resources	in	ways	that	invite	broader	conversations.’94	Beyond	this,	our	approaches	diverge.		Fehir	 and	Connell	 claim	 that	Kierkegaard	 devotes	 little	 attention	 to	RD;	Fehir	 sees	 diversity	 as,	 ‘not	 a	 very	 “Kierkegaardian”	 question	 at	 all’.95	Rather,	they	see	this	question	as	imposed	by	the	contemporary	situation:	in	the	light	of	the	limited	and	exclusivist	resources	provided	by	Kierkegaard,	engagement	with	RD	 is	 a	 necessary	 evil.96	While	 they	 attempt	 to	 draw	 pluralist	 or	 inclusivist	resources	 from	 Kierkegaard,	 they	 see	 this	 as	 impeded	 by	 his	 adherence	 to	 an	exclusivist	conception	of	faith	as	absolute	commitment	and	of	Christianity	as	the	highest	 expression	 of	 this,	 ‘Like	 Plantinga,	 Kierkegaard	 describes	 faith	 as	 full,	unqualified	commitment	 (subjective	certainty)	 to	a	belief	 that	 is	acknowledged																																																									92	These	were	published	near	the	completion	of	my	thesis,	after	which	my	position	was	already	established,	but	engagement	with	them	has	allowed	me	to	identify	and	address	problems	to	which	they	succumb.	George	B.	Connell,	Kierkegaard	and	the	Paradox	of	Religious	Diversity	(Grand	Rapids,	Michigan:	Eerdmans,	2016)	[Hereafter	Connell,	KPRD].	Aaron	Fehir,	
Kierkegaardian	Reflections	on	the	Problem	of	Religious	Pluralism	(London:	Lexington	Books,	2015)	[Hereafter	Fehir,	KRPRP].	93	Connell,	KPRD,	pp.	69-80.	Fehir,	KRPRP,	pp.	6-7.	94	George	B.	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	13.	95	Aaron	Fehir,	KRPRP,	ix.		96	Connell	sees	Kierkegaard’s	primary	engagement	with	extant	religious	diversity	as	being	in	his	supersessionist	and	disparaging	comments	about	Judaism	and	other	religious	traditions,	which	he	sees	Kierkegaard	as	grouping	into	a	threefold	typology	of	Christian-Jew-Pagan.	[Connell,	KPRD,	pp.	28-29.]	
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as	objectively	uncertain.’97	The	result	 is	 that	 they	see	Kierkegaard’s	position	on	diversity	as	underdeveloped	or	 flawed	and,	 in	developing	 fuller	positions,	 they	are	 forced	 to	 be	 unfaithful	 to	 his	 position.98	Connell	 develops	 a	 ‘parallelist’	position,	which	balances	 the	absolute	 commitment	of	 faith	with	a	humour	 that	allows	 persons	 to	 take	 religiousness,	 ‘with	 a	 grain	 of	 salt’,	 such	 that	 they	 can	coexist	 alongside	 others	 while	 maintaining	 their	 own	 faith	 in	 a	 ‘laid	 back’	attitude	of	tolerant	humility.99	In	contrast,	I	argue	that	a	more	authentically	Kierkegaardian	response	to	RD	 is	 facilitated	 by,	 and	 latently	 present	 in,	 the	 authorship.	 Moreover,	 this	approach	 provides	 for	 a	 fuller	 and	 more	 radical	 alternative	 to	 the	 dominant	paradigms.	 Rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 identify	 the	 Kierkegaardian	 response	 as	exclusivist,	 inclusivist,	 or	 pluralist,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	problem	 can	be	 completely	reconceptualised	 from	 a	 Kierkegaardian	 perspective	 and	 that	 this	 facilitates	 a	full,	 authentic	 engagement	 with	 diversity.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 unfortunate	consequence	 of	 living	 in	 a	 diverse	 context	 in	 which	 one	 has	 to	 learn	 to	 live	parallel	with	others;	rather,	full	engagement	with	others	is	a	fundamental	feature	of	authentic	Kierkegaardian	religiousness.			(1.4.b)	Kierkegaard’s	Exclusivist	Context		 Contrary	 to	 Fehir’s	 view	 that	 Kierkegaard	 did	 not	 face	 problems	 of	diversity,	 it	 is	evident	that	the	authorship	is	critically	engaged	with	at	least	one	central	 issue	 about	 diversity:	 exclusivist	 views	 of	 Christianity.	 The	 opening	sections	of	CUP	are	engaged	with	a	crisis	of	religious	authority	(CUP,	pp.	23-49)																																																									97	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	102.	See	also:	Fehir,	KRPRP,	x.	98	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	105.	Aaron	Fehir,	KRPRP,	xiii.	99	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	100.	
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and	 the	 whole	 text	 explores	 the	 nature	 of	 and	 basis	 for	 personal	 religious	commitment.	Henriksen	interprets	Climacus	as	responding	to	the	decline	of	the	socially	given	plausibility	structures	on	which	Christianity	was	dependent,	due	to	an	awareness	of	RD.100	Henriksen	fails	to	cite	evidence	for	the	link	between	this	decline	and	RD;	 it	 is	possible	 that	 the	decline	results	 from	other	 factors.101	The	source	of	the	crisis	appears	to	be	a	number	of	contentious	theological	disputes	to	which	 Kierkegaard	 was	 exposed	 in	 the	 1830’s	 and	 1840’s.	 These	 revolved	around	 the	 question	 of	 the	 locus	 of	 authority	 in	 Christianity	 and,	 due	 to	 the	diversity	 within	 Christianity,	 involved	 various	 exclusivist	 appeals	 to	 different	authorities.102																																																									100	Jan-Olav	Henriksen,	The	Reconstruction	of	Religion:	Lessing,	Kierkegaard,	and	Nietzsche	(Grand	Rapids:	Eerdmans	Publishing,	2001),	p.	7.	101	For	example,	it	could	be	occasioned	by	the	choice	between	atheism	and	Christianity	or,	as	Bahler	suggests,	between	commitment	to	Christianity	or	‘paganism’.	Indeed,	Climacus	does	not	discuss	non-Christian	religions.	[Brock	Bahler,	‘Kierkegaard’s	View	of	Religious	Pluralism	in	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript.’	Intermountain	West	Journal	of	Religious	Studies	3,	no.1	(2011)	p.	5.	[http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/	imwjournal/vol3/iss1/2]]	102	For	example,	Martensen’s	critical	review	of	Kolthoff’s	Apocalypsis	Joanni	Apostolo	vindicate,	written	when	he	was	Kierkegaard’s	private	theology	tutor	in	1834,	rejected	its	appeal	to	‘the	unanimity	of	the	Church	tradition’,	and	argued	that	the	Protestant	principle	requires	a	decision	of	personal	conscience	supported	by	critical	biblical	scholarship	on	the	issue	of	the	canonicity	of	a	text,	‘he	must,	according	to	the	Protestant	principle,	have	this	conviction	at	first	hand,	i.e.,	he	must	know	its	originality	and	genuineness	as	such.’	[Martensen,	Maanedskrift	for	Litteratur,	vol.12,	p.	21.	In	Robert	Leslie	Horn,	Positivity	and	Dialectic:	A	Study	in	the	Theological	Method	of	
Hans	Lassen	Martensen	(Copenhagen:	C.A.	Reitzel’s	Publishers,	2007),	p.	58].	Mynster’s	authoritarian	ecclesial	intervention	in	the	Baptist	controversy	of	the	early	1840’s,	in	which	he	argued	for	the	state-imposed	baptism	of	children	enshrined	in	the	royal	edict	Kancelliplakat	(1842),	provoked	a	controversy	about	the	nature	of	faith	and	commitment	in	relation	to	church	authorities.	Kierkegaard’s	contemporaries	regarded	CUP	as	a	contribution	to	this	debate	and	as	criticising	appeals	to	and	reliance	on	church	authorities,	Eriksson	citing	it	as	opposing	the	church’s,	‘wretched	faith	in	authority’	in	favour	of	the	view	that,	‘each	person	has	faith	on	his	own,	and	not	by	means	of	a	foreign	faith,	not	by	means	of	another’s	faith.’	[Magnus	Eriksson,	Tro,	
Overto	og	Vantro,	p.	105.	Cited	in	Gerhard	Schreiber,	‘Eriksson:	An	Opponent	of	Martensen	and	an	Unwelcome	Ally	of	Kierkegaard.’	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Kierkegaard	and	His	Danish	Contemporaries,	
Tome	II:	Theology	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009),	p.	58]	Grundtvig’s	‘church	theory’	similarly	invested	authority	in	the	church,	positing	the	uniting	aspect	of	true	Christianity	throughout	the	ages	as	Christian	acceptance	of	salvation	through	reception	of	the	church-distributed	sacrament	of	baptism.	[N.F.S.	Grundtvig,	Udvalgte	Skrifter	(Copenhagen:	Gyldendal,	1904-09),	vol.10,	p.	353.	Cited	in	Anders	Holm,	‘Nicolai	Frederik	Severin	Grundtvig:	The	Matchless	Giant.’	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Kierkegaard	and	His	Danish	Contemporaries,	Tome	II:	Theology,	p.	98]	The	locus	of	authority	was	also	at	stake	in	the	debates	over	Hegelian	interpretations	of	Christianity.	For	Heiberg,	Hegelian	rationalism	legitimated	Christian	belief	by	showing	that,	even	though	it	was	a	human	religion,	it	represented	a	manifestation	of	Spirit,	‘philosophy	confirms	the	legitimacy	of	our	finite	undertakings,	specifically	by	showing	how	the	infinite	is	their	goal’.	[Johan	Ludvig	Heiberg,	On	the	
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Furthermore,	 the	 positions	 of	 Kierkegaard’s	 opponents,	 who	 had	significant	impacts	on	Christianity	in	Denmark,	were	exclusivist.103		Mynster	and	Grundtvig	maintained	the	exclusive	authority	and	truth	of	a	revelation	mediated	by	 scripture,	 creeds,	 sacraments	 or	 the	 church.	 Mynster	 saw	 ‘immediate	conviction’	as	a	possibility	for	the	recipients	of	the	divine	revelation	mediated	by	church	tradition,	‘Here	the	Christian	finds	what	he	seeks,	a	sensate	phenomenon,	in	which	the	eternal	clearly	comes	forth	and	which	satisfies	the	religious	drive….	Thus,	 I	 know	 that	 the	 divine	 has	 been	 revealed	 and	 come	 closer	 to	 me’.104	Likewise,	Martensen	and	Heiberg’s	approaches	to	RD	were	exclusivist,	investing	authority	 in	 Hegelian	 dialectic.	 Martensen	 utilised	 a	 Hegelian	 hierarchy	 of	religious	 truth	 with	 primitive,	 ‘oprindelige’,	 religion	 finding	 its	 highest	development	 in	 a	 Hegelian,	 philosophical	 demythologisation	 of	 Christianity.105	Heiberg	 stressed	 that	 religions	make	 competing	 and	mutually	 exclusive	 claims	because	 they	 are	 contextual	 expressions	 of	 the	 infinite,	 but	 speculative	philosophy	 provides	 a	way	 of	 unveiling	 the	 infinite,	 overcoming	 diversity	 in	 a	higher	 exclusivist	 unity,	 ‘When	 one	 recognizes	 that	 the	 truth	 is	 the	 common,	substantial	 content	which	 unites	 them…and	 one	 knows	 this	 by…grasping	 their	
																																																																																																																																																														
Significance	of	Philosophy	for	the	Present	Age.	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Heiberg’s	On	the	Significance	of	Philosophy	for	the	Present	Age	and	Other	Texts	(Copenhagen:	C.	A.	Reitzel,	2005),	p.	102]	Martensen	and	Heiberg	are	clearly	targets	of	sections	of	CUP.	[See:	‘The	Speculative	Point	of	View.’	CUP,	p.	50.	And	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Papirer	X:6	B	114,	pp.	147-8	and	Papirer	X:6	B	121	[Journals	and	Papers	VI,	6574,	p.275].	See	also:	Jon	Stewart,	Kierkegaard’s	Relations	with	Hegel	
Reconsidered,	p.	517].		103	Many	interpreters	see	the	opening	sections	of	CUP	as	part	of	Kierkegaard’s	fideistic	campaign	against	rationalism,	[e.g.	Robert	M.	Adams,	The	Virtue	of	Faith	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1987)]	but	this	fails	to	explain	why	Mynster	and	institutional	Christianity	are	targets	alongside	Hegel.	Interpreting	the	text	as	critiquing	exclusivism	explains	its	diverse	targets.		104	Jakob	Peter	Mynster,	‘On	Religious	Conviction’.	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Heiberg’s	On	the	Significance	of	Philosophy	for	the	Present	Age	and	Other	Texts,	p.	149.	105	Robert	Leslie	Horn,	Positivity	and	Dialectic:	A	Study	in	the	Theological	Method	of	Hans	Lassen	
Martensen,	p.45.	
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common	substance	as	Concept…and	this	is	what	philosophy	is—then	one	realizes	that	they	all	can	exist	peacefully	alongside	one	another.’106		Climacus	 criticises	 these	 exclusivist	 views	 in,	 ‘The	 Historical	 Point	 of	View’	(CUP,	p.	23),	which	describes	the	assertions	of	Mynster	and	Grundtvig,	and,	‘The	 Speculative	 Point	 of	 View’	 (CUP,	 p.	 50),	which	 describes	 the	 views	 of	 the	Danish	Hegelians.107	My	thesis	will	demonstrate	that	Climacus	and	Anti-Climacus	critique	 the	 theoretical	 commitments	 that	underpin	 these	 exclusivist	positions,	particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 religious	 knowing	 and	 salvation.	 Climacus’	construction	of	faith	as	subjective	commitment	provides	a	critical	response	to	a	context	of	exclusivism	and	aims	to	demonstrate	its	 inimical	effects	on	Christian	faith	 and	 religiousness.	 Thus,	 although	 the	 authorship	 is	 not	 directly	 engaged	with	 questions	 about	 RD,	 it	 emerged	 from	 a	 context	 dominated	 by	 religious	exclusivism	and	issues	of	peer	diversity.	It	 will	 also	 be	 shown	 that,	 in	 reflecting	 on	 the	 exclusivist	 context,	Kierkegaard	provides	compelling	reasons	to	reject	the	approaches	of	exclusivism	and	 pluralism	 and	 also	 the	 underlying	 conception	 of	 religion	 and	 diversity	 on	which	 these	 positions	 are	 based.	His	 reconceptualization	 of	 religious	 faith	 and	commitment	 on	 non-exclusivist	 grounds	 will	 also	 be	 shown	 to	 facilitate	 and	energise	a	 full	engagement	with	RD	as	 integral	 to	authentic	religiousness	 itself,	providing	a	deeper	response	to	RD	than	Connell’s	parallelism.																																																									106	Johan	Ludvig	Heiberg,	On	the	Significance	of	Philosophy	for	the	Present	Age.	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	
Heiberg’s	On	the	Significance	of	Philosophy	for	the	Present	Age	and	Other	Texts,	p.	106.	107	Hence	Climacus	claims	to	lack	authority	himself	so	as	to	not	perpetuate	the	debate	about	the	location	of	authority	(CUP,	p.	618).	This	is	also	apparent	in	the	focus	of	the	opening	sections	of	CUP:	‘The	Historical	Point	of	View’	criticises	reliance	on	the	authority	of	the	bible	and	ecclesial	tradition,	and	‘The	Speculative	Point	of	View’	rejects	attempts	to	legitimate	the	truth	of	religious	positions	through	appeal	to	reason	(CUP,	p.	23;	p.	50).	Holm	notes	that	the	title	of	Part	One	of	CUP,	‘The	Objective	Issue	of	the	Truth	of	Christianity’,	refers	to	the	titles	of	Grundtvig’s	treatises,	‘On	True	Christianity’	and	‘On	Christianity’s	Truth’.	[Anders	Holm,	‘Nicolai	Frederik	Severin	Grundtvig:	The	Matchless	Giant.’	In	Jon	Stewart	(ed.)	Kierkegaard	and	His	Danish	Contemporaries,	
Tome	II:	Theology,	p.	98].	
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	(1.4.c)	Kierkegaardian	Resources	for	Engaging	with	RD	in	Philosophy	of	Religion		 Chapter	 3	 demonstrates	 that	 engagements	 with	 RD	 in	 philosophy	 of	religion	have	been	characterised	by	the	abstraction	of	the	discipline	and	its	focus	on	truth-claims	and	knowledge.108	Alongside	its	different	conception	of	religion,	the	authorship	presents	a	different	conception	of	philosophy.	A	full	discussion	of	Kierkegaard’s	philosophical	project	 is	beyond	this	thesis,	but	I	 follow	a	number	of	 commentators	 in	 identifying	 several	 key	 features	 of	 his	 philosophical	approach	that	make	it	particularly	valuable	for	approaching	RD.109		First,	 Kierkegaard’s	 philosophical	 focus	 is	 on	 persons	 and	 their	 lived,	subjective	 situations.	 Climacus	 identifies	 the	 person	 as	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	philosophy,	‘every	human	being	is	assigned	to	himself.	In	that	regard,	he	himself	is	more	than	enough	for	himself;	indeed,	he	is	the	only	place	where	he	can	with	certainty	study	it’	(CUP,	pp.	141-142).	Anti-Climacus’	complaint	against	Hegelian																																																									108	See,	for	example,	Swinburne’s	outline	of	the	programme	of	philosophy	of	religion	as	aimed	at	verifying/falsifying	religious	beliefs	that	are	expressed	in	coherent	metaphysical	systems.	[Richard	Swinburne,	‘The	Value	and	Christian	Routes	of	Analytical	Philosophy	of	Religion.’	In,	Harriet	Harris	&	Christopher	Insole	(eds.),	Faith	and	Philosophical	Analysis	(Ashgate,	2005),	p.	34.]	109	My	understanding	of	Kierkegaard’s	philosophical	project	is	particularly	influenced	by	continental	appropriations	of	Kierkegaard,	such	as	Goodchild’s	view	that,	in	contrast	to	analytical	philosophy,	such	philosophers,	‘question	the	whole	framework	of	the	debate	by	questioning	confidence	in	the	empirical	and	rational	epistemologies	used	to	decide	the	issue’	and	recognise	‘‘religion’	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	purely	rational	concern,	but	is	shaped	by	imagination	and	passion,	involving	the	whole	person.’	[Philip	Goodchild,	‘Continental	Philosophy	of	Religion:	An	Introduction.’	In	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.)	Rethinking	Philosophy	of	Religion:	Approaches	from	
Continental	Philosophy	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2002),	pp.	9-10.]	This	also	involves	reading	Kierkegaard	in	relation	to	existential	and	phenomenological	philosophy,	as	it	understands	him	as	aiming	to	reflect	on	human	existence	in	ways	that	are	fuller	and	more	descriptively	accurate,	sensitive	and	imaginative.	[That	Kierkegaard	is	a	proto-phenomenologist	is	the	thesis	of	the	contributors	to	Jeffrey	Hanson	(ed.)	Kierkegaard	as	Phenomenologist:	An	
Experiment	(Evanston:	Northwestern	University	Press,	2010).]	I	do	not	regard	Kierkegaard	as	an	anti-philosopher,	but	as	arguing	for	a	more	expansive	philosophy	that	incorporated	human	existence	and	emotion	more	fully	as	well	as	aiming,	under	the	influence	of	the	projects	of	ancient	philosophy,	to	provide	resources	for	living	a	good	human	life.	[In	support	of	the	view	that	Kierkegaard	attempts	to	reintroduce	such	themes	from	ancient	philosophy,	see:	Rick	Furtak,	‘Kierkegaard	and	the	Passions	of	Hellenistic	Philosophy.’	In	Tonny	Aagaard	Olesen,	Richard	Purkarthofer	and	K.Brian	Soderquist	(eds.),	Kierkegaardiana	24	(Copenhagen:	C.A.	Reitzel,	2007),	p.	69.]	
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rationality	 is	 that	 its	 abstraction	 is	 reductive	 by	 eliminating	 the	 actuality	 and	specificity	of	human	subjects	and	their	emotional	and	existential	 features	(SuD,	pp.	 43-44).	 This	 approach	 thus	 stresses	 the	 centrality	 of	 descriptive,	phenomenological	 accuracy	 in	 understanding	 human	 persons	 and	 their	existential	situations,	 incorporating	imagination,	emotion,	experimentation,	and	a	focus	on	human	realities,	such	as	questions	of	personhood	and	identity.110	Such	aspects	 of	 human	 being	 are	 regarded	 by	 Kierkegaard	 as	 integral	 to	 our	relationships	to	the	world,	which	are,	in	turn,	integral	to	our	ways	of	knowing,	as	Furtak	observes,	‘For	Kierkegaard…the	emotions	ought	to	be	acknowledged	as	a	valuable	kind	of	cognitive	rationality.’111	Furthermore,	philosophers	are	called	to	be	emotionally	engaged	and	passionate	 in	response	 to	 the	ultimate	 importance	of	 existential	 questions	 for	 their	 lives	 (CUP,	 p.	 73;	 SuD,	 p.	 5).	 Hence	 a	Kierkegaardian	 approach	 to	 philosophy	 may	 provide	 a	 fuller	 conception	 of	human	rationality	that	is	more	sensitive	to	the	subjects	on	which	it	reflects	and	has	deeper	existential	significance	for	philosophers.	In	relation	to	RD,	this	provides	a	number	of	advances	beyond	the	limited	approach	 of	 analytical	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 It	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 view	religions	 not	 as	 abstract	 metaphysical	 systems,	 such	 that	 the	 question	 of	diversity	is	primarily	about	conflicting-truth	claims	and	knowledge,	but	rather	as	bound	 up	 with	 the	 subjective	 commitments,	 emotions,	 and	 situations	 of	 their																																																									110	As	Kevin	Hart	observes,	Kierkegaard,	‘is	a	philosopher	for	whom	proving	is	less	important	than	showing.’	Kevin	Hart,	‘The	Elusive	Reductions	of	Søren	Kierkegaard.’	In,	Jeffrey	Hanson	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	as	Phenomenologist:	An	Experiment,	p.	5.	111	Rick	Furtak,	‘Kierkegaard	and	the	Passions	of	Hellenistic	Philosophy.’	In,	Tonny	Aagaard	Olesen,	Richard	Purkarthofer	and	K.Brian	Soderquist	(eds.),	Kierkegaardiana	24,	p.	71.	Grøn	identifies	this	as	helping	to	explain	the	focus	of	various	Kierkegaardian	works	on	subjectivity	as	something	other	than	relativism	or	egocentric	denial	of	intersubjectivity:	they	are	concerned	with	subjectivity	itself	as	the	possibility	of	relating,	not	with	specific	relationships,	‘not	subjectivity	as	foundation	for	relating	to	the	world,	but	subjectivity	as	relating.’	[Arne	Grøn,	‘Self-Givenness	and	Self-Understanding:	Kierkegaard	and	the	Question	of	Phenomenology.’	In,	Jeffrey	Hanson	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	as	Phenomenologist:	An	Experiment,	p.	84.]	
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adherents.	 This	 presents	 a	wider	 and	more	 descriptively	 accurate	 approach	 to	RD.	Moreover,	it	acknowledges	the	emotional	and	existential	problems	posed	by	RD,	 which	 require	 approaches	 that	 facilitate	 existential	 response	 to	 these	challenges.		Second,	 the	 Kierkegaardian	 authorship	 has	 the	 aim	 of	 facilitating	authentic	selfhood	and,	‘a	properly	religious	way	of	being	in	the	world’,	that	is	a	response	 to	 a	 divine	 reality.112	The	 Kierkegaardian	 approach	 prioritises	 the	development	 of	 selfhood	 and	 healthy	 interpersonal	 relationships.	 The	 fruits	 of	philosophical	 rationality	 must	 be	 pragmatically	 valuable	 to	 human	 persons	 in	living	 out	 transformed,	 authentic	 lives	 in	 response	 to	 their	 existential	 and	religious	situations.113	Indeed,	given	the	view	of	religiousness	mapped	out	by	the	authorship:	 that	 it	 is	 a	 passionate,	 risky	 venture	 encountered	 at	 the	 limits	 of	one’s	 identity	 and	 in	 encounters	with	 inassimilable	 others	who	make	 absolute	demands,	a	central	strand	of	my	argument	is	that	there	are	fecund	intersections	between	authentic	religious	faith	and	deep	engagement	with	RD.114					
																																																								112	Jeffrey	Bloechl,	‘Kierkegaard	Between	Fundamental	Ontology	and	Theology:	Phenomenological	Approaches	to	Love	of	God.’	In,	Jeffrey	Hanson	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	as	
Phenomenologist:	An	Experiment,	p.	25.	See	also:	George	Pattison,	‘Kierkegaard	and	the	Limits	of	Phenomenology.’	In,	Jeffrey	Hanson	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	as	Phenomenologist:	An	Experiment,	pp.	193-4.	In	this	way,	it	goes	beyond	phenomenological	description	and	epoche.		113	Come	sees	this	as	Kierkegaard’s	central	philosophical	commitment,	‘his	goal,	his	ending	is	not	a	system	of	ideas	or	even	understanding,	but	is	to	turn	his	‘subjective	reflexion’	toward	the	task	of	transformation	of	his	concrete	existence	as	a	self.’	Arnold	B.	Come,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Method:	Does	He	Have	One?’	In,	N.	J.	Cappelørn,	Helge	Hultberg	and	Poul	Lübcke	(eds.),	Kierkegaardiana	
XIV	(Copenhagen:	C.	A.	Reitzel,	1988),	p.	22.]	114	This	is	suggested	by	Levinas,	who	sees	such	a	radical	encounter	with	the	other	as	key	to	Kierkegaardian	views	of	transcendence.	Emmanuel	Levinas,	‘A	Propos	of	“Kierkegaard	Vivant”’.	In,	Daniel	W.	Conway	(ed.),	Søren	Kierkegaard:	Critical	Assessments	of	Leading	Philosophers,	
Volume	1,	p.	115.	
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1.5.	Prolegomenon		 My	 thesis	 is	 that	 a	 Kierkegaardian	 perspective	 on	 religion	 provides	 a	critique	 of	 and	 alternative	 to	 the	 limited,	 dominant	 approaches	 to	 RD	 within	philosophy	of	religion.	An	exegesis	of	and	dialogue	with	Kierkegaardian	concepts	is	used	to	construct	the	approach	of	unbounded	commitment,	which	entails	both	passionate	 fidelity	 and	 boundary-crossing	 openness.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 this	provides	 an	 authentic	 Christian	 response	 to	 the	 central,	 existential	 challenges	posed	by	RD	that	 incentivises	and	energises	full,	deep	engagement	with	others.	This	 provides	 a	 persuasive	 approach	 to	 RD	 as	 it	 incorporates	 the	 subjective	nature	 of	 religious	 commitment	 and	 retains	 the	 fidelity	 that	 Christians	 feel	towards	Christ	alongside	radical	openness	and	obligation	to	finding	God’s	grace	and	revelation	in	others.		Chapter	2	outlines	a	Kierkegaardian	approach	to	religiousness	through	a	close	exegesis	of	Climacus’	and	Anti-Climacus’	conceptions	of	religion,	religious	epistemology,	 and	 Christology.	 In	 dialogue	 with	 their	 texts,	 I	 sketch	 an	existential-phenomenological	 approach	 to	 religion	 that	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 key	features	of	 Christian	 faith	 and	devotion	 as	well	 as	 to	present	 a	Kierkegaardian	conception	of	authentic	Christian	religiousness	as	a	transforming	relation	to	an	absolute	in	the	finite	human	situation.	To	develop	this	position	as	a	fuller	basis	for	engaging	with	the	literature	on	RD,	I	also	map	out	an	existential	epistemology	inspired	by	Climacus	that	denies	the	possibility	of	objective	religious	knowledge	as	 always	 preceded	 by	 tacit	 existential	 commitments	 that	 are	 inextricably	subjective	and	hermeneutical.	The	pseudonyms’	Christologies	are	also	outlined,	as	the	unique	and	universal	claims	made	about	Christ	pose	serious	problems	for	engagement	 with	 diversity	 and	 have	 provided	 the	 basis	 for	 many	 influential	
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Christian	 approaches	 to	 it.	 Later	 chapters	 seek	 to	build	on	 these	Christological	themes	 to	 show	 how	 they	 can	 motivate	 rather	 than	 obstruct	 full	 engagement	with	RD.		Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 outline	 and	 critique	 the	 dominant	 approaches	 to	 RD.	Chapter	3	critiques	the	classical	typology	developed	by	philosophers	of	religion.	It	is	argued	that	this	problematization	and	typology	of	approaches	fundamentally	misrepresents	the	nature	of	religion	and	RD	by	understanding	them	objectively.	This	is	critiqued	from	the	Kierkegaardian	perspective	developed	in	Chapter	2.	It	then	proposes	an	alternative,	existential	 typology,	which	understands	positions	based	 on	 the	 type	 of	 commitment	 they	 foster:	 closed	 commitment,	 Quixotic	commitment,	 partial	 commitment,	 or	 non-commitment.	 These	 are	 identified	 as	varieties	 of	 despair	 that	 are	 expressed	 in	 the	 ways	 of	 being	 facilitated	 by	pluralism	and	exclusivism.	Chapter	4	utilises	this	existential	typology	to	critique	exclusivist	 and	 pluralist	 Christologies	 as	 leading	 to	 types	 of	 inauthentic	existence:	closed	or	Quixotic	commitment.	My	interpretation	of	the	pseudonyms’	Christologies	are	distinguished	from	these	positions	and	used	to	critique	them	as	well	 as	 to	 open	 up	 new	 avenues	 for	 engagement	 with	 RD	 from	 a	 Christian	perspective.	Chapters	5	and	6	develop	an	alternative,	Kierkegaardian	approach	to	RD,	summed	 up	 as	 unbounded	 commitment,	 and	 sketch	 an	 existential	 theology	 of	religions	alongside	an	authentic	Christian	religiousness	that	is	engaged	with	RD.	Chapter	 5	 outlines	 the	 basic	 features	 of	 my	 existential	 theology	 of	 religions,	contrasting	 it	 with	 inclusivism	 and	 expounding	 two	 key	 theoretical	commitments:	 existential	 situationism	 and	 the	 Christological	 horizon	 of	 divine	activity	beyond	Christian	boundaries.	In	elucidating	these	features,	the	aim	is	to	
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define	 unbounded	 commitment	 as	 a	 way	 of	 living	 out	 authentic	 Christian	religiousness	with	 full	 fidelity	 to	Christ	 that	 is	simultaneously	radically	open	to	others	and	does	not	cling	to	its	own	boundaries.	This	incorporates	Christological	themes	 that	 assert	 God’s	 activity	 in	 the	 other	 such	 that	 these	 two	 factors	 in	tension	energise	each	other:	 the	radical	commitment	to	Christ	demands	radical	openness	 to	 others	 and	 the	 encounter	 with	 others	 is	 the	 site	 at	 which	 divine	revelation	and	grace	are	encountered	most	 fully.	Chapter	6	proposes	resources	for	 facilitating	 deep	 fidelity	 and	 open	 engagement	 in	 interreligious	 encounter,	through	the	attitudes	and	behaviours	of	participants.								
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CHAPTER	2	
RELIGIOUSNESS	AS	BEING	IN	TRANSFORMATION:		
AN	EXISTENTIAL	VIEW	OF	RELIGION		
(2.1)	Argument	in	Brief	This	 chapter	 engages	 with	 Climacus’	 Philosophical	 Fragments	 and	
Concluding	 Unscientific	 Postscript	 and	 Anti-Climacus’	 Practice	 in	 Christianity.	Utilising	the	insights	of	these	texts,	it	sketches	an	existential	approach	to	religion	as	 a	 way	 of	 being	 in	 response	 to	 features	 of	 the	 human	 situation.	 In	 this	framework,	 it	 presents	 a	 conception	 of	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness	 as	 a	transforming	relation	to	an	absolute	in	the	finite	human	context.	To	facilitate	the	application	 of	 this	 position	 to	 RD,	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 outlines	my	interpretation	 of	 Climacus’	 epistemology	 of	 religious	 knowing	 as	 an	interpretative	activity	underpinned	by	existential	commitments	and	delimited	by	the	 ineluctable	 contingency	 of	 its	 human	 context,	 such	 that	 objective	 religious	knowledge	 cannot	 be	 possessed	 because	 it	 is	 entirely	 dependent	 on	 tacit	subjective	commitments.	The	third	part	of	the	chapter	outlines	my	interpretation	of	 the	 key	 features	 of	 the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 as	 presenting	 a	 collision	with	a	 radical	other	 in	an	offensive	 site	as	 integral	 to	authentic	Christian	 faith.	This	 provides	 a	 conception	 of	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness	 that	 later	chapters	apply	to	RD.				
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(2.2)	The	Pseudonyms’	Existential	Approach	to	Religion	Through	the	
Spheres	of	Existence	(2.2.a)	Religions	in	the	Spheres	of	Existence	Section	1.3.d	claimed	that	the	spheres	of	existence	provide	the	context	for	interpreting	PF	and	CUP.	The	central	question	of	CUP	is,	‘Can	a	historical	point	of	departure	 be	 given	 for	 an	 eternal	 consciousness…can	 an	 eternal	 happiness	 be	built	on	historical	knowledge?’	(CUP,	p.	15,	See	also,	PF,	p.	1)	Climacus	qualifies	this	to	mean	that	he	is	inquiring	into	how	the	person	enters	into	Christian	faith,	which	claims	to	achieve	this,	‘I…have	heard	that	Christianity	is	one’s	prerequisite	for	this	good.	I	now	ask	how	I	may	enter	into	relation	to	this	doctrine.’	(CUP,	pp.	15-16)	 This	 involves	 the	 question	 of	 how	 a	 normative,	 universalised	 religious	identity	and	way	of	being,	like	Christianity,	can	be	lived	out	in	authentic	selfhood	in	the	specific	situations	of	individuals	(CUP,	p.	73).	He	produces	an	existential-phenomenological	account,	 focused	on	how	embodied	consciousness	is	enabled	to	adopt	and	affected	by	adopting	Christian	religiousness	as	a	means	of	arriving	at	 selfhood,	 ‘the	 issue	 is	 not	 about	 the	 truth	 of	 Christianity	 but	 about	 the	individual’s	relation	to	Christianity’	(CUP,	p.	15).		Climacus	 charts	 religiousness	 by	 exploring	 how	 individuals	 configure	personhood	 in	 a	 process	 of	 movement	 between	 different	 ways	 of	 being	 and	boundary	situations,	such	as	the	aesthetic	and	ethical	(CUP,	pp.	251-300).	He	also	presents	 authentic	 selfhood	 as	 incorporating	 general	 features	 of	 subjectivity,	such	as	 the	passionate	appropriation	of	an	ultimate	relationship	(Religiousness	
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A),	 and	 the	 specifically	 Christian	 form	 of	 religious	 subjectivity	 (Religiousness	B).115	 This	framework	allows	for	an	understanding	of	religion	to	be	formulated	under	 the	 inspiration	 of	 the	 texts.	 Religions	 are	 understood	 as	 spheres	 of	existence:	 existence-possibilities	 and	ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	world	 through	 how	personhood	is	configured.	The	term	religiousness,	signifying	a	subjective	way	of	being	 religious,	 is	 to	 be	 preferred	 over	 religion,	 which	 conveys	 an	 image	 of	 a	static,	 objective	 body.	 The	 corpus	 invites	 the	 application	 of	 this	 to	 a	 range	 of	religions,	 not	 just	 Christianity,	 by	 depicting	 various	 religious	 existence-possibilities.116	Climacus	offers	an	existential-expressive	account	of	religiousness	as	 an	 activity	 of	 embodied	 consciousness,	 which	 he	 explores	 through	 a	 proto-phenomenological	 analysis	 focussed	 on	 how	 this	 is	 directed	 when	 individuals	express	it	subjectively	in	ways	that	are	religious.117																																																										115	He	interprets	the	entire	Kierkegaardian	authorship	in	the	same	way	(CUP,	pp.	251-300).		116	For	examples,	FaT,	CUP,	SoLW	and	EUD	each	have	different	configurations	of	their	core	faith-commitments	and	conflicts.	Pojman	makes	this	observation,	though	he	fails	to	appreciate	its	value	for	understanding	distinct	religions	by	conflating	them	into	two	main	spheres.	Louis	Pojman,	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	37;	p.	40.	117	This	need	not	be	a	comprehensive	account	of	religion,	nor	is	it	the	only	view	developed	within	the	Kierkegaardian	corpus.	It	is	rather	offered	as	a	thought-experiment	or	‘imaginary	construction’	exploring	the	consequences	of	religion	in	relation	to	human	subjectivity	(CUP,	p.	15	and	p.	617).	While	the	claim	that	religions	are	a	human	activity	and	way	of	constructing	subjectivity	could	compete	with	religions’	own	understandings	of	themselves,	for	example,	as	divinely	revealed,	this	need	not	be	the	case:	Climacus	distinguishes	between	the	objects	of	religious	devotion	and	religious	commitments	themselves	(‘the	issue	is	not	about	the	truth	of	Christianity	but	about	the	individual’s	relation	to	Christianity’	[CUP,	p.15]),	making	only	minimal	pronouncements	about	the	objects	and	confining	himself	to	an	epistemological	position	on	the	undecidability	and	unknowability	of	the	essential	nature	and	truth	of	such	objects	from	the	human	perspective	and	thus	asserts	that	the	subjective	human	commitment	is	always	a	decisive	issue,	as	one	must	decide	whether	and	how	to	commit	in	the	face	of	uncertainty.	Whatever	else	religions	may	be,	they	are,	at	their	core,	human	responses.	Thus,	Climacus	is	willing	to	entertain	the	possibility	of	a	divine	origin	of	Christianity	but	maintains	that	even	if	a	person	shows	subservience	to	a	particular	religious	system,	this	entails	their	own	decision	to	do	this	with	a	lack	of	sufficient	guarantees.	This	enables	Climacus	to	maintain	a	balanced	account	of	religion,	between	the	excesses	of	supernaturalist	neglect	of	the	human	character	of	religion,	which	is	unfaithful	to	the	genesis	and	character	of	scripture	as	a	fallible	and	historically	relative	entity	[Keith	Ward,	Religion	and	Revelation	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1994),	p.	212]	and	a	purely	anthropocentric	account	that	omits	the	supernatural	and	thus	the	fundamental	claims	of	Christianity.	This	approach	allows	a	more	faithful	and	descriptive	approach	to	the	existential,	experiential	and	empirical	data	of	Christianity	[John	Macquarrie,	Principles	of	Christian	Theology	
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The	 spheres	 provide	 a	 model	 for	 describing	 and	 analysing	 religions	 as	ways	 of	 being	 and	 configuring	 personhood	 around	 core	 commitments	 and	conflicts	 in	 addition	 to	 understanding	 encounters	 and	 transitions	 between	different	 religions	 as	 ways	 of	 responding	 to	 the	 human	 situation.	 Other	important	features	elucidated	include	how	religions	shape	subjectivity,	facilitate	action	and	decision-making,	the	moods	and	experiences	they	provoke,	how	they	configure	 relationships,	 values	 and	 thought.	 While	 the	 emphasis	 is	 on	phenomenological,	 descriptive	 accuracy,	 key	 evaluative	 questions	 include	whether	 it	 is	 a	 viable	 and	 coherent	 way	 of	 being	 and	what	 happens	when	 its	structures	are	pursued	to	their	maximum	limits	and	boundaries.		Phenomenological	 components	 include	 Climacus’	 exploration	 of	 guilt,	renunciation,	 suffering,	 and	 faith	 as	 they	 are	 expressed	 and	 experienced	subjectively.	 Religiousness	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 way	 of	 constituting	 one’s	subjectivity,	 particularly	 shaping	 and	 cultivating	 ‘inwardness’	 as	 an	 internal	capacity	 of	 subjectivity	 that	 involves,	 ‘imagination,	 feeling,	 and	 dialectics	 in	impassioned	 existence-inwardness….	 But	 first	 and	 last,	 passion’.118	Subjectivity	should	 not	 be	 understood	 as,	 ‘whim,	 eccentricity,	 or	 arbitrary	 taste’;	 rather,	 it	refers	to	the	process	of	configuring	personhood	creatively	in	a	 lived	context,	as	Mooney	explains,	particularly	embodying,	 ‘a	complex	relational	pattern	of	deep	
																																																																																																																																																														(London:	SCM	Press,	1977	[Revised	Edition]),	pp.	56-57],	allows	religions	to	be	seen	as	vital	ways	of	responding	to	the	existential	challenges	posed	by	the	human	situation	and,	in	a	secular	and	religiously	diverse	context,	it	also	offers	the	possibility	of	dialogue	and	comprehension	of	diversity	as	relative	to	different	human	responses	to	the	divine	[George	Pattison,	Agnosis:	
Theology	in	the	Void	(Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1996),	p.	165.]			118	CUP,	p.	350;	405.	While	no	clear	definition	is	offered	of	inwardness,	it	is	closely	linked	with	such	factors	in	Climacus’	claim,	‘inwardness	is	subjectivity;	subjectivity	is	essentially	passion,	and	at	its	maximum	an	infinite,	personally	interested	passion	for	one’s	eternal	happiness.’	(CUP,	p.	33)		
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personal	 concern’,	 that	 emphasises	 personal	 agency	 and	 responsibility. 119	Religious	subjectivities	are	thus	to	be	described	as	both	experiential,	in	that	they	are	features	of	conscious	experience,	and	existential,	in	that	they	entail	particular	configurations	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 embodied	 activity,	 shaping,	 organising	 and	expressing	 personhood.	 Hence,	 for	 example,	 passion	 is	 understood	 not	 as	 a	merely	 affective	 state	 but	 primarily	 as	 pathos-filled	 action.120 	His	 model	 is	existential-expressive	 in	 that	 it	 regards	 religious	 language	 and	 structures	 as	expressing	and	shaping	existential	commitments.		(2.2.b)	The	Nature	of	Religious	Commitment		The	three	components	identified	in	the	theory	of	the	spheres	in	Chapter	1	can	be	used	to	unpack	how	religions	are	to	be	understood	within	this	framework.	(S1)	They	are	autonomous	sets	of	possibilities	for	interpreting	and	responding	to	an	absolute	or	‘evig	salighed’	in	the	human	situation.	(S2)	They	are	subjectively	appropriated	 in	 the	 local	 situations	 of	 individual	 persons.	 (S3)	 Authentic	religiousness	 involves	 a	 particular	 way	 of	 subjectively	 navigating	 these	possibilities	in	the	human	situation.	(2.2.b.i	–	S1)	The	defining	commitment	of	religious	ways	of	being	is	to	an	absolute.	Religions	present	particular	possibilities	 for	 responding	 to	 existential	questions	of	ultimacy,	matters	of	ultimate	 importance	 to	persons	because	 they	relate	 to	 their	 ‘evig	 salighed’	 (CUP,	 p.	 15).121	The	 term	 ‘evig	 salighed’	 is	 used	
																																																								119	Edward	F.	Mooney,	On	Søren	Kierkegaard:	Dialogue,	Polemics,	Lost	Intimacy,	and	Time	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2007),	p.	182.	120	Evans	interprets	consciousness	and	its	affects	as	existentially	embodied	in	this	way.	[C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript	and	Fragments:	The	Religious	Philosophy	of	Johannes	
Climacus,	p.	138.]		121	CUP,	p.	15.	Note	that	he	does	not	commit	to	any	position	on	whether	an	‘evig	salighed’	actually	exists;	he	simply	defines	religion	as	a	decision	to	act	as	if	it	exists.	‘Evig	Salighed’	can	be	
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broadly	 to	 signify	 factors	 that	 have	 ultimate,	 decisive	 significance	 for	 the	meaning	 of	 a	 person’s	 life	 and	 questions	 of	 salvation	 and	 the	 afterlife.122	It	 is	particularly	 linked	to	questions	arising	 from	an	awareness	of	human	mortality;	hence	he	 identifies	Christianity	as	a	particular	 stance	on	 temporality:	 ‘the	here	and	 hereafter’	 (CUP,	 p.	 570).123	Such	 questions	 also	 arise	 from	 quasi-universal																																																																																																																																																															interpreted	as	eternal	life,	blessedness,	happiness	or	salvation,	and	Climacus	also	links	it	with	immortality	and	relationships	to	God.	For	analysis	of	these	equivocations,	see:	Abrahim	Khan,	
Salighed	as	Happiness?	Kierkegaard	on	the	Concept	of	Salighed	(Waterloo,	Ontario:	Wilfrid	Laurier	University	Press,	1985).	The	term	‘ultimate’	is	not	used	here	to	prioritise	any	particular	values:	as	Smart	observes,	what	people	regard	as	ultimate	may	vary	widely.	It	is	intended	in	a	minimalist	sense	to	signify	issues	raised	by	humans	who	are	free,	finite	and	mortal	and	thus	are	faced	with	forced	decisions	on	the	meaning	and	continuity	of	their	lives	in	the	light	of	such	boundary	situations	that	circumscribe	all	possible	human	experience,	meaning	and	value:	it	is	intended	to	identify,	‘the	thought	that	some	of	our	concerns	–	our	questions	about	meaning	and	therefore	about	value	–	are	deeper	and	more	towards	the	limits	of	life	than	many	everyday	questions.’	[Ninian	Smart,	‘What	is	Religion?’	In	Ninian	Smart;	John	J.	Shepherd	(ed.)	Ninian	Smart	on	World	
Religions,	Volume	I:	Religious	Experience	and	Philosophical	Analysis	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009	[1975]),	p.	116.]	Cheetham	criticises	this	definition	of	religion,	which	he	identifies	in	Tillich’s	notion	of	religion	as	ultimate	concern	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	cultures,	for	being,	‘too	inclusive	to	allow	differentiation.’	[David	Cheetham,	Ways	of	Meeting	and	the	Theology	of	Religions	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2013),	p.	63.]	There	is	insufficient	space	for	a	full	response	to	this	criticism.	Though	Climacus	and	Kierkegaard	are	not	invested	in	the	task	of	categorizing	phenomena	so	as	to	enable	scholarly	investigation	of	them,	they	share	Cheetham’s	concern	that	religiousness	should	not	be	subsumed	under	broader	cultural	constructs.	However,	their	description	of	Religiousness	A	will	be	taken	as	mapping	out	a	particular	way	in	which	ultimate	concern	and	commitment	is	expressed	in	religious	ways:	not	all	forms	of	ultimate	commitment	are	religious,	though	they	may	intersect	and	compete	with	religious	concerns,	and	they	are	only	considered	such	when	they	include	various	existential	components,	thus	allowing	for	a	more	focused	definition	than	Cheetham	sees	Tillich	as	providing.	122	Czakó	sees	the	question	of	the	afterlife	as	central	to	Kierkegaard	and	Climacus	because	it	is	a	paradigmatic	type	of	religious	question:	its	reality	cannot	be	known	through	proof,	but	whether	there	is	an	afterlife	and	what	form	it	takes	will	have	profound	existential	implications	for	the	person,	such	that	it	is	a	forced	question	of	ultimacy	that	cannot	be	answered	adequately	and	only	responded	to.	[István	Czakó,	‘Rethinking	Religion	Existentially’.	In,	Jon	Stewart	(ed.),	A	
Companion	to	Kierkegaard,	pp.	289-290.]		123	Mortality	has	a	central	role	because	it	is	a	universal	feature	of	the	human	condition	that	has	profound	existential	implications	for	the	person.	It	adds	infinite	weight	and	importance	(CUP,	p.	21)	to	temporal	choices	because	it	places	a	limit	on	the	number	of	these,	such	that	they	are	made,	metaphorically,	for	eternity.	It	also	finitises	one’s	life	and	its	meanings	and	objectives	and	raises	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	the	whole	and	of	eternity,	as	Macquarrie	points	out,	‘Death…is	an	ultimate	in	human	existence,	bringing	us	to	a	point	where	we	have	to	face	the	most	serious	questions	about	the	meaning	and	goal	of	human	life	or,	indeed,	whether	it	has	any	meaning	or	goal.’	[John	Macquarrie,	In	Search	of	Humanity	(London:	SCM,	1982),	p.	241.]	That	this	is	a	prominent	feature	of	much	religious	reflection	supports	the	contention	that	religions	are	attempting	to	respond	to	this	universal	feature	of	the	human	condition	in	different	ways.	An	encounter	with	death	at	a	graveside	is	the	occasion	for	Climacus’	own	religious	awakening	or	‘call’	(CUP,	p.	234;	239)	and	he	sees	it	as	eliciting	religious	responses	as	it	provokes	subjective	engagement	with	death	as	something	that	affects	oneself,	breaks	one	out	of	immersion	in	immanence	and	occupation	in	a	finite	teleologies	and	raises	questions	about	survival	and	the	afterlife,	questions	that	are	more	important	as	they	relate	to	eternity	rather	than	finite	life,	as	well	as	precluding	certainty	in	the	answers	given	to	these	questions	(CUP,	p.	82).	
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encounters:	humans	encounter	 their	own	mortality	and	 the	mortality	of	others	through	 the	 loss	of	 contingent	 relationships	and	death.124	The	ambiguity	of	 the	term	 ‘evig	 salighed’	 is	 deliberate	 as	 it	 signifies	 the	 experiential,	 subjective	 and	diverse	nature	of	 responses,	 ‘it	 can	be	defined	only	by	 the	mode	 in	which	 it	 is	acquired.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 427)	 Climacus	 thus	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 awareness	 of	mortality	can	take	various	forms	and	provokes	various	responses	and	questions	depending	on	the	context.		Religions	 are	 distinct	 life-views	 and	 ways	 of	 being	 that	 interpret	 this	situation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 absolute	 and	 provide	 sets	 of	 possibilities	 for	responding	to	these.	Religions	differ	 insofar	as	 they	 identify	different	absolutes	and	 facilitate	different	 forms	of	appropriative	response.	These	possibilities	will	be	enshrined	in	social	bodies,	texts,	traditions,	and	other	sources,	incorporating	accounts,	 narratives,	 religious	 practices,	 and	 moral	 systems	 that	 describe	 and	foster	their	ways	of	being.		(2.2.b.ii	 –	 S2)	 The	 defining	 struggle	 in	 appropriating	 religious	 ways	 of	being	 is	 to	 live	out	 subjectively	an	absolute	commitment	 to	 the	absolute	 in	 the	human	 situation	 defined	 by	 finitude,	 temporality,	 and	 mortality	 (CUP,	 p.	 86),	confronting	the	anxiety	and	despair	that	emerges	from	this	 in	passionate	ways.	This	 is	 subjective	 insofar	 as	 individuals	 must	 exercise	 agency	 in	 applying	 the	possibilities	of	(S1)	in	their	unique	and	local	situations,	deciding	how	to	integrate	these	possibilities	and	express	them	in	their	identities	and	lives.	Nevertheless,	it																																																									124	This	claim	should	not	be	understood	normatively:	the	ways	these	events	are	interpreted	and	experienced	is	itself	subjective	and	contextual.	Hence	the	possible	objection,	that	the	question	of	ultimacy	is	only	posed	by	the	religious	context,	is	not	problematic	for	Climacus.	He	admits	that	this	may	be	the	case	and	simply	requires	that	something,	whether	an	encounter	with	mortality	or	religious	structures,	exists	to	provoke	the	question,	‘it	is	not	I	who	of	my	own	accord	have	become	so	audacious;	it	is	Christianity	that	compels	me.	It	attaches	an	entirely	different	sort	of	importance	to	my	own	little	self	and	to	every	ever-so-little-self,	since	it	wants	to	make	him	eternally	happy’	(CUP,	p.	16).	
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is	 likely	 that	 there	will	 be	 comparable	 structures	 evident	 in	 religions,	 such	 as	renunciation	of	relative	ends	(CUP,	p.	387),	because	they	express	commitments	to	absolutes.	Religious	appropriations	may	also	obstruct	authentic	responses	to	the	human	situation,	expressing	existential	cowardice	or	offering	palliatives	that	exploit	the	anxiety	that	attends	the	human	situation	for	the	purpose	of	exercising	power	over	adherents;	Climacus	has	this	worry	about	forms	of	Christianity	(CUP,	pp.	610-616).125		A	defining	feature	of	religious	ways	of	being	is	that	they	are	agonistic	and	pulled	 between	 forces	 that	 the	 person	 must	 navigate	 in	 living	 them	 out.	Climacus’	situation,	his	description	of	religiousness,	and	the	fragmented	form	of	CUP	convey	this.	Climacus	has	encountered	Christianity	as	an	‘outsider’	in	such	a	way	that	it	makes	absolute	demands	on	him	and	he	must	decide	how	to	respond	to	 this	 collision	 (CUP,	 pp.	 16-17);	 this	 occurs	 in	 a	 context	 in	 which	 there	 is	tension	 between	 the	 dominant	 form	 of	 Christendom	 and	 the	 high	 demands	 of	authentic	 Christianity,	 making	 appropriation	 ‘difficult’	 (CUP,	 p.	 606).	 Religious	questions	 arise	 in	 a	 context	 of	 irrevocable	 anxiety,	 uncertainty,	 yet	 where	mortality	 and	 temporality	 demand	 immediate	 and	 full	 responses;	 the	 human	situation	is	one	of	immersion	in	relative	ends,	making	a	relation	to	the	absolute	one	of	tension,	conflict,	renunciation,	guilt,	suffering	and	struggle	(CUP,	pp.	387-555).	Moreover,	 the	 revelation	 itself	 is	 encountered	 as	 paradoxical,	 disrupting	expectations	and	announcing	possibilities	in	tension	with	what	seems	possible;	it	is,	 ‘an	unknown	against	which	the	understanding	in	its	paradoxical	passion	and	which	even	disturbs	man	and	his	self-knowledge’	(PF,	p.	39;	see	also:	PiC,	p.	143).	
																																																								125	For	example,	Climacus	rejects	the	practice	of	ascetic	renunciation	on	the	grounds	that	is	supplants	the	existential	renunciation	of	relative	ends	(CUP,	p.	408).	
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The	Absolute	Paradox	encountered	by	Christians	in	Jesus	heightens	the	collision	further	as	Christians	must	decide	how	to	respond	to	the	revelation	occurring	in	the	most	offensive	site.	Anti-Climacus	develops	this,	describing	the	Christian	life	as	one	of	conflict	with	and	persecution	by	 the	Established	Order	 (PiC,	pp.	249-250).		 Alterity	is	thus	intrinsic	to	religious	identities,	which	are	not	static,	stable	or	 secure.	 Religious	 identities	 are	 sources	 of	 existential	 struggle	 and	 inward	conflict;	a	marker	of	authenticity	will	be	uniqueness	and	diversity	of	expression,	which	demonstrate	 that	people	are	 appropriating	and	 living	out	 the	 structures	subjectively.	(S1)	and	(S2)	fit	with	the	nature	of	religions:	they	provide	general	structures	 of	 belief	 and	 practice	 that	 are	 bound	 up	 with	 identity	 and	ways	 of	being,	 yet	 are	 always	 locally	 interpreted	 and	 expressed	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 their	adherents,	 leading	 to	 pervasive	 diversity	 in	 religious	 expression,	 even	 in	 the	same	religion.				(2.2.c)	Authentic	Religiousness:	Passionate	and	Transforming	Faith-Commitment	Religions	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 primarily	 through	 how	 they	 shape	subjectivity	and	evaluated	pragmatically	in	relation	to	whether	they	facilitate	or	obstruct	authentic	personhood.	Religious	ways	of	being	are	authentic	responses	(S3)	 when	 they	 successfully	 integrate	 passionate	 faith	 and	 activities	 of	appropriative	 self-transformation	 directed	 at	 sustaining	 the	 relationship	 to	 an	absolute	as	a	reality	by	living	out	its	consequences	in	the	finite	human	situation.	These	 factors	 are	 necessary	 to	 express	 that	 it	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 of	 ultimate	importance	 for	 the	person	 and	provides	 a	 religious	perspective	 on	his/her	 life	and	death	as	finding	meaning	in	relation	to	something	beyond	it.	
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A	feature	of	Climacus’	exposition	of	the	spheres	that	is	easily	applicable	to	RD,	 because	 it	 acknowledges	 different	 forms	of	 religiousness,	 is	 his	 distinction	between	 Religiousness	 A,	 immanent	 religiousness	 (CUP,	 pp.	 387-560),	 and	Religiousness	B,	dialectical	religiousness	(CUP,	pp.	561-586).	126	A	and	B	should	not	 be	 equated	 with	 specific	 religions;	 rather	 they	 describe	 the	 two	 sets	 of	features	that	are	integrated	in	authentic	religiousness,	as	Climacus	observes,	‘An	existence-issue…is	pathos-filled	and	dialectical….	I	ask	the	reader	continually	to	recollect	that	the	difficulty	finally	consists	in	combining	the	two,	that	the	existing	person	who	in	absolute	passion	and	filled	with	pathos	expresses	by	his	existence	his	 pathos-filled	 relation	 to	 the	 eternal	 happiness—must	 now	 relate	 to	 the	dialectical	 decision.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 386)127	This	 coheres	 with	 the	 processual	 way	 in	
																																																								126	Connell	identifies	three	main	ways	in	which	this	distinction	has	been	interpreted:	(i)	as	asserting	the	exclusive	superiority	of	B,	which	is	equated	with	Christianity,	over	the	untenable	form	of	religiousness	described	as	A;	(ii)	as	incorporating	A	into	B	in	a	supersessionist	or	inclusivist	manner;	or	(iii)	retaining	A	and	B	in	a	higher,	dialectical	unity-in-tension.	[Connell,	KPRD,	p.	151.]	Interpretations	(i)	and	(ii)	are	incompatible	with	Climacus’	claims	and	the	interpretation	that	authentic	selfhood	entails	an	agonistic	commitment	that	lives	out	tensions	that	never	find	resolution.	It	is	admitted	that	some	of	Climacus’	claims	support	(i)	or	(ii)	[See,	for	example,	CUP,	pp.	581-583,	which	identifies	B	with	Christianity	and	sees	adherents	of	A	as	excluded	and	existing	in	paganism.]	B	is	identified	with	religiousness	that	is,	‘linked	to	a	historical	condition’	of	revelation,	as	in	the	Incarnation	(CUP,	p.	582).		127	Hence	he	asserts,	‘the	definition	of	truth	as	inwardness…must	also	be	more	explicitly	understood	before	it	is	even	religious,	to	say	nothing	of	being	Christianly	religious.’	CUP,	p.	258.	See	also	his	claim	that	it	represents	an	intensification	of	subjectivity	that	is	intensified	not	by	focussing	its	innate	resources	but	by	encountering	a	paradoxical	object	of	faith	that	provokes	a	new	form	of	commitment,	which	nevertheless	incorporates	the	preceding	structures	in	a	dialectical	way	(CUP,	p.	610).	Lowrie	concurs	with	this	interpretation,	asserting,	‘not	only	did	he	affirm	that	it	[Religiousness	A,	the	religion	of	immanence]	is	the	permanent	substratum	of	all	religion,	but	it	was	the	religiousness	which	he	expounded	in	eighty-six	Edifying	Discourses’.	[Walter	Lowrie,	A	Short	Life	of	Kierkegaard	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2013),	p.	200]	This	reading,	that	Religiousness	A	remains	‘at	play’	within	B	is	supported	by	Ferriera	on	the	grounds	that	features	of	A	are	integral	to	living	out	B.	[M.	Jamie	Ferreira,	‘The	“Socratic	secret”:	the	postscript	to	the	Philosophical	Crumbs.	In,	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	
Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010),	p.	18]	Evans	disagrees,	arguing	that	Climacus	does	not	apply	his	anthropocentric	interpretation	to	Christianity,	which	he	presents	as	divinely	instituted.	Evans	distinguishes	between	religions	of	immanence	(A),	which	he	takes	to	be	immanent	because	founded	on	human	capacities,	and	the	‘transcendent’	religion	of	Christianity	(B),	in	which,	‘God	is	known	outside	man’s	general	religious	consciousness’,	because	this	is	inadequate	and	requires	divine	revelation	to	establish	a	relation.	[C.Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript	and	Fragments:	The	Religious	
Philosophy	of	Johannes	Climacus,	p.	45;	148]	This	interpretation	is	fallacious.	The	central	concepts	through	which	Christianity	is	described	are	existential-expressive:	‘sin-consciousness’,	‘offence’	
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which	 Climacus	 sees	 the	 spheres	 as	 related	 (CUP,	 pp.	 251-300),	 though	 the	struggle	to	relate	these	is	an	unending,	subjective	task.128		Religiousness	 A	 describes	 the	 immanent	 features	 of	 passionate	religiousness	as	it	attempts	to	sustain	an	absolute	relation	to	its	absolute	(CUP,	p.	581);	 this	 provides	 a	 range	 of	 possibilities	 for	 passionate	 agency	 and	appropriation.	 Religiousness	 is,	 ‘pathos-filled’,	 involving	 deep	 emotion	 and	existential,	‘exertion’	(CUP,	pp.	385-386).	At	the	same	time,	the	person	remains	a	finite,	 temporal	 being	 in	 a	 context	 of	 anxiety	 and	 uncertainty,	 such	 that	 the	central	 agony	 in	 religiousness	 is	 sustaining	 an	 absolute	 relation	 in	 one’s	 finite	situation.	As	examples,	Climacus	cites	renunciation,	relating	oneself	passionately	and	absolutely	to	the	absolute’s	existential	demands	and	relatively	to	all	relative	demands	on	one’s	 existence	 as	 (CUP,	 pp.	 387-430);	 and	 the	 resulting	 suffering	and	struggle	(CUP,	pp.	431-524).	
																																																																																																																																																														and	‘the	pain	of	sympathy’	and	Evans’	transition	from	the	exposition	of	structures	of	human	consciousness	to	the	activities	of	God	has	no	parallel	in	the	text	and	breaches	Climacus’	own	disavowal	of	knowledge	of	the	nature	and	activity	of	God	independent	of	human	existence	(CUP,	pp.	583-585).	Moreover,	Climacus	does	not	use	Evans’	term	‘transcendens’	to	describe	Christianity,	but	uses	‘dialectical’	instead	to	emphasise	the	role	of	consciousness	in	passionately	holding	together	the	competing	forces	through	a	particular	configuration	of	subjectivity	(CUP,	p.	576).	B’s	realisation	of	the	human	incapacity	to	establish	a	relationship	to	the	divine	arises	from	embodied	experience	and	the	structure	of	human	existence	itself	as	having	to	decide	its	eternal	fate	temporally.	Furthermore,	Christian	faith	is	‘pathos-filled	and	dialectical’,	involving	a	risky	commitment	that	is	never	resolved,	even	by	God,	in	the	existence	of	the	individual	(CUP,	p.	385),	such	that	B	does	not	supersede	A:	the	individual	knows	the	relationship	to	be	impossible	and	relies	on	divine	grace	while	simultaneously	striving	for	it,	‘the	dialectical	is	decisive	only	insofar	as	it	is	joined	together	with	the	pathos-filled	and	gives	rise	to	a	new	pathos.’	(CUP,	p.	555)		128	It	is	this	processual	interrelationship	that	provides	the	primary	evidence	for	interpretation	(i)	and	(ii)	above.	However,	the	prioritisation	of	A	over	B	is	descriptive,	not	ontological	or	existential,	as	Westphal	similarly	concludes	that.	[Merold	Westphal,	Kierkegaard’s	Concept	of	
Faith	(Grand	Rapids:	Eerdmans,	2014),	p.	209.]	This	is	also	informed	by	Westphal’s	argument	that	spheres	reveal	the	inadequacy	of	a	merely	immanent	embodiment	of	a	sphere,	teleologically	suspending	such	immanence	and	opening	up	the	agonistic	struggle	at	the	core	of	every	sphere,	‘A…form	of	life	is	immediate	just	to	the	degree	that	it	takes	itself	to	be	self-sufficient,	complete,	absolute.	The	necessity	of	passing	beyond	it	is	the	experience	of	its	other	as	such,	as	the	other	that	reveals	its	insufficiency,	incompleteness	and	relativity.’	[Merold	Westphal,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Teleological	Suspension	of	Religiousness	B’.	In,	George	B.	Connell	and	C.	Stephen	Evans	(eds.),	
Foundations	of	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	Community:	Religion,	Ethics	and	Politics	in	Kierkegaard	(London:	Humanities	Press	International,	1992),	p.	111.]		
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This	 agony	of	 religiousness	 is	heightened	 to	a	paradoxical	 level	 through	the	 incorporation	 of	 the	 features	 described	 as	 Religiousness	 B.	 Religions	 like	Christianity	 do	 not	 regard	 themselves	 as,	 ‘purely	 human’	 but	 as	 responses	 to	divine	 revelation	 and	 activity	 (CUP,	 pp.	 581-583).	 Indeed,	 Christianity	 sees	relating	 to	 the	 absolute	 as	 impossible	 because	 of	 human	 sin	 and	 finitude;	 it	 is	made	possible	through	a	divinely	initiated,	saving	revelation	of	divine	grace	that	transforms	 the	 person.	 This	 allows	 Climacus	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 relational,	transforming,	transcendent,	and	paradoxical	aspects	of	religions.	Together,	 these	 features	 are	 incorporated	 into	 Climacus’	 description	 of	faith	 as	 the	 core	 commitment	 animating	 authentic	 religiousness.	 Given	 the	subjectivity	 and	 agony	 of	 religiousness,	 different	 emphases	 are	 possible	 in	 the	definition	of	 faith,	but	 it	 incorporates	 several	main	 features,	 summed	up	 in	his	description	of	it	as,	‘An	objective	uncertainty,	held	fast	through	appropriation	with	
the	 most	 passionate	 inwardness’	 (CUP,	 p.	 203). 129 	Faith	 is	 a	 passionate,	appropriative	activity	(CUP,	p.	611)	yet	passive	and	receptive	response	(CUP,	pp.	581-582)	to	divine	agency.	It	is	fragile	in	that	it	is	a	commitment	of	one	party	to	another,	which	thus	lacks	any	guarantees	and	is	dependent	on	hope	and	fidelity	(CUP,	 p.	 202);	 hence	 it	 is	 compared	 to	 a	 leap	 (CUP,	 p.	 93)	 and	 being,	 ‘out	 on	70,000	 fathoms’	 (CUP,	 p.	 204).	 It	 entails	 a	 passionate,	 total	 commitment	 in	 a	context	 of	 total	 insecurity	 and	 uncertainty,	 ‘Faith	 is	 the	 objective	 uncertainty	with	the	repulsion	of	the	absurd,	held	fast	in	the	passion	of	inwardness’	(CUP,	p.	611).	 The	 disparity	 between	 the	 passionate	 commitment	 of	 faith	 and	 the	insecurity	of	the	situation	makes	faith	appear	‘difficult’,	impossible,	paradoxical,																																																									129	Five	types	of	Climacian	emphases	are	identified	by	Westphal	and	are	incorporated	into	my	definition	of	faith:	it	is	a	response	to	revelation,	it	overcomes	offence,	it	is	an	objective	uncertainty	but	passionate	certainty,	it	is	a	leap	and	appears	irrational.	[Merold	Westphal,	
Kierkegaard’s	Concept	of	Faith.]	
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and	absurd	(CUP,	pp.	557-558).	Yet	it	 is	this	paradoxicality	that	makes	it	a	self-transcendent,	transforming	commitment.	Hence	Westphal	notes	that,	while	it	 is	insecure,	 this	 should	 not	 be	 equated	 with	 doubt,	 offence,	 or	 despair,	 which	 it	faces	through	its	passionate	embrace	of	commitment	and	insecurity.130		This	 insecurity	 is	 insurmountable.	 Religious	 faith	 is	 the	 opposite	 of	 a	static,	 secure	 identity	and	 is	 lived	out	over	 the	course	of	a	 lifetime	through	the	entire	way	of	being	of	a	person.	One	never	achieves	security	since	the	insecurity	is	coterminous	with	 life,	resulting	 from	the	finitude	of	 the	human	situation	and	its	 dependence	 on	 a	 relationship	 to	 the	 divine	 through	 faith	 and	 hope.	 As	Pattison	 observes,	 ‘Our	 end	 can	 never	 be	 had	 other	 than	 in	what	 Kierkegaard	calls	 the	mode	 of	 “anticipation”….	 The	 hope	 that	 I	might,	 actually,	 become	 the	person	that	I	believe	myself	to	be	can	only	exist	for	me	as	a	possibility’.131		Such	 faith	 is	 seen	 by	 Climacus	 as	 the	 fullest	 expression	 of	 authentic	religiousness	 because	 it	 incorporates	 the	 tensions	 of	 relating	 to	 an	 absolute	 in	the	 human	 situation.	 It	 is	 also	 seen	 as	 the	most	 authentic	way	 of	 being	 for	 all	people,	‘the	truth,	the	highest	truth	there	is	for	an	existing	person’	(CUP,	p.	203),	because	 it	 lives	 out	 the	 tensions	 of	 the	human	 situation	 itself,	 allowing	 for	 the	most	passionate	existence.	All	ways	of	being	involve	relational	commitments	that	are	 lived	 out	 agonistically	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 insecurity;	 religious	 faith	 expresses	such	 acts	 of	 agonistic,	 relational	 fidelity	 in	 the	 most	 absolute	 way	 yet	 in	 full	awareness	 of	 the	 finitude	 and	 incapacity	 of	 the	 person,	 and,	 ‘the	 way	 to	 be	commended	 is	 naturally	 the	 one	 that	 especially	 accentuates	 what	 it	 means	 to	exist.’	(CUP,	p.	193)	
																																																								130	Merold	Westphal,	Kierkegaard’s	Concept	of	Faith,	pp.	152-153.	131	George	Pattison,	The	Philosophy	of	Kierkegaard,	p.41.	
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(2.3)	The	Pseudonyms’	Existential	Epistemology	Much	 of	 the	 philosophical	 debate	 over	 RD	 is	 focused	 on	 doxastic	disagreement	 and	 religious	 knowing.	 To	 enable	 engagement	 with	 this,	 my	Climacian	inspired	approach	to	religious	knowing	will	now	be	outlined.132	This	is	illuminated	 with	 brief	 references	 to	 the	 Heideggerian	 insight	 that	 embodied	coping	and	skilfulness	precede	purely	cognitive	processes.133	Climacus’	 epistemology	 asserts	 that	 knowledge	 is	 an	 activity:	 it	 is	‘interested’	in	that	it	entails	existential	involvement	and	occurs	in	the	embodied	context	 of	 the	 knower.	 This	 involves	 existential	 perspectivism	 in	 that	 the	person’s	sphere,	with	its	core	commitments,	decisively	shapes	their	thinking	and	evaluating.	 Knowing	 is	 thus	 interpretative	 and	 local	 to	 individual	 perspectives	and	existential	activities;	it	is	also	circumscribed	by	the	finitude	and	temporality	of	 human	 activity.	 Climacus’	 epistemological	 reflections	 revolve	 around	 his	distinction	of	objective	knowing	and	subjective	knowing.		(2.3.a)	Objective	Knowing	and	the	Existential	Basis	of	Knowing		(2.3.a.i)	Objective	Knowing	Objective	 knowing	 comprehends	 its	 objects	 through	 representational	correspondence	between	 thought	and	 reality	 in	a,	 ‘unity	of	 thinking	and	being’																																																									132	This	will	be	referred	to	as	an	existential	epistemology.	I	concur	with	Holmer	in	seeing	Kierkegaard	and	Climacus	as	not	advocating	a	clear	epistemology;	even	Piety,	who	claims	they	do,	admits	their	inconsistent	use	of	key	terms	like	knowledge.	[Paul	L.	Holmer,	On	Kierkegaard	
and	the	Truth	(Cambridge:	James	Clarke	&	Co.,	2012),	p.	160.	M.	G.	Piety,	Ways	of	Knowing:	
Kierkegaard’s	Pluralist	Epistemology,	p.	16.]	However,	Climacus	makes	various	consistent	claims	about	knowledge	and	I	will	present	these	as	offering	a	minimalist	epistemology	in	relation	to	which	a	view	of	religious	knowing	can	be	constructed.	133	My	interpretation	of	Climacus	is	influenced	by	a	Heideggerian	view	of	knowledge	and	by	Holmer’s	more	Wittgensteinean	approach,	particularly	on	the	nature	of	subjective	knowing.	This	interpretation	is	discussed	and	justified	below	[Paul	L.	Holmer,	On	Kierkegaard	and	the	Truth.]		
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that	incorporates	known	objects	into	human	generated	schemas	(CUP,	p.	86).	As	an	approach	with	the	aim	of	achieving	such	knowledge,	objectivity	is	associated	with	three	main	features.	(i)	It	aims	to	distance	itself	from	the	relative,	subjective	situations	 of	 knowers,	 becoming	 ‘disinterested’	 and	 dispassionate	 so	 as	 to	achieve	a	direct	comprehension	unhampered	by	subjectivity	and	bias	(CUP,	pp.	52-54;	p.	121).	(ii)	To	this	end,	 it	aims	to	evidence	and	legitimise	knowledge	in	rational	 and	 presuppositionless	 ways	 (CUP,	 p.	 112).	 (iii)	 This	 focus	 on	legitimisation	and	the	acquisition	of	direct	correspondence	with	reality	leads	to	objectivity	aspiring	to	construct	totalising	systems	(CUP,	p.	109).134			 Objectivity	 aims	 to	 abstract	 from	 the	 local	 perspective	 of	 persons,	‘Modern	speculative	thought	has	mustered	everything	to	enable	the	individual	to	transcend	himself	objectively,	but	this	just	cannot	be	done.’	(CUP,	p.	197)	While	Adams	 argues	 that	 subjective	 interest	 in	 a	 subject	 and	 dispassion	 in	 one’s	evaluation	 are	 not	 incompatible,	 he	 fails	 to	 identify	 the	 underlying	 existential	epistemology	 that	 justifies	 Climacus’	 argument:	 that	 objective	 thinking	 fails	 to	acknowledge	 the	 existential	 commitments	 that	 underpin	 it	 and	 thus	 fails	 to	engage	 at	 an	 existential	 level,	 only	 at	 a	 second	 order	 level	 that	 veils	 the	underlying	 existential	 commitments	 and	 cannot	 distinguish	 between	 levels	 of	importance	 in	knowledge,	 ‘despite	 the	great	amount	one	comes	 to	know	about	China	 and	Monomotapa,	 the	 boundary	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 world-historical	nevertheless	remains	undecided.’	(CUP,	p.	154)135	
																																																								134	Climacus	sees	metaphysical	systems,	such	as	Hegel’s,	as	the	essential	expression	of	this	endeavour,	as	they	present	a	method	of	thought	and	a	theory	of	reality	that	regulates	the	various	concepts	and	legitimises	the	link	between	knowing	and	being.	135	Robert	M.	Adams,	The	Virtue	of	Faith,	pp.	45-46.	Hence	a	recurring	theme	of	the	corpus	is	that	progress	in	understanding	is	not	to	be	made	by	the	accumulation	of	more	knowledge,	which	only	perpetuates	the	problem	that	the	underlying	existential	commitments	are	overlooked,	‘Objectively	understood,	there	are	more	than	enough	results	everywhere,	but	no	decisive	result	
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Climacus	 argues	 that	 such	 correspondence	 with	 and	 certainty	 about	reality	 is	 a	 ‘mirage’	 (CUP,	 p.	 198)	 and	 fantasy	 (CUP,	 p.	 121)	 because	 ways	 of	knowing	are	not	‘presuppositionless’	(CUP,	p.	14)	and	fail	to	provide	legitimating	foundations,	 being	 dependent	 on	 ineliminable	 underlying	 commitments	 and	configurations	 of	 subjectivity,	 ‘every	 beginning,	 when	 it	 is	 made	 (if	 it	 is	 not	arbitrariness	 by	 not	 being	 conscious	 of	 this)	 does	 not	 occur	 by	 immanental	thinking	but	 is	made	 by	 virtue	of	 a	 resolution,	 essentially	 by	 virtue	of	 faith.’136	Climacus	 seems	 to	 have	 in	 mind	 a	 variation	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 regress	 of	justification:	 that	any	attempt	 to	 justify	a	belief	 requires	 further	 justification	of	the	process	of	justification,	which	makes	the	process	groundless	or	grounded	in	an	 arbitrary	 foundationalist	 commitment	 to	 certain	 basic	 beliefs	 as	 inherently	authoritative	in	producing	warranted	beliefs.	Hence,	Climacus	aims	to	identify	a	contradiction	in	Hegelian	metaphysics	as	being	presuppositionless,	 ‘immediate’,	yet	 beginning	 with	 a	 process	 of	 reflection,	 ‘The	 beginning	 of	 the	 system	 that	begins	with	the	immediate	is	then	itself	achieved	through	reflection.’	(CUP,	p.	112)		(2.3.a.ii)	The	Existential	Basis	of	Knowing	In	 contrast,	 Climacus	 argues	 that	 all	 structures	 of	 representation	 are	generated	 by	 embodied	 existential	 commitments	 and	 are	 thus	 intrinsically	perspectival.	 The	only	 actuality	 available	 to	 the	person	 is	 their	 own	existential	
																																																																																																																																																														anywhere’	(CUP,	p.	34),	such	that,	‘speculative	thought	does	not	permit	the	issue	to	arise	at	all,	and	thus	all	of	its	response	is	only	a	mystification.’	(CUP,	p.	57).	136	CUP,	p.	189.	This	explains	his	criticism	of	scholarly	‘postponement’	of	existential	decisions:	they	have	already	adopted	an	existential	stance	but	by	proceeding	on	this	basis	as	if	it	is	a	legitimated	discourse	they	fail	to	acknowledge	this.	This	interpretation	is	supported	by:	Harold	Durfee,	‘Metaphilosophy	in	the	Shadow	of	Kierkegaard’.	In,	Joseph	H.	Smith	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	
Truth:	The	Disclosure	of	the	Self,	p.	102.	
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actuality.137	The	 person’s	 commitment	 to	 a	 certain	 way	 of	 being	 provides	 the	basis	 for	all	subsequent	questions,	 thinking,	and	methodologies.	Knowing	takes	place	at	 a	point	on	an	existential	hermeneutical	 circle,	 entailing	prior	 layers	of	decision-making	activities	that	provide	the	motivation,	methods,	questions,	and	the	 orientation	 to	 certain	 projects	 and	 ends.138	Knowing	 is	 also	 ‘interested’	 in	that	 it	 is	 always	 intertwined	 with	 emotions,	 experience	 and	 other	 existential	factors.139	Scholarly	 abstraction	 itself	 is	 an	 existential	 activity	 that	 projects	 the	features	that	it	veils;	hence	Climacus	describes	it	as	‘ventriloquism’	(CUP,	p.	111).	Moreover,	 the	 adoption	 of	 an	 existence-possibility	 is	 an	 anxious	 decision	 that	lacks	 any	 guarantees,	 because	 it	 precedes	 all	 structures	 of	 legitimisation,	 and	emerges	from	the	embodied,	existential	situation	and	history	of	the	person,	who	is	in	a	perpetual	process	of	becoming	(CUP,	p.	118).		Climacus	 thus	 advocates	 existential	 perspectivism:	 knowledge	 is	 an	interpretation	 that	 reflects	 how	 the	world	 looks	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 one’s	way	of	 being.140	Holmer	notes	 that	 ‘truth’	 and	 ‘reality’	 are	 seen	by	Climacus	 as	relative	 to	 these	 local	 interpretations,	 ‘there	 is	 no	 one	 definition	 of	 truth,	applicable	to	all	the	circumstances	where	the	word	is	used’,	because	such	terms	
																																																								137	Hence	Climacus	asserts,	‘A	system	of	existence	cannot	be	given’	(CUP,	p.	119).	‘Virkelighed’,	actuality,	is	used	to	signify	the	concrete	nature	of	existence	as	a	processual,	eventful	and	temporal	reality,	particularly	linked	to	subjective	activity	in	transforming	subjectivity	in	relation	to	one’s	context	(CUP,	p.	339).	This	interpretation	is	supported	by:	Julia	Watkin,	Historical	
Dictionary	of	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophy,	p.	12.	138	Martin	Heidegger,	Being	and	Time	(Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell,	1967),	p.	90.		139	This	is	supported	by	Furtak’s	contention	that	Kierkegaard	regards	emotion	as	an	important	feature	of	knowing.	Rick	Furtak,	‘Kierkegaard	and	the	Passions	of	Hellenistic	Philosophy.’	In,	Tonny	Aagaard	Olesen,	Richard	Purkarthofer	and	K.Brian	Soderquist	(eds.),	Kierkegaardiana	24,	p.	71.	140	Jaspers	interprets	Climacus	in	the	same	way	asserting	that,	‘Being	is	interpretation.’	Karl	Jaspers,	‘The	Origin	of	the	Contemporary	Philosophical	Situation:	Kierkegaard	and	Nietzsche.’	In	William	L.	McBride,	Existentialist	Background:	Kierkegaard,	Dostoevsky,	Nietzsche,	Jaspers,	
Heidegger	(New	York:	Garland	Publishing,	1997),	p.	220.		
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represent	their	located	perspectives	and	meanings,	being,	‘a	subtle	consequence	of	how	a	person,	a	subject,	addresses	the	things	around	him.’141		This	 invites	 a	 Heideggerian	 view	 of	 knowing	 as,	 ‘an	 ongoing	 activity	 of	coping	 with	 the	 world	 by	 bodily,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 beings.	 This	 coping	 can	never	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	representations,	but	provides	the	background	against	 which	 our	 representations	 have	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 do’.142 	Holmer	similarly	 interprets	 Climacus	 as	 claiming	 that	 philosophical	 theorising	 is	derivative,	secondary,	or	even	obstructive	to	living	an	authentic	life,	as	Heidegger	explains,	 ‘The	 kind	 of	 dealing	 which	 is	 closest	 to	 us	 is…not	 a	 bare	 perceptual	cognition,	 but	 rather	 that	 kind	 of	 concern	 which	manipulates	 things	 and	 puts	them	to	use;	and	this	has	its	own	kind	of	‘knowledge’.’143	Personhood	 is	 a	 precarious	 and	 contingent	 activity	 that	 is	 continually	passing	 into	 the	 non-existence	 of	 the	 past	 and	 future,	 and	 has	 no	 necessary	features:	 it	 could	 always	 be	 otherwise	 or	 not	 be	 at	 all	 (CUP,	 p.	 80).	Moreover,	Climacus	suggests	that	reality	itself	is	in	a	process	of	becoming	or	‘in	motion’;	it	could	 be	 at	 bottom	 polyphonous,	 requiring	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 mobile,	interpretative	 schema	 and	 being	 inexpressible	 in	 singular	 systems	 that	 are	‘contractions’	of	meaning.144			(2.3.a.iii)	Application	to	Ethico-Religious	Knowledge																																																									141	Paul	L.	Holmer,	On	Kierkegaard	and	the	Truth,	p.	76	and	p.	53.	142	Charles	Taylor,	‘Closed	world	structures’.	In,	Mark	A.	Wrathall	(ed.),	Religion	After	Metaphysics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	p.	50.	143	Martin	Heidegger,	Being	and	Time,	p.	95.	Paul	L.	Holmer,	On	Kierkegaard	and	the	Truth,	p.	160.	144	CUP,	p.	118.	Carlisle	offers	such	an	interpretation.	Clare	Carlisle,	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophy	of	
Becoming:	Movements	and	Positions	(New	York:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2005).	Durfee	explains	Climacus’	logic	in	a	similar	way,	‘Those	plural	systems	offer	us	logical	possibilities,	but	no	assurances,	so	that	the	selection	between	them	must	be	by	decisional	and	not	rational	criteria.’	Harold	Durfee,	‘Metaphilosophy	in	the	Shadow	of	Kierkegaard’.	In,	Joseph	H.	Smith	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Truth:	The	Disclosure	of	the	Self,	p.	103.	
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Climacus’	 primary	 concern	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 insufficiency	 of	objectivity	 as	 an	 approach	 to	 ethico-religious	matters.	 Since	 religiousness	 is	 a	passionate	 response	 to	 existential	matters	 of	 ‘infinite	 interest’	 to	 the	person,	 a	dispassionate	approach	misrepresents	and	obstructs	 it,	 ‘if	Christianity	 requires	this	infinite	interest	in	the	individual	subject…it	is	easy	to	see	that	in	speculative	thought	he	cannot	possibly	find	what	he	is	seeking.—This		can	also	be	expressed	as	follows:	speculative	thought	does	not	permit	the	issue	to	arise	at	all,	and	thus	all	 of	 its	 response	 is	 only	 a	mystification.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 57)	 An	 objective	 approach	requires	 evidence	 or	 authoritative	 guarantees	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 knowing,	 but	 the	finite	nature	of	the	person,	anxiety,	and	temporality	of	the	human	situation	and	paradoxical,	offensive	nature	of	the	objects	of	religious	devotion	indicate	that	no	such	security	can	be	obtained;	indeed,	reason	is	likely	to	be	offended	by	faith	(PF,	pp.	49-50).	Reason	deals	with	quantitative	approximations	that	always	fall	short	of	 the	 absolute	 demonstration	 or	 evidence	 needed	 to	 secure	 a	 qualitative,	absolute	commitment	and	‘leap’	(CUP,	p.	93),	 ‘Objectively	understood,	there	are	more	 than	 enough	 results	 everywhere,	 but	 no	 decisive	 results	anywhere…because	 decision	 is	 rooted	 in	 subjectivity’	 (CUP,	 p.	 34).	 Moreover,	given	 the	 agonistic,	 temporal	 nature	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 and	 the	undecidability	 of	 existential	 questions,	 humans	 have	 to	 respond	without	 being	able	to	know	how	to	respond	and	religiousness	is	a	task	for	a	lifetime,	it	cannot	be	 expressed	 in	 a	 systematic,	 secure	 system,	 ‘A	 system	 of	 existence	 cannot	 be	given….	System	and	conclusiveness	correspond	to	each	other,	but	existence	is	the	very	opposite.’	(CUP,	p.	118)	Climacus	 depicts	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 objectivity	 for	 ethical-religious	knowing	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 escaped	 lunatic.	 The	 lunatic	 cites	 objective	 truths,	
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‘Boom!	The	earth	is	round!’	to	demonstrate	his	sanity,	showing	his	lunacy	by	his	‘parroting’	 of	 truths	 that	 are	 not	 appropriate	 to	 his	 situation.	 The	 objective	thinker	demonstrates	he	has	lost	his	mind	in	a	horrifyingly	comic	way	because	of	the	disparity	between	his	dispassionate,	speculative	reduction	of	reality	to	facts	and	 the	 absolute	 magnitude	 of	 the	 pressing	 existential	 and	 ethico-religious	questions	he	faces	(CUP,	pp.	195-196).		Climacus’	assertion	of	the	layered,	existential,	and	relational	character	of	knowing	posits	relationships	with	others	as	a	basic	condition	of	understanding	in	a	way	 that	 is	particularly	pertinent	 for	 religions,	which	 integrate	ethical	values	and	 relate	 to	 an	 absolute	 other.	His	 critique	 of	 objectivity	 challenges	 the	 drive	towards	 exclusivist	 realism	 in	Western	 philosophy	 as	 ethically	 and	 religiously	harmful.		Objectivity	is	unable	to	deal	with	values	and	decisions	on	the	formation	of	subjectivity	because	of	its	focus	on	problems	and	‘facts’	about	reality	or	‘the	case	in	 point’,	 for	 example,	 inquiring	 into	 the	 nature	 of	moral	 values	 as	 objectively	real	properties	rather	 than	as	relating	to	subjective	commitment	(CUP,	p.	253).	Hegelian	metaphysics	 is	 particularly	 guilty	 of	 this,	 Climacus	 argues,	 because	 it	omits	 the	 role	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 the	 agent	 of	 history	 by	 describing	 the	fundamental	 constituents	 of	 reality	 as	 the	 metaphysical	 components	 that	determine	 reality	 and	measures	 ethical	 achievement	 by	 the	 quantity	 of	 effects	rather	than	the	quality	of	ethical	intention,	‘ethics	looks	with	a	suspicious	eye	at	all	 world-historical	 knowledge,	 because	 this	 easily	 becomes	 a	 trap,	 a	demoralising	 esthetic…because	 the	 distinction	 between	 what	 does	 and	 what	does	 not	 become	 world-historical	 is	 quantitative	 dialectic…neutralised	 in	 the	
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esthetic-metaphysical	category	of	“the	great”’.145	Like	Levinas,	Climacus	 levels	a	philosophical	 and	 ethical	 charge	 at	 Western	 rationality:	 that	 its	 totalising	methods	 entail	 inauthentic	 and	 demoralising	 relationships	 to	 others	 that	deracinate	persons	from	their	existential	context	of	ethical	agency.146	Climacus	also	sees	rationality	as	awoken	by	the	other,	through	its	desire	for	and	 interest	 in	 inassimilable,	mysterious	others.	This	 is	particularly	evident	in	 religion,	 which	 is	 a	 response	 to	 something	 taken	 as	 an	 absolute	 and	transcendent	reality.	He	describes	 this	desire	as	motivating	rationality,	arguing	that	 it	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 human	understanding	 that	 it	 is	 driven	 towards	 its	 own	boundaries	and	downfall	in	an	encounter	with	what	it	cannot	comprehend,	 ‘the	understanding’s	 paradoxical	 passion	 that	 wills	 collision	 awakens	 and,	 without	really	 understanding	 itself,	 wills	 its	 own	 downfall.’	 (PF,	 pp.	 38-39)	 This	 is	because	understanding	is	motivated	by	desire	for	consummation	with	the	other;	hence	he	describes	 it	as	motivated	by	an	existential	 lacuna,	 ‘It	 is	 the	same	with	the	 paradox	 of	 erotic	 love.	 A	 person	 lives	 undisturbed	 in	 himself,	 and	 then	awakens	the	paradox	of	self-love	as	love	for	another,	for	one	missing’	(PF,	p.	39).	Objectivity	 represents	 an	 attempt	 to	 secure	 a	 relationship	 to	 the	 other	 by	mastering	it	within	a	system	of	representation	but	the	paradox	is	that	it	cannot	be	possessed	and	still	be	 the	desirable,	 transcendent	other.	As	 in	 love,	one	can	only	sustain	a	relationship	to	the	other,	not	master	it,	such	that	the	collision	with	the	other	occasions	the	decision	of	how	to	relate	to	it:	in	faith	or	offence	(PF,	p.	49).																																																											145	CUP,	p.	134.	Climacus	even	describes	it	as	annulling	the	agency	of	God	in	history	(CUP,	p.	156).	146	See,	for	example:	Emmanuel	Levinas,	‘God	and	Philosophy’.	In	Adriaan	T.	Peperzak,	Simon	Critchley	and	Robert	Bernasconi	(eds.)	Emmanuel	Levinas:	Basic	Philosophical	Writings,	pp.	131-135.		
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(2.3.b)	Essential	Knowing	is	Subjective;	Subjective	Truth	In	contrast	to	objective	knowing,	Climacus	advocates	subjective	knowing	and	 equates	 truth	 and	 subjectivity,	 ‘subjectivity	 is	 truth’	 (CUP,	 p.	 203).	 The	meaning	of	this	claim	is	a	contentious	issue	and	is	key	to	positioning	Climacus	in	relation	 to	 exclusivism	 and	 pluralism.	 It	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 advocating	relativistic	 views	 that	 commitment	makes	 something	 true	 or	 that	 there	 are	 no	truths	 beyond	 relative	 commitments. 147 	Climacus’	 defence	 of	 the	 ‘how’	 of	commitment	as	the	measure	of	subjective	truth	seems	to	support	this,	‘If	only	the	
how	of	this	relation	is	in	truth,	the	individual	is	in	truth,	even	if	he	in	this	way	were	
to	relate	himself	to	untruth.’	 (CUP,	p.	199)	Climacus’	assertion	of	the	superiority	of	the	passionate,	authentic	idolater	over	the	hypocritical,	inauthentic	Christian,	on	 the	grounds	of	 their	different	existential	orientations	seems	 to	apply	 this	 to	support	religious	relativism	(CUP,	p.	201).	In	 order	 to	 avoid	 this	 conclusion,	 numerous	 commentators	 see	subjectivity	as	entailing	an	appropriative	 relation	 to	objective	 truths,	 such	 that	subjectivity	 incorporates	 an	 objective	 pole	 and	 the	 highest	 position	 is	 both	objectively	and	subjectively	true.148	Evans,	for	example,	claims	that,	‘[the]	thesis	that	objective	truth	is	the	outcome	of	subjective	truth	is	held	by	Kierkegaard	as	well	 as	 Climacus’. 149 	For	 such	 interpreters,	 Climacus	 and	 Kierkegaard	 are	exclusivists	about	truth	and	are	simply	concerned	to	describe	a	subjective	way	of																																																									147	MacIntyre,	for	example,	sees	Kierkegaard	as	advocating	an	amoral	position	that	what	is	chosen	does	not	matter,	only	that	a	choice	is	made	and,	furthermore,	for	seeing	this	choice	as	subjective	and	groundless,	accusing	him	of	advocating,	‘the	distinctively	modern	standpoint…[that]…moral	commitment…[is]	the	expression	of	a	criterionless	choice…a	type	of	choice	for	which	no	rational	justification	can	be	given.’	[Alasdair	MacIntyre,	After	Virtue	(London:	Duckworth,	1985	[Second	Edition]),	p.39.]		148	Hannay	argues	that	subjective	appropriation	is	a	necessary	condition	but,	without	an	objective	component,	insufficient	for	subjective	truth.	[Alister	Hannay,	Kierkegaard	(London:	Routledge,	1982),	pp.	136-7.	149	C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript	and	Fragments:	The	Religious	Philosophy	of	
Johannes	Climacus,	p.	129.	
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arriving	 at	 this	 truth.	 Hence	 Piety	 claims	 that	 subjective	 truth	 is	 simply	 the	appropriation	of	objectively	true	ethico-religious	knowledge	in	one’s	 life.150	She	asserts	 that	 Kierkegaard	 and	 Climacus	 are	 exclusivists	 about	 the	 truth	 of	Christianity,	 ‘There	is,	for	Kierkegaard,	a	single	ethical-religious	reality—that	is,	Christianity—it	 is	 just	 that	 the	way	 to	 knowledge	of	 this	 reality	 is	 through	 the	individual,	 through	 attention	 to	 his	 subjective	 experience	 as	 such’.151	She	 also	rejects	pluralist	and	relativist	 interpretations,	 ‘Kierkegaard’s	claim	that	 truth	 is	subjectivity	 means	 no	 more	 than	 that	 when	 “truth”	 is	 prescriptive	 of	 an	individual’s	existence,	the	substance	of	the	prescription	ought	to	be	expressed	in	that	 existence,	 not	 that	 Christianity	 may	 be	 “true”	 for	 one	 person	 and	Buddhism…“true”	for	another.’152		This	 concern	 is	 justified	 in	 that	 Climacus,	 the	most	 radical	 advocate	 of	subjectivity	 in	 the	 authorship,	 emphasises	 the	 possibility	 of	 specific,	 authentic	responses	to	the	real	human	situation	alongside	his	assertion	of	uncertainty	and	the	 irrevocable	 subjectivity	 of	 knowing.	 While	 acknowledging	 this,	 I	 follow	Holmer	 in	 rejecting	 attempts	 to	 incorporate	 an	 objective	 pole	 into	 subjectivity	and	I	reject	exclusivist	interpretations.			Objective	 truth	 cannot	 be	 integrated	 into	 subjectivity	 because	 the	ultimate	 truths	 are	 inaccessible	 within	 the	 processual	 development	 of	 the	subject;	 no	 security	 or	 conclusions	 can	 be	 achieved	 (CUP,	 pp.	 85-86),	 and	 the	individual	remains	perpetually	alienated	from	reality	as	a	system	(CUP,	p.	109;	p.	118).	Identity	between	thought	and	reality	cannot	be	achieved:	only	the	relation	is	 accessible,	 ‘the	 ethical	 actuality’,	 never	 the	 objects	 or	 ‘historical	 externality’																																																									150	M.	G.	Piety,	Ways	of	Knowing:	Kierkegaard’s	Pluralist	Epistemology,	p.	129;	p.	162.	151	M.	G.	Piety,	Ways	of	Knowing:	Kierkegaard’s	Pluralist	Epistemology,	pp.	96-97.	152	M.	G.	Piety,	‘The	epistemology	of	the	Postscript.’	In,	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	p.	201	
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(CUP,	 p.	 575).153	As	 Mooney	 observes,	 persons	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 determine	‘decisive’	 answers	 to	 the	 forced	 existential	 and	 ethico-religious	 questions,	‘Subjectivity	becomes	an	apt	and	even	urgent	orientation…because	our	needs	as	persons	far	exceed	our	cognitive	needs.	We	need	much	more	in	life	than	cognitive	
success.’ 154 Furthermore,	 objective	 truth-claims	 are	 themselves	 products	 of	subjective	interpretations	and	existential	decisions.		Piety’s	 interpretation	misunderstands	 the	nature	of	 subjective	 truth	and	knowing.	 Climacus	 describes	 subjective	 knowing	 as	 taking	 account	 of	 the	interpretative	and	existential	features	of	knowing	in	the	existence	of	the	knower.	‘Subjective	reflection’	is	a	means	of	interpreting	and	constituting	the	underlying	activities	 of	 subjectivity	 through	 which	 the	 person	 interacts	 with	 and	 knows	existence.	 He	 refers	 to	 such	 knowing	 as	 ‘essential	 knowing’,	 because,	 ‘the	knowledge	is	related	to	the	knower,	who	is	essentially	an	existing	person’	(CUP,	pp.	 197-198).	 Stokes	 interprets	 it	 as	 ‘essential’	 because	 it	 establishes	 the	foundational	 meaning	 of	 the	 commitments	 and	 structures	 for	 the	 individual:	subjective	 reflection	 is	 a	means	 of	 exploring	meaning-conferral	 structures	 that	inform	 existential	 activity,	 ‘All	 questions	 of	 inquiry	 will	 be	 attended	 by	 a	nonconceptual	‘question’…	‘how	does	all	this	relate	to	me?’155	It	is	also	‘essential’	because	 the	 practical	 and	 ethical	 implications	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 indicate	that	the	most	 important	questions,	which	are	normative	for	human	life	and	are																																																									153	While	Climacus	admits	the	necessity	of	knowing	about	Christianity	in	order	to	constitute	Christian	subjectivity,	this	knowledge	is	not	objective	but	always	subjective	and	performative	know-how,	‘“What	is	Christianity?”….	[T]he	person	asking	about	it	is	asking	in	terms	of	existing	and	in	the	interest	of	existing’,	(CUP,	p.	373)	that	is,	‘whether	he	would	be	a	Christian’,	and	he	contrasts	this	with	knowledge	of	cognitive	knowledge	(CUP,	p.	372).	Furthermore,	this	relation	is	intersubjective	(CUP,	pp.	200-201),	directed	at	personal	beings,	like	Christ,	such	that	the	relation	can	never	be	objectified	and	exists	only	subjectively	as	a	relation	to	a	relational	being	or	event,	‘Actuality,	that	is,	that	such	and	such	has	actually	happened,	is	the	object	of	faith’	(CUP,	p.	581).		154	Edward	F.	Mooney,	On	Søren	Kierkegaard:	Dialogue,	Polemics,	Lost	Intimacy,	and	Time,	p.	184.	155	Patrick	Stokes,	Kierkegaard’s	Mirrors:	Interest,	Self,	and	Moral	Vision	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2010),	p.	175.	
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thus	 ‘forced’	 questions,	 relate	 to	 subjectivity	 and	must	 be	 engaged	with	 in	 the	context	 of	 embodied	 existence:	 one	 has	 to	 decide	 how	 one	 is	 going	 to	 live,	construct	selfhood,	form	relationships	and	act	in	relation	to	others.				Subjective	 truths	 are	not	 principles	 that	 can	be	 objectively	 true	 or	 false	but	are	rather	decisions	on	what	relationships	one	should	have	and	how	one	is	to	configure	 one’s	 identity.	 There	 can	 be	 no	 objectively	 true	 answers	 to	 such	questions	as	“Should	I	date	this	person?”,	“Should	I	pursue	a	career	in	the	theatre	or	 music?”,	 or,	 “what	 is	 the	 subjective	 significance	 of	 death	 for	 me	 and	 how	should	I	respond	to	it?”	Hence,	as	examples	of	his	principle	of	subjective	truth,	Climacus	cites	the	questions,	 ‘what	 it	means	 to	 die’	 (CUP,	 p.	 165),	 ‘what	 it	means	 to	 be	 immortal’	(CUP,	 p.	 171),	 ‘what	 does	 it	mean	 that	 I	 should	 thank	God?’	 (CUP,	 p.	 177)	 and,	‘what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 marry?’	 (CUP,	 p.	 179)	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 existential	meaning	 and	 how	 one	 relates	 cannot	 be	 determined	 by	 objective	 facts;	objectivity	 obstructs	 subjective	 responsiveness	 and	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 an	 evasive	procedure	aimed	at	disengaging	from	the	anxiety	of	appropriative	choice.		Hence,	Climacus	argues	that	the	doctrine	of	immortality	cannot	be	proven	to	 be	 true	 and	 doing	 this	would	 negate	 its	 underlying	 existential	meaning	 and	ability	to	elicit	existential	action:	it	essentially	expresses	hope	for	something	that	seems	impossible	in	the	present	situation;	proving	it	to	be	true	would	prevent	it	providing	 such	 hope,	 ‘Objectively	 the	 question	 cannot	 be	 answered	 at	 all,	because	 objectively	 the	 question	 of	 immortality	 is	 precisely	 the	 intensification	and	highest	 development	 of	 the	developed	 subjectivity.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 173)	On	 such	questions,	 one	 simply	 has	 to	 decide	what	 to	 do,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 authenticity	with	which	 the	 decision	 is	 made	 that	 is	 the	 mark	 of	 truth.	 Holmer	 interprets	
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subjective	truth	in	the	same	way,	seeing	it	as	referring	to	the	existential	reality	that,	‘Every	man	has	to	synthesise	his	hopes,	his	plans,	his	expectations,	and	his	projects	with	actual	situations.’156	Authenticity	and	subjective	 truth	do	not	 involve	conformity	with	ethical	principles,	 as	 Piety	 claims,	 as	 they	 are	 relative	 and	 situational.	 However,	 since	Climacus	 regards	 the	 person	 as	 essentially	 relational	 (see	 Chapters	 1	 and	 6),	authenticity	 exists	 not	 simply	 in	 such	 specific	 relationships	 but	 in	 one’s	 entire	way	 of	 being	 in	 response	 to	 the	 human	 situation,	 allowing	 a	 range	 of	 general	features	of	authenticity	to	be	identified,	‘To	subjective	reflection,	truth	becomes	appropriation…and	 the	 point	 is	 to	 immerse	 oneself,	 existing,	 in	 subjectivity.’	(CUP,	 p.	 192)	 The	 meaning	 of	 the	 claim	 that	 truth	 is	 subjectivity	 is	 that	 an	authentic	way	of	sustaining	personhood	and	relationships	 is	 the	personal	 truth	for	which	one	should	strive:	one	can	be	true	to	oneself	and	to	what	it	is	to	be	a	human	 person.	 Relationships	 do	 not	 make	 particular	 things	 true,	 as	 in	 the	relativist	position,	but	the	orientation	of	relating	is	itself	truth	because	it	signifies	a	whole	way	of	being	in	the	world	and	a	means	of	making	things	‘true	for	me’.157		As	Dreyfus	 observes,	 a	 subjective	 relation	 to	 the	 existential	 situation	 of	actuality	is	itself	truth	because	it	is	the	precondition	for	all	subsequent	meaning,	comprehension	and	beliefs:	it,	‘centres	and	outlines	a	whole	world	within	which	an	 infinite	 variety	 of	 experience	 can	 occur	 for	 an	 individual’;	 subjectivity	 is	 an	existential	 hermeneutical	 commitment,	 ‘to	 a	world	which	 it	 opens	 up	 and	 lays	
																																																								156	Paul	L.	Holmer,	On	Kierkegaard	and	the	Truth,	p.	139.	157	Hence	he	rejects	the	idea	that	Don	Quixote’s	passionate	embodiment	of	idiosyncrasies	makes	them	true	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	an	inauthentic	way	of	being	in	the	world.	(CUP,	p.	195)	
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out	as	real	for	him.’158	It	is	for	this	reason	that	subjectivity	is	linked	most	closely	with	an	‘evig	salighed’	and	‘essential	knowing’:	because	it	relates	to	the	way	one	constructs	subjectivity	itself	in	relation	to	what	one	considers	most	important.		The	existential	context	of	persons	necessitates	passionate,	appropriative	activity,	agency,	decision,	creativity,	interest,	and	the	formation	of	personhood	to	interpret	 and	 configure	 its	 relational	 place	 and	 animate	 existence.159	This	 is	balanced	by	acknowledging	the	finite	and	provisional	nature	of	human	existence	and	knowing:	a	passionate	commitment	alongside	a	refusal	of	attachment	to	any	answers	 as	 finally	 authoritative	 that	 would	 allow	 subjectivity	 to	 be	 translated	into	objectivity,	‘he	always	keeps	open	the	wound	of	negativity.’160																																																																158	Samuel	J.	Todes	and	Hubert	L.	Dreyfus,	‘The	Existentialist	Critique	of	Objectivity.’	In,	William	L.	McBride	(ed.),	Existentialist	Background:	Kierkegaard,	Dostoevsky,	Nietzsche,	Jaspers,	Heidegger,	p.	251.	159	CUP,	p.	294.	Subjective	reflection	addresses	such	questions	as	how	to	relate	and	configure	subjectivity	(CUP,	p.	129),	personal	ethical	choices	(CUP,	p.	121),	activity	(CUP,	p.	158)	and	realities	facing	the	subject,	like	death	(CUP,	p.	165).	This	interpretation	is	supported	by	Mooney,	who	sees	it	as	analysing,	‘lines	of	meaningful	connection	that	structure	self	and	world.’	Edward	Mooney,	Selves	in	Discord	and	Resolve:	Kierkegaard’s	Moral-Religious	Psychology	from	EITHER/OR	
to	SICKNESS	UNTO	DEATH,	pp.	70-71.	160	CUP,	p.	85.	Mehl	rejects	this	interpretation,	citing	Climacus’	claim	that,	‘The	ethical	is	the	only	certainty…the	only	secure	knowledge’	(CUP,	p.	152),	and	arguing	that	actuality	provides,	‘our	Archimedean	point,	our	certain	grounding	in	the	shifting	sands	of	the	empirical.’	[Peter	Mehl,	
Thinking	Through	Kierkegaard:	Existential	Identity	in	a	Pluralistic	World,	p.	49].	Mehl	thus	criticises	Climacus	for	making	a	Cartesian	move	to	the	certainty	of	the	subject	and	for	setting	the	criteria	of	objective	certainty	illegitimately	high:	‘truth	for	finite	humans	is	educated	guesses,	relative	informed	beliefs’.	[Peter	Mehl,	Thinking	Through	Kierkegaard:	Existential	Identity	in	a	
Pluralistic	World,	p.	55].	However,	Mehl	misinterprets	the	‘certainty’	ascribed	to	the	ethical:	the	ethical	is	not	a	basis	of	certain	knowledge	but	is	defined	as	a,	‘task	assigned	to	every	human	being’;	its	certainty	is	thus	contrasted	with	the	uncertainty	of	other	tasks	and	involves	only	the	certainty	that	everyone,	by	virtue	of	their	relational,	existential	context,	has	this	task,	‘the	ethical	is…the	reconciling	fellowship	with	every	human	being.’	(CUP,	pp.	152-153)	
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2.4.	Key	Features	of	the	Pseudonyms’	Christologies	(2.4.a)	Existential	Christology	The	 pseudonyms	 interpret	 faith	 in	 Jesus	 as	 the	 defining	 relationship	 of	Christian	 religiousness.	 Anti-Climacus	 sees	 imitative	 and	 contemporaneous	relationships	with	 Jesus	 as	 the	 heart	 of	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness.161	In	conformity	with	their	existential	approach,	 they	explicate	 their	Christologies	as	expressing	 particular	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 relation	 to	 Jesus.	 This	 is	 particularly	significant	for	RD:	Christology	has	provided	the	basis	for	Christian	positions	on	other	 religions,	 claims	 of	 Jesus’	 uniqueness	 and	 universal	 significance	 posing	serious	 obstacles	 to	 full	 engagement	 with	 others.	 As	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 later	chapters,	 the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 also	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	 a	 deeper	engagement	with	diversity.		Climacus	identifies	the	central	problematic	of	Christian	faith	as	being	how	its	claims	about	the	universal	and	eternal	soteriological	significance	of	its	object	of	faith,	Jesus,	relate	to	the	uniqueness	and	locatedness	of	that	object	as	present	in	 a	 particular	 historical	 moment	 and	 accessible	 to	 people	 in	 later	 times	 only	through	their	subjective	appropriation	of	it	in	reliance	on	testimonies	about	that	historical	 event.	His	 central	 question	 is,	 ‘Can	 a	 historical	 point	 of	 departure	be	given	 for	 an	 eternal	 consciousness…can	 an	 eternal	 happiness	 be	 built	 on	historical	knowledge?’	(PF,	p.	1;	See	also	CUP,	p.	17).	Comparably,	Anti-Climacus	focuses	 on	 Jesus’	 universal	 soteriological	 invitation	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	faith/offence	 that	 is	 generated	 by	 its	 being	 issued	 from	 a	 specific,	 intrinsically	offensive	site	(PiC,	p.	9).		
																																																								161	Merold	Westphal	sees	this	as	the	core	of	Anti-Climacian	faith.	See:	Merold	Westphal,	
Kierkegaard’s	Concept	of	Faith	pp.	231-277.	
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Their	 Christologies	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 person,	 their	‘evig	 salighed’,	 and	 the	specific	historical	object	offering	 ‘evig	 salighed’.162	They	offer	phenomenological	 and	existential	 accounts	of	how	 the	person	enters	 into	and	is	affected	by	faith	in	Jesus	as	saviour,	for	example,	by	coming	to	share	in	its	subjective	truth	(PiC,	p.205).163	They	offer	thin,	existential	Christologies,	focused	on	 interpreting	 Christological	 language	 as	 expressing	 the	 heuristic	 function	 of	Jesus	 in	 bringing	 about	 a	 salvific,	 existential	 transformation	 of	 the	 person.164	
																																																								162	The	relationship	between	Jesus	and	the	‘evig	salighed’,	including	doctrinal	formulations	of	the	nature	of	Jesus,	lie	outside	of	human	consciousness	and	the	pseudonyms	reject	the	usefulness	of	historically,	doctrinally	and	metaphysically	focussed	Christologies,	which	are	grounded	in	particular	conceptions	of	this	relationship.	Hence	there	is	no	consideration	by	the	pseudonyms	of	how	the	two	natures	relate,	nor	of	how	Jesus	relates	to	the	Trinity,	of	the	virgin	birth,	atonement,	redemption,	Christ’s	sacrificial	death,	or	the	cosmic	defeat	of	death	and	sin	in	the	resurrection.	The	pseudonyms	devote	some	attention	to	this	by	expounding	the	claim	that	Jesus	is	a	‘sign’,	arguing	that	offence	is	partly	generated	by	the	person’s	inability	to	reconcile	the	two	aspects	of	Jesus’	nature	(PiC,	p.	81),	and	asserting	his	role	as	divine	saviour.	This	has	led	some	interpreters	to	seek	to	find	a	framework	for	interpreting	Kierkegaard	as	possessing	an	underlying	theological	or	metaphysical	Christology.	It	is	used	by	Law,	for	example,	to	support	his	claim	that	Kierkegaard	adheres	to	a	Chalcedonian	and	Kenotic	Christology	[David	R.	Law,	Kierkegaard’s	Kenotic	
Christology.].	Such	attempts	will	not	be	considered	as	they	fail	to	recognise	the	existential	emphases	and	agenda	of	the	texts	to	contrast	two	bodies,	Jesus	and	the	Danish	church,	rather	than	provide	substantive	reflection	on	the	actual	nature	of	Christ.	However,	the	thrust	of	these	reflections	is	polemical,	aimed	at	critiquing	Christologies	that	focus	on	the	nature	of	Jesus.	Both	pseudonyms	criticise	such	Christologies	as	precluding	personal	transformation,	obfuscating	the	existential	and	soteriological	nature	of	the	relationship	to	Christ	by	focussing	on	objective	issues	(CUP,	p.	610,	PiC,	p.	26),	attempting	to	make	the	nature	of	Christ	intelligible	within	a	metaphysical	system	or	attempting	to	legitimate	beliefs	about	Jesus	through	historical	demonstration,	theological	arguments	or	the	authority	of	the	‘Established	Order’	to	secure	the	exclusive	truth	of	Christianity	in	a	way	that	occludes	the	necessity	of	risk	for	faith.	Anti-Climacus’	reflections	on	Jesus	contrast	the	Jesus	of	the	New	Testament	and	the	contemporary	Danish	church,	offering	an	ideology-critique	of	the	hegemonic	uses	of	Christology	rather	than	attempting	to	construct	a	substantial	Christology.	[Bruce	Kirmmse,	Kierkegaard	in	Golden	Age	Denmark	(Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1990),	p.	380.]	A	similar	interpretation	of	the	context	is	offered	by,	Robert	L.	Perkins,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Anti-Climacus	in	His	Social	and	Political	Environment’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC]	163	‘the	being	of	truth	is	the	redoubling	of	truth	within	yourself…that	your	life…expresses	the	truth	approximately	in	the	striving	for	it…just	as	the	truth	was	in	Christ	a	life,	for	he	was	the	truth.’	For	example:	becoming,	‘a	new	person’,	expressing,	‘repentance’	and	experiencing,	‘rebirth’.	(PF,	pp.	18-19).	That	their	Christologies	are	explored	in	relation	to	the	existential	transformation	effected	in	the	person	through	a	faith-relationship	with	Jesus	is	acknowledged	even	by	commentators	who	stress	their	Christian	orthodoxy,	such	as	Rae,	Law	and	Gouwens.	Gouwens,	for	example,	refers	to	them	as	‘functional’	Christologies.	[Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard	and	
Theology	(London:	Continuum,	2010),	p.	58.	David	R.	Law,	‘Making	Christianity	difficult:	the	“existentialist	theology”	of	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript.’	In	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.)	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	pp.	219-246.	David	J.	Gouwens,	Kierkegaard	
as	Religious	Thinker	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	p.	144.]	164	My	interpretation	coheres	with	Law’s	view	of	Kierkegaard	as	an	existential	theologian,	but	I	reject	Law’s	doctrinally	focused	understanding	of	the	relationship	on	the	grounds	that	he	leans	
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Substantial	claims	are	made	about	Jesus’	nature:	that	he	is	the	God-man	(PiC,	p.	143),	 the	presence	of	God	on	earth,	 ‘as	 an	 individual	human	being’,	 (PiC,	 p.31)	and	 is	 the	 Absolute	 Paradox	 (PF,	 p.	 37).	 However,	 these	 are	 explicated	existentially	 in	 relation	 to	 how	 they	 are	 experienced:	 offence	 repelling	 the	person	 (PF,	p.	49;	PiC,	p.	139);	undermining	understanding	 (PF,	pp.	38-9);	 and	exciting	 a	 subjective,	 passionate	 appropriation	 (PF,	 p.	 44;	 CUP,	 p.	 385;	 PiC,	 p.	202),	that	includes	love	(PF,	p.	25;	PiC,	p.	181),	suffering	(CUP,	p.	431;	PiC,	p.	179)	and	repentance	(PiC,	p.	67),	all	summed	up	in	the	life	of	faith	(PF,	p.	65;	CUP,	p.	611;	PiC	p.	82)	and	a	dialectical	relationship	of	‘contemporaneity’	between	Jesus	and	the	person	that	is	based	on	fidelity	and	grace	(PF,	pp.	26-32	and	PiC,	p.	64).			Climacus	views	 Jesus	 through	 the	 lens	of	 ‘the	moment’	within	 the	 life	of	the	person	in	which	Jesus	becomes	a	‘saviour’	for	the	person	(PF,	pp.	17-18),	‘the	eternal,	previously	non-existent,	came	into	existence	in	that	moment’	(PF,	p.	13).	He	states	that	all	additional	information	about	Jesus,	beyond	what	is	required	to	effect	 this	 transformation,	 is	superfluous,	 ‘Even	 if	 the	contemporary	generation	had	not	left	anything	behind	except	these	words,	“We	have	believed	that	in	such	and	 such	 a	 year	 the	 god	 appeared	 in	 the	 humble	 form	 of	 a	 servant,	 lived	 and	taught	 among	 us,	 and	 then	 died.”	 –	 that	 is	 enough….	 [T]his	 little	announcement…is	enough	to	become	an	occasion	for	someone	who	comes	later,	
																																																																																																																																																														towards	seeing	the	doctrines	as	objectively	fixed	by	Creedal	Christianity,	with	the	Kierkegaardian	interest	simply	being	in	their	subjective	appropriation,	‘Here	it	is	not	doctrine	that	is	the	problem,	but	the	way	the	individual	relates	him/herself	to	doctrine.’	[David	R.	Law,	Kierkegaard’s	Kenotic	
Christology	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	p.	15]	In	contrast,	my	interpretation	is	that	Kierkegaard	offers	a	more	radical	reinterpretation	of	Christian	symbols	as	existential,	describing	ways	of	being	rather	than	offering	quasi-metaphysical	pronouncement	about	the	nature	of	God.	In	this	way,	my	account	is	closer	to	Barrett’s	claim	that,	‘[For	Climacus]	Doctrines	are	not	connected	by	logical	relations,	but	by	concrete	activities	and	emotions.	The	synthesis	of	the	various	concepts	and	propositions	occurs	in	the	lives	of	individuals,	not	on	paper.’	[Lee	Barrett,	‘The	Paradox	of	Faith	in	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophical	Fragments:	Gift	or	Task?’	In,	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	Philosophical	Fragments	and	Johannes	
Climacus	(Macon:	Mercer	University	Press,	1994),	p.	283].	
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and	the	most	prolix	report	can	never	in	all	eternity	become	more	for	the	person	who	comes	 later.’	 (PF,	p.	104)	Though	Anti-Climacus	devotes	more	attention	to	the	details	of	Jesus’	life:	that	he	suffered	and	was	a	‘lowly’	person	in	conflict	with	religious	institutions	(PiC,	p.	47,	56,	59),	he	similarly	explicates	its	significance	in	relation	to	the	respondent	and	rejects	the	importance	of	Jesus	if	he	does	not	have	this	 relation	 to	 personal	 transformation,	 ‘So	 inseparable	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	offense	from	faith	that	if	the	God-man	were	not	the	possibility	of	offense	he	could	not	be	the	object	of	faith,	either.’	(PiC,	p.	143).			(2.4.b)	A	relationship	with	Jesus	facilitates	collision	and	transformation	The	 transformation	 achieved	 by	 faith	 in	 Jesus	 arises	 in	 a	 situation	 of	tension	and	‘collision’	that	is	essential	for	the	possibility	of	faith;	this	tension	is	coterminous	 with	 faith	 and	 is	 described	 as	 a	 relationship.	 Both	 pseudonyms	argue	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 God	 in	 Jesus	 cannot	 be	 demonstrated	 or	 made	intelligible	 because	 it	 is	 incommensurate	 with	 any	 historical	 evidence,	 even	Jesus’	 miracles	 (CUP,	 p.	 24;	 PiC,	 p.	 96);	 that	 it	 is	 implausible	 and	 paradoxical	because	contrary	to	human	expectations	of	the	divine;	and	that	the	presence	of	God	 in	 Jesus	 is	 thus	 offensive	 to	 human	 persons	 but	 that	 this	 presents	 an	opportunity	 for	a	decision,	 ‘either	 to	be	offended	or	 to	believe’	 (PiC,	p.105,	See	also:	PF,	p.	49),	 and	 for	 faith	as	 a	venture	 in	a	 context	of	objective	uncertainty	(CUP,	p.	203).	Human	incapacity	and	the	necessity	of	transformation	in	religiousness	is	prefigured	in	the	structures	of	consciousness	itself	and	could	be	encountered	in	various	 religious	 and	 non-religious	 configurations	 of	 subjectivity	 (PF,	 pp.	 38-
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39). 165 	The	 more	 rigorously	 one	 attempts	 to	 absolutise	 the	 absolute	 and	relativise	 the	 relative	 in	 renunciation,	 the	 more	 one	 realises	 one’s	 guilt,	inadequacy	 and	 failure.	 However,	 both	 pseudonyms	 identify	 the	 incapacity	 of	religious	striving	as	most	 fully	expressed	 in	a	 limit-point	encounter	or	collision	with	revelation.	 Jesus	provides	 the	paradigmatic	 form	of	such	revelation	as	 the	Absolute	Paradox	(PF,	p.	53)	or	‘sign	of	contradiction’	(PiC,	p.	125).		Anti-Climacus	 provides	 a	 tripartite	 account	 of	 how	 Jesus	 occasions	 this	collision,	 incorporating	Climacus’	analysis.	All	 three	relate	to	the	hiddenness	or	‘incognito’	of	God’s	presence	 in	 Jesus	(PiC,	p.	131),	which	 is	similarly	 identified	by	Climacus’	‘god’s	poem’	as	the	primary	motive	of	the	incarnation:	hiddenness	is	necessary	 to	 retain	 the	 freedom	 of	 human	 response	 (PF,	 pp.	 26-32)	 and	hiddenness	in	a	place	that	seems	to	contradict	the	presence	of	God	is	necessary	to	facilitate	the	collision	that	makes	faith	possible.	The	first	type	of	offence	is	Jesus’	undermining	of	attempts	to	commit	to	an	‘evig	salighed’	in	a	context	of	security.	Though	this	collision	is	due	to	the	nature	of	 understanding	 and	 reason	 (PF,	 p.	 49),	 this	 is	 because	 the	 understanding	 is	motivated	by	underlying	existential	structures	and	commitments	that	underpin	rationality;	 Jesus,	 ‘discloses	 the	 thoughts	 of	 hearts.’	 (PiC,	 p.	 126)166	For	 both	pseudonyms,	this	is	the	existential	demand	that	humans	feel	for	the	commitment	to	 be	 secured	 and	 legitimated	 by	 reasons,	 evidence	 or	 institutional	 authority,	particularly	 when	 dealing	 with	 something	 as	 important	 and	 decisive	 as	 one’s	‘evig	salighed’.	(CUP,	p.	21)	The	pseudonyms	argue	that	historical	and	theological	argument	 can	 never	 demonstrate	 the	 presence	 of	 God	 in	 Jesus.	 Many	 of	 the	
																																																								165	Westphal	makes	this	observation	in:	Merold	Westphal,	Kierkegaard’s	Concept	of	Faith,	p.	224.	166	This	interpretation	is	indebted	to:	David	J.	Gouwens,	Kierkegaard	as	Religious	Thinker,	p.	132.	
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proposed	 evidences	 for	 this,	 such	 as	 Jesus’	 signs	 and	miracles,	 are	 themselves	dependent	on	belief	or	are	ambiguous	and	open	 to	 interpretation	 in	what	 they	demonstrate	 (PiC,	 p.	 96).	 They	 are,	 at	 best,	 ‘approximations’	 (CUP,	 p.	 23).	Moreover,	 there	 are	 no	 criteria	 that	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 a	 human	 being	 is	God,	only,	at	best,	a	human	with	extremely	unusual	powers,	‘At	most…that	Jesus	Christ	 was	 a	 great	 man’	 (PiC	 p.	 27).	 The	 historical	 actions	 will	 always	 be	‘incommensurable’	with	the	infinite	divine	nature	asserted,	such	that,	 ‘If	I,	then,	or	anyone	starts	with	the	assumption	that	it	was	a	human	being,	it	can	never	in	all	eternity	be	shown	that	it	was	God.’	(PiC,	p.	29)		The	 two	 ‘essential’	 types	 of	 offence	 are	 collisions	 brought	 about	 by	 the	disparity	 between	 one’s	 expectations	 and	 the	 revelation,	 ‘that	 an	 individual	human	being	speaks	or	acts	as	if	he	were	God’	(PiC,	p.	94)	and	that	God	became	incarnate	 as	 a	 lowly	 person,	 ‘that	 he,	 the	 loftily	 exalted	 one,	 the	 Father’s	 only	begotten	Son,	that	he	should	suffer	in	this	manner,	that	he	should	be	surrendered	powerless	into	the	hands	of	his	enemies.’	(PiC,	p.	103)	Human	expectations	entail	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	God,	where	God	is	to	be	found	and	how	God	is	to	be	 related	 to,	 enshrined	 in	 established	 cultural-ethical-religious	 norms.	 The	identification	 of	 God	 in	 Jesus	 is	 opposed	 to	 ‘convention’,	 the	 authorities	 and	general	population	(PiC,	p.	56),	and	the	‘established	order’	of	society	and	religion	(PiC,	p.	47	and	pp.	86-87);	Jesus	is	seen	as	a	blasphemer	(PiC,	p.	54),	and	thus	the	opposite	of	a	religious	ideal.167	Far	from	demonstrating	his	divinity,	the	historical	details	make	it	more	implausible	as	he	is	identified	with	the	‘abased’,	‘this	lowly	man	who	moreover	claimed	to	be	God	(which	literally	amounts	to	pouring	oil	on																																																									167	Westphal	supports	this	interpretation	claiming	that,	‘for	most	of	the	jurors	the	problem	is	not	intellectual	but	social.’	Merold	Westphal,	‘Kenosis	and	Offense:	A	Kierkegaardian	Look	at	Divine	Transcendence’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	34.	
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fire).’	 (PiC,	 p.	 37)	 This	 also	 makes	 his	 link	 to	 an	 ‘evig	 salighed’	 and	 offer	 of	salvation	absurd:	‘it	is	a	contradiction	for	someone	to	want	to	help	others	when	he	himself	is	most	in	need	of	help.’	(PiC,	p.	39)	Finally,	as	a	prototype,	he	makes	the	 religious	 life	 itself	 repelling,	 because	he	unveils	 it	 as	 a	 life	 of	 suffering	 and	struggle	(PiC,	p.	63).		 	(2.4.c)	Contemporaneity	with	Jesus	The	 result	 of	 the	 collision	 for	 faith	 is	 to	 make	 it	 impossible	 to	 achieve	through	 human	 effort,	 forcing	 the	 person	 to	 rely	 on	 transformation	 through	divine	 grace.	While	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 foregoing	 could	 be	 achieved	without	specifically	Christological	symbols,	the	idea	that	divine	grace	is	received	through	contemporaneity	with	Jesus	directly	introduces	the	uniqueness	and	necessity	of	Jesus	 into	 Climacus’	 and	 Anti-Climacus’	 explication	 of	 Christian	 religiousness.	Jesus	is	the	means	through	which	human	incapacity	is	overcome,	necessitating	a	reliance	on	divine	activity	(PF,	p.	22),	grace	(PiC,	p.	67)	and	a	relationship	with	the	 specific	 historical	 Jesus	 as	 the	 object	 of	 faith	 and	medium	 for	 this	 activity.	According	 to	 Climacus’	 ‘god’s	 poem’,	 the	 religious	 life	 is	 a	 relationship	 to	 God,	which	 requires	a	historical	person	 in	which	God	adopts	 the	 ‘form	of	 a	 servant’	(PF,	 p.	 31)	 in	 a	 full	 kenosis	 and	 suffering	 (PiC,	 pp.	 33-34)	 that	 establishes	 his	equality	 with	 even	 the	 ‘lowliest’	 person	 (PF,	 p.	 31),	 thereby	 allowing	 for	 a	relationship	of	love	(PF,	p.	28)	that	is	freely	accessible	to	all	(PiC,	p.	55).	Climacus	understands	 this	 relationship	 as	 primarily	 constituted	 by	 an	 existential	appropriation	 of	 structures	 that	 arise	 from	 a	 commitment	 to	 Jesus	 as	 the	prototype	 of	 the	 Christian	 life:	 renunciation,	 resignation,	 suffering,	 repentance,	and	 faith.	Anti-Climacus	understands	 faith	as	synonymous	with	a	 transforming,	
	85	 	
inter-subjective	 relationship	 with	 Jesus	 as	 a	 contemporary,	 ‘This	contemporaneity	is	the	condition	of	faith,	and,	more	sharply	defined,	 it	 is	faith.’	(PiC,	p.	9)	The	 possibility	 of	 contemporaneity	 with	 Jesus	 is	 problematic	 because	Anti-Climacus	claims	it	is	not	the	risen	Christ	but	the	historical	person	of	Jesus	in	his	abasement	who	becomes	contemporaneous	with	the	person.	This	leads	some	to	interpret	the	pseudonyms	as	requiring	the	authority	of	Christian	structures	to		mediate	 information.	 Law,	 for	 example,	 sees	 contemporaneity	 as	 requiring	information	 about	 Jesus	 that	 can	 be	 mediated	 in	 memory	 and	 in	 spoken	 and	written	reports.168	Similarly,	Rae	asserts	the	necessity	of	believing	in	the	veracity	of	 biblical	 narratives.169	The	 nature	 of	 contemporaneity	 is	 also	 unclear.	 Some	interpreters,	such	as	Rae,	interpret	it	as	an	ethical	commitment,	imitating	Jesus’	self-sacrificial	 love	 and	 suffering:	 one	 is	 contemporaneous	 with	 Jesus	 by	following	him	as	prototype.170	Anti-Climacus	explains	it	 in	this	way	but	this	is	a	heuristic	 device	 intended	 to	 unveil	 the	 impossibility	 of	 achieving	 such	 high	demands	through	striving	(PiC,	p.	65).171	In	order	to	resolve	this	difficulty,	various	uses	of	‘contemporaneity’	can	be	distinguished.	 Contemporaneity	 can	 signify	 being	 historically	 contemporary;	 it	can	 signify	 embodying	 Jesus’	 life	 in	 obedience	 to	 him	 as	 prototype,	 something	that	cannot	be	fully	achieved;	it	can	also	signify	a	personal	relationship	with	him	through	 faith.	 The	 latter	 entails	 that	 it	 is	 a	 relationship	with	 an	 actual	 person;	
																																																								168	David	R.	Law,	Kierkegaard’s	Kenotic	Christology,	pp.	197-199.	169	Murray	A.	Rae,	‘The	Forgetfulness	of	Historical-Talkative	Remembrance	in	Kierkegaard’s	
Practice	in	Christianity’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	87.	170	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard	and	Theology,	pp.	80-82.		171	Rae	admits	this	in,	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard	and	Theology,	p.	81.	He	offers	a	more	coherent	interpretation	that	relates	the	two	in:	Murray	A.	Rae,	‘The	Forgetfulness	of	Historical-Talkative	Remembrance	in	Kierkegaard’s	Practice	in	Christianity’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	86.		
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hence	 Anti-Climacus	 contrasts	 it	 with	 viewing	 Jesus	 as	 a	 historical	 or	 poetic	figure,	‘Only	the	contemporary	is	actuality	for	me.	That	with	which	you	are	living	simultaneously	is	actuality—for	you.’	(PiC,	p.64)	In	that	it	signifies	a	relationship	between	 an	 individual	 person	 and	 Jesus,	 it	 is	 also	 individualising:	 faith	 is	 only	achieved	by	individuals	 in	relation	to	their	own	experiences,	appropriation	and	relationship.172	This	 ‘living	simultaneously’	 (PiC,	p.	64)	with	 Jesus	also	requires	that	Jesus’	history	is	‘sacred	history’,	that	is,	that	it	intersects	with	all	moments	of	human	history,	Jesus	existing	at	the	same	time	as	every	person,	‘His	life	on	earth	accompanies	the	human	race	and	accompanies	each	particular	generation	as	the	eternal	 history;	 his	 life	 on	 earth	 has	 the	 eternal	 contemporaneity.’	 (PiC,	 p.64)	Anti-Climacus	only	hints	at	how	Jesus	 is	present	 in	 this	 latter	way,	 linking	 it	 to	faith	 (PiC,	 p.	 9);	 religious	 experience	 for	 the	 believer,	 such	 as	 the	 comfort	 of	Jesus’	 presence	 (PiC,	 pp.	 15-16);	 and	 the	 appropriative	 transformation	 it	produces,	particularly	Jesus’	love	(PiC,	p.	181)	and	suffering	(PiC,	p.	179),	relating	to	 Jesus	 by	 becoming	 like	 him.	 This	 is	 in	 conformity	 with	 an	 existential-expressive	 approach,	 as	 it	 necessitates	 religious	 experience	 and	 existential	response	as	integral	to	Christian	faith	and	religiousness.																																																																172	This	argument	is	made	in:	Leo	Stan,	‘Contemporaneity’.	In,	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	William	McDonald	and	Jon	Stewart	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concepts,	Tome	II:	Classicism	to	Enthusiasm	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2014),	p.	63.	
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2.5.	Conclusion	This	chapter	has	outlined	the	pseudonyms’	descriptions	of	religiousness.	They	 map	 out	 a	 form	 of	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness,	 incorporating	 an	implicit	 epistemology	 and	 Christology,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 wider	 view	 of	religiousness.	They	understand	authentic	religiousness	as	a	way	of	being	that	is	perpetually	transforming	and	takes	place	within	a	process	of	striving	to	live	out	authentic	 selfhood,	 which	 commits	 absolutely	 to	 an	 absolute	 in	 the	 anxious	human	 situation	 defined	 by	 finitude,	 temporality,	 and	 mortality.	 Objective	certainty	and	knowledge	cannot	be	achieved	and	the	aim	of	persons	is	to	develop	authentic,	subjective	 interpretations	and	ways	of	being.	 In	the	case	of	Christian	religiousness,	although	this	begins	with	the	subjective	striving	of	the	person,	the	person	 is	 revealed	 by	 the	 process	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 in	 the	 Christian’s	confrontation	with	Jesus,	to	be	incapable	of	achieving	it;	they	are	thus	forced	to	rely	on	divine	grace	and	assistance,	which	is	mediated	by	contemporaneity	with	Jesus,	which	is	thus	the	means	of	achieving	a	transforming	religious	relationship	with	God.		Viewing	religions	as	spheres	of	existence	opens	up	a	range	of	options	for	engaging	with	RD	that	are	developed	in	subsequent	chapters.	Chapters	3	and	4	use	it	to	critique	the	classical	philosophical	view	of	RD.	Chapters	5	and	6	argue	that	 the	 existential	 situations	 in	 which	 religiousness	 arises	 are	 diverse	 and	subjective,	 such	 that	 diversity	 is	 to	 be	 expected	 and	 serves	 as	 a	marker	 of	 the	authenticity	of	the	commitment	(5.3.a).	The	depiction	of	authentic	religiousness	also	implies	a	number	of	points	at	which	engagement	with	alterity	and	diversity	is	 integral	to	authentic	selfhood	(5.3.a),	particularly	in	relation	to	Christological	themes:	 Jesus	 provides	 a	 collision	 with	 an	 inassimilable	 and	 offensive	 yet	
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revelatory	other,	located	beyond	religious	boundaries	(5.3.b).	Further	resources	provided	 by	 viewing	 religions	 as	 spheres	 of	 existence,	 explored	 in	 Chapter	 6,	include:	 how	 they	 intersect	 or	 interact,	 how	 one	 makes	 transitions	 between	them,	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 the	 shared	 human	 situation,	 and	 how	 one	communicates	them	to	outsiders.				 																		
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CHAPTER	3	
BEYOND	THE	CLASSICAL	VIEW:	A	CRITIQUE	OF	THE	DOMINANT	
PHILOSOPHICAL	TYPOLOGY	OF	RELIGIOUS	DIVERSITY	
	
(3.1)	Argument	in	Brief	This	 chapter	 draws	 together	 the	 existential	 approach	 to	 religion	 and	epistemology	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 2	 to	 critique	 the	 classical	 philosophical	problematization	and	typology	of	approaches	to	RD,	hereafter	referred	to	as	the	classical	view	(CV).	It	then	proposes	an	alternative	typology	of	approaches	to	RD	as	an	existential	problem.	CV	is	outlined	and	it	is	argued	that	it	is	founded	on	an	objective	ontology,	as	evinced	by	its	preoccupation	with	questions	of	truth	and	the	correspondence	of	 religions	 to	 metaphysical	 realities.	 The	 prioritisation	 of	 such	 questions	 is	insufficiently	sensitive	to	the	subjective	and	interpretative	nature	of	religions;	as	such	 it	 favours	 exclusivism	 and	 is	 evident	 particularly	 in	 exclusivist	 positions,	but	 it	 is	 also	 implicit	 in	 pluralistic	 positions	 within	 CV	 because	 they	 define	themselves	in	relation	to	CV’s	problematization	of	RD.		Four	theses	are	identified	as	entailed	in	this	objective	ontology	and	each	one	 is	 subjected	 to	 a	 Kierkegaardian	 critique.	 This	 critique	 is	 applied	 to	representative	 approaches	 across	 the	 spectrum	 of	 the	 typology	 in	 order	 to	demonstrate	 that	 they	 share	 a	 common,	 objective,	 and	 exclusivist	 ontology.	 In	each	case,	the	thesis	is	first	explained	as	it	is	evident	in	CV	as	well	as	exclusivism	and	pluralism.	Second,	it	is	demonstrated	that	it	fundamentally	misunderstands	the	nature	of	 religions	and	RD	by	 interpreting	 them	as	objective,	metaphysical,	doctrinal,	 or	 institutional	 structures,	 rather	 than	 subjective	ways	of	 being.	 It	 is	
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then	argued	that	the	existential	approach	is	superior	because	it	incorporates	the	subjective	and	resists	reifying	religious	structures.		The	 final	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 proposes	 an	 alternative	 typology	 of	commitment,	 focused	 on	 the	 types	 of	 religiousness	 evident	 in	 the	 different	approaches	 to	 RD:	 closed	 commitment,	 Quixotic	 commitment,	 partial	commitment	and	non-commitment.	This	is	intended	to	provide	a	Kierkegaardian	understanding	of	positions	on	diversity,	which	is	applied	in	Chapter	4,	as	well	as	to	open	up	new	possibilities	for	developing	positions	on	diversity	beyond	those	provided	by	CV.																	
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(3.2)	The	Problematization	of	Religious	Diversity	in	the	Classical	View	(3.2.a)	The	Classical	View	(CV)	The	 philosophical	 problematization	 of	 RD,	 that	 is,	 the	 philosophical	understanding	of	the	nature	of	RD	and	the	questions	and	problems	that	it	poses,	is	 dominated	 by	 CV,	 which	 also	 provides	 a	 typology	 of	 possible	 responses.173	Schmidt-Leukel’s	outline	and	defence	of	CV	is	taken	here	as	the	representative	of	it.174			 Schmidt-Leukel	 sees	 RD	 as	 raising	 the	 central	 question	 of	 whether	 and	how	many	 times,	 ‘mediation	 of	 a	 salvific	 knowledge	 of	 ultimate/transcendent	reality’,	 is	 a	 property	 of	 religions:	 none	 (atheism);	 once	 (exclusivism);	 many	times,	 but	 with	 one	 superior	 case	 (inclusivism);	 or	 many	 times,	 equally	(pluralism).175	He	 thus	 sees	 the	 primary	 problem	 of	 being	 in	which	 religion(s)	truth	 and	 salvation	 are	 located.	 This	 problem	 is	 explored	 in	 relation	 to	epistemological	and	doxastic	questions:	what	one	is	to	believe	in	the	context	of	competing	religious	truth-claims	and	how	one	is	to	legitimise	one’s	beliefs.176	He																																																									173	This	was	introduced	by	Race.	[Alan	Race,	Christians	and	Religious	Pluralism:	Patterns	in	the	
Christian	Theology	of	Religions.]	It	is	termed	the	‘classical	typology’	by	Hedges,	[Paul	Hedges,	
Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	17].	See	also:	Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	Christian	Approaches	to	Other	Faiths,	vii.	Knitter	identifies	a	theological	typology	that	organises	positions	differently,	in	relation	to	the	insider	perspective	adopted	by	adherents	of	a	religion	on	the	relation	of	their	religion	to	other	religions,	replacing	them,	fulfilling	them	or	having	parity	with	each	other.	However,	Knitter	and	Hedges	correlate	these	positions	to	the	classical	typology:	replacement	(exclusivism),	fulfilment	(inclusivism),	mutuality	(pluralism)	and	acceptance	(particularism);	they	are	also	indebted	to	the	same	problematization:	the	question	is	about	the	objective	status	and	relationship	between	different	extant	religious	bodies.	[Paul	F.	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	Religions,	vii-ix.	Paul	Hedges,	
Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	20.]	174	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism.		175	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	2005),	p.	19.	See	also:	Robert	B.	Stewart,	‘Can	Only	One	Religion	Be	True?	Considering	This	Question.’	In,	Robert	B.	Stewart	(ed.),	Can	Only	One	Religion	
Be	True?	Paul	Knitter	and	Harold	Netland	in	Dialogue,	p.	3.		176	Schmidt-Leukel	is	no	exception	in	this.	For	example,	see:	Kevin	Meeker	and	Philip	L.	Quinn,	‘Introduction:	The	Philosophical	Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	
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claims	 that	 the	 typology	 is	 ‘comprehensive’,	 such	 that	no	other	approaches	are	possible,	 and	 that	 one	 must	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 which	 position	 one	 is	 to	adopt	 when	 confronted	 with	 RD.177	While	 he	 admits	 that	 theologians	 might	adopt	different	perspectives,	such	as	bracketing	questions	of	truth	and	salvation,	such	perspectives	 are	not	 positions	 on	 the	problem	of	RD;	 insofar	 as	 they	 are,	they	will	conform	to	one	of	the	positions.178		 CV	 entails	 definitions	 of	 religion,	 truth,	 and	 salvation.	 These	 are	 loosely	defined	as	they	depend	on	which	position	is	adopted,	but	CV	offers	prescriptive	meta-definitions	 given	 that	 its	 problematization	 makes	 reference	 to	 religion,	truth	and	salvation	as	the	contested	issues.	A	fourth	feature	implicit	in	CV	is	its	epistemological	 assumption	 that	 the	problem	 is	 resolvable	objectively,	 through	philosophical	rationality.179		
																																																																																																																																																														Meeker	(eds.),	The	Philosophical	Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	2.	Basinger	similarly	focuses	on	the	question	of,	‘what	we	can	know	or	justifiably	say’.	[David	Basinger,	Religious	Diversity:	A	
Philosophical	Assessment,	vii.]	Byrne	sees	it	as	raising	a	fuller	range	of	questions,	though	he	similarly	identifies	epistemological	questions	and	questions	of	the	truth	of	accounts	as	the	core	issues	because	he	sees	religions	as	offering	competing	accounts	of	God	and	the	ultimate.	[Peter	Byrne,	‘A	Philosophical	Approach	to	Questions	about	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	
The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	29;	p.	37.]	177	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	20.	This	claim	is	rejected	by	a	number	of	scholars	as	being	reductive,	but	they	fail	to	provide	alternative	suggestions	that	do	not	directly	correlate	to	CV;	most	are	simply	concerned	to	nuance	the	threefold	typology.	For	example,	Morgan	argues	that	the	three	categories	are	inadequate	because	they	combined	two	distinct	questions:	the	question	of	salvation	and	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	world	religions;	these	are	distinct	such	that	one	could	be	an	exclusivist	about	one	question	but	a	pluralist	about	the	other.	He	also	argues	that	they	homogenise	the	various	positions	within	each	of	the	three.	However,	his	proposal	is	simply	to	offer	a	wider	list	of	varieties	of	exclusivism	and	inclusivism	in	relation	to	the	two	distinct	questions	[Christopher	W.	Morgan,	‘Inclusivisms	and	Exclusivisms’.	In,	Christopher	W.	Morgan	and	Robert	A.	Peterson	(eds.),	Faith	Comes	by	Hearing:	A	Response	to	Inclusivism	(Nottingham:	Apollos,	2008),	p.	22;	p.	26;	pp.	36-39)]	For	similar	proposals	about	CV,	see:		Paul	F.	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	Religions,	p.	238.	And:	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	
Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	19.	178	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	25.	179	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	27.	When	practical	solutions	are	offered,	as	in	D’Costa’s	proposal	of	the	need	for	interreligious	prayer,	this	is	similarly	grounded	in	a	philosophical	or	theological	account	
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CV	defines	religion	as	a	body	that	asserts	that	there	is	something	that	is,	‘more	important	than	anything	else	in	the	world’,	and	that	this	is	a,	‘transcendent	reality’,	 about	 which	 it	 possesses	 and	 mediates,	 ‘some	 form	 of	 [salvific]	knowledge	(or	revelation)’,	and	which	is	normative	for	belief	and	conduct.180	CV	claims	that	this	will	usually	be	in	the	form	of	a	‘grand	narrative’	that	makes	total	and	 ‘universal’	 claims	 about	 the	 whole	 of	 reality. 181 	Moreover,	 religion	 is	primarily	identified	with	‘world	religions’.182	CV	 defines	 contested	 claims	 as	 truth-claims	 expressed	 in	 accounts	 or	narratives	that	are	in	some	way	universal	or	total	in	the	claims	they	make	about																																																																																																																																																															that	is	presented	as	solving	the	problem	through	the	practical	resources	it	provides,	as	in	D’Costa’s	claim	that,	‘We	are,	thankfully,	not	God	and	cannot	know	the	prudential	meaning	of	religious	diversity,	if	indeed	there	is	any	such	meaning,	but	we	do	know	that	God’s	trinity	calls	Christians	to	seek	to	serve	and	worship	this	God	in	sometimes	quite	unpredictable	ways.’	[Gavin	D’Costa,	The	Meeting	of	Religions	and	the	Trinity	(Edinburgh:	T&T	Clark,	2000),	p.	166.]	The	same	is	true	of	McKim’s	argument	for	the	religious	ambiguity	of	the	cosmos:	it	solves	the	problem	because	the	ambiguity	indicates,	‘how	their	beliefs	should	be	held.’	[Robert	McKim,	Religious	
Ambiguity	and	Religious	Diversity	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001),	p.	153.]	180	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	18.	181	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Need	for	an	Interreligious	Theology’.	In,	Sharada	Sugirtharajah	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Modern	World	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012),	p.	23.	This	definition	is	shared	by	most	scholars	engaged	with	the	question.	Byrne,	for	example,	defines	a	religion	as	making	claims	about	the	ultimate	[Peter	Byrne,	‘A	Philosophical	Approach	to	Questions	about	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	
Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	29].	Although	McKim	does	not	emphasise	religious	accounts	in	this	way,	he	similarly	defines	religions	as	forms	of	life	that	are,	‘comprehensive…and	of	central	importance’,	to	their	adherents,	such	that	they	are	foundational,	in	the	same	way	as	accounts	of	reality,	for	everything	else	in	their	lives;	he	also	sees	epistemic	questions	and	questions	of	truth	as	the	central	issues.	[Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	12.]	182	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	21.	This	excludes	positions	not	regarded	as	religious,	including	atheism,	which	Schmidt-Leukel	distinguishes	as	a	fourth	position	in	CV,	ruling	out	the	possibility	that	atheists	could	be	pluralists	or	inclusivists,	and	humanism.	It	also	privileges	specific	religious	groups.	For	example,	there	is	no	consideration	of	new	religious	movements	or	minority	religions	in	most	anthologies	that	include	a	range	of	perspectives	from	Christianity,	Judaism,	Islam	and	Hinduism	[See,	for	example:	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-
Religious	Dialogue	(Oxford:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2013);	David	Cheetham,	Douglas	Pratt	and	David	Thomas	(eds.),	Understanding	Interreligious	Relations	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013);	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity].	While	Race	and	Hedges	include	a	short	section	on	it,	this	focuses	on	the	New	Age,	which	they	acknowledge	to	be	‘passé’	and	they	admit	that	new	religious	movements	are,	‘Often	ignored	or	side-lined	(if	not	excluded	outright)	in	discussions’,	despite	being	one	of	the	most	prevalent	groups	of	religions	in	the	West.	[Paul	Hedges,	‘New	Religious	Movements’	In,	Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	Christian	
Approaches	to	Other	Faiths,	p.	232].	
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reality,	 ‘Has	 not	 every	 religious	 belief	 –	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	contains	 some	 universal	 claims	 –	 already	 an	 element	 of	 a	 grand	 or	metanarrative?’183	CV	also	entails	a	view	on	the	truth-status	of	the	philosophical	positions	on	diversity:	one	of	the	positions	is	expected	to	offer	a	true	account	and	solution	of	the	problem	of	RD,	and	this	is	determined	by	the	correspondence	of	the	theory	to	reality;	it	is	also	exclusivist	in	that	it	is	assumed	that	this	position	is	incompatible	 with	 the	 other	 philosophical	 theories	 and	 religious	 positions	 on	diversity.184	If	 pluralism	 is	 true,	 it	 is	 exclusively	 true,	 ‘If	 a	 pluralist	 account	renders	 a	 broadly	 true	 picture,	 it	 inevitably	 excludes	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 particular	religion’s	exclusivist	or	 inclusivist	 superiority	claim’.185	Truth	 is	also	defined	as	absolute:	the	truth	that	is	contested	between	religions	and	the	approaches	of	CV	are	not	mundane	truth-claims	but	rather	make	vital	or	ultimate	claims	about	the	nature	of	reality	itself.	This	is	emphasised	because	CV	defines	the	truth-claims	as	salvific	and	thus	as	having	decisive	importance	for	the	person.		Although	 salvation	 is	 defined	more	 loosely,	 the	 concept	 has	 a	 Christian	heritage,	eschatological	implications	about	the	destiny	of	the	person,	and	moral	dimensions	pertaining	to	the	value	of	life.	Moreover,	by	seeing	this	as	mediated	by	the	knowledge	and	practices	possessed	by	religions,	Schmidt-Leukel	 follows	the	Christian	bias	towards	seeing	salvation	as	entailing	right	belief	and	conduct	achieved	through	conformity	with	religious	groups	and	as	being	agency-centred:	
																																																								183	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Need	for	an	Interreligious	Theology’.	In,	Sharada	Sugirtharajah	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Modern	World,	p.	23.	184	Markham	argues	that	the	debate	utilizes	various	different	conceptions	of	truth.	However,	all	posit	the	necessity	of	some	form	of	correspondence	to	reality,	whether	this	is	a	direct	correspondence	of	propositions,	or	of	coherent	systems.	Ian	S.	Markham,	‘Truth	in	Religion’.	In,	Chad	Meister	and	Paul	Copan	(eds.),	The	Routledge	Companion	to	Philosophy	of	Religion	(London:	Routledge,	2007),	pp.	194-195.	185	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Need	for	an	Interreligious	Theology’.	In,	Sharada	Sugirtharajah	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Modern	World,	p.	23.	
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the	aim	of	the	person	should	be	to	identify	the	right	religion,	beliefs	and	practices	so	that	he/she	can	adopt	them	and	thereby	achieve	salvation.186		(3.2.b)	Four	Approaches	Within	CV	This	 chapter	 considers	 four	 approaches	 within	 CV:	 Plantinga’s	exclusivism,	 Lindbeck’s	 particularism,	 Hick’s	 pluralism,	 and	 Cobb’s	complementary	pluralism.	These	highlight	the	core	features	of	CV	that	are	to	be	subjected	to	my	Kierkegaardian	critique.187	Plantinga’s	 exclusivism	 asserts	 that	 there	 are	 objectively	 true	 religious	beliefs	 that	 can	 be	 justifiably	 believed	 because	 cognitive	 faculties	 provide	sufficiently	 reliable	 access	 to	 reality. 188 	Plantinga	 claims	 that	 one	 religion	contains	all	religious-truth	claims	about	God,	reality	and	salvation	in	an	exclusive	way:	when	religions	make	claims	that	are	incompatible	with	these,	they	are	false,	‘the	 exclusivist	 holds	 that	 the	 tenets	 of	 some	 or	 the	 tenets	 of	 one	 religion—Christianity,	 let’s	 say—are	 in	 fact	 truth…[and]	 that	 any	 propositions,	 including	other	religious	beliefs,	that	are	incompatible	with	those	tenets	are	false.’189		Lindbeck’s	particularism	adopts	a	cultural-linguistic	view	of	religions	as,	‘a	 variegated	 set	 of	 cultural-linguistic	 systems’,	 that	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 all																																																									186	Heim	notes	and	criticizes	this	Christian-centric	view	of	salvation	as	afflicting	varieties	of	pluralism	and	CV,	proposing	that	‘salvations’	should	be	used	instead	to	preserve	the	plurality	and	distinctness	of	religious	aims.	He	equates	salvation	with	the	diverse	and	distinct	ends	pursued	by	religions,	claiming	that,	‘Religious	aims	and	fulfilments	are	various.’	[S.	Mark	Heim,	Salvations:	
Truth	and	Difference	in	Religion	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	1995),	p.	145.]	187	Inclusivism	is	considered	in	Chapter	5	rather	than	here	as	it	is	closer	to	the	position	that	will	be	defended	and	many	of	its	defenders,	such	as	Heim	and	Morgan,	offer	similar	criticisms	of	CV	to	those	offered	here.	188	Alvin	Plaintinga,	‘A	Defense	of	Religious	Exclusivism’.	In,	Alvin	Plantinga,	James	F.	Sennett	(ed.),	The	Analytic	Theist:	An	Alvin	Plantinga	Reader	(Grand	Rapids:	Eerdmans,	1998),	p.	187.	For	further	examples,	see:	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	
Religions,	pp.	20-22.	Daniel	Strange,	‘Exclusivisms’.	In,	Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	
Christian	Approaches	to	Other	Faiths,	p.	5.	189	Alvin	Plaintinga,	‘A	Defense	of	Religious	Exclusivism’.	In,	Alvin	Plantinga,	James	F.	Sennett	(ed.),	The	Analytic	Theist:	An	Alvin	Plantinga	Reader,	p.	189.	
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experience,	 thought	 and	 value-judgements;	 without	 these	 culturally	 mediated	structures,	these	are	impossible.190	As	‘comprehensive’	interpretative	structures,	Lindbeck	 concludes	 religions	 are	 ‘untranslatable’:	 outside	 and	 between	 such	structures	 there	 are	 no	 shared	 values,	 experiences,	 rationalities	 or	 rules	 for	discourse,	because	these	emerge	only	from	within	the	hermeneutical	regimes.191	Moreover,	 because	 one	 cannot	 achieve	 a	 non-tradition	 specific	 perspective	 to	decide	on	religious	truth,	pluralism	is	rejected	and	a	position	of	‘indeterminacy’	with	regards	to	other	religions	is	adopted.	Nevertheless,	the	approach	adopts	an	exclusivist	 position	 on	 its	 own	 religion,	 as	 Hedges	 observes,	 ‘Being	 based	 in	 a	Christian	 context,	 they	 believe	 that	 tradition	 tells	 them	 that	 salvation	 is	 only	possible	through	their	path’.192			 Hick’s	 pluralism	 asserts	 that	 many	 religions	 have	 parity	 in	 mediating	truth	and	salvation,	such	that,	‘there	is	more	than	one	legitimate	way	to	what	can	broadly	 be	 termed	 ‘salvation’’.193 	Hick	 advances	 the	 Kantian	 claim	 that	 the	divine,	 or	 Real,	 cannot	 be	 experienced	 or	 described	 in	 itself,	 only	 as	 it	 is	experienced	through	a	range	of	filters	that	make	experience	possible	and	that	are	provided	by	 the	 relative	 situation	of	 the	experiencer,	 including	his/her	 choices	and	 culture.194	Their	 situational	 and	mediated	 nature	means	 that	 religions	 are	interpretative,	 religious	 language	 being	 a	 symbolic	 expression	 of	 human																																																									190	George	A.	Lindbeck,	The	Nature	of	Doctrine:	Religion	and	Theology	in	a	Postliberal	Age	(London:	Westminster	John	Knox	Press,	1984),	p.40.	Milbank	outlines	a	similar	version	of	particularism.	See:	John	Milbank,	‘The	End	of	Dialogue’.	In,	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	
Uniqueness	Reconsidered,	pp.	174-191.	And:	John	Milbank,	Theology	and	Social	Theory:	Beyond	
Secular	Reason	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2006	[Second	Edition]).	191	George	A.	Lindbeck,	‘The	Gospel’s	Uniqueness:	Election	and	Untranslatability.’	In,	George	A.	Lindbeck,	James	J.	Buckley	(ed.),	The	Church	in	a	Postliberal	Age	(London:	SCM	Press,	2002),	p.	231.	192	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	28.	193	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	26.	And,	John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion.	194	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate	(London:	SCM	Press,	2005	[Second,	Revised	Edition]),	pp.	103-4.	And,	John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	246.	
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experiences	of	the	Real	rather	than	ontological	description.195	Religious	language	and	structures	interpret	and	express	experiences	of	God’s	will,	love	and	the	ideal	life.	They	also	effect,	‘human…transformation’,	from	‘self-centredness’	to	‘Reality-centeredness’	 or	 altruism,	 ‘Love,	 compassion,	 self-sacrificing	 concern	 for	 the	good	 of	 others,	 generous	 kindness	 and	 forgiveness’. 196 	This	 provides	 the	normative	 moral-soteriological	 ‘criterion’	 for	 interpreting	 and	 judging	 the	validity	of	religious	traditions.197	Hick	asserts	that	pluralism	accurately	describes	the	nature	of	religions	and	provides	a	basis	for	a	global	community	by	equalising	them	and	seeing	their	core	as	a	universal	commitment	to	altruism.198			 Cobb’s	complementary	pluralism	asserts	that	there	is	genuine	difference	in	reality	itself,	‘the	totality	of	what	is,	is	very	complex,	far	exceeding	all	that	we	can	 ever	 hope	 to	 know	 or	 think.’199	It	 asserts	 that	 different	 religions	 have	genuinely	encountered	different	aspects	of	this	totality,	‘in	different	parts	of	the	world	at	different	times,	remarkable	individuals	have	penetrated	into	this	reality	
																																																								195	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate,	pp.	105-106.	This	reading	is	informed	by	Sinkinson’s	exposition	of	the	relationship	of	situational	awareness	to	interpretation	in	Hick’s	position	and	of	his	reading	of	Hick	as	advocating	a	form	of	expressive-experiential	model	of	religion.	[Christopher	Sinkinson,	The	Universe	of	Faiths:	A	Critical	Study	of	John	Hick’s	Religious	
Pluralism	(Carlisle:	Paternoster	Press,	2001),	p.	37.]	196	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate,	p.	105.	And,	John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	240;	309;	325.	197	John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	325.	The	role	of	critical	assessment	of	religions	in	Hick’s	pluralism	should	not	be	stressed	too	greatly	because	Sinkinson	observes	that,	for	Hick,	‘the	knowledge	of	God	varies	among	religions	by	a	matter	of	degree,	not	as	a	matter	of	kind.’	[Christopher	Sinkinson,	The	Universe	of	Faiths:	A	Critical	Study	of	John	Hick’s	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	118]	While	some	religions	may	more	accurately	present	the	core	moral	truths	than	others,	it	cannot	be	said	that	one	is	true	and	another	false.	Nevertheless,	as	evinced	in	Hick’s	discussion	here	and	in	the	development	of	his	position	as	sketched	by	Sinkinson,	the	objective	of	providing	a	credible,	universal	religion	informed	by	philosophical	needs	and	the	enlightenment	method	is	a	feature	of	Hick’s	approach.	198	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate,	ix;	see	also	pp.	103-4.	And,	John	Hick,	An	
Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	246.	199	Cobb,	cited	in:	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	David	Ray	Griffin	(ed.),	Deep	Religious	Pluralism	(Louisville:	Westminster	John	Knox	Press,	2005),	p.	47.	
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and	discovered	features	of	it	that	are	really	there	to	be	found’.200	Religions	thus	possess	 truth	and	different	 religions	contain	 truths	 that	are	complementary	by	describing	different	features	of	reality,	even	if	they	appear	to	compete	by	making	absolute	claims.	Conflict	is	also	explicable	by	the	truths	they	communicate	being	answers	to	different	questions	or	a	result	of	the	many	falsehoods	that	religions	also	contain.201	Cobb	defends	three	theses	as	integral	to	his	pluralism:	linguistic	realism	and	the	correspondence	of	true	cognitive	systems	to	reality,	the	truth	of	the	 pluralist	 ontology	 as	 a	 description	 of	 reality,	 and	 the	 true	 and	 referential	nature	 of	 veridical	 religious	 experiences.202	He	 also	 advocates	 the	 ‘normative’	thesis	 that	 RD	 is	 a	 great	 good,	 ‘the	 diversity	 is	 acceptable	 and…people	 should	learn	to	live	with	it	in	mutual	appreciation.’203		(3.2.c)	The	Modernist,	Christian	Context	of	CV	The	 exclusivist	 positions	 attributed	 to	 Kierkegaard’s	 contemporaries	 in	1.4.b	are	products	of	a	modernist	conception	of	religion	and	its	appropriation	of	Christianity,	 which	 also	 underpins	 much	 of	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 and	 CV.	204	
																																																								200	Cobb,	cited	in:	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	47.	201	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	47-48.	202	John	B.	Cobb	Jr.,	‘Some	Whiteheadian	Assumptions	about	Religion	and	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	254-258.	Hence,	for	example,	he	claims	that	‘totality’	is	polyphonous	and	can	be	described	as	having	three	facets.	[Cobb,	cited	in:	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	47.]		203	John	B.	Cobb,	Transforming	Christianity	and	the	World:	A	Way	beyond	Absolutism	and	
Relativism.	Ed.	Paul	F.	Knitter	(Maryknoll,	Orbis,	1999),	p.	50.	Cited	in	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	50.	204	The	reliance	of	philosophy	of	religion	on	a	modernist	conception	of	religion	has	been	noted	by	numerous	critics.	Schilbrack	summarises	many	of	these	criticisms	in:	Kevin	Schilbrack,	
Philosophy	and	the	Study	of	Religions:	A	Manifesto	(Oxford:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2014),	pp.	85-88,	105-110.	I	differ	from	some	of	these	critics	in	that	they	usually	identify	only	pluralism	as	dependent	on	modernity,	which	is	often	seen	to	be	hostile	to	exclusivism.	For	example,	D’Costa	only	claims	that	most	pluralisms	are	dependent	on	a	modernist	conception	of	religion.	[D’Costa,	MRT,	pp.	1-2.]	The	reason	that	this	conception	of	religion	is	definitive	for	CV	and	exclusivist	positions	that	may	seek	to	define	themselves	in	pre-modern	ways	or	with	greater	fidelity	to	a	
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Hegel	 provides	 an	 influential	 source	 of	 this	 conception	 of	 religion	 for	Kierkegaard,	explicitly	 formulating	 it	 in	the	context	of	 the	 ‘legitimisation	crises’	facing	 Christianity	 that	 included	 the	 challenge	 of	 RD.205	A	 core	 feature	 of	 this	construction	of	religion,	which	also	impairs	the	engagement	with	diversity,	is	its	positing	of	a	universal	essence	of	religion	that	explains	 its	nature	 in	a	way	that	annuls	diversity	and	imposes	reified	religious	identities	and	boundaries.206	
																																																																																																																																																														religious	tradition	is	that	it	is	a	result	of	a	Christian	conception	of	religion	as	institutional,	doctrinal,	soteriological	and	theological	as	much	as	it	is	indebted	to	a	modernist	emphasis	on	reason	and	truth.	Moreover,	the	debate	occurs	in	the	context	of	philosophy	of	religion,	which	has	been	decisively	shaped	by	the	modernist	context,	particularly	due	to	the	decisive	influence	Hegel	over	the	discipline.			205	Berger	identifies	contributing	factors	to	this	crisis	as	the	awareness	of	religious	alternatives	produced	by	the	Reformation,	exposure	to	the	Orient,	secularisation	and	the	threat	of	religious	conservatism.	[Peter	Berger,	The	Heretical	Imperative	(Harper	Collins,	1980),	p.	17]	Though	there	could	be	other	sources,	Hegel	provides	a	primary	source	for	Kierkegaard’s	context.	This	chapter	lacks	the	space	to	demonstrate	the	trajectory	of	this	construction	of	religion	from	early	to	contemporary	philosophy	of	religion,	but	sufficient	commonalities	between	them	will	be	demonstrated	to	accept	this	thesis.	Capps	identifies	Schleiermacher,	Kant,	and	Descartes	as	sources.	[Walter	Capps,	Religious	Studies:	The	Making	of	a	Discipline	(Minneapolis:	Fortress	Press,	1995),	pp.	1-13]	Westphal	identifies	its	origins	in	Hegel	[Merold	Westphal,	‘The	Emergence	of	Modern	Philosophy	of	Religion’.	In	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Charles	Taliaferro	(eds.)	A	Companion	to	
Philosophy	of	Religion	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1997),	pp.	111-117].	See	also:	For	the	sources	of	these	claims,	see	Curtis	L.	Thompson	and	David	J.	Kangas	(eds.)	Between	Hegel	and	Kierkegaard:	Hans	L.	
Martensen’s	Philosophy	of	Religion	(Atlanta:	Scholars	Press,	1997)	and	Robert	Leslie	Horn,	
Positivity	and	Dialectic:	A	Study	in	the	Theological	Method	of	Hans	Lassen	Martensen.		206	This	can	be	traced	back	to	Lessing.	Climacus	acknowledges	this	by	utilizing	Lessing’s	description	of	the	tension	in	Christianity	between	faith	and	history	(CUP,	p.	67).	This	essentialism	derives	from	Lessing’s	distinction	between	‘positive’	religions	and	the	natural	essence	of	religion,	which	bifurcates	necessary	religious	truths	and	values	from	the	contingent,	mythological,	and	historical	structures	in	which	they	are	expressed	by	religions,	thereby	providing	a	paradigmatic	vantage	point	from	which	to	understand	and	assess	specific	religions.	Lessing	asserts	the	existence	of	a	universal,	simple,	and	credible	natural	religion	that	is	realizable	through	innate	moral	and	rational	faculties	that	are	predisposed	towards	it,	these	delivering	an	awareness	of	the	existence	of	God	and	the	necessity	of	living	appropriately.	[Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	‘On	the	Origin	of	Revealed	Religion’.	In,	Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	Philosophical	and	Theological	
Writings,	ed.	and	trans.	by	H.B.	Nisbet	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005),	p.35.]	According	to	Lessing,	positive	religion	develops	through	accretion	provoked	by	the	societal	context	and	thus	tends	to	be	divisive,	degrading	the	moral	value	of	religion:	it,	'weakens	and	suppresses'	the	'essential	elements'	of	natural	religion	and,	'The	best	revealed	or	positive	religion	is	that	which	contains	the	fewest	conventional	additions	to	natural	religion,	and	imposes	the	fewest	limitations	on	the	good	effects	of	natural	religion'.	[Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	‘On	the	Origin	of	Revealed	Religion’.	In,	Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	Philosophical	and	Theological	
Writings,	p.	36.]	Like	different	religions,	peer	diversity	is	a	degradation	of	natural	religion	as	it	signifies	a	failure	to	find	consensus	and	results	from	partisanship	and	lack	of	clarity	in	the	structures	of	positive	religions;	hence	Lessing’s	criticism	of	Christianity	as,	‘so	uncertain	and	ambiguous	that	there	is	scarcely	a	single	passage	which	any	two	individuals,	throughout	the	history	of	the	world,	have	thought	of	in	the	same	way.'	[Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	‘The	Religion	of	Christ’.	In,	Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	Philosophical	and	Theological	Writings,	p.179.]	Lessing’s	dismissal	of	the	historical	claims	of	religions,	which	include	the	resurrection	of	Jesus	and	the	
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This	 is	 evident	 in	 Hegel’s	 Lectures	 on	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 Religion.	 The	paradigmatic	‘concept’	of	religion	as,	‘the	relation	of	the	subject,	of	the	subjective	consciousness,	 to	 God,	 who	 is	 spirit’,	 posits	 the	 essence	 of	 religion	 as	 the	identification	of	human	consciousness	with	the	structure	of	existence	through	a	complete	 and	 true	 comprehension	 of	 it.207	Specific	 ‘determinate’	 religions	 are	interpreted	 as	 moments	 in	 the,	 ‘single	 sequence	 of	 configurations’,	 evolving	towards	 this	 complete	 comprehension;	 they	 are	 cognitive-propositional	 bodies	of	‘representational’	or	symbolic	thinking	about	reality	that	bear	some	truths	or	partial	 truths	 in	 symbolic	 form	 and	 are	 left	 behind	 in	 the	 development	 of	historical	 consciousness	once	 this	 truth	has	been	extracted,	 like	plants	 that	die	having	 passed	 on	 their	 essential	 genetic	 information.208	This	 imposes	 static	identities	 on	 religions	 dependent	 on	 the	 particular	 truths	 they	 realise	 and	interprets	 and	 stratifies	 them	 hierarchically	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 single	 ‘Absolute	Religion’	that	supersedes	them:	an	Hegelian	interpretation	of	Christianity,	which	is	legitimated	by	a	divinely	endorsed	apotheosis	of	the	structure	as,	‘the	concept	of	 God’s	 own	 self’,	 which	 serves	 an	 ideological	 function	 of	 justifying	 Hegelian	Christianity	as	the	consummate	religion,	with	other	religions	as	lower	stages	in	a	supersessionist	development.209																																																																																																																																																															history	of	Israel,	as	lacking	the	requisite	doxastic	certainty	for	religious	belief	and	being	a	contingent	knowledge	that	differs	from	the	necessary	truths	of	theological	reason,		further	enforces	this	dismissal	of	specific	religions.	[Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing,	‘On	the	Proof	of	the	Spirit	and	of	Power’.	In,	Gotthold	Ephraim	Lessing;	H.B.	Nisbet	(ed.),	Philosophical	and	Theological	
Writings,	pp.	85-86.]	207	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel,	Lectures	on	the	Philosophy	of	Religion,	Volume	I,	ed.	and	trans.	by	Peter	C.	Hodgson	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1984),	p.	178.	208	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel,	Lectures	on	the	Philosophy	of	Religion,	Volume	I,	pp.	182-183.	This	is	applied	to	numerous	religions,	which	are	analysed	schematically	in:	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel,	Lectures	on	the	Philosophy	of	Religion,	Volume	II,	ed.	and	trans.	by	Peter	C.	Hodgson	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1987).	209	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel;	Peter	C.	Hodgson	(ed.)	Lectures	on	the	Philosophy	of	Religion,	
Volume	I,	p.184.	This	critique	is	developed	further	by	Arvind-Pal	S.	Mandair,	‘What	if	Religio	Remained	Untranslatable?’	In	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.)	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion	(Abingdon:	Ashgate,	2003)	pp.	87-100.	
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	(3.2.d)	The	Objective,	Exclusivist	Ontology	of	CV				 A	 number	 of	 common	 features	 emerge	 from	 the	 sketch	 of	 CV,	Kierkegaard’s	 exclusivist	 context	 (1.4.b),	 and	 the	 shared	 modernist,	 Christian	construction	of	the	essence	of	religion	that	underpins	both.	For	this	reason,	the	pseudonyms’	criticism	of	 their	exclusivist	contemporaries	can	be	extended	to	a	critique	 of	 CV	 and	 four	 theses	 that	 my	 analysis	 identifies	 as	 underpinning	 it.	These	 theses	 misrepresent	 religion	 and	 RD	 and	 can	 be	 critiqued	 from	 the	perspective	of	the	conception	of	religiousness	developed	in	Chapter	2.	Although	these	 theses	 are	 particularly	 evident	 in	 exclusivism,	 it	will	 be	 shown	 that	 they	underpin	all	positions	within	CV,	which	has	an	exclusivist	bias	and	ontology.		The	theses	are	as	follows.	(i)	The	substantive	thesis	is	that	religions	exist	as	reified	entities	independently	of	the	existential	activities	that	constitute	them;	they	 are	 different	 instantiations	 of	 a	 single	 phenomenon	 or	 concept	 such	 that	diversity	 is	only	apparent	or	 is	a	 result	of	different	bodies	contesting	 the	same	facts.	(ii)	The	hegemonic	thesis	 is	that	truth	and	salvation	can	only	be	obtained	within	 the	 context	 of	 particular	 religious	 practices	 or	 institutions	 and	 in	obedience	 to	 certain	 authorities,	 such	 as	 church	 sacraments	 or	 prescribed	creeds;	 the	question	posed	by	RD	is	which	and	how	many	such	bodies	mediate	this.	 (iii)	 The	metaphysical	 thesis	 is	 that	 religions	 and/or	 positions	 within	 CV	express	 truths	 or	 principles	 that	 can	 be	 exclusively	 true,	 such	 that	 a	 primary	question	posed	by	diversity	 is	which	account	 it	 true.	 (iv)	The	doxastic	 thesis	 is	that	 religious	 truth	 can	be	apprehended	with	 certainty,	 such	 that	diversity	 is	 a	phenomenon	 that	 can	 and	 should	 be	 overcome	 by	 adopting	 a	 particular	philosophical-religious	position.		
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Goodchild	identifies	implicit	ontologies	and	epistemologies	in	the	various	approaches	 to	 RD,	 including	 exclusivism’s	 singular	 and	 pluralism’s	 polyphonic	conception	 of	 being.210	Griffin	 similarly	 sees	 an	 ontology	 and	 epistemology	 of	naturalism	 as	 underpinning	 pluralism	 just	 as	 supernaturalism	 underpins	exclusivism:	 exclusivism	 entails	 the	 ability	 to	 receive	 and	 know	 a	 revelation	directly	through	supernatural	means;	pluralism	entails	that	religious	knowing	is	inextricably	limited	to	the	natural,	cultural	context,	such	that	religious	knowing	will	be	interpretative	and	relative,	with	RD	as	a	consequence.211		My	Kierkegaardian	analysis	of	CV	goes	further	by	arguing	that	exclusivism	and	 pluralism	 are	 grounded	 in	 the	 more	 fundamental,	 objective,	 exclusivist	ontology	 expressed	 in	 the	 four	 theses.	 This	 chapter	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 the	theses	 are	 present	 in	 CV	 and	 evince	 an	 exclusivist,	 objective	 ontology.	 This	 is	objective	 in	 that	 it	 signifies	 a	 theory	 of	 being	 as	 a	 sum	 of	 objects	 with	 which	thought	 can	 correspond	 directly.	 It	 is	 exclusivist	 in	 that	 the	 problem	 is	 to	 be	solved	by	adopting	a	single	explanatory	schema	and/or	religious	perspective	on	diversity.	This	chapter	will	critique	this	as	misrepresenting	religion	and	RD.	CV	does	 not	 offer	 an	 engagement	 with	 RD	 from	 the	 ‘inside’,	 as	 it	 is	 experienced	persons	because	the	existential,	subjective	nature	of	religion	is	invisible	to	CV.	It	will	 also	 be	 argued	 that,	 given	 the	 description	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 and	authentic	 religiousness	 in	Chapter	2,	 this	 expresses	 an	 inauthentic	 response	 to	RD	and	posits	an	illegitimate	perspective	for	the	philosopher.																																																										210	Philip	Goodchild,	‘Politics,	Pluralism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Religion:	an	Essay	on	Exteriority’.	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	194.	211	Supernaturalism,	‘allows	for	divine	causation	to	override	the	normal	belief-forming	processes	of	particular	human	beings,	cancelling	out	the	causes	of	fallibility	and	error,	so	that	human	beings	could	be	vehicles	of	infallible	revelation’.	In	contrast,	the	naturalist	ontology	supports	a	naturalist	and	pluralist	epistemology,	‘Human	beings	are	fallible,	their	belief-forming	processes	being	shaped	by	cultural	conditioning,	sin,	and	ignorance.’	[David	Ray	Griffin,	‘Religious	Pluralism:	Generic,	Identist,	and	Deep’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	14-15.]	
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(3.3)	The	Substantive	and	Hegemonic	Theses	(3.3.a)	The	Theses	Evident	in	CV	
The	Substantive	Thesis	The	 substantive	 thesis	 is	 that	 religions	 are	 objective	 entities	 that	 exist	independently	 of	 the	 local,	 subjective	 existential	 activities	 that	 constitute	 them	and	 that	 these	 correspond	 to	 the	 entities	 described	 by	 scholars.212	Since	 these	are	 understood	 as	 variations	 of	 the	 same	 genus,	 religion,	 they	 are	 defined	primarily	 through	 ahistorical	 philosophical	 construction,	 rather	 than	 empirical	or	phenomenological	description.	This	problematizes	RD	as	 the	problem	of	 the	relationship	between	 these	distinct	bodies	 as	 variations	of	 the	 same	 type.	This	thesis	configures	 the	debate	with	an	exclusivist	bias:	by	being	variations	of	 the	same	 type	 yet	 having	 different	 structures	 and	 claims	 about	 the	 same	 religious	matters,	religious	conflict	 is	 integral	to	CV’s	conception	of	diversity	and	is	most	easily	explained	as	deviation	from	the	core	truth.		
	
The	Hegemonic	Thesis	The	hegemonic	thesis	asserts	that	truth	and	salvation	are	obtained	in	the	context	of	 specific	 religious	bodies.	RD	 is	an	objective	problem	to	be	solved	by	determining	which	 and	 how	many	 religions	 are	 valid	 and	 authoritative	 and	 in	which	religious	bodies	truth	is	located:	none,	one,	or	many.213	
																																																								212	Schilbrack	notes	that	this	is	a	common	scholarly	conceit	in	academic	studies	of	religion.	There	are	a	range	of	‘social	constructivist’	criticisms	of	this	approach.	[Kevin	Schilbrack,	Philosophy	and	
the	Study	of	Religions:	A	Manifesto,	p.	85.]	213	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	19.	
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The	 debate	 focuses	 on	 the	 relation	 of	 truth/salvation	 to	 large,	 extant	groups	with	clear	identities,	as	opposed	to	groups	that	have	ceased	to	exist,	are	small,	or	not	defined	as	religions;	thus,	the	debate	privileges	certain	groups	over	others.214	Furthermore,	this	is	dependent	upon	a	conception	of	specific	religions	as	 lacking	 in	 peer	 diversity,	 with	 static,	 fixed	 boundaries	 and	 homogenised	identities	 imposed	 upon	 them.	 For	 example,	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 relationship	between	reified	bodies	like	Christianity	and	Islam.		The	 conviction	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 large,	 powerful,	 homogeneous,	totalising	 systems,	 institutions,	 and	 groups	mediate	 religious	 truth	 and	 reality	and	that	individuals	need	to	associate	with	and	submit	to	them	as	authorities	in	order	 to	 acquire	 knowledge	 and	 salvation.	 This	 favours	 exclusivism	because	 it	sees	 truth	 as	 inhering	 in	whole	 sets	 of	 beliefs	 possessed	 by	 singular	 bodies;	 it	also	asserts	that	only	some	of	the	perspectives	can	be	valid:	those	represented	by	religions	 rather	 than	 individuals	 or	 atheistic	 worldviews.	 This	 also	 privileges	religion	 as	 a	 distinct,	 unique	 sphere	 of	 human	 activity,	 rather	 than	 something	entangled	with	subjective,	local	human	life	and	culturally	relative	structures.		
The	Theses	Evident	in	CV	Both	theses	are	evident	in	Schmidt-Leukel’s	categorisation	of	approaches	based	 on	 the	 number	 of	 religions	 in	 which	 they	 claim	 truth	 is	 present.215	He																																																									214	See,	for	example,	the	discussion	in:	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	Meeker	(eds.),	The	Philosophical	
Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	2.	And	the	religions	covered	in:	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	
Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity,	ix.	And:	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.)	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	
Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism	,	v-vi.	See	also:	Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	
Christian	Approaches	to	Other	Faiths,	ix-xi.	See	also	Hedges’	admission	that	groups	such	as	new	religious	movements	have	been	ignored	in	the	debate	[Alan	Race	and	Paul	M.	Hedges	(eds.),	
Christian	Approaches	to	Other	Faiths,	p.	232.]	215	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	19.	
	105	 	
explicitly	 privileges	 ‘traditional	 religions’	 in	 the	 options	 he	 considers:	 none,	which	he	equates	with	atheism,	one,	some	or	many.216	His	failure	to	conceive	of	the	 possibility	 that	 one	 could	 reject	 the	 claim	 that	 salvific	 knowledge	 of	 a	transcendent	 reality	 is	mediated	 by	 religions	without	 this	 equating	 to	 atheism	reveals	 this	 privileging	 of	 religious	 hegemonies.217	Similarly,	 he	 does	 not	 see	atheism	as	a	perspective	that	can	have	parity	with	other	religions	or	be	true	on	a	pluralistic	model.	He	emphasises	the	hegemonic	thesis	further	by	suggesting	that	pluralism	 asserts	 parity	 between	 ‘world	 religions’	 rather	 than	 the	 religious	commitments	of	 specific	 individuals.218	This	 is	also	evident	 in	Griffiths’	 framing	of	the	debate	in	terms	of	the	definition	of	religion	as,	‘a	form	of	life	that	seems	to	those	who	belong	to	 it	 to	be	comprehensive,	 incapable	of	abandonment,	and	of	central	 importance	 to	 the	 ordering	 of	 their	 lives.’219	CV	 combines	 this	 with	Christian	 concepts,	 as	 is	 evident	 in	 Schmidt-Leukel’s	 claim	 that	 religions	 offer	salvific	knowledge	and	are	to	be	understood	as	coherent	systems	or	institutions	that	mediate	a	relation	to	the	divine	through	doctrine	and	practice.220																																																									216	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	19.	See	also,	p.	21,	where	he	reiterates	this	claim,	‘The	first	option—
atheist/naturalist—can	be	excluded	as	a	religious	or	theological	option…since	it	rests	on	the	denial	of	a	transcendent	reality’.	Morgan	identifies	this	problem,	noting	that	CV	is	responding	to	two	distinct	questions	that	are	often	collapsed	into	each	other:	the	relation	of	world	religions	to	salvation	and	the	possibility	of	salvation	outside	of	Christianity.	[Christopher	W.	Morgan,	‘Inclusivisms	and	Exclusivisms’.	In,	Christopher	W.	Morgan	and	Robert	A.	Peterson	(eds.),	Faith	
Comes	by	Hearing:	A	Response	to	Inclusivism,	p.	22.]	217	He	even	distinguishes	pluralism	about	religions	from	‘relativism’	about	‘world	views	or	value	systems’,	seeing	the	latter	as	not	involved	in	the	debate.	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	
The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	22.	218	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	21.	219	Paul	J.	Griffiths,	Problems	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	12.	Depoortere	and	Lambkin	similarly	see	the	question	as	being	about	the	number	of	religions	that	mediate	truth.	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin,	‘The	Question	of	Theological	Truth	in	a	Multireligious	World:	Reflections	at	the	Interface	of	Continental	Philosophy	and	Interreligious	Studies’.	In,	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin	(eds.),	The	Question	of	Theological	Truth,	p.	275.	220	Heim	offers	the	same	criticism	of	the	singularity	of	‘salvation’	in	CV.	Heim,	STDR,	p.	145.	
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These	 theses	 are	 evident	 in	 exclusivism	 and	 particularism.	 Lindbeck	defines	 religions	 as	 ‘comprehensive’	 interpretative	 structures	 that	 are	 total	 in	that	 they	are	 the	basis	 for	all	experience	and	beliefs	 that	are	held	within	 them,	‘religions	 are	 producers	 of	 experience’,	 and,	 ‘comprehensive	 interpretative	schemes…which	 structure	 human	 experience	 and	 understanding	 of	 self	 and	world’,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 issues	 that	 are	 taken	 to	 be,	 ‘more	 important	than	anything	else’.221	They	provide	all	of	the	data	and	structures	necessary	for	the	 life	of	 their	adherents.	Furthermore,	 they	are	enshrined	 in	and	 transmitted	by	communal	bodies	that	deliver	the	grammar	and	vocabulary	of	the	structures	in	 narratives	 and	 practices;	 this	 is	 acquired	 by	 membership	 of	 the	 body.222	Although	 these	 bodies	 may	 develop	 as	 traditions	 over	 time,	 they	 have	 core,	unifying	characteristics	that	allow	them	to	be	spoken	of	as	a	single	body,	such	as	‘the	 Church’.	 They	 thus	 exist	 independently	 of	 and	 prior	 to	 all	 personal	experiential	and	existential	activities,	which	are	dependent	upon	them.	This	also	leads	him	 to	understand	RD	as	 the	 clash	of	 these	opposing	 cultural	 gestalts.223	Plantinga	similarly	 links	exclusivism	with	the	idea	that	entire	religions	must	be	true	or	 false	 in	his	claim	that	the	question	 is	not	about	which	 individual	claims	are	true	but	about	which	religious	system	is	true,	‘the	exclusivist	holds	that…the	tenets	 of	one	 religion—Christianity,	 let’s	 say—are	 in	 fact	 truth…[and]	 that	 any	propositions,	 including	other	religious	beliefs,	 that	are	 incompatible	with	 those	tenets	are	false.’224		
																																																								221	Lindbeck,	ND,	p.30,	32	and	33.	222	Lindbeck,	ND,	p.33.	223	George	A.	Lindbeck,	‘The	Gospel’s	Uniqueness:	Election	and	Untranslatability.’	In	George	A.	Lindbeck,	James	J.	Buckley	(ed.)	The	Church	in	a	Postliberal	Age.	224	Alvin	Plaintinga,	James	F.	Sennett	(ed.),	The	Analytic	Theist:	An	Alvin	Plantinga	Reader,	p.	189.	
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Pluralistic	positions	are	more	sensitive	 to	 the	relative,	eclectic	nature	of	religious	 bodies	 and	 their	 blurred	 boundaries.	 Hick	 admits	 the	 plurality	 of	Christian	 devotions	 and	 beliefs	 about	 Jesus,	which,	 ‘are	 so	widely	 various	 that	they	 must	 in	 part	 reflect	 the	 variety	 of	 temperaments	 and	 ideals…within	 the	world	 of	 believers….	 Jesus	 has	 been	 able	 to	 become	 so	 many	 things	 to	 many	men.’225	Nevertheless,	the	theses	are	evident	in	his	totalising	vision	of	pluralism:	religions	are	different	manifestations	of	the	same	truths	and	structures.226	While	Cobb	tries	to	avoid	a	reified	understanding	of	religion,	he	provides	a	typology	of	religious	 responses	 as	 theistic,	 acosmic,	 and	 cosmic;	 he	 thereby	 transfers	 the	reification	from	religions	to	religious	responses.227		The	 hegemonic	 thesis	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 the	 pluralist	 tendency	 to	emphasise	 the	necessity	of	extant	religions.	Knitter	 implicitly	rejects	 the	ability	of	individuals	to	possess	truth	and	salvation	without	involvement	with	religions	by	 asserting	 the	 contingency	 of	 religious	 understanding	 on	 religions.228	Griffin	omits	 incorporating	 the	 value	 of	 individual	 perspectives	 in	 his	 assertion	 that	pluralism	 entails	 an	 acceptance	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 perspectives	 of	 other	religions,	 ‘the	acceptance	of	the	idea	that	there	are	indeed	religions	others	than	one’s	own	that	provide	saving	truths	and	values	to	their	adherents.’229																																																										225	John	Hick,	‘Jesus	and	the	World	Religions’.	In,	John	Hick	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	God	Incarnate	(London:	SCM	Press,	1977),	p.	168.	226	Sinkinson	claims	that	this	is	the	case	in	Hick’s	pluralism.	[Christopher	Sinkinson,	The	Universe	
of	Faiths:	A	Critical	Study	of	John	Hick’s	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	118.]	227	John	B.	Cobb	Jr.,	‘Some	Whiteheadian	Assumptions	about	Religion	and	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	243-246.	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	49.	228	For	example,	he	claims	that	Christians	must	recognise	revelation	as	necessarily	embodied	in	religious	structures	and	equates	God	working	through	religious	structures	with	God	working	through	people,	‘unless	Christians	recognise	that	the	Divine	Spirit	can	breathe	in	other	religions,	they	will	not	allow	the	Spirit	to	be	what	it	showed	itself	to	be	in	Jesus	–	an	always	embodied	Spirit.	The	Spirit	touches	people	through	other	people,	through	stories,	gestures,	music,	and	dance	–	and	may	do	so	through	other	religions.’	[Paul	F	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	
Religions,	p.	101].		229	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘Religious	Pluralism:	Generic,	Identist,	and	Deep’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	3.	
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	(3.3.b)	The	Theses	Misrepresent	Religion	The	 existential	model	 of	 religion	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	 experience	 and	subjective,	 existential	 activity	 in	 religious	 identity.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	decontextualisation	 of	 religiousness	 from	 its	 subjective	 context	 in	 the	ways	 of	being	 of	 individuals	 fundamentally	 misrepresents	 it	 and	 presents	 a	dehumanising	 approach	 to	 human	 phenomena.	 Furthermore,	 this	 rejects	 the	hegemonic	thesis	as	there	are	no	timeless	religious	bodies	that	exist	separate	to	local	appropriations	in	personal,	existential	activity.		The	pseudonyms	admit	that	persons	are	located,	but,	by	focusing	on	how	idealised	 religious	 identities	 are	 appropriated	 and	 interpreted	 in	 local,	existential	 activity,	 they	 incorporate	 the	 shared,	 embodied	 human	 situation	alongside	the	eclectic,	subjective	nature	of	religious	identities	and	commitments,	rather	 than	 focussing	 on	 homogenised,	 institutional	 contexts.	 This	 provides	 a	superior	 approach	 to	 religious	 phenomena	 and	 exposes	 weaknesses	 in	 CV	 in	three	areas:	(i)	it	provides	a	better	fit	with	the	role	of	human	agency	in	religions,	(ii)	 it	 is	 more	 descriptively	 accurate	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 intrareligious	diversity	and	the	blurred	boundaries	extant	in	interreligious	diversity,	and	(iii)	it	avoids	some	ideologically	loaded	Western	impositions.		(3.3.b.i)	CV	fails	to	incorporate	subjectivity	and	human	agency	adequately	The	substantive	and	hegemonic	theses	present	religions	as	static	entities	and	 individuals	 as	 passive	 recipients	who	 learn	 the	 language	 of	 the	 system	 or	acquire	salvific	 truth	and	knowledge	 through	membership	of	and	adherence	 to	the	system.	This	reflects	the	religions’	totalisation	of	their	own	structures,	often	
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for	the	purposes	of	control	and	becoming,	‘established	orders’	(PiC,	p.	219),	and	scholarship,	 which	 tends	 towards	 abstraction	 and	 the	 objectification	 of	 its	structures	 as	 timeless	 explanatory	 systems,	 disengaging	 from	 the	 temporal	 by	imposing	static	 identities	on	religions,	 ‘when	an	existence	 is	 turned	over	 to	 the	past,	 it	 is	 indeed	 finished…and	 to	 that	 extent	 is	 turned	 over	 to	 the	 systematic	view.’	(CUP,	p.	118)230	Climacus	sketches	this	process	whereby	scholarly	inquiry	into	 Christianity	 itself	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 inquiry	 and	 the	 content	 of	Christianity	 becomes	 the	 history	 of	 scholarship	 about	 the	 content,	 scholarship	becoming	 parasitic	 upon	 itself	 and	 thus	 increasingly	 detached	 from	 subjective	religiousness	 (CUP,	 pp.	 23-49).	 On	 Lindbeck’s	 account,	 for	 example,	 what	development	occurs	within	religion	is	initiated	by	the	system	itself,	not	by	people	acquiring	new	experiences	or	ways	of	experiencing.		Viewing	 religions	 as	 separate	 from	 or	 prior	 to	 experience	 and	 agency	marginalises	 the	 role	of	people	 in	 the	 formation	and	development	of	 religions:	religions	 cannot	 grow	 out	 of	 experience	 because	 they	 are	 a	 precondition	 of	 it.	Given	 the	 important	 role	 played	 by	 experience	 and	 agency	 in	 religion	 and,	 in	particular,	 in	 religious	 innovation	 and	 the	 development	 of	 new	 religious	positions,	this	is	false.	From	a	Climacian	perspective,	agency	and	experience	are	adaptable	and	central	to	being	in	the	world,	‘The	decision	rests	in	the	subject;	the	appropriation	is	the	paradoxical	inwardness’	(CUP,	p.	610).	The	view	that	these	are	passively	received	from	systems	that	generate	them	puts	the	relationship	the	wrong	way	round:	such	systems	are	generated	by	embodied	human	activity.																																																										230	Hence	Goncalves	observes	that	identifying	singular	religious	identities,	such	as	‘Hindu’	or	‘Christian’	overlooks	the	‘agonistic’	and	fragmented	history	of	those	identities.	[Paulo	Goncalves,	‘Religious	‘Worlds’	and	their	Alien	Invaders.’	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	
Religion,	p.116.]	Heim	identifies	the	same	problem	with	CV,	‘Its	categories	treat	religious	traditions	as	reified,	single	entities	which	“sit	still”	for	people	to	make	the	kind	of	global	judgements	that	the	types	represent.’	[Heim,	STDR,	p.	4.]	
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The	 centrality	 of	 agency	 and	 experience	 is	 evident	 in	 various	 ways	 in	religion,	 such	 as	 when	 religiousness	 is	 responding	 to	 newly	 encountered	existential	challenges	in	passionate	ways.231	The	agonistic	nature	of	the	religious	sphere	 (2.2)	 demonstrates	 that	 there	 can	 only	 be	 subjective	 appropriation	 in	navigating	 the	 tensions,	 never	 a	 fixed	 and	 received	 identity.	 The	 substantive	thesis	 describes	 commitment	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 identifying	 the	 right	 group	 and	theory,	 rather	 than	 responding	 anxiously	 to	 the	 personal	 significance	 of	 one’s	own	mortality	in	one’s	encounters	with	the	absolute	claims	of	religions.	This	fails	to	 capture	 the	 passionate,	 anxious	 leaps	 involved	 for	many	 in	 conversion	 to	 a	religion,	 and	 their	 continuing	 devotion,	 particularly	when	 it	 occurs	 in	 crisis	 or	boundary	situations	of	existential	 struggle,	 ‘In	 the	 language	of	abstraction,	 that	which	 is	 the	 difficulty	 of	 existence	 and	 of	 the	 existing	 person	 never	 actually	appears;	even	less	is	the	difficulty	explained’.	(CUP,	p.	301-302)	
																																																								231	Evidence	in	support	of	the	role	of	agency	and	the	agonistic	nature	of	religions	is	cited	by	the	anthropologist	Piette,	who	lists	a	range	of	ways	in	which	general	religious	norms,	beliefs,	identities,	and	structures	are	expressed	in	subjective,	ambivalent	and	nuanced	ways	that	depend	on	human	agency	and	appropriation	as	the	primary	factor,	for	example	in	acts	of	religious	fidelity	and	infidelity,	dialectics	of	hope	and	doubt,	different	interpretations	of	beliefs,	attaching	different	significance	to	rituals	and	experiencing	different	emotions	(pp.	196-197),	leading	him	to	conclude	that,	‘A	believer’s	everyday	life	is	no	doubt	structured	by	a	dynamic	between	all	of	these	synchronisations	between	himself	and	the	divinity.’	(Albert	Piette,	‘Existence,	Minimality,	and	Believing’.	In,	Michael	Jackson	and	Albert	Piette	(eds.),	What	is	Existential	Anthropology?,	pp.	196-200).	Similarly,	in	her	research	on	individuals	leaving	religious	organisations,	sociologist	Ebaugh	identifies	six	stages	in	a	dialectical	process	of	leaving	that	includes	the	developments	internal	to	the	religious	structures,	as	described	by	the	cultural-linguistic	model,	the	social	context	that	shapes	this	religious	identity	and	the	person’s	own	subjective,	existential	history,	experiences,	commitments	and	appropriations	of	the	religious	identity.	The	role	of	agency	is	central	to	her	findings,	which	also	support	the	pseudonyms’	view	of	personhood	as	a	dialectic	between	the	two	factors	of	the	universal	identity	and	the	specific	appropriation,	‘Throughout	the	six	stages	that	characterize	her	exit	process	there	is	continual	interaction	between	the	issue	of	who	I	am	to	myself	and	who	I	am	to	relevant	others.	The	creation	of	an	identity	of	an	ex-nun	results	from	the	process	of	harmonizing	self-definition	and	role	expectations.’	(Helen	Rose	Fuchs	Ebaugh,	‘Leaving	the	Convent:	The	Experience	of	Role	Exit	and	Self-Transformation’.	In,	Joseph	A	Kotarba	and	Andrea	Fontana	(eds.),	The	Existential	Self	in	Society	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1984),	p.	175.	The	importance	of	subjectivity	is	also	to	be	preferred	as	a	default	position	because	it	fits	the	empirical	data,	that	there	are	many	different	and	subjective	ways	of	configuring	subjectivity,	even	within	a	single	religion,	without	entailing	further	theorising.	
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The	substantive	thesis	also	occludes	the	subjectivity	of	religions.	Religions	are	multifaceted	bodies	 that	have	developed,	 and	continue	 to	develop,	 through	existential	 usage	 by	 persons:	 how	 human	 persons	 have	 subjectively	 raised,	reflected	 on,	 interpreted,	 and	 addressed	 their	 local,	 existential	 situations,	including	 the	 subjective	 appropriation	 of	 religious	 structures	 from	 preceding	generations.	 Furthermore,	 religions	 are	 entangled	 with	 and	 commodified	 in	relation	to	a	range	of	local	spheres	of	activity.	The	involvement	of	subjectivity	is	particularly	evident	in	a	religiously	diverse	context	in	which	individuals	choose	how	 to	 interact	 and	 engage	with	 the	 various	 religious	 structures.	 This	 fits	 the	pseudonyms’	view	of	religions	as	tied	to	the	relative,	existential,	subjective,	and	intersubjective	 personal	 activities	 of	 the	 people	 who	 compose	 religious	communities,	 religiousness	 involving	 a,	 ‘double	 reflection’:	 an	 appropriation	 of	religious	structures,	 subjectively	and	 innovatively	applied	 in	each	new,	 relative	existential	context.		(3.3.b.ii)	CV	is	at	variance	with	the	phenomena	observable	in	religions	The	 existential	 approach	 is	more	 descriptively	 accurate	with	 regards	 to	religions	 themselves,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	RD,	 demonstrating	 CV’s	 lack	 of	attentiveness	to	the	phenomena.	Religions	display	a	wide	array	of	intrareligious	diversity	 regarding	 all	 of	 the	 central	 claims	 and	 practices	 and	 are	 eclectic,	fragmented,	 and	 interpreted	 in	 local,	 individual	 contexts.	Alterity	 is	 internal	 to	religious	 identities,	 which	 are	 fragmented	 and	 incorporate	 various	 layers	 of	existential	 histories,	 identities,	 and	 structures.232	CV’s	 failure	 to	 recognise	 the																																																									232	There	is	insufficient	space	to	justify	this	claim	fully.	Mandair	notes	that	the	denial	of	peer	diversity	and	locality	of	religious	structures	through	the	imposition	of	single,	homogenized	identities	with	reified	boundaries	misrepresents	phenomena	by	constructing	it	as	‘Buddhism’	or	
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centrality	of	intrareligious	diversity	is	evident	from	its	homogenisation	of	these	into	distinct,	reified	religions.		For	 example,	 Christianity	 is	 not	 a	 singular	 structure.	 It	 develops	temporally,	 with	 different	 sources	 being	 appealed	 to	 as	 authorities,	 including	individuals,	doctrines,	and	texts;	the	interpretations	of	these,	and	how	they	are	to	be	 lived	 out	 in	 Christian	 practice,	 also	 remain	 local	 to	 particular	 global	 and	historical	 contexts	 (CUP,	 p.	 38).	 Even	 if	 all	 Christians	 are	 thought	 to	 believe	something	central	about	Christ,	which	is	probably	a	 fallacious	view,	how	this	 is	subjectively	 appropriated	 in	 a	 local	 context	 will	 vary	 widely. 233 	The	 local	variations	 of	 Christian	 religiousness	 are	 a	 result	 of	 a	 complex,	 subjective	interaction	between	the	given	multifaceted	religious	identity,	the	local	existential	sites	 of	 usage,	 needs,	 and	 relationships,	 and	how	each	 individual	navigates	 the	two	in	subjective,	creative,	existential	action.		Christianity	 is	 thus	 a	 rhizomatic	 tangle	 of	 interconnected	 yet	heterogeneous	 structures	 that	 present	 labyrinthine	 channels	 of	 embedded	identity,	 shifting	 through	 time,	 rather	 than	 a	 timeless	 essence	 enshrined	 in	 an	institution.	 Given	 that	 Christianity	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 more	 institutional	religions,	 with	 a	 foundational	 canon,	 creedal	 pronouncements,	 and	 several	
																																																																																																																																																														‘Hinduism’.	Arvind-Pal	S.	Mandair,	‘What	if	Religio	Remained	Untranslatable?’	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	89.	This	is	a	problem	with	analytical	philosophy	of	religion	itself,	as	Insole	observes	in	accusing	it	of	‘forgetting	history’,	citing	Swinburne’s	claim	that,	‘we	are	interested	in	the	truth,	not	in	who	says	it.’	Christopher	J.	Insole,	‘Political	Liberalism,	Analytical	Philosophy	of	Religion	and	the	Forgetting	of	History’.	In,	Harriet	A.	Harris	and	Christopher	J.	Insole	(eds.),	Faith	and	Philosophical	Analysis:	The	Impact	of	Analytical	Philosophy	
on	the	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	161.	It	is	also	supported	by	Goncalves	[Paulo	Goncalves,	‘Religious	‘Worlds’	and	their	Alien	Invaders.’	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	
Religion,	p.116]	and	Deleuzian	complexity	theory,	which	asserts	the	polyphonous	and	rhizomatic	nature	of	being,	‘Nature	doesn’t	work	that	way…this	system	of	thought	has	never	reached	an	understanding	of	multiplicity.’	[Gilles	Deleuze	and	Felix	Guattari,	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	
and	Schizophrenia	(London:	Continuum,	2004),	p.	5].			233	John	Hick,	‘Jesus	and	the	World	Religions’.	In,	John	Hick	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	God	Incarnate,	p.	168.	
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powerful	 institutions,	 this	 provides	 a	 compelling	 reason	 to	 suppose	 that	 other	religions	are	also	diverse.	Goncalves	argues	that	this	 is	 ignored	by	the	cultural-linguistic	model,	‘such	approaches	are	not,	as	they	claim,	so	much	describing,	but	rather	 generating,	 promoting	 and	 perpetuating	 idealized…fantasms	 of	 quasi-autonomous	and	homogeneous	religious	 traditions’,	overlooking	 the,	 ‘agonistic’	history	of	how	these	religious	identities	come	about.234	CV	 also	 overlooks	 the	 permeable	 boundaries	 between	 religions	 and	misunderstands	the	nature	of	 intrareligious	diversity,	conceiving	of	religions	as	hermetically	 sealed	 entities	 that	 exist	 in	 a	 vacuum,	 as	 in	 Lindbeck’s	 view	 that	they	 are	 ‘untranslatable’.	 CV	 reifies	 religious	 boundaries	 by	 asking	 about	 the	relation	between	different	‘Established	Orders’	rather	than	individuals	and	their	relative	 interpretations,	 ‘The	 established	 order	 wants	 to	 be	 a	 totality	 that	recognises	nothing	above	itself	but	has	every	individual	under	it’	(PiC,	p.	91).	The	question	is	asked	about	the	relation	between	large	religious	groups,	rather	than	asking	 about	 the	 relation	 of	 individuals.	 In	 reality,	 religious	 identities	 have	permeable	 boundaries,	 which	 often	 blur	 and	 interact	 through	 meeting	 with	alternative	structures	in	processes	of	synthesis	and	hybridity.				(3.3.b.iii)	CV	is	ideologically	loaded	CV	 imposes	 Western	 concepts	 on	 to	 RD.	 Schmidt-Leukel	 responds	 a	similar	objection,	offered	by	Heim,	 that,	 ‘The	typology…does	not	do	justice	to	the	
radical	 diversity	 of	 the	 religions.’235	He	 sees	 this	 objection	 as	 relating	 to	 the	
																																																								234	Paulo	Goncalves,	‘Religious	‘Worlds’	and	their	Alien	Invaders.’	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	
Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	116.	235	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	16.	
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imposition	of	an	‘unequivocal’	model	of	soteriology	that	neglects	the	diversity	of	soteriological	claims	in	different	religions.	He	responds	that	this	 is	the	problem	CV	aims	to	explore:	whether	there	are	many,	one,	or	no	salvific	visions	mediated	by	 religions.236	Although	Knitter	 acknowledges	 the	 dangers	 of	 homogenisation,	he	gives	a	similar	response.237		Schmidt-Leukel	 and	 Knitter	 fail	 to	 appreciate	 the	 core	 of	 the	 objection,	which	is	not	that	CV	assumes	a	particular	position	on	the	definition	of	salvation	but	rather	that	it	assumes	that	religions	are	to	be	understood	as	entities	that	are	concerned	with	 salvation	however	 it	 is	defined.	The	procedure	of	CV	 is	not,	 as	Schmidt-Leukel	 asserts,	 that	 of	 observing	 various	 claims	 about	 salvation	 and	thus	having	to	decide	how	these	are	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	one	another;	rather	it	assumes	that	the	Western	Christian	concern	with	salvation	is	the	central	issue	different	religions	are	concerned	with,	that	this	is	the	issue	that	needs	to	be	decided	 about,	 and	 that	 resolving	 the	 problem	of	RD	 amounts	 to	 deciding	 this	issue.238		The	very	use	of	the	word	‘salvation’	is	ideologically	loaded	and	derived	from	 a	 Christian	 context,	 as	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 religion	 as	 sacramentally	mediating	such	salvation.239	The	 view	 that	 a	 religion	 is	 indispensible	 and	 total	 reflects	 the	 mono-religious	 ideology	of	premodern	Europe	and	the	 idea	of	religion	as	a	universal,	
																																																								236	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	26.	For	Heim’s	presentation	of	this	objection,	see:	Heim,	STDR,	p.	4.		237	Paul	F.	Knitter,	‘Is	the	Pluralist	Model	a	Western	Imposition?’	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	
of	Religious	Superiority,	p.	37.	238	Knitter,	for	example,	defines	his	pluralistic	position	as	entailing	the	view	that,	‘other	religions	may	be	ways	of	salvation	just	as	much	as	Christianity.’	[Paul	F.	Knitter,	No	Other	Name?	A	Critical	
Survey	of	Christian	Attitudes	toward	the	World	Religions	(Maryknoll:	Orbis,	1986),	p.	17.]	239	The	context	of	religion,	‘demands	to	be	taken	into	account,	reflected,	thematized,	dated.’	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Faith	and	Knowledge:	the	Two	Sources	of	‘Religion’	at	the	Limits	of	Reason	Alone.’	In,	Jacques	Derrida	and	Gianni	Vattimo	(eds.)	Religion	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	1998),	p.	4.	
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culture-transcending	 phenomenon	 represents	 an	 attempt	 of	 modern	 Western	culture	 to	 interface	with	 other	 cultures.240	This	 privileges	 religions	 that	 cohere	more	directly	with	the	Western	paradigm	of	religion	as	cognitive	and	relating	to	God,	contravening	the	objectivity	of	the	philosophical	enterprise,	and	precluding	a	global	perspective	and	full	engagement	with	RD.241		The	 pseudonyms	 are	 particularly	 sensitive	 to	 attempts	 to	 enmesh	Christianity	with	culture	 for	 the	 ideological	purpose	of	 supporting	either.	They	accuse	 Western	 societies	 of	 using	 a	 reified	 notion	 of	 Christianity	 to	 support	Western	hegemony	and	identities,	 ‘people…have	wanted	to	form	comparatively	and	quantitatively	a	direct	transition	from	culture	to	Christianity.’	(CUP,	p.	606;	See	 also:	 PiC,	 p.	 111-112).	 A	 particular	 concern	 that	 they	 share	 is	 that	 this	prevents	the	ability	of	religions	to	provide	a	transforming	alternative	or	critique	of	 socio-cultural	 norms;	 instead	 they	 are	 ways	 of	 imposing	 whatever	 cultural	norms	 they	 have	 been	 commodified	 to,	 ‘This	 dubious	 situation	 has	 been	remedied	by	 the	presupposition	 that	 everyone	 in	Christendom	 is	 a	Christian….	[But]	the	most	dangerous	illusion	of	all	is	to	become	so	sure	of	being	one	that	all	Christendom	must	be	defended	against	the	Turk—instead	of	defending	the	faith	within	oneself	against	the	illusion	about	the	Turk.’	(CUP,	p.	608.	See	also:	PiC,	pp.	211-212).	CV	projects	a	single,	Christian	concept	on	to	RD.																																																											240	Kevin	Schilbrack,	Philosophy	and	the	Study	of	Religions:	A	Manifesto,	p.	86.	241	Cheetham	notes	this	as	a	limitation	of	philosophy	of	religion	as	traditionally	conceived.	[David	Cheetham,	‘Comparative	Philosophy	of	Religion.’	In,	David	Cheetham	and	Rolfe	King	(eds.),	
Contemporary	Practice	and	Method	in	the	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	101.]	Swinburne	admits	this	by	advocating	such	an	approach,	‘The	Philosophy	of	Religion	is	an	examination	of	the	meaning	and	justification	of	religious	claims…more	typical	of	Western	religions	–	Christianity,	Judaism,	Islam	–	than	of	Eastern	religions	such	as	Buddhism,	Hinduism	and	Confucianism,	which	tend	to	concentrate	much	more	on	the	practice	of	a	way	of	life	than	on	a	theoretical	system.’	[Richard	Swinburne,	‘Philosophy	of	Religion.’	In,	Ted	Honderich	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Companion	to	Philosophy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995),	p.	763.]	
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(3.3.b.iv)	The	existential	view	of	religion	avoids	the	problems	while	incorporating	
the	insights	of	these	positions	Focusing	 on	 religiousness	 as	 developing	 in	 relation	 to	 shared,	 quasi-universal	existential	situations	that	are	faced	subjectively	by	individual	persons	enables	 the	 existential	 approach	 to	 acknowledge	 and	 explain	 the	 diversity	 of	religious	phenomena	and	their	points	of	intersection.	Comparable	features,	such	as	certain	beliefs,	values,	and	practices,	arise	from	the	shared	existential	contexts	denied	 by	 exclusivists	 like	 Lindbeck,	 but	 diversity	 results	 from	 the	 relative	subjective	 responses	 to	 these	 contexts. 242 	The	 existential	 approach	 thus	incorporates	Lindbeck’s	insight	that	religion	entails	more	than	experience,	which	always	has	a	reciprocal	relationship	to	its	context,	and	that	there	is	no	singular	cross-cultural	 experience	 because	 of	 the	 relativity	 of	 this	 background.	 Yet	 it	avoids	 Lindbeck’s	 limitations	 because	 it	 identifies	 the	 existential	 context,	including	 subjective	 appropriation,	 agency,	 and	 a	 shared	 human	 situation	 and	public	space,	as	providing	this	background.		This	 acknowledges	 the	 rhizomatic	 connections	 between	 and	heterogeneity	 of	 such	 bodies	 as	 potentially	 connected,	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	historical	and	global	context	as	well	as	their	origin	in	existential	human	activity,	yet	 also	 forming	 concentrated	manifestations	 of	 such	 subjective	 activity	 when	they	 form	 into	 collective	 bodies	 of	 individuals.	 They	 are	 prone	 to	 continual	reinterpretation	and	remapping	by	those	who	associate	with	them.243	Moreover,	this	 occurs	 at	 various	 sites	 in	 religions,	 not	 just	 in	 the	 theologically	 literate	
																																																								242	Even	Lindbeck	is	forced	to	admit	one	commonality:	that,	as	comprehensive	schema,	all	religions	identify	issues	taken	to	be,	‘more	important	than	anything	else’.	[Lindbeck,	ND,	p.	32.]	243	Hence	Deleuze	and	Guattari	advocate	a	cartographic	and	exploratory	approach	for	describing	rhizomes.	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Felix	Guattari,	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia,	p.	13.	
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authorities	who	determine	and	 legislate	on	 the	 regimes	of	phrases;	 individuals	choose	how	to	navigate,	interact	with,	use,	subvert,	or	leave	them.	This	avoids	a	‘clash	of	religions’	model,	focused	on	large,	powerful,	homogenised	groups.	RD	must	 also	 be	 recognised	 as	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 religiousness	 and	 as	integral	 to	 the	nature	of	 religions	 as	personal	 and	 subjective	 and	 thus	 existing	within	vaguely	defined	religious	bodies	as	well	as	between	them;	indeed,	it	is	to	be	welcomed	as	a	 sign	of	deep	personal	appropriation	and	engagement,	 rather	than	 a	 deviation	 from	 an	 artificially	 prescribed	 essence.	 Furthermore,	 the	pseudonyms	 identify	 a	 public	 space,	 in	 the	 shared	 human	 situation,	 where	engagement	between	religions	is	possible	and	important,	given	that	humans	are	facing	existentially	ultimate	questions.																	
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(3.4)	The	Metaphysical	and	Doxastic	Theses	(3.4.a)	The	Theses	Evident	in	CV	
The	Metaphysical	Thesis	The	metaphysical	thesis	is	that	religions,	and/or	the	theory	of	RD,	express	objective,	 propositional	 truths,	 prescriptions,	 and	 accounts	 that	 purport	 to	accurately	describe	reality:	they	are	sets	of	doctrines,	metaphysical	propositions,	or	 axiological	 codes	 that	 make	 claims	 about	 reality	 that	 can	 be	 true,	 false,	 or	contain	degrees	of	truth.244	The	conception	of	metaphysical	truth	may	be	of	two	main	kinds:	propositional	or	coherentist,	such	that	religions	may	be	conceived	of	as	 offering	 specific	 propositions	 that	 correspond	 to	 reality	 or	 accounts	 that	correspond	 as	 a	 whole.245	Given	 its	 hegemonic	 view	 of	 religion,	 CV	 is	 usually	formulated	in	terms	of	the	latter:	Schmidt-Leukel,	for	example,	views	religions	as	offering	 total	 accounts	 of	 reality.	 This	 also	 presents	 RD	 as	 primarily	 an	intellectual	 problem	 of	 disagreement	 between	 different	 metaphysical	accounts.246		This	 thesis	 solidifies	 the	 link	 between	 CV’s	 objective	 ontology	 and	religious	 exclusivism:	 both	 posit	 the	 ability	 of	 human-generated	 schemas	 to	describe	 reality,	 and,	 as	 mediating	 sets	 of	 truths	 about	 reality,	 competing	religions	 are	unlikely	 to	 both	have	 validity	 as	 there	will	 be	 a	 single	 account	 of	reality	 that	 is	 true.	 It	 requires	 that	 there	 is	 a	 reality,	 whether	 singular	 or																																																									244	Schilbrack	notes	this	as	a	deficiency	of	academic	approaches	to	religion,	but	proceeds	to	do	this	himself	by	identifying	religions	as	offering	superempirical	accounts.	Kevin	Schilbrack,	
Philosophy	and	the	Study	of	Religions:	A	Manifesto,	p.	97.	245	Four	are	identified	by	Markham,	though	these	two	are	the	accounts	of	truth	in	the	approaches	considered	here.	Ian	S.	Markham,	‘Truth	in	Religion’.	In,	Chad	Meister	and	Paul	Copan	(eds.),	The	
Routledge	Companion	to	Philosophy	of	Religion,	pp.	194-195.	246	Adams,	for	example,	claims	that	a	central	difficulty	for	reconciling	different	religious	positions	is	that,	‘religions	pack	into	their	philosophical	theologies	metaphysical	claims’,	and	specifically	rules	out	interpreting	such	accounts	as	metaphorical.	[Marilyn	McCord	Adams,	‘Which	Is	It?	Religious	Pluralism	or	Global	Theology?’	In,	Sharada	Sugirtharajah	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	
the	Modern	World,	p.	41.]	
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polyphonous,	 in	 relation	 to	 which	 religions	 are/are	 not	 situated.247	Climacus	identifies	the	correspondence	theory	of	truth	as	integral	to	an	objective	ontology:	objective	 reflection	 aims	 to	 comprehend	 its	 objects	 through	 cognitive	correspondence	 between	 the	 objects	 of	 thought	 and	 the	 objects	 of	 reality	 in	 a	‘unity	of	thinking	and	being’	(CUP,	p.	86).			
The	Doxastic	Thesis	The	 doxastic	 thesis	 asserts	 that	 true	 religious	 knowledge	 about	 the	position	 one	 should	 take	 on	 RD	 can	 be	 possessed	 with	 sufficient	 certainty	 to	justify	belief	in	it.	In	conformity	with	the	assertion	of	the	metaphysical	thesis	that	RD	is	an	intellectual	problem	revolving	around	competing	accounts	of	reality,	the	doxastic	thesis	asserts	that	this	problem	can	be	solved	through	the	adoption	of	a	true	 explanatory	 position	 provided	 by	 a	 specific	 religion	 or	 theoretical	perspective.	 This	 position	 will	 be	 global	 and	 generic,	 seizing	 on	 a	 feature	 of	reality	 to	 explain	 a	 range	 of	 phenomena.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 Schmidt-Leukel’s	totalisation	of	CV’s	 rationality	as	definitive:	 that	CV	outlines	all	of	 the	available	options,	 that	one	must	adopt	a	position	on	 it,	and	that	philosophical	rationality	can,	in	principle,	solve	the	problem.248	This	is	an	exclusivist	gesture	as	it	asserts	our	capability	of	achieving	religious	knowledge	that	 is	more	than	a	provisional,	finite	 schema	 and	 is	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 commitment	 to	 a	 single	 position	 as	accurately	corresponding	to	reality	in	the	face	of	a	range	of	alternatives.																																																											247	See,	for	example,	McKim’s	definition	of	the	problem	as	revolving	around	the	status	of	competing	religions	in	relation	to	truth	and	salvation.	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	pp.	6-7.	Similarly,	Quinn	and	Meeker	claim	that,	‘we	use	the	term	religious	diversity	to	refer	to	the	undisputed	fact	that	different	religions	espouse	doctrines	that	are	at	least	apparently	in	conflict	and	offer	alternative	paths	of	salvation’.	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	Meeker	(eds.),	The	
Philosophical	Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	3.	248	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	27.	
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The	Theses	Evident	in	CV	Byrne	provides	an	example	of	the	use	of	these	theses	in	his	definition	of	RD	as	being,	‘The	fact…that	different	religions	contain	competing	accounts	of	the	character	 of	 the	 metaphysically	 and	 axiologically	 ultimate	 reality	 and…of	 the	character	of	the	ultimate	good	human	beings	can	attain	through	relation	to	this	reality.’249	This	 is	 similarly	 apparent	 in	 Schmidt-Leukel’s	 claim	 that	 religions	understand	 themselves	 as	 mediating,	 ‘a	 salvific	 knowledge	 of	ultimate/transcendent	 reality’.250	This	 presents	 the	 nature	 of	 RD	 as	 being	 the	existence	of	different	accounts	of	reality;	the	problem	it	presents	is	capable	of	a	satisfactory,	intellectual	resolution.251		The	 propositional	 version	 of	 the	 theses	 are	 evident	 in	 Plantinga’s	exclusivist	 claim	 that	 religions	 contain	propositions	 that	 purport	 to	 be	 true	by	accurately	describing	reality	and	that	these	can	be	known	to	a	sufficient	level	to	be	 believed. 252 	Although	 Lindbeck’s	 cultural-linguistic	 model	 aims	 to	 avoid	reducing	 religions	 to	 propositional	 truth-claims	 in	 the	 way	 that	 the	 cognitive-propositional	 model	 does,	 his	 view	 is	 coherentist:	 religions	 present	 whole	accounts	of	reality	through	their	hermeneutical	structures.	This	 description	 of	 an	 objective	 ontology	 and	 correspondence	 theory	 of	epistemology	 seems	 to	 be	 at	 odds	 with	 pluralism,	 particularly	 Griffin’s	naturalism,	 which	 asserts	 the	 diversity	 of	 reality	 itself	 as	 eluding	 any	 single																																																									249	Peter	Byrne,	‘A	Philosophical	Approach	to	Questions	about	Religious	Diversity’.	In,	Chad	Meister	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	30.	250	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	19.		251	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	19.	252	Alvin	Plaintinga,	James	F.	Sennett	(ed.),	The	Analytic	Theist:	An	Alvin	Plantinga	Reader,	p.	187.	
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religious	perspective,	 and	Hick’s	Kantianism,	which	asserts	 the	 impossibility	of	correspondence	 given	 the	 interpretative,	 perspectival	 nature	 of	 religious	knowing.	However,	 Hick’s	 pluralism	 transfers	 the	 metaphysical	 thesis	 to	 the	pluralistic	 position	 itself	 in	 claiming	 to	 accurately	 describe	 the	 religious	situation.	 Insofar	 as	pluralism	purports	 to	 give	 the	 true	or	 superior	 account	of	religions,	 it	 offers	 a	 single	 account	 that	 replaces	 other	 philosophical	 and	theological	accounts	and	religions’	own	accounts	with	the	truth	claims	and	moral	framework	 of	 pluralism.253	Pluralism	 also	 asserts	 the	 certainty	 of	 the	 pluralist	perspective	 above	 the	 particular	 claims	 to	 truth	 made	 by	 religions	 and	 of	pluralism	as	the	solution	of	the	problem	of	diversity.		A	 number	 of	 critics	 identify	 the	 same	 exclusivist	 gesture	 in	 pluralism.	Heim	claims	 that,	 ‘each	appears	 to	deconstruct	 the	pluralism	 it	 seeks	 to	affirm.	They	 insist	 that	 despite	 any	 apparent	 indications	 to	 the	 contrary,	 there	 is	 no	diversity	in	the	religious	object	(Hick),	in	the	human	religious	attitude	(Smith),	or	the	primary	religious	 function	 (Knitter).	Thus	 they	agree	 that	 the	 faiths	cannot	be	 regarded	 as	 serious	 religious	 alternatives.’ 254 	This	 exclusivism	 is	 not	accidental;	its	cause	is,	according	to	Heim,	pluralism’s	underlying	assertion	that	their	theory	of	religion	is	true	and	that,	‘Pluralistic	theories	of	religion	should	be	accepted	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 others.’255	Such	 pluralism	 is	 self-contradictory	because	 it	 asserts	 that	 many	 religions	 are	 true	 and	 that	 only	 the	 religion	 of	pluralism	is	 true.	Plantinga	uses	this	contradiction	to	argue	for	the	necessity	of	
																																																								253	As	an	example,	see:	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘Religious	Pluralism:	Generic,	Identist,	and	Deep’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	12.	254	Heim,	STDR,	p.	102.	See	also	D’Costa’s	claim	that	Hick’s	pluralism	is	an	‘Enlightenment	exclusivism’	founded	in	a	Kantian,	ontological	agnosticism.	[D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	30.]	255	Heim,	STDR,	p.	141.	
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exclusivism,	 even	 for	 pluralists,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 holding	 a	 belief	 entails	rejecting	 opposing	 beliefs,	 ‘the	 pluralist…thinks	 the	 thing	 to	 do	 when	 there	 is	internal	 epistemic	 parity	 is	 to	withhold	 judgement;	 he	 knows	 there	 are	 others	who	don't	think	so,	and	for	all	he	knows,	that	belief	has	internal	parity	with	his;	if	he	 continues	 in	 that	 belief,	 therefore,	 he	 will	 be	 in	 the	 same	 condition	 as	 the	exclusivist’.256	Schmidt-Leukel’s	 response	 is	 that	 the	 typology	 is	 not	 claiming	 that	 all	truth-claims	must	fit	into	this	model,	but	only	the	claims	about	salvation	made	by	religions;	 thus	 one	 can	 be	 an	 exclusivist	 about	 one’s	 pluralism	while	 rejecting	religious	 exclusivism.257	Pluralism	 can	 be	 expressed	 as	 an	 account	 of	 religion	rather	than	a	religious	position	itself,	thereby	escaping	the	objection	that	it	is	an	exclusivist	competitor.			However,	 as	 Heim	 observes,	 most	 pluralistic	 positions	 blur	 the	 line	between	their	pluralism	and	the	religious	position	they	advocate	in	that	only	one	account	 is	 to	 be	 believed.258	Indeed,	 as	 Adams	 observes,	 their	 accounts	 are	 at	odds	 with	 religions’	 own	 accounts	 of	 themselves	 and	 are	 asserted	 to	 be	exclusively	 true	 when	 the	 religious	 claims	 are	 incompatible	 with	 them.259	As	
																																																								256	Alvin	Plantinga,	‘A	Defense	of	Religious	Exclusivism’.	In,	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Kevin	Meeker	(eds.),	The	Philosophical	Challenge	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	182.	His	doxastic	principle	is	that,	‘if	he	believes	(1)	or	(2),	then	he	must	also	believe	that	those	who	believe	something	incompatible	with	them	are	mistaken	and	believe	what	is	false.’	Alvin	Plaintinga,	‘A	Defense	of	Religious	Exclusivism’.	In,	Alvin	Plaintinga,	James	F.	Sennett	(ed.),	The	Analytic	Theist:	An	Alvin	Plantinga	
Reader,	p.	192.	257	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Exclusivism,	Inclusivism,	Pluralism:	The	Tripolar	Typology—Clarified	and	Reaffirmed’.	In,	Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	
of	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	24.	He	considers	related	issues	in:	Schmidt-Leukel	identifies	various	such	objections	in,	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	‘Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Need	for	an	Interreligious	Theology’.	In,	Sharada	Sugirtharajah	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Modern	World,	pp.	21-22.	258	Heim,	STDR,	p.	142.		259	Marilyn	McCord	Adams,	‘Which	Is	It?	Religious	Pluralism	or	Global	Theology?’	In,	Sharada	Sugirtharajah	(ed.),	Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Modern	World,	p.	40.	Knitter’s	alternative	response	is	that	pluralism	is	compatible	with	elements	of	those	religious	traditions,	such	that	it	is	not	a	competitor	because,	‘All	the	religions	possess	the	resources	within	their	own	traditions	to	
adopt	the	pluralist	model’,	but	by	doing	this	he	makes	an	exclusivist	gesture	by	asserting	a	single	
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D’Costa	claims,	pluralism	is	a	competitor	to	religions	in	regarding	their	accounts	as	 mythological	 and	 in	 need	 of	 revision	 or	 rejection,	 ‘all	 religions	 are	 seen	 to	make	 “mythological”	 (or	 false)	 claims,	except	 for	pluralists	who	possess	a	non-mythological	 set	 of	 ontological	 assumptions’. 260 	Moreover,	 Schmidt-Leukel’s	defence	 confirms	 the	 accusation	 that	 CV	 assumes	 the	 philosopher’s	 ability	 to	accurately	and	exclusively	describe	reality	 in	a	set	of	propositions,	 in	 this	case,	meta-level	propositions	about	the	nature	of	reality	and	status	of	religions.261			Griffin	 ascribes	 an	 exclusivist	 ontology	 to	 ‘identist’	 pluralisms,	 such	 as	Hick’s,	 that	 assert	 a	 higher	 ontological	 unity	 and	 account	 for	 diversity	 only	epistemologically,	as	a	result	of	different	perceptions.	He	claims	that	‘differential’	and	‘deep’	ontological	pluralisms,	such	as	Cobb’s,	escape	the	charge	by	adopting	a	 pluralist	 ontology	 that	 stresses	 that	 religious	 difference	 is	 irrevocable	 and	reflected	 in	 reality	 itself.262	However,	 Griffin	 and	 Cobb	 remain	 guilty	 of	 the	exclusivist	gesture	of	claiming	to	accurately	describe	reality.	Griffin’s	 naturalism	 is	 an	 assertion	 about	 reality	 and	 includes	 claims	 to	accurately	 describe	 the	 human	 situation,	 an	 epistemological	 thesis	 about	religious	knowing,	and	theological	thesis	about	how	the	divine	interacts	with	the	world	 and	 should	 be	 spoken	 of.	 Cobb	 similarly	 defends	 three	 exclusivist	assertions	 as	 integral	 to	 his	 pluralism.	 (C1)	 He	 advocates	 linguistic	 realism,	asserting	 that,	 ‘Our	 language	 refers	 beyond	 itself	 to	 a	 real	 world’,	 such	 that	religions,	 and	 his	 pluralistic	 account,	 make	 claims	 that	 are	 true	 if	 they																																																																																																																																																															truth	to	which	the	different	bodies	correspond	and	also	by	assigning	interpretative	authority	to	a	pluralist	interpretation	of	the	content	of	religions.	[Paul	F.	Knitter	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	Religious	
Superiority:	Multifaith	Explorations	of	Religious	Pluralism,	x.]	260	D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	46.	261	Hence,	as	will	be	shown	in	Chapter	4,	some	pluralisms	are	forced	to	adopt	forms	of	antirealism,	because	denying	there	is	a	reality	to	which	thought	corresponds	is	the	only	avenue	for	rejecting	the	implicit	exclusivism	of	correspondence	theories.	262	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘Religious	Pluralism:	Generic,	Identist,	and	Deep’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	29.		
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correspond	 to	 the	polyphonal	 reality,	 ‘the	 great	 religious	 thinkers	 of	West	 and	East	 have	 apprehended	 real	 features	 of	 a	 real	 world.’263	(C2)	 He	 asserts	 that	different	religions	have	genuinely	encountered	different	aspects	of	 the	 ‘totality’	and	describe	this	in	language	that	corresponds	to	reality.	The	truths	conveyed	by	religions	 are	 thus	 complementary:	 they	 are	 valid	 descriptions,	 even	 if	 they	appear	to	compete.264	(C3)	He	also	asserts	the	truth	of	the	pluralist	ontology	as	a	description	of	reality.265	Pluralism	is	 ‘normative’	and	should	be	adopted	as	true	because	its	pluralistic	insights	corresponds	to	the	polyphonal	nature	of	reality.266		Pluralisms	also	make	an	exclusivist	gesture	by	asserting	a	set	of	religious	and	moral	principles	that	are	held	to	be	true,	not	simply	second	order	theories	about	 what	 truth	 claims	 can	 be	 made,	 further	 blurring	 the	 theory/religion	distinction	 as	 suggested	 in	 Heim’s	 criticism.	 For	 example,	 Griffin	 claims	 that	 a	primary	motive	in	developing	pluralism	has	been	a	conception	of	the	‘primacy	of	divine	love’	as	incompatible	with	exclusivism	and	its	exclusion	of	access	to	God,	a	point	similarly	made	by	Hick,	 ‘Can	we	accept	that	the	God	of	 love	who	seeks	to	save	 all	mankind	has	nevertheless	 ordained	 that	men	must	be	 saved	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 only	 a	 small	 minority	 can	 in	 fact	 receive	 this	 salvation?’267	Hick	 also	asserts	 that	 religions	 focus	on	moving	 the	 individual	 from	self-centredeness	 to	reality-centredeness	and	that	this	is	the	moral	objective	truth	communicated	by	
																																																								263	John	B.	Cobb	Jr.,	‘Some	Whiteheadian	Assumptions	about	Religion	and	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	256-257	and	p.	258.	264	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	47-48.	265	John	B.	Cobb	Jr.,	‘Some	Whiteheadian	Assumptions	about	Religion	and	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	254-258.	266	John	B.	Cobb,	Transforming	Christianity	and	the	World:	A	Way	beyond	Absolutism	and	
Relativism.	Ed.	Paul	F.	Knitter,	p.	50.	Cited	in	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘John	Cobb’s	Whiteheadian	Complementary	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	50.	267	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘Religious	Pluralism:	Generic,	Identist,	and	Deep’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	10-11.	John	Hick,	God	and	the	Universe	of	Faiths	(Macmillan,	1973),	p.	122.	
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religions	 that	 underlies	 their	 apparent	 differences.268	Similarly,	 Griffin	 claims	that	 pluralism	 is	 to	 be	 promoted	 as	 having	 social	 and	 global	 utility	 and	 that	religions	contain	moral	values	that	are	conducive	to	this:	‘The	growth	of	religious	pluralism	 in	 the	 various	 traditions	 could	 encourage	 a	 mutual	 respect	 and	appreciation	that	would	facilitate	cooperation.’269	This	evinces	the	metaphysical	thesis:	there	is	a	single	moral	framework	that	should	guide	belief-formation	and	decision-making	and	this	can	be	found	in	religions.		Even	deep	pluralism	is	thus	grounded	in	a	metaphysical	account	of	reality	that	 is	 claimed	 to	 be	 true,	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 diversity,	 and	 to	 supersede	religious	 claims.	 This	 is	 particularly	 problematic	 because	 it	 conflicts	 with	 the	deeper	 pluralist	 conviction	 that	 all	 knowing	 is	 situational	 and	 context-bound,	including	meta-theories	about	religion.270	The	existential	epistemology	outlined	in	 2.3	makes	 this	 pluralist	 assertion	 invalid;	 it	 adopts	 that	 view	 that	would	 be	more	coherent	within	a	pluralist	position:	the	necessity	of	interpretation	goes	to	the	core	of	understanding	and	is	inescapable,	even	in	theories	themselves,	which	operate	within	a	particular,	relative	interpretative	framework.271																																																												268	Sinkinson	observes	that	this	commits	Hick	to	an	exclusivist	ethics.	[Christopher	Sinkinson,	The	
Universe	of	Faiths:	A	Critical	Study	of	John	Hick’s	Religious	Pluralism,	p.	169.]	269	David	Ray	Griffin,	‘Religious	Pluralism:	Generic,	Identist,	and	Deep’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	p.	5.	270	Heim	makes	a	similar	criticism.	[Heim,	STDR,	p.	143.]	The	focus	of	my	critique	is	exclusivism	and	it	should	not	be	taken	as	a	definitive	refutation	of	deep	pluralism.	Cobb	shares	a	number	of	affinities	with	the	critique,	such	as	his	rejection	of	the	reification	of	religion	and	the	attempt	to	identify	its	essence	or	a	common	notion	of	salvation.	[John	B.	Cobb	Jr.,	‘Some	Whiteheadian	Assumptions	about	Religion	and	Pluralism’.	In,	Griffin	(ed.),	DRP,	pp.	243-251.]	My	critique	demonstrates	that	pluralist	positions	are	hampered	by	defining	themselves	in	relation	to	CV	and	a	typology	that	is	configured	along	exclusivist	lines	that	emphasizes	the	problem	as	objective	and	theoretical	and	requiring	the	deployment	of	a	generic,	global	account	of	reality.	They	fail	to	capitalize	on	their	hermeneutical	insights	into	religion	as	interpretative	contextual	frameworks	because	they	fail	to	apply	the	same	insight	to	philosophical	and	metaphysical	accounts.	Deep	pluralism	may	be	able	to	respond	to	my	critique,	but	it	must	do	so	through	a	more	radical	departure	from	CV	than	Cobb	and	Griffin	achieve.	271	Heim	refers	to	this	as	the,	‘orientational	pluralist’	insight.	Heim,	STDR,	p.	143.		
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(3.4.b)	The	Theses	Misrepresent	Religion	The	existential	conception	of	religiousness	and	religious	knowing,	which	regards	 certainty	 as	 unachievable	 and	 undesirable	 in	 the	 light	 of	 its	interpretative	 and	 embodied	 nature,	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 view	 of	 religions	 as	metaphysical	accounts	and	the	idea	of	religious	certainty.	The	ontology	of	CV	also	posits	 singularity	 and	 unity	 as	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 reality	and	consciousness;	it	fosters	totalising	visions	of	the	Truth	of	the	whole.272	This	view	 of	 religious	 truth	 is	 an	 onto-theological	 gesture	 critiqued	 by	 the	pseudonyms.273	Westphal	 identifies	 the	 onto-theological	 gesture	 as	 the	utilisation	of	 the	divine	 as	 an	 explicable	 concept	 that	 can	 be	 directly	 described	 through	 a	theological	system	and	through	which	existence	can	be	understood	as	a	totality	with	the	person	occupying,	 ‘the	divine	perspective	on	the	world’;	 it	 thus	serves	as	 the	 foundational	 criterion	 of	 legitimisation	 for	 the	 philosophical	 system.274	The	divine,	 understood	homophously	 as	 in	 exclusivism	or	polyphonously	 as	 in	pluralism,	provides	the	singular	concept	in	which	CV’s	ontology	is	expressed	and	justified,	 allowing	 existence	 to	 be	 thought	 as	 systematic	 totality,	 ‘Metaphysics	thinks	 of	 beings	 as	 such,	 that	 is,	 in	 general…[and]	 as	 a	whole.’275	This	 grounds	and	 predetermines	 the	 relations	 one	 is	 to	 sustain	 to	 others	 and	 religions.	 The	pseudonyms	 reject	 this	 onto-theological	 gesture	 of	 the	 exclusivist	 theses	 in	several	 ways:	 totalising	 systems	 misrepresent	 religion,	 posit	 an	 illegitimate																																																									272	Hence	Goodchild	identifies	exclusivism	as	Neoplatonic,	though	he	fails	to	see	pluralism	as	making	the	same	gesture.	Philip	Goodchild,	‘Politics,	Pluralism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Religion:	an	Essay	on	Exteriority’.	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	194.	273	Westphal	interprets	Kierkegaard	as	part	of	the	tradition	of	defining	and	rejecting	ontotheology.	Merold	Westphal,	Overcoming	Onto-theology:	Toward	a	Postmodern	Christian	Faith	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2001),	p.	6.	274	Merold	Westphal,	Overcoming	Onto-theology:	Toward	a	Postmodern	Christian	Faith,	p.	6.	275	Martin	Heidegger,	‘The	Onto-Theo-Logical	Constitution	of	Metaphysics’.	In,	John	D.	Caputo	(ed.),	The	Religious	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2002),	p.	69.	
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perspective	of	the	philosopher	and	are	designed	to	insulate	persons	against	the	anxiety	of	existence	through	acts	of	domination.	 In	all	 three	cases,	 the	problem	derives	from	ascribing	interpretative	authority	to	metaphysical	accounts.		(3.4.b.i)	CV	focuses	on	metaphysical	accounts	that	impede	authentic	religiousness	The	metaphysical	thesis	defines	religion	‘objectively’:	as	a	set	of	doctrines,	metaphysical	 propositions,	 or	 code	 of	 values	 that	 makes	 claims	 about	 reality	(CUP,	p.	218).	This	distorts	religions	by	objectifying	their	essentially	subjective,	existential	 and	 experiential	 content,	 as	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world,	 and	translating	 them	 into	 sets	 of	 intellectual	 or	 moral	 assertions,	 ‘attention	 is	immediately	turned	outward	in	order	to	find	out	what	Christianity’s	doctrine	is’	(CUP,	p.	607).			 The	 ways	 of	 being	 religious	 that	 are	 facilitated	 by	 CV	 translate	 the	encounter	 with	 different	 religions	 into	 an	 objective	 problem	 about	 deciding	between	 truth-claims	 and	 gaining	 certainty.	 According	 to	 Climacus,	 this	perpetually	 postpones	 real	 existential	 engagement	 because	 there	 can	 be	 no,	‘transition	 from	something	objective	 to	a	 subjective	acceptance’	 (CUP,	pp.	129-130).	This	is	because	the	aim	of	the	objective	approach,	in	attempting	to	decide	the	matter	rationally	and	impartially,	is	to	abstract	from	the	personal,	subjective,	existential	 commitments	 (CUP,	 p.	 118).	 This	 intellectualisation	 is	 inimical	 to	passion,	which	 requires	existential	 encounter;	hence,	Climacus	 links	objectivity	with	 the	 inability	 to	 have	 the	 passion	 of	 faith	 or	 feel	 religious	 ‘terror’	 (CUP,	 p.	215)	and	‘unutterable	joy’	(CUP,	p.	221).		Marginalising	 the	 role	 of	 accounts	 and	 truth-claims	 in	 religion	 seems	spurious,	as	religions	do	involve	such	features,	but	the	pseudonyms’	contention	
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is	that	these	are	secondary	to	the	existential	activity	and	wider	range	of	features.	Their	 account	 coheres	 more	 closely	 with	 religious	 phenomena,	 which	 include	narratives,	 practices,	 and	 a	 range	 of	 embodied	 experiences,	 emotions,	 and	activities	 more	 than	 metaphysical	 treatises.	 This	 acknowledges	 the	 existential	nature	of	encounters	with	religion:	humans	turn	to	religious	ways	of	being	when	it	comes	to	questions	that	cannot	be	empirically	or	objectively	answered:	death,	afterlife,	salvation,	values,	meaning,	and	identity.	The	meaning	of	religious	truth-claims	 is	 lived	 out	 relationally	 and	 subjectively	 through	 the	 resources	 that	religions	provide,	so	propositional	elements	must	be	considered	as	expressions	tied	 to	 the	 existential	 context	 that	 gives	 rise	 to	 them.	 Extricating	 propositions	from	 this	 context	 has	 the	 result	 of	 altering	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 beliefs	 and	ignoring	 the	 subjective	 dimension	 of	 knowing	 from	which	 they	 emerge	 and	 to	which	they	relate.276	The	priority	of	embodied	coping	over	theory	means	that	the	more	 fundamental	 questions	 posed	 by	RD	 are	 existential,	 about	 how	 one	 is	 to	relate	to	others,	not	theoretical.	Hence	Cheetham	observes	that,	far	from	being	a	more	 limited	 perspective,	 comparative	 theologians	 who	 avoid	 CV	 may	demonstrate,	 ‘a	 fuller	 comprehension	 of	 these	 basic	 questions	 by	 soberly	recognizing	the	appropriateness	of	a	more	finite	task…[that]	has	acknowledged	its	 human	 limitations	 in	 light	 of	 the	 depths	 and	 complexity	 of	 ultimate	questions.’277	Climacus	 also	 critiques	 the	metaphysical	 thesis’	 objective	 conception	 of	religious	 absolutes	 as	 totality-of-explanation	 as	 incommensurate	 with	 the	absolute	commitment	elicited	by	the	question	of	one’s	‘evig	salighed’.	The	latter,																																																									276	Climacus	notes	the	use	of	the	Danish	‘ophaeve’,	‘annul’,	to	translate	Hegel’s	‘aufheben’,	‘synthesis’,	the	implication	being	that	its	extraction	of	truth	negates	the	diversity	and	specificity	of	Christianity	by	regarding	the	variations	as	merely	rhetorical	variations	(CUP,	p.	220).		277	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	76.	
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which	he	sees	as	the	proper	object	of	religious	devotion,	is	qualitatively	distinct	in	 that	 it	 elicits	devotion,	not	 intellectual	assent,	 ‘Objectively	understood,	 there	are	 more	 than	 enough	 results	 everywhere,	 but	 no	 decisive	 results	anywhere…because	decision	is	rooted	in	subjectivity’	(CUP,	p.	34).		(3.4.b.ii)	CV	posits	the	unachievable	goal	of	gaining	secure	knowledge	of	absolute	
religious	truth	The	approach	to	reality	as	a	total	system	is	impossible	for	existing	beings,		‘A	system	of	existence	cannot	be	given….	System	and	conclusiveness	correspond	to	 each	 other,	 but	 existence	 is	 the	 very	 opposite.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 118)	 First,	 such	 a	totalising	 grasp	 is	 impossible	 because	 one	 is	 dealing	with	 human	 realities,	 not	fixed,	timeless	essences.	Resolving	the	issue	for	CV	also	requires	the	achievement	of	 an	 unachievable	 certitude	 that	 a	 particular	 system	 is	 exclusively	 and	 totally	true	and	not	merely	provisional,	yet,	as	products	of	human	subjects,	all	systems	are	 provisional	 and	 relative	 to	 ways	 of	 being,	 such	 that	 a	 neutral	 view	 from	nowhere	cannot	be	achieved,	‘certainty	is	impossible	for	a	person	in	a	process	of	becoming,	 and	 is	 indeed	 a	 deception.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 74)	 Authentic	 religiousness	 is	consciously	 aware	 of	 its	 nature	 as	 a	 commitment	 necessitated	 by	 the	 anxious,	uncertain,	 agonistic,	 and	 processual	 limitations	 of	 the	 human	 situation.	 This	context	 entails	 that	 beliefs	 inevitably	 change	 and	 evolve:	 a	 belief	may	 seem	 to	have	 certitude	 or	 be	 the	 result	 of	 reliable	methods	 but,	 since	 all	 positions	 and	methods	 are	 the	 result	 of	 changeable	 interpretations	 and	 commitments,	 all	positions	are	uncertain	and	provisional.278	
																																																								278	‘Oh	yes,	in	the	end	everything	will	become	clear,	but	the	end	is	not	here	yet.’	(CUP,	p.	13).	
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Furthermore,	the	onto-theological	gesture	is	an	act	of	despair,	intended	to	insulate	 one	 against	 encounter	 with	 the	 other	 and	 the	 agonistic	 nature	 of	personhood	legitimising	one’s	singular	conception	of	reality,		‘In	a	human	being	there	is	always	a	desire…to	have	something	really	firm	and	 fixed	 that	 can	 exclude	 the	 dialectical,	 but	 this	 is	 cowardliness	 and	fraudulence	toward	the	divine.	Even	the	most	certain	of	all,	a	revelation,	
eo	ipso	becomes	dialectical	when	I	am	to	appropriate	 it….	 It	 is,	however,	far	more	comfortable	to	be	objective	and	superstitious,	boasting	about	it	and	proclaiming	thoughtlessness.’	(CUP,	p.	35)	Viewed	objectively,	how	one	is	to	interact	with	religious	others	is	dependent	on	one’s	 theoretical	account	of	diversity,	but	 this	suspends	the	eventfulness	of	 the	encounter	 and	 occasion	 for	 relationship	 and	 transformation	 that	 all	 such	encounters	present.	Indeed,	if	the	problem	of	RD	could	be	solved	with	certainty,	faith	 would	 become	 impossible,	 since	 there	 would	 be	 no	 risk	 or	 uncertainty,	‘Without	risk,	no	faith’	(CUP,	p.	204).	The	desire	for	a	doxastic	resolution	of	the	problem,	 from	 Climacus’	 perspective,	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 gain	 a	 security	 that	 is	impossible	and	demonstrates	despair.			(3.4.b.iii)	CV	is	incompatible	with	divine	transcendence		These	 theses	 also	 conflict	 with	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 divine	 as	 a	transcendent	 or	 ineffable	 personal	 being.	 As	 Buber	 observes,	 for	 example,	 the	objectification	of	a	Thou	is	an	inappropriate	relationship	to	an	absolute	because	it	assumes	a	complete	grasp	of	the	absolute	through	its	characteristics	and	thus	the	 superiority	of	 the	observer	over	 the	observed	as	 capable	of	describing	and	
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manipulating	 it.279 	Objectification	 of	 a	 Thou	 in	 a	 set	 of	 characteristics	 also	reduces	 it	 to	 being	 an	 object	 among	 others,	 rather	 than	 a	 unique,	 personal	presence,	 ‘in	 the	 exclusive	 situation	 of	 what	 is	 over	 against	 it.’ 280 	The	pseudonyms’	 identification	 of	 the	 object	 of	 Christian	 faith	 as	 paradoxical,	offensive,	and	opposed	to	reason	(PF,	p.	53;	PiC,	p.	125)	disrupts	any	attempt	to	incorporate	 it	 into	 such	 an	 onto-theology,	 calling,	 instead	 for	 the	 language	 of	collision,	 discontinuity,	 and	 disruption	 in	 conformity	with	 encounters	wherein	reason	 is	 stretched	 to	 its	 limits	and	collapses,	 ‘the	understanding’s	paradoxical	passion	 that	 wills	 collision	 awakens	 and,	 without	 really	 understanding	 itself,	wills	its	own	downfall.’	(PF,	pp.	38-39)	Furthermore,	 the	 pseudonyms’	 describe	 encounters	 with	 the	 divine	 in	which	existential	 transformation	 is	encountered	as	generated	 from	the	outside,	even	 if	 it	 is	 initiated	by	an	act	of	 faith,	as	 in	 the	transforming	relationship	with	Jesus	 through	God’s	 grace	 (PF,	 pp.	 26-32;	PiC,	 p.	 64).	On	 such	a	 view	of	divine	activity,	 religions	 convey	 transcendent	 and	 seemingly	 impossible	 encounters	without	 claiming	 to	 describe	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 being	 encountered	 in	 total	 or	metaphysical	ways.	CV	precludes	such	eventfulness	because	it	legislates	and	pre-empts	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 other	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 God.	 God	 cannot	 be	encountered	 in	 an	 eventful,	 transforming	 way,	 because	 God’s	 presence	 in	 a	particular	 religious	 system	 is	 predetermined	 by	 the	 philosophical	 reflection	 of	CV.			 Finally,	 the	pseudonyms	defend	a	personalist	 view	of	 the	nature	of	God	and	 describe	 the	 ‘God-relationship’	 as	 involving	 a	 relationship	 of	
																																																								279	Martin	Buber,	I	and	Thou	(London:	Continuum,	2004),	p.	17.	280	Martin	Buber,	I	and	Thou,	p.	30.	
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contemporaneity	with	God	as	a	person,	such	as	Jesus.281	By	asserting	that	God	is	a	personal	being,	who	can	only	be	related	to	personally,	the	pseudonyms	aim	to	preclude	the	conception	of	God	as	a	component	of	a	metaphysical	system,	such	as	a	causa	sui.	For	a	response	within	CV	to	be	valid,	it	must	make	claims	about	the	divine	that	are	true	but,	on	the	personalist	account,	God,	as	a	personal	entity,	can	only	 be	 encountered	 relationally	 and	 cannot	 be	 presented	 in	 a	 propositional	system,	‘to	bring	forth	God	objectively…is	not	achieved	in	all	eternity,	for	God	is	a	subject	and	hence	only	for	subjectivity	in	inwardness.’282		Beyond	this	encounter	with	a	personal	being,	Climacus	claims	that	God	is	an	 inexpressible	mystery,	 and	 neither	 revelation	 nor	 nature	 provide	 a	 way	 of	penetrating	 into	 it	 (CUP,	 pp.	 245-246).	 Rather	 than	 delivering	 knowledge,	 the	effects	of	the	relationship	are	transforming,	such	that	the	other	is	only	known	as	it	affects	the	person	and	is	never	laid	bare,	‘With	regard	to	the	essential	truth,	a	direct	relation	between	spirit	and	spirit	is	unthinkable.’	(CUP,	p.	247)	Part	of	the	role	 assigned	 to	 the	 Absolute	 Paradox	 in	 Christianity	 is	 to	 destabilise	 onto-theological	 structures	 because,	 as	 ‘absurd’,	 it	 cannot	 be	 known	 only	 related	 to	(CUP,	 p.	 213).	 Climacus	 also	 argues	 that	 if	 a	 direct	 relationship	 to	 God	 were	possible,	through	adherence	to	exclusivist	structures,	God	would	be	culpable	for	
																																																								281	Personalism	is	here	understood	loosely	as	the	claim	that	God	is	‘a	personal	agent’	who	interacts	with	humans,	for	example,	through	prayer,	and	who	is	possessed	of	intentions,	will	and	personality.	I	follow	Moser	and	McCreary	in	defining	Climacus	as	a	theological	personalist	in	this	way.	Paul	K.	Moser	and	Mark	L.	McCreary,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Conception	of	God’.	Philosophy	Compass,	5/2	(2010),	p.	129.	282	CUP,	pp.	199-200.	This	is	sometimes	interpreted	as	advocating	theological	antirealism:	Cupitt,	for	example,	claims	that	God	is	a	product	of	subjectivity	[Don	Cupitt,	The	World	to	Come	(London:	SCM	Press,	1982),	p.	46].	This	is	fallacious	as	Climacus	argues	that	God	can	only	be	related	to	subjectively	precisely	because	God	is	a	subject	and	hence	he	compares	the	God-relation	to	other	interpersonal	relations	(CUP,	p.	247).	Law	supports	this	interpretation,	‘God	is	a	subject.	Therefore	the	appropriate	relationship	is	a	subjective	relationship.	But	this	does	not	mean	that	God	is	a	feature	of	human	existence.’	[David	Law,	‘Making	Christianity	difficult:	the	“existentialist	theology”	of	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript.’	In	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.)	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	p.	234].	
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failing	 to	make	 this	 available	 to	 everyone:	 ‘Oddly	 enough…it	 does	not	 occur	 to	anyone	 to	 complain	 about	 God,	 who…would	 seem	 to	 be	 able	 in	 the	communication	of	truth	to	relate	himself	directly’	(CUP,	p.	243).																					
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3.5.	An	Existential	Typology	of	Approaches	to	Religious	Diversity	CV	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 inappropriate	 as	 a	means	 of	 approaching	 RD	because	 it	 misrepresents	 the	 nature	 of	 religion,	 the	 nature	 of	 diversity,	 and	because	it	is	an	unachievable	and	inauthentic	approach	to	religious	knowing	and	devotion.	 A	 typology	 must	 be	 more	 sensitive	 to	 the	 subjective	 and	 existential	dimensions	 that	 are	 vital	 to	 religious	 devotion.	Rather	 than	utilising	 the	 blunt,	objective	 typology	 provided	 by	 CV,	 a	 new	 typology	 must	 be	 constructed	 to	describe	 the	 existential	 orientations	 and	ways	 of	 being	 that	 are	 possible	when	confronted	 with	 RD	 as	 an	 existential	 problem.	 As	 an	 existential	 problem,	 the	primary	 dilemmas	 it	 poses	 relate	 to	 how	 one	 is	 to	 configure	 commitment	 and	openness,	relate	to	others	and	construct	authentic	ways	of	being	in	the	situation	of	diversity.	Cheetham	has	suggested	 the	need	 to	adopt	an	aesthetic	approach	 to	 the	typology,	 focussed	 on	 the	 ‘tone	 of	 voice’	 and	ways	 of	 speaking	 adopted	 by	 the	positions.283	This	 is	comparable	to	Connell’s	utilisation	of	 ‘moods’	as	describing	fundamental	orientations	in	one’s	way	of	being	in	the	world.	In	a	strategy	similar	to	my	own,	Connell	 identifies	exclusivism	with	 ‘seriousness’	and	pluralism	with	‘irony’.284	I	 will	 now	 propose	 an	 alternative	 typology	 of	 approaches	 to	 RD,	focused	 on	 the	 ways	 of	 being	 they	 facilitate	 and	 express,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	providing	 a	 fuller,	 Kierkegaardian	 account	 of	 the	 subjective	 and	 existential	dimensions	than	these	two	suggestions.			
																																																								283	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	4.	284	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	85.	Chapter	4	will	develop	this	in	two	ways:	it	will	be	argued	that	pluralism	and	exclusivism	advocate	entire	ways	of	being,	not	simply	tones	of	voice	or	moods,	and	that	these	ways	of	being	are	not	simply	limited	perspectives	but	are	entirely	inauthentic	and	inimical	to	developing	authentic	religiousness	and	engaging	with	religious	diversity.	
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Despair	Climacus	 and	 Anti-Climacus	 outline	 various	 ways	 of	 being	 that	 they	regard	as	inauthentic	responses	to	the	human	situation.	Anti-Climacus	describes	these	 through	 his	 typology	 of	 despair,	 which	 he	 expounds,	 in	 relation	 to	 his	ontology	 of	 the	 person,	 as	 a	 misrelation	 to	 oneself.285	It	 signifies	 a	 failure	 to	constitute	selfhood,	particularly	in	relation	to	an	identity	that	one	has	willed.286	As	 such,	 it	 provides	 an	 understanding	 of	 inauthentic	 religiousness	 as	 a	 failed	attempt	to	constitute	selfhood	through	commitment.	SuD	maps	out	varieties	of	despair	that	fail	 to	 live	out	the	dialectic	of	the	human	 situation	 of	 finitude/infinitude,	 possibility/necessity	 and,	 to	 add	Climacus’,	universality	and	specificity	(SuD,	pp.	29-74).	Anti-Climacus	 identifies	four	 types	of	despair:	 ‘to	 lack	 finitude’	 (SuD,	p.	30),	 ‘to	 lack	 infinitude’	 (SuD,	p.	33),	 ‘to	 lack	necessity’	(SuD,	p.	35)	and	 ‘to	 lack	possibility’	(SuD,	p.	37).	He	also	sees	ways	of	being	as	either	conscious	or	unconscious	of	this	despair.		All	 forms	of	despair	are	underpinned	by	spiritlessness	and	are	 linked	to	anxiety,	weakness	(SuD,	p.	61),	existential	cowardice,	and	a	misplaced	confidence	that	 is	 in	denial	about	 the	precariousness	of	 its	own	situation,	 ‘the	anxiety	 that	characterises	 spiritlessness	 is	 recognised	 precisely	 by	 its	 spiritless	 sense	 of	security.’	 (SuD,	 p.	 44)287	Anti-Climacus	 recognises	 that	 living	 in	 the	 human	situation	 is	an	anxious	struggle	 in	which	one	must	respond	to	a	range	of	crises																																																									285	I	follow	McCarthy	in	defining	despair	as,	‘misrelationship	to	oneself	in	one’s	inner	life’.	Vincent	McCarthy,	Kierkegaard	as	Psychologist	(Evanston:	Northwestern	University	Press,	2015),	p.	138.	286	McCarthy	sees	will	as	the	primary	issue	in	despair.	Vincent	McCarthy,	Kierkegaard	as	
Psychologist,	pp.	139-140.	287	Pattison	notes	that	anxiety	in	CA	provides	the	theoretical	basis	for	Anti-Climacus’	exegesis,	though	he	identifies	a	modification	of	the	concept	in	SuD,	which	treats	anxiety	as	a	symptom	of	despair.	There	is	insufficient	space	to	analyse	the	differences,	but	I	follow	Pattison	in	arguing	that	despair	is	best	understood	as	resulting	from	the	universal	condition	of	anxiety,	such	that	there	can	be	an	authentic	response	to	despair	in	the	anxious	human	situation.	George	Pattison,	The	
Philosophy	of	Kierkegaard,	p.	65.	
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and	difficulties	but	without	the	ability	to	do	so	on	the	basis	of	secure	foundations	because	one	remains	temporal	and	finite.	In	the	face	of	this	situation,	adhering	to	a	seemingly	secure,	authoritarian	structure,	disengaging	by	becoming	absorbed	in	 known	 fantasies,	 attempting	 to	 master	 the	 situation	 by	 committing	 in	accordance	with	 the	 level	of	security	one	can	achieve,	or	avoiding	 the	question	altogether	 are	 failures	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 real	 human	 situation	 as	 an	 unending,	dialectical	struggle	to	constitute	identity.	Such	approaches	will	fail	to	respond	to	the	 human	 situation	 in	 the	 most	 authentic,	 fullest,	 and	 most	 passionate	 way	possible;	the	loss	of	selfhood	may	go	completely	unnoticed	if	their	diversionary	tactics	 are	 successful	 (SuD,	 pp.	 32-33;	 p.	 45).	 In	 short,	many	 religious	ways	 of	being,	like	many	of	the	other	spheres,	are	in	despair;	fleeing	or	failing	to	address	selfhood	and	utilising	aspects	of	their	way	of	being	to	support	this	spiritlessness.	Features	 of	 despair	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 a	 range	 of	 responses	 to	 RD	 that	 are	described	by	CV.		(3.5.a)	Closed	Commitment	Two	parallel	forms	of	despair,	lacking	finitude	and	lacking	possibility,	are	expressed	 in	 closed	ways	 of	 being	 and	 commitment.	 Lacking	 finitude	 involves	absorption	 in	 ‘the	 fantastic’	 (SuD,	p.	30),	 through	how	feeling,	knowing,	and/or	willing	are	configured	(SuD,	p.	30).	When	linked	to	knowledge,	lacking	finitude	is	evident	 in	 attempts	 to	 ground	 personhood	 through	 the	 accumulation	 of	objective,	‘inhuman	knowledge’	(SuD,	p.	31).	This	is	described	as	lacking	finitude	for	 two	 reasons.	 It	 does	 not	 acknowledge	 sufficiently	 the	 relative,	 finite	situations	and	interests	of	the	existing	person	in	a	way	that	facilitates	personal,	existential	action,	focusing	purely	on	the	universal	identity,	facts,	knowledge,	or	
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ideals	rather	than	integrating	the	specificity	of	the	person’s	appropriation	of	this	identity	 (CUP,	 p.	 73).	 Hence	 Anti-Climacus	 compares	 it	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 one	who	builds	a	palace	while	 forgetting	 they	 live	 in	 the	doghouse	next	door	 (SuD,	pp.	43-44).	It	can	be	seen	in	forms	of	aesthetic	life	that	have	become	so	focused	on	romantic	ideals	that	they	cause	aesthetes	to	become	detached	from	their	real	lives	and	relationships.	 It	 is	based	in	the	erroneous	fantasy	that	the	person	can	escape	his/her	finitude,	often	by	coming	into	the	secure	possession	of	truth.		Lacking	 possibility	 signifies	 a	 lack	 of	 agency	 in	 developing	 personhood,	‘The	 determinist,	 the	 fatalist,	 is	 in	 despair…because	 for	 him	 everything	 has	become	necessary.’	(SuD,	p.	40)	This	type	of	despair	sees	identity	as	conferred	by	external	 factors	 over	 which	 the	 individual	 has	 no	 control;	 its	 opposite	 is	 to	believe	 that	 there	 are	 other	 possibilities	 for	 transformation	 and	 that	 human	agency	makes	 a	 real	difference	 in	 this;	 hence	Anti-Climacus	 compares	 it	 to	 the	value	of	prayer	for	affecting	real	change	(SuD,	pp.	40-41).	It	may	see	selfhood	as	inherited	or	as	an	impossibility	and	is	likely	to	see	identities	as	inescapable	and	fixed	by	historical	or	socio-cultural	factors.		The	despair	of	lacking	finitude	is	evident	in	most	forms	of	exclusivism	and	in	pluralisms	that	assert	the	exclusive	religious	truth	of	the	pluralist	hypothesis.	Religious	 faith	 is	 defined	 as	 objective	 and	 total	 assent	 to	 a	 particular	 set	 of	beliefs,	practices,	values	or	an	 institution,	whether	 this	 is	 the	exclusivist	claims	made	by	a	specific	religion	or	the	exclusivist	claims	of	pluralism.	This	orientation	asserts	a	single	account	of	religious	truth	and	claims	that	this	truth	can	be	known	by	 adherents;	 it	 rejects	 alternative	 perspectives;	 it	 understands	 religious	commitment	as	paradigmatically	grounded	in	this,	such	that	it	is	entirely	secure,	‘the	objective	way	is	of	the	opinion	that	it	has	a	security	that	the	subjective	way	
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does	 not	 have’	 (CUP,	 p.	 194).	 Because	 the	 religious	 object	 is	 taken	 as	guaranteeing	 truth,	 the	 finite	and	 temporal	nature	and	concerns	of	 the	person,	and	their	inescapable	anxiety	and	uncertainty,	are	seen	as	negated	(CUP,	p.	195);	their	only	task	is	to	conform	to	the	external	group	of	the	true	religion(s).			The	despair	of	 lacking	possibility	 is	present	 in	 forms	of	exclusivism	that	assert	 the	 necessity	 and	 inescapability	 of	 culturally	 bound	 religious	 belonging.	The	 cultural-linguistic	 view,	 for	 example,	 asserts	 that	 identity	 is	 conferred	 by	being	born	into	a	particular	context	which	then	provides	the	whole	horizon	for	agency	and	understanding;	those	outside	of	this	are	simply	others	who	can	never	be	 understood	 or	 engaged	 with	 due	 to	 the	 accident	 of	 fate	 or	 history	 that	 a	particular	religion	dominates	in	a	particular	group	of	people.		Religious	 commitment	 can	be	 closed	 in	various	ways	and	 is	particularly	evident	in	exclusivism	and	particularism.	First,	it	is	closed	to	the	possibility	that	it	could	be	 in	error	or	that	other	 interpretations	could	be	valuable	or	true.	 It	 is	closed	 to	 the	 possibility	 that	 others	 can	 even	 be	 understood	 or	 that	 one	 can	escape	the	confines	of	the	religious	identity	in	ways	that	are	transforming:	one	is	confined	to	the	necessary	religious	identity	in	which	one	finds	oneself	and	other	religions	are	alien	others	that	can	never	be	engaged	with.	 It	denies	the	need	to	and	possibility	of	engaging	with	alternatives,	or	to	develop	its	own	position,	on	the	 basis	 that	 its	 commitment	 is	 known	 to	 be	 the	 truth	 or	 is	 secured	 in	 some	other	 way.	 Because	 it	 posits	 an	 illegitimate	 authority	 to	 its	 own	 structures,	Climacus	compares	this	to	paganism	in	that	it	involves	believing	various	mythical	accounts	 to	 be	 true	 in	 a	 directly	 accessible	 way	 through	 conformity	 with	immanent	 religious	 structures,	 ‘Direct	 recognisability	 is	 paganism;	 all	 solemn	assurances	that	this	is	indeed	Christ	and	that	he	is	the	true	God	are	futile	as	soon	
	139	 	
as	 it	 ends	 with	 direct	 recognisability.	 A	 mythological	 figure	 is	 directly	distinguishable.	 If	 one	 charges	 an	 orthodox	with	 this,	 he	 becomes	 furious	 and	flares	up:	Yes,	but	Christ	 is	 indeed	 the	 true	God…one	can	see	 that	 in	his	gentle	countenance.	But	if	one	can	see	it	in	him,	then	he	is	eo	ipso	a	mythological	figure.’	(CUP,	p.600.	See	also:	CUP,	p.	248;	PiC,	p.	125)	He	also	describes	this	as	a	lunatic	fixation	on	a	particular	object	that	disengages	from	the	existential	situation	(CUP,	pp.	195-196).	Second,	 it	 is	equated	by	Climacus	with	authoritarian	views	of	religion	as	identical	with	a	fixed	body	of	knowledge	such	as	rational,	philosophical	method,	the	 bible,	 creeds,	 or	 church	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 securing	 certain	 knowledge	 and	personhood	 (CUP,	 pp.	 19-57).	 Such	 commitment	 is	 slavish	 obedience,	 not	agency-driven	 appropriation,	 in	 which	 a	 prefabricated	 religious	 identity	 is	simply	taken	on	by	a	person	coming	to	 identify	 in	relation	to	a	religious	group.	This	is	a	closed	commitment,	because	religiousness	is	defined	as	conformity	with	these	objective	structures,	‘not	by	what	has	taken	place	within	the	individual	but	by	what	has	taken	place	with	 the	individual’.	(CUP,	pp.	609-610).	It	clings	to	an	identity	derived	 from	external	 factors,	 in	which	creative	agency	 is	not	 involved	because	 the	 identity	 is	 taken	as	 the	only	possibility	 for	 the	person.	This	 closed	commitment	is	inauthentic	because	it	forgets	the	existential	struggles	individual	persons	face	that	require	existential,	rather	than	cognitive,	responses	and	it	also	effaces	the	role	of	agency	in	the	formation	of	authentic	selfhood.			Subjectivity	may	be	seen	as	bias	in	such	an	orientation:	the	local	religious	perspective	that	one	must	surmount	to	obtain	a	fuller	perspective	(pluralism)	or	the	 personal	 aspects	 of	 identity	 that	 must	 be	 renounced	 in	 conformity	 with	objective	 religious	 patterns	 (exclusivism).	 Alternatively,	 subjectivity	 may	 be	
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acknowledged	 as	 something	 to	 be	 shaped	 by	 religious	 structures	 in	 order	 to	allow	the	perception	of	truth,	‘the	pathos	of	immediacy’,	in	which	‘appropriation’	is	 defined	 as,	 ‘a	 temporary	 function	 whereby	 one	 temporarily	 adheres	 to	something	that	 is	 to	become	an	object	 for	understanding’	 (CUP,	p.	609).	This	 is	the	case	where	exclusivists	assert	that	knowledge	can	be	achieved	through	forms	of	 apotheosis.	 Religious	 truth	 is	 achieved	 by	 adherents	 becoming	 subjectively	identical:	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 person	 and	 their	 inward,	 local	 expression	 of	religiousness	 are	 subsumed	 or	 displaced	 and	 capable	 of	 being	 expressed	 only	within	the	limited	confines	of	particular	religious	structures.		The	ways	in	which	it	is	closed	not	only	misrepresent	the	human	situation;	they	 also	 obstruct	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness.	 This	 is	 bound	 up	 with	Christological	motifs	of	encountering	God	in	the	other,	particularly	where	this	is	thought	to	be	impossible,	 in	such	a	way	that	the	encounter	is	transforming	and	opens	up	new	possibilities.	 It	 also	 requires	personal	 appropriation	of	 religious	identities	 in	 a	 context	 of	 radical	 insecurity	 and	 uncertainty	 befitting	 the	existential	and	agonistic	struggles	of	life,	such	that	they	become	subjectively	true.	Anti-Climacus	describes	the	closed	commitment	that	rules	out	other	possibilities	as	thus	having	no	God	beyond	its	own	constructs,	‘or,	what	amounts	to	the	same	thing,	his	God	is	necessity’	(SuD,	p.	40).	For	religion	to	present	encounters	with	the	 impossible	 that	 are	 the	 occasion	 for	 transforming	 faith,	 it	must	 be	 able	 to	conceive	of	an	open	world	of	radical	possibilities.		(3.5.b)	Quixotic	Commitment	While	Climacus	sees	closed	commitment	as	the	deeper	lunacy	because	it	has	become	detached	from	the	defining	realities	of	the	human	situation,	he	views	
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Quixotic	commitment	as	passionate	but	misguided,	‘Don	Quixote	is	the	prototype	of	 the	subjective	 lunacy	 in	which	the	passion	of	 inwardness	grasps	a	particular	fixed	 finite	 idea.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 195)	 Although	 Don	 Quixote	 is	 passionate	 and	 has	inwardness,	 his	 lunacy	does	not	 reflect	his	 existential	 situation	 in	 that	he	 lives	out	a	fictional,	illusory	life.	Since	the	fallacy	of	his	situation	cannot,	on	Climacus’	understanding,	 be	 an	 objective	 fallacy,	 such	 as	 committing	 to	 a	 religious	 truth	that	 is	untrue,	 it	must	rather	be	that	his	subjectivity	 is	 in	some	way	configured	that	 it	 is	 inappropriate	 to	 his	 existential	 situation,	 just	 as	 Don	 Quixote	 is	committed	to	being	a	knight,	when	he	is	not	a	knight.		Quixotic	 commitment	 can	 be	 equated	 to	 the	 forms	 of	 despair	 of	 lacking	finitude	and	lacking	necessity.	While	lacking	finitude	through	the	abstraction	of	knowledge	corresponds	most	obviously	to	exclusivist	ways	of	being,	finitude	can	also	be	forgotten	by	living	out	a	‘fantasized	existence’	(SuD,	p.	32).	Anti-Climacus’	example	 is	 of	 a	 religious	 person	 who	 is	 ‘intoxicated’	 and	 ‘swept	 off	 his	 feet’,	carried	away	by	his	own	religious	imaginations	in	a	way	that	is	divorced	from	his	real	existential	situation	and	the	challenges	he	faces	and	that	impairs	his	ability	for	 existential	 action	 and	 transformation,	 ‘he	 cannot	 come	 back	 to	 himself,	become	himself’	(SuD,	p.	32).	Another	possible	example	is	one	who	attempts	to	live	according	 to	 their	own	resources,	without	acknowledging	 their	reliance	on	God	and	that,	‘subjectivity	is	untruth’	(CUP,	p.	207;	PiC,	p.	67).		This	 can	 be	 further	 elaborated	 in	 connection	 with	 its	 parallel:	 lacking	necessity.	Part	of	this	necessity	is	the	real	existential	situation	in	which	one	finds	oneself,	 ‘His	 concrete	 self…has	 necessity	 and	 limitations,	 is	 this	 very	 specific	being	 with	 these	 natural	 capacities,	 predispositions,	 etc.	 in	 this	 specific	concretion	 of	 relations,	 etc.’	 (SuD,	 p.	 68)	 This	 includes	 identities	 and	
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characteristics	 that	 one	may	have	 inherited	 from	one’s	 situation,	 such	 that	 the	self	is	described	as	‘angular’	and	authenticity	entails	living	out	and	grinding	these	identities	into	shape	through	subjective	appropriation	(SuD,	p.	33).		Anti-Climacus	 sees	 agency	 in	 developing	 authentic	 selfhood	 not	 as	 the	ability	to	dispense	with	contingently	derived	identity	but	as	the	ability	to	work	through	it.	This	also	expresses	the	Climacian	and	Anti-Climacian	conviction	that	authentic	selfhood	is	achieved	by	deepening	in	a	sphere	rather	than	becoming	a	long	 legged	 fly	 that	can	skate	across	a	range	of	 identities	and	possibilities	with	ease,	‘To	become	is	a	movement	away	from	that	place,	but	to	become	oneself	is	a	movement	 in	 that	 place.’	 (SuD,	 p.	 36)	 A	 religious	 identity,	 while	 diverse	 and	subjectively	 appropriated	 is	 also,	 ‘a	 very	 definite	 something’	 (SuD,	 p.	 36),	 that	provides	the	resources	one	must	appropriate.	Pluralism	and	nihilistic	relativism,	by	making	identity	easily	dispensable,	fail	 to	 provide	 the	 resources	 for	 a	 full,	 deep	 engagement	 with	 the	 existential	situations	 and	 struggles	 in	 which	 persons	 necessarily	 or	 inevitably	 find	themselves.	 Easy	 transition	 between	 identities	 is	 a	 mechanism	 for	irresponsibility,	 evasion,	 diversion	 and	 disengagement	 from	 the	 real	 struggles,	‘Eventually…the	 time	 that	 should	 be	 used	 for	 actuality	 grows	 shorter	 and	shorter;	 everything	 becomes	 more	 and	 more	 momentary….	 The	 instant	something	 appears	 to	 be	 possible,	 a	 new	 possibility	 appears,	 and	 finally	 these	phantasmagoria	 follow	one	another	 in	such	rapid	succession	that	 it	seems	as	 if	everything	were	possible,	and	this	 is…the	point	at	which	the	 individual	himself	becomes	a	mirage.’	(SuD,	p.	36)	The	 view	 that	 exercising	 agency	 in	 making	 transitions	 of	 identity	 or	embracing	full	multiple-religious	belonging	can	ultimately	undermine	the	ability	
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of	 agency	 to	 face	 the	 existential	 situation	 seems	 counterintuitive.	 Could	 the	pluralist	not	be	responding	to	the	existential	situations	precisely	by	making	such	transitions	 to	 structures	 that	 allow	 him/her	 the	 flexibility	 in	 addressing	 each	situation	as	it	 is	encountered?	It	will	be	shown	in	later	chapters	that	such	deep	encounters	 play	 an	 important	 part	 in	 authenticity.	 However,	 the	 concern	 that	pluralism’s	levelling	of	options	undermines	the	ability	of	these	options	to	engage	with	existential	situations	by	making	them	too	readily	dispensable	has	traction.	The	view	that	a	religious	identity	is	easily	dispensable	entails	that	its	existential	struggles	are	 finite	and	can	be	 terminated	by	adopting	a	different	 identity.	For	example,	 in	 a	 Christian	 context	 a	 person	 is	 struggling	 with	 experiencing	themselves	as	sinful.	A	temptation	facing	this	person	will	be	to	rid	him/herself	of	this	 existential	 struggle	 by	 simply	 adopting	 a	 different	 religious	 identity	 that	lacks	the	concept	of	sin.	But	if	this	route	is	taken,	the	underlying	features	of	the	human	situation	to	which	the	idea	of	sin	is	responding	will	go	unaddressed	and,	far	 from	 finding	 new	ways	 to	 address	 the	 situation,	 the	 individual	will	 simply	have	 disengaged	 from	 it.	 Hence	 Climacus	 asserts	 that,	 ‘Repentance…viewed	religiously,	will	not	have	its	day	and	then	be	over;	the	uncertainty	of	faith	will	not	have	its	day	and	then	be	over;	the	consciousness	of	sin	will	not	have	its	day	and	be	over—in	that	case	we	return	to	the	esthetic.’	(CUP,	p.	524)	Authentic	 selfhood	 requires	 a	 realistic	 view	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 and	commitment	to	face	its	existential	struggles	in	a	long-term	process	that	balances	the	 resources	at	one’s	disposal,	 including	 the	 identities	one	has	 inherited,	with	subjective	 appropriation.	 Forms	 of	 pluralism	 that	 see	 religious	 identity	 as	dispensable	 or	 as	 requiring	 modification	 so	 that	 it	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 useful	myth,	fail	to	provide	such	an	approach.	Chapter	4	will	show	that	various	types	of	
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antirealism	and	pluralism	endorse	this	type	of	commitment,	in	that	they	endorse	commitment	 when	 the	 objects	 of	 faith	 are	 not	 real,	 when	 the	 relationship	 is	purely	with	 oneself	 rather	 than	God,	 or	 because	 they	 rely	 on	 one’s	 own	moral	capacity	 and	 resources:	 they	 are	 fixations	 on	 self-generated	 fantasies	 that	 are	known	to	be	fantasies	by	the	one	who	commits.		(3.5.c)	Partial	Commitment	This	way	of	being	is	evident	in	orientations	that	possess	a	limited	degree	of	commitment	that	corresponds	to	the	limited	degree	of	certainty	that	has	been	achieved,	with	faith	in	proportion	to,	‘probabilities	and	guarantees’	(CUP,	p.	11).	Climacus	describes	this	as	living,	‘in	suspenso’,	that	is,	committing	in	accordance	with	the	current	stage	of	one’s	ability	to	demonstrate	the	truth	of	one’s	position	(PF,	 p.	 42)	 or	 committing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 partial,	 ‘approximation	knowledge’	 (CUP,	pp.	21-34)	religious	 truth	will	always	possess.	An	example	 is	an	 evidentialist	 view	 that	 asserts	 the	 necessity	 of	 commitment	 being	commensurate	 with	 the	 evidence,	 ‘A	 wise	 man…proportions	 his	 belief	 to	 the	evidence.’ 288 	It	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 hermeneutical,	 antirealist	 and	 ‘weak’	conceptions	of	 faith	 that	 equate	a	 loss	of	belief	 in	objective	 reality	with	a	non-committal	 faith.	 For	 example,	 Cupitt	 rejects	 Kierkegaardian	 commitment	 as	incompatible	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 real,	 favouring	 ‘nihilism’,	 and	 claiming,	 ‘we	should	 simply	 expend	 ourselves	 and	 our	 lives….	 One	 should	 not	 cling	 to	 one’s	selfhood	 or	 to	 anything	 that	 one	 has	 done,	 been,	 made	 or	 loved.’289 	Such	
																																																								288	David	Hume,	Enquiries	Concerning	Human	Understanding	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1975	[Third	Edition]),	p.	110.	289	Don	Cupitt,	Solar	Ethics	(London:	SCM	Press,	1995),	p.	47.	Some	antirealists	differ	on	this	point.	Caputo’s	conception	of	weak	faith,	for	example,	advocates	the	Kierkegaardian	view	that	
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approaches	are	essentially	objective	 in	 their	 configuration	of	 faith,	due	 to	 their	idea	 that	 the	 level	of	 commitment	must	 correspond	 to	 the	amount	of	objective	certainty;	they	prioritise	rationality	and	the	supremacy	of	reason.	They	express	a	form	of	existential	commitment,	but	the	aim	is	to	keep	it	disentangled	from	too	much	 involvement	with	 local	 structures.	 Such	 commitment	 fails	 to	 live	 out	 the	full,	 passionate,	 relational	 life	 that	 the	 pseudonyms	 see	 as	 the	most	 authentic	response	 to	 the	 human	 situation;	 to	 care,	 love,	 and	 commit	 deeply	 as	 if	 every	relationship	 and	 every	 choice	 had	 deep	 significance,	 and	 is	 eventful	 and	transforming	for	the	person.			(3.5.d)	Non-commitment		The	 opposite	 of	 the	 exclusivist	 lack	 of	 finitude	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 infinitude,	which	Anti-Climacus	equates	with	 secularism,	nihilism,	and	misplaced	material	commitments,	‘the	attribution	of	infinite	worth	to	the	indifferent’	(SuD,	p.	33).	He	equates	 this	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 spirituality	 because	 it	 constructs	 personhood	 in	relation	to	purely	finite	concerns	and	is	a	refusal	to	commit	to	any	religious	way	of	 being.	 It	 includes	 indifference	 to	 religious	 questions	 and	 ‘offence’	 at	 the	demands	made	 by	 religions	 and	 at	 the	 location	 posited	 of	 the	 divine	 in	 Jesus.	Such	orientations	reject	 the	viability	of	 faith	commitments	as	either	 impossible	of	achieving	the	requisite	 level	of	certainty	to	make	commitment	credible	or	as	having	 so	much	 to	 disconfirm	 it	 that	 commitment	 is	 irrational	 and	 thus	 to	 be	rejected	 as	 ‘foolishness’	 (PF,	 p.	 52).	 This	 is	 a	 reasonable	 response,	 given	 the	religious	incapacity	of	reason.	In	relation	to	the	divinity	of	Jesus,	for	example,	‘If	I,	
																																																																																																																																																														uncertainty	is	a	prerequisite	of	passionate	commitment:	‘the	very	highest	passion	is	driven	by	non-knowing.’	John	D.	Caputo,	On	Religion	(Abingdon:	Routledge,	2001),	p.	129.	
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then,	 or	 anyone	 starts	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 it	 was	 a	 human	 being,	 it	 can	never	in	all	eternity	be	shown	that	it	was	God.’	(PiC,	p.	29)		This	may	 also	be	 grounded	 in	 an	 existential	 distaste	 for	 or	 antipathy	 to	faith	and/or	its	objects,	as	in	offence	at	the	demands	of	Christian	faith	or	location	posited	of	the	divine	(PiC,	p.	9).	Climacus	also	detects	it	as	an	orientation	within	religions	 themselves,	 evident	 when	 a	 person	 sees	 all	 of	 the	 existential	 and	religious	 questions	 as	 resolved	 and	 commitment	 as	 unnecessary	 by	 virtue	 of	their	membership	of	a	religious	group,	 ‘No,	 if	someone	were	to	say,	plainly	and	simply,	that	he	was	concerned	about	himself,	that	it	was	not	quite	right	for	him	to	 call	 himself	 a	 Christian…his	wife	would	 tell	 him,	 “Hubby	darling….	How	 can	you	not	be	a	Christian?	You	are	Danish,	aren’t	you?....	You	aren’t	a	Jew,	are	you,	or	a	Mohammedan?	What	else	would	you	be	then?”’	(CUP,	p.	50)		While	this	is	a	reasonable	approach	in	relation	to	reason	and,	if	it	is	a	form	of	offence,	may	be	a	higher	insight	into	the	nature	of	the	demands	presented	by	religions	 because	 it	 recognises	 them	 as	 something	 that	 should	 provoke	 a	passionate	response,	it	is	seen	by	Anti-Climacus	as	expressing	one	of	the	first	two	forms	of	despair	because	it	is	a	repressive	denial	of	what	one	is,	a	spiritual	being	that	is	more	than	its	rational	faculty	(SuD,	p.	14).290								
																																																								290	As	non-commitment	is	not	a	primary	way	of	being	seriously	religious	but	rather	a	rejection	of	religiousness,	it	will	not	be	considered	further	in	this	thesis.	
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3.6.	Conclusion	This	chapter	has	demonstrated	that	CV	 fails	 to	adequately	conceptualise	the	nature	of	and	problems	posed	by	RD,	primarily	because	it	is	committed	to	an	objective,	 exclusivist	 ontology	 and	 is	 blind	 to	 the	more	 central	 subjective	 and	existential	 dimensions	 of	 religiousness.	 An	 existential	 typology	 of	 commitment	has	 been	 proposed	 as	 a	 superior	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	 different	 ways	 of	being	fostered	by	responses	to	RD,	categorising	the	positions	within	CV	based	on	the	 types	 of	 commitment	 they	 evince,	 how	 these	 configure	 religiousness,	 and	how	 they	 express	 forms	 of	 despair.	 Chapter	 4	 interprets	 and	 critiques	 the	exclusivist	 Christology	 of	 Barth	 and	 pluralist	 Christology	 of	 Hick	 from	 this	perspective,	identifying	them	as	forms	of	inauthentic	commitment.	To	 avoid	 the	 problems	 of	 CV,	 an	 approach	 to	 RD	 should	 build	 on	 my	existential	typology	to	identify	the	existential	questions	underlying	RD.	It	should	explore	the	nature	of	commitment	and	faith,	as	these	are	relative	to	the	rich	and	varied	ways	in	which	religiousness	is	expressed	in	different	ways	of	being	and	in	how	religious	identities	are	manifested	in	local,	subjective	situations,	rather	than	focusing	on	 the	relationship	between	religious	hegemonies.	 It	 should	recognise	that	 its	own	criteria	of	 legitimisation	are	existentially,	as	well	as	culturally	and	religiously,	relative,	such	that	no	global,	generic	solutions	are	possible.	Indeed,	it	should	seek	to	avoid	any	theoretical	resolution	of	the	problem	as	this	inevitably	negates	the	diversity,	overlooks	the	elusive	and	transcendent	nature	ascribed	to	many	 objects	 of	 religious	 devotion,	 and	 posits	 an	 illegitimate	 position	 for	 the	philosopher.	 Instead,	 it	 should	 seek	 to	 foster	 encounter,	 be	 sensitive	 to	 the	relative	commitments	and	aim	for	deep	description	and	empathetic	engagement	over	 theoretical	 conclusions.	Above	 all,	 from	a	Kierkegaardian	perspective,	 the	
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focus	 should	 be	 on	 how	 the	 engagement	 with	 diversity	 can	 be	 configured	 to	facilitate	full	relationships	as	part	of	an	authentic	way	of	being	in	the	world	that	has	 faced	 up	 to	 despair	 in	 the	 way	 that	 best	 expresses	 a	 full,	 creative,	 and	passionate	response	to	the	human	situation.			
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CHAPTER	4	
FOLLOWING	CHRIST	AUTHENTICALLY:		
KIERKEGAARDIAN	CHRISTOLOGY	AND	DIVERSITY		
4.1.	Argument	in	Brief	The	 previous	 chapter	 critiqued	 CV’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 RD	 and	 the	range	of	responses	to	it,	 focused	on	how	it	misrepresents	the	nature	of	religion	and	 limits	 the	 responses	 to	diversity	by	grounding	 the	debate	 in	an	exclusivist	ontology.	 Since	 religions	 and	 theories,	 according	 to	 my	 existential	 approach,	express	ways	of	being,	the	misrepresentation	of	religiousness	in	CV	is	not	simply	an	 error;	 it	 expresses	 and	 fosters	 ways	 of	 being	 that	 are	 inauthentic	 and	despairing.	 This	 chapter	 resituates	 the	 positions	 of	 exclusivism	 and	 pluralism	within	my	existential	typology	of	commitment	and	critiques	them	as	expressing	types	of	inauthentic	commitment	that	are	inimical	to	authentic	religious	ways	of	being	 in	 the	 world.	 Rather	 than	 providing	 a	 robust	 basis	 for	 strong	 faith	 and	commitment,	the	objective	nature	of	religious	exclusivism	undermines	it,	just	as	the	objective	nature	of	pluralism	undermines	its	ability	to	embrace	RD.	This	critique	focuses	on	two	Christologies:	Barth’s	exclusivist	Christology	and	Hick’s	pluralist	Christology.	Christology	has	been	chosen	to	provide	the	basis	for	the	critique	for	several	reasons.	First,	Barth	and	Hick	represent	diametrically	opposed	 and	 influential	 alternatives	 on	 RD,	 utilising	 Christologies	 to	 support	their	 positions.	 Second,	 Christian	 claims	 about	 Christ	 provide	 the	 primary	problem	 for	 Christian	 engagements	 with	 diversity	 yet	 are	 central	 to	 Christian	faith,	 such	 that	 a	 critique	of	 exclusivism	and	pluralism	 from	 the	perspective	of	Christology	 will	 disallow	 them	 from	 being	 options	 for	 Christians.	 To	 be	
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convincing	to	Christian	theologians,	 the	Kierkegaardian	model	proposed	 in	 this	thesis	must	address	the	central	position	of	Christ	in	Christian	devotion.291	Third,	the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 have	 often	 been	 interpreted	 as	 offering	exclusivist	or	pluralist	perspectives	on	Christ,	and	it	will	be	necessary	to	refute	these	interpretations	to	develop	a	Kierkegaardian	alternative.	Christology	is	vital	in	 the	 pseudonyms’	 elaboration	 of	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness,	 which,	 as	outlined	 in	 2.4,	 entails	 a	 relationship	 of	 contemporaneity	with	 Jesus.	 It	will	 be	argued	 that	 the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 offer	 a	 direct	 critique	 of	 such	positions,	such	that,	far	from	providing	an	obstacle	to	engagement	with	diversity,	their	Christologies	are	the	primary	ways	they	reflect	on	otherness,	presenting	an	opportunity	rather	than	an	obstacle	to	encounter	with	religious	others.								
																																																								291	Knitter,	for	example,	asserts	that	the	‘uniqueness	of	Christ’	is	the	central	problem	for	Christian	theological	engagements	with	diversity.	[Paul	F.	Knitter,	No	Other	Name?	A	Critical	Survey	of	
Christian	Attitudes	toward	the	World	Religions,	p.	20]	He	sees	the	measure	of	a	successful	Christian	response	as	being	that	it	is	able	to	preserve	the	uniqueness	and	global	significance	of	Jesus	in	a	way	that	does	not	disrupt	engagement	and	dialogue.	[Paul	F	Knitter,	Introducing	
Theologies	of	Religions,	p.111.]	Beyond	theoretical	accounts	of	diversity,	many	theologians	also	look	to	Christ’s	character	of	service	and	message	of	love,	humility	and	mercy	as	a	model	for	how	to	engage	with	religious	others.	[See,	for	example:	Jacques	Dupuis,	Christianity	and	the	Religions,	trans.	Phillip	Berryman	(New	York:	Maryknoll,	2002),	pp.	20-30.	And:	D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	166.]	The	centrality	of	Christology	in	the	Christian	debate	over	religious	diversity	is	indicated	by	its	importance	even	for	those	demythologise	and	dispense	with	realist	claims	about	Christ,	such	as	Hick.	Sinkinson,	for	example,	sees	Hick’s	turn	to	pluralism	as	dependent	on	his	Christological	position.	[Christopher	Sinkinson,	The	Universe	of	Faiths:	A	Critical	Study	of	John	Hick’s	Religious	
Pluralism,	pp.	10-11.]	
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4.2.	Exclusivist	Christology	(4.2.a)	Barth’s	Exclusivist	Christology:	Closed	Commitment		
Revelation:	The	Doxastic	and	Metaphysical	Theses	Christology	 has	 provided	 the	 foundation	 for	 Christian	 exclusivism,	underpinning	 the	 exclusivist	 theses	 identified	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 As	 a	representative	 example,	 Barth’s	 Christology	 supports	 several	 of	 his	 central,	exclusivist	claims.292	First,	Jesus	presents	a	unique	revelatory	incarnation	of	God,	all	truths	about	God	being	exclusively	available	through	knowledge	about	God’s	presence	in	Jesus,	‘Who	God	is	and	what	it	is	to	be	divine	is	something	we	have	to	learn	 where	 God	 has	 revealed	 Himself	 and	 His	 nature,	 the	 essence	 of	 the	divine.’ 293 	As	 this	 historical	 event	 is	 recorded	 in	 the	 New	 Testament	 and	expounded	 in	 the	 gospel	 and	 creeds,	 this	 supports	 the	 exclusivist	 claim	 that	Christianity	possesses	 exclusive	 truths	 about	God.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	 focal	 point	 of	cosmic	 and	 human	 history,	 Jesus	 supports	 the	 onto-theological	 gesture	 of	exclusivism,	as	 the	 totality	of	 reality	and	God	are	understood	and	possessed	 in	this	site.		
Conformity	with	Christ:	The	Doxastic	Thesis	Barth	 offers	 Christological	 support	 for	 the	 exclusivist	 doxastic	 thesis	 by	asserting	 that	 salvation	 effects	 metanoia,	 a	 transformation	 in	 the	 person	 that																																																									292	Barth	has	been	chosen	because	he	developed	an	influential	and	entirely	negative	appraisal	of	religions	and	religious	diversity,	leading	Knitter	to	present	him	as	the	most	extreme	form	of	exclusivist,	offering	a,	‘total	replacement	model’.	[Paul	F.	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	
Religions,	p.	25.]	His	Christology	also	developed	under	the	influence	of	Kierkegaard,	particularly	on	the	radical	otherness	of	God	and	‘infinite	qualitative	distance’	between	God	and	humanity,	which	he	interpreted	in	an	exclusivist	light	in	opposition	to	alternative	readings	of	Kierkegaard’s	Christology	found,	for	example,	in	Bultmann.	[Karl	Barth,	‘Rudolf	Bultmann	–	An	Attempt	to	Understand	Him’.	In	H.	W.	Bartsch	(ed.),	Kerygma	and	Myth:	A	Theological	Debate,	(London:	SPCK,	1972),	Volume	II,	p.	94.	This	Barthian	connection	has	also	supported	exclusivist	interpretations	of	Kierkegaard’s	Christology.	293	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	4.1	(Edinburgh:	T&T	Clark,	1956),	p.	186	[59.1].		
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grants	 a	 privileged	 perspective	 for	 knowing	 religious	 truth	with	 certainty,	 ‘He	Himself	 makes	 us	 ready	 to	 listen	 to	 the	 Word’.294	This	 transformation	 of	 the	person	into	‘conformity	with	Christ’	grants	a	higher	epistemic	and	moral	position	for	 accepting	 and	 obeying	 the	 revelation,	 ‘This	 directing	 and	 integrating	 into	Christ	is	the	work	of	the	Holy	Spirit,	and	in	it	he	can	hear	and	receive	the	divine	revelation.’295		
Salvation	in	the	Church:	The	Substantive	and	Hegemonic	Theses	Barth	claims	that	Jesus	is	decisive	for	salvation	history,	which	is	the	result	he	 achieves	 as	 the	 outcome	of	 his	 sacrificial	 death,	 ‘[He]	 founded	 a	new	world	and	 inaugurated	 a	 new	 aeon—and	 all	 this	 in	 His	 passion.’296	This	 salvation	 is	made	available	through	the	presence	of	Jesus	to	those	who	are	saved,	which	is	a	possibility	 because	 Jesus	 is	 not	 dead	 and	 thus	 consigned	 to	 the	 past	 but,	 as	resurrected,	 can	 come	 as	 a	 living	 person	 into	 relation	 with	 subsequent	generations,	‘The	event	of	Easter	Day	is	the	removing	of	the	barrier	between	His	life	 in	His	 time	and	their	 life	 in	 their	 times,	 the	 initiation	of	His	 lordship	as	 the	Lord	 of	 all	 time’.297	It	 is	 the	 resurrection	 that	 secures	 Jesus’	 ‘contemporaneity’	with	all	believers.298	This	supports	the	exclusivist	assertion	that	only	Christianity	is	saving,	particularly	its	gospel	message	as	this	mediates	the	salvific	knowledge	
																																																								294	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2	(Edinburgh:	T&T	Clark,	1956),	p.	221	[16.1].	295	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	277	[16.2].		296	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	4.1,	p.	254	[59.2].	297	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	4.1,	p.	316	[59.3].		298	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	4.1,	p.	348	[59.3].	Various	commentators	point	out	that,	without	resurrection,	Barth	believes	there	is	no	mechanism	for	contemporaneity.	[E.g.,	Geoffrey	W.	Bromiley,	Introduction	to	the	Theology	of	Karl	Barth	(Edinburgh:	T&T	Clark,	1979),	p.	184).	John	Webster,	Karl	Barth	(London:	Continuum,	2004	[Second	Edition]),	p.	123.	George	Hunsinger,	‘Karl	Barth’s	Christology:	its	basic	Chalcedonian	character’.	In	John	Webster	(ed.),	The	Cambridge	
Companion	to	Karl	Barth	(Cambridge:	Camrbidge	University	Press,	2000),	pp.	138-9.			
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and	relationship,	‘To	know	it,	we	must	know	it	as	such….	To	speak	of	it,	we	must	tell	it	as	history….	To	say	atonement	is	to	say	Jesus	Christ.’299	The	 exclusivist	 hegemonic	 thesis,	 that	 truth	 and	 salvation	 are	 located	exclusively	 in	 the	 institutions,	 scriptures	and	creeds	of	Christianity,	 is	 similarly	supported	 by	 Barth’s	 equation	 of	 the	 church	 with	 Jesus’	 continuing	 presence,	‘The	 community	 is	 the	 earthly-historical	 form	 of	 existence	 of	 Jesus	 Christ	Himself….	 The	 Church	 is	 His	 body,	 created	 and	 continually	 renewed	 by	 the	awakening	power	of	the	Holy	Spirit.’300	He	claims	that	the	Church	is	established	by	 God,	 who	 thus	 defines	 the	 true	 religious	 community	 by	 the	 institutional	boundaries	 of	 the	 physical	 church,	 ‘a	 quite	 visible	 coming	 together,	 which	originates	with	the	twelve	apostles…a	visible	group’.301			Soteriological	 activity	 cannot	 take	 place	 outside	 these	 boundaries;	participation	 in	 the	 Church	 is	 necessary	 for	 salvation,	 ‘extra	 ecclesiam	 nulla	
salus’. 302 	Regarding	 non-Christian	 religions,	 Barth	 argues	 that,	 ‘religion	 is	unbelief.’303 	He	 asserts	 that	 religions	 are	 the	 attempts	 of	 ‘godless	 man’	 to,	‘arbitrarily	 and	 wilfully’,	 reach	 God	 through	 human	 activity.304	As	 a	 human	construct,	‘In	religion	man	bolts	and	bars	himself	against	revelation	by	providing	a	substitute’.305	This	evaluation	of	 religions	derives	 from	Barth’s	assertion	 that,	as	 divinely	 initiated	 in	 Jesus,	 salvation	 and	 revelation	 has	 to	 be	 imparted	 to	passive	 recipients;	 in	 contrast	 to	 religions	 that	 represent	 attempts	 to	 appease	God	or	deify	humanity,	‘God	in	Jesus	Christ,	is	the	One	who	takes	on	Himself	the	
																																																								299	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	4.1,	p.	157	[15.2].	300	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	4.1,	p.	661	[62.2].			301	Karl	Barth,	Dogmatics	in	Outline	(London:	SCM	Press,	1949),	p.	142.	302	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	220	[16.1].	303	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	299	[17.2].	304	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	300	and	p.	302	[17.2].	305	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	303	[17.2].	
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sin	of	the	world’.306	An	exception	is	made	for	the	Church	as	it	is	identified	as	the	unique	embodiment	of	 Jesus,	 ‘the	Church,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 a	human	gathering	and	institution,	cannot	therefore	be	regarded	as	a	human	production…the	church	cannot	be	thought	of	otherwise	than	as	the	reality	of	God’s	revelation	to	us’.307			Barth’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 Church	 as	 a,	 ‘community…created	 by	 the	Word	of	God’,	asserts	the	singularity	of	the	message,	 ‘Word’,	that	is	imparted	to	‘witnesses’,	 the	apostles,	enabling	him	to	assert	the	universality	and	singularity	of	Christianity,	 in	which	peer	diversity	 is	explained	as	a	 later	development	and	departure	from	the	initial	Christian	unity:	the	true	church	is	the	single,	catholic	Church.308	Intrareligious	diversity	is	thus	identified	as	an	aberration;	the	purpose	of	theology	is	to	ensure	the	orthodoxy	of	belief	by	its	singularity	and	conformity	to	 the	 singular	 revelation,	 ‘In	 theology	 the	 question	 about	 truth	 is…does	 the	community	 properly	 understand	 the	 word	 in	 its	 purity	 as	 the	 truth?’309	Unity,	singularity	and	truth	are	thus	equated	through	the	presence-of-God-in-Jesus-as-Church;	 this	 is	 gained	 by	 people	 through	 a	 transformation	 of	 their	 moral	 and	epistemic	condition	through	participation	in	the	institution	of	the	Church.	This	is	a	paradigmatic	type	of	closed	commitment	because	it	argues	for	the	necessity	of	complete	 acceptance	 of	 a	 single	 religious	 structure	 that	 is	 configured	 as	hermetically	sealed	and	transcendent	of	all	immanent,	human	structures;	it	also	disallows	any	engagement	with	external	bodies,	which	are	equated	with	sin	and	idolatry.		
																																																								306	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	309	[17.2].	307	Karl	Barth,	Church	Dogmatics	1.2,	p.	221	[16.1].	308	Karl	Barth,	Evangelical	Theology:	An	Introduction	(Grand	Rapids:	Eerdmans,	1963),	pp.	37-38.	See	also:	Karl	Barth,	Dogmatics	in	Outline,	pp.	142-143.	309	Karl	Barth,	Evangelical	Theology:	An	Introduction,	p.	39.	
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(4.2.b)	Exclusivist	Interpretations	of	the	Pseudonyms’	Christology		Although	 the	previous	 chapter	demonstrated	 the	pseudonyms’	 rejection	of	 the	 exclusivist	 thesis,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 authorship	 reintroduces	exclusivism:	 it	 could	 be	 that	 it	 presents	 a	 higher	 perspective	 than	 Climacus’	subjective	religiousness,	either	in	his	own	Religiousness	B	or	in	Anti-Climacus’	or	Kierkegaard’s	 Christian	 religiousness.	 It	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 their	 position	 is	incoherent,	retaining	exclusivism	despite	their	rejection	of	its	theses,	or	that	they	construct	 an	 alternative	 type	 of	 exclusivist	 closed	 commitment	 on	 the	 basis	 of	their	 Christological	 reflections.	 Connell	 argues	 that	 Kierkegaard	 defends	 an	exclusivism	because	he	advocates	commitment	as,	‘going	“all	in”’,	an	orientation	he	 sees	 as	 comparable	 to	 Plantinga’s	 position,	 ‘Like	 Plantinga,	 Kierkegaard	describes	faith	as	full,	unqualified	commitment	(subjective	certainty)	to	a	belief	that	 is	 acknowledged	 as	 objectively	 uncertain.’310	Central	 to	 the	 authorship’s	elaboration	of	religiousness	are	Christological	reflections	and	concepts,	such	as	‘the	Absolute	Paradox’,	 ‘the	absurd’,	and	 ‘offence’,	 that	stress	 the	uniqueness	of	Jesus	and	the	normative	status	of	the	relationship	to	him,	‘he	is	the	Saviour,	and	for	no	human	being	is	there	salvation	except	through	him.’	(PiC,	p.77)	Moreover,	the	 central	question	posed	by	both	pseudonyms	 is	 about	 the	nature	of	 faith	 in	Jesus	(e.g.	PF,	p.	1;	CUP,	p.	17,	p.	381,	pp.	629-630;	PiC,	p.	9).		Rae’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 pseudonyms	 coheres	 with	 the	 exclusivist	elements	 of	 Barth’s	 Christology.	 He	 claims	 that	 Kierkegaard’s	 existential	approach	aims	to	encourage	appropriation	of	orthodox	Christological	beliefs,	 ‘If	it	 is	 not	 true…that	 in	 Jesus	God	himself	 has	 come	among	us…then	 it	 is	 of	 little	consequence	how	we	respond	to	 the	apostolic	 testimony	presented	 in	 the	New																																																									310	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	102.	
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Testament.	 The	 individual’s	 existential	 response	 to	 Christ	 is	 of	 eternal	significance	precisely	because	 the	doctrinal	 claims	are	 true.’311	These	 ‘doctrinal	claims’	are	the	historical	claims	of	the	New	Testament,	the	two-natures	of	Christ,	and	the	necessity	of	the	revelation	of	God	in	Christ	for	obtaining	religious	truth	and	 salvation.312 	McCombs	 agrees,	 asserting	 the	 centrality	 of	 Christological	revelation	 for	Kierkegaard,	 ‘The	non-negotiable	core	of	 the	distinction	between	Socratic	 subjectivity	 and	 Christian	 faith	 is	 that	 neither	 Socrates	 nor	 any	 other	human	being	could,	without	grace	and	revelation,	 fully	discover	Christianity	so	as	to	become	a	Christian	and	save	his	soul.’313	Law	identifies	the	same	exclusivist	argument:	human	beings	lack	the	capability	of	arriving	at	religious	truth,	which	is	provided	exclusively	in	salvation	through	Christ.314			Rae	 interprets	 the	 pseudonyms	 as	 supporting	 the	 exclusivist	 doxastic	thesis,	asserting	that,	 ‘Reason	 is	reinstated’,	after	 its	collision	with	the	paradox,	such	 that	 the	Christian	 is	able	 to	 comprehend	 the	 initially	paradoxical	mystery	through	 revelation,	 God	 thus	 being	 exclusively	 known	 by	 the	 Christian,	 who	possesses	a	higher	epistemic	status.315	He	claims	that	the	trustworthiness	of	the	biblical	witness	 is	 confirmed	by	experiential	 and	existential	 transformations	 in	the	 believer,	 granting	 them	 unique	 epistemic	 access	 to	 theological	 truth,	
																																																								311	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard	and	Theology,	p.	59.	312	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	the	Incarnation	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997),	p.	19.	313	Richard	McCombs,	The	Paradoxical	Rationality	of	Søren	Kierkegaard	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2013),	p.	148.	314	David	R.	Law,	Kierkegaard’s	Kenotic	Christology,	p.	156.	315	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	the	Incarnation,	p.	21.	This	view	is	echoed	by	Evans’	claim	that	the	paradox	of	the	incarnation	is	only	‘apparent’	and	not	essential:	that	is,	it	does	not	exist	in	reality,	only	from	the	perspective	of	the	unbeliever	who	has	not	yet	been	transformed	to	grasp	the	real	unity	of	God	and	man	in	Christ.	C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard	on	Faith	and	the	Self:	
Collected	Essays,	pp.	131-132.	It	can	also	be	found	in:	Richard	McCombs,	The	Paradoxical	
Rationality	of	Søren	Kierkegaard,	p.	147.	
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Christian	 experience	 providing	 ‘plausibility	 structures’	 that	 ground	 Christian	belief.316	Non-Christians	lack	epistemic	parity	with	Christians.			Rae	 also	 argues	 that	 this	 locates	 the	 boundaries	 of	 truth	 and	 salvation	within	the	body	of	the	Church	because	it	possesses	and	transmits	the	necessary	propositional	and	doctrinal	information	about	Jesus,	‘the	grace	of	God…has	come	among	 us…as	 the	 Spirit	 who	 makes	 eloquent	 the	 testimony	 of	 those	 who	 are	called	 to	 bear	 witness	 to	 the	 Truth’. 317 	Emmanuel	 offers	 a	 comparable	interpretation	of	the	pseudonyms’	emphasis	on	lived	appropriation,	arguing	that,	by	equating	Christian	faith	with	the	entire	range	of	life	fostered	by	Christianity,	rather	 than	 merely	 belief	 or	 experience,	 Kierkegaard	 advocates	 an	 embryonic	version	 of	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 approach,	 ‘There	 is	 thus	 affirmed	 a	 sort	 of	correspondence	 between	 the	 totality	 of	 Christian	 thought	 and	 practice,	 the	Christian	form	of	life,	and	the	ultimate	reality	of	things.’318	Thus,	Kierkegaard	is	interpreted	as	advocating	closed	commitment:	religiousness	as	total	submission	to	revelation	mediated	by	the	Church	that	entails	conformity	with	its	structures,	creeds	and	beliefs.	This	also	elevates	the	believer	to	a	higher	level	than	outsiders,	such	 that	 there	can	be	no	dialogue	between	 them:	 the	higher	 rationality	of	 the	Christian	will	seem	like	foolishness	to	the	non-Christian.		(4.2.c)	 The	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 as	 ideology-critiques	 of	 exclusivist	Christology	and	its	closed	commitment	Such	 commentators	 are	 correct	 in	 identifying	 the	 pseudonyms	 as	asserting	 the	 contingency	 of	 Christian	 faith	 on	 the	 presence	 of	 God	 in	 the																																																									316	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	the	Incarnation,	p.	96;	p.	131.	317	Murray	Rae,	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	the	Incarnation,	p.	19.	318	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	Kierkegaard	and	the	Concept	of	Revelation	(New	York:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1996),	p.	107.	
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historical	 Jesus,	 because	 it	 is	 the	 collision	 of	 this	 with	 the	 universal	 need	 of	humanity	 for	 salvation	 that	 is	 their	 primary	 question.319	However,	 the	 three	central	 features	 of	 the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 refute	 the	 exclusivist	interpretation	and,	furthermore,	configure	Christology	in	an	anti-exclusivist	way.	Their	 existential	 approach	 rejects	 the	 closed	 commitment	 of	 Christian	dogmatism	as	obstructing	existential	transformation	through	faith	in	Jesus;	they	define	Jesus	as	an	oppositional	figure	to	Christianity	itself,	entailing	uncertainty,	hiddenness,	offence	and	collision;	 they	elucidate	contemporaneity	as	 individual	and	personal	experience	of	Jesus	unmediated	by	religious	institutions.		The	 core	 of	 their	 objection	 to	 exclusivist	 Christology	 is	 its	 advocacy	 of	closed	commitment,	which	 they	see	as	having	an	 inimical	existential	 impact	on	religiousness,	as	being	ecclesiocentric	and	illegitimate,	and	as	aimed	at	removing	the	agency	and	anxious	choice	that	is	integral	to	faith	for	the	purposes	of	control	and	 reinforcing	 institutional	 power.	 The	 features	 of	 their	 Christologies	 also	provide	 an	 ideological	 critique	 of	 the	 ecclesial	 use	 of	 Christology	 to	 legitimise	exclusivist	 Christianity.	 This	 is	 not	 tangential	 to	 their	 Christologies;	 both	Climacus	and	Anti-Climacus	attempt	a	deconstruction	of	Christianity	through	the	tensions	generated	by	 its	hegemonic,	 exclusivist	manipulation	of	 the	symbol	of	Jesus.320	Indeed,	they	see	the	irruption	of	God	in	Jesus	as	providing	a	perpetual,	anti-ideological	 impetus	by	 always	 announcing	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 immanent																																																									319	E.g.	PF,	p.	1,	CUP,	p.	17;	p.	381,	pp.	629-630.		320	Anti-Climacus	uses	the	term	‘Christendom’	to	signify	that	he	is	criticising	a	particular	configuration	of	Christian	faith	within	the	contemporary	institution	of	the	church.	Kirmmse,	Perkins	and	Hong	all	assert	that	the	position	of	the	Danish	Lutheran	Church	in	the	public	sphere	is	the	target	of	the	critique	of	Practice	in	Christianity.	I	will	develop	their	interpretation	to	suggest	that	it	is	not	merely	the	historical	situation	of	the	church	in	Danish	society	that	the	pseudonyms	regard	as	illegitimate	and	that	they	provide	a	more	fundamental	critique	of	the	utilization	of	Christology	as	a	totalitarian	ideology.	Robert	L.	Perkins,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Anti-Climacus	in	His	Social	and	Political	Environment’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	275.	And,	Kirmmse,	Kierkegaard	in	
Golden	Age	Denmark,	p.	395.	
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religious	community,	 ‘“My	kingdom	is	not	of	 this	world,”…is	eternally	valid,	 for	all	 times	 just	 as	 valid	 a	 statement	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 Christ’s	kingdom	and	this	world.’	(PiC,	p.	211)	Hence	 Climacus’	 central	 question	 is	 how	 the	 individual	 is	 to	 become	 an	authentic	Christian	against	 the	backdrop	of	 inauthentic	Christian	religiousness:	how	one	is	to	become	a	Christian	in	Christendom	(CUP,	p.	612).321	Climacus	sees	this	 as	 a	 difficulty	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 where	 passion	 is	 involved	 this	 is	misdirected	 into	 ‘going	 beyond’	 faith	 and	 defending	 the	 rational	 or	 doctrinal	authority	of	Christianity,	as	 in	the	case	of	 the	 ‘honourable	gentleman’	(CUP,	pp.	612-615)	 and	 the	 ‘learned	 research	 scholar’	 (CUP,	 p.	 27).	 Second,	 Christian	religiousness	 is	seen	as	 the	default	cultural	 identity	and	so	has	ceased	to	be	an	occasion	 for	 passionate	 transformation,	 ‘The	 name	 “Christian”	 is	 used	 in	 the	same	way	those	people	borrowed	bonds—in	order	to	attend	the	general	meeting	where	the	fate	of	the	Christians	is	decided	by	Christians	who	for	their	own	sake	do	not	care	about	being	Christians.’	(CUP,	p.	612)		Both	of	these	correspond	to	despairing	closed	commitment	as	defined	in	3.5.	 The	 despair	 of	 closed	 commitment	 is	 that	 it	 lacks	 finitude	 by	 positing	 an	illegitimate	 perspective	 of	 the	 person,	 allowing	 them	 to	 attain	 ‘inhuman	knowledge’,	 denying	 the	 finitude	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 and	 replacing	 the	existential	commitment	of	faith	with	cognition.	It	was	also	identified	as	denying	possibility	and	agency	in	its	exclusion	of	other	possibilities	and	seeing	identity	as	conferred	 by	 external	 factors.	 These	 types	 of	 despair	 are	 motivated	 by	 an	
																																																								321	For	this	reason,	Walsh	identifies	CUP	as	the	beginning	of	Kierkegaard’s	polemic	against	Christianity	[Sylvia	Walsh,	Kierkegaard:	Thinking	Christianly	in	an	Existential	Mode	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	p.	27.]	
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authoritarian	 ideology	 that	exploits	 the	agonistic	and	anxious	human	situation.	All	of	these	features	can	be	identified	in	the	religiousness	of	Barth.			(4.2.c.i)	 The	 pseudonyms’	 existential	 Christologies	 versus	 the	 closed	commitment	and	‘inhuman	knowledge’	of	exclusivism	Barth’s	 exclusivism	 asserts	 versions	 of	 the	 doxastic	 and	 metaphysical	theses:	the	truth	of	Christian	belief	is	the	object	of	closed	commitment.	In	order	to	 be	 secure,	 the	 Christian	 has	 to	 know	 that	 he/she	 has	 the	 truth	 and	 that	 all	other	 options	 are	 false,	 such	 that	 closed	 commitment	 is	 based	 on	 a	 process	 of	legitimisation	 via	 belief	 in	 the	 authority	 of	 Christianity:	 X	 has	 truth/salvation	because	X	adheres	to	Y	(prescribed	beliefs	and	practices)	as	true,	and	is	justified	in	 committing	 to	 these	 totally,	 because	 Z,	 an	 authority	 in	 such	 matters,	 (for	example:	the	bible,	church,	creedal	affirmations),	has	stated	that	Y	is	true.	On	this	model,	the	truth	of	the	incarnation	is	understood	as	a	set	of	beliefs	and	practices	that	 are	 legitimised	 by	 Christianity	 and	 must	 be	 accepted	 with	 unwavering	commitment.	The	pseudonyms	reject	this	on	numerous	points.	
	
The	truth	communicated	in	Jesus	is	existential,	not	doctrinal.	The	pseudonyms	reject	the	idea	that	faith	in	Jesus	entails	acceptance	of	a	set	 of	 truths	 and	practices.	 The	diversity	 of	 views	 of	 Jesus	 is	 preserved	by	 the	pseudonyms’	 emphasis	 on	 personal,	 subjective	 appropriation	 as	 the	 authentic	expression	 of	 commitment.	 Regarding	 revelation,	 the	 pseudonyms	 emphasise	that	 no	 theological	 doctrines	 are	 communicated	 as	 the	 person	 cannot	 be	communicated	 in	 sets	of	historical	or	 theological	propositions	 (PiC,	pp.	23-24);	through	 them,	 ‘one	 comes	 to	know	something	about	him	 that	 is	different	 from	
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what	he	is.’	(PiC,	p.	26)	Anti-Climacus	uses	only	minimal	doctrinal	 language:	he	does	 not	 offer	 a	 doctrine	 of	 redemption	 or	 discuss	 the	 place	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	Trinity,	‘Christianity	is	no	doctrine;	all	talk	of	offense	with	regard	to	it	as	doctrine	is	 a	 misunderstanding’,	 including,	 ‘the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 God-man’.	 (PiC,	 p.	 106)	Similarly,	the	‘god’s	poem’	does	not	utilize	any	biblical	imagery	but	is	offered	as	a	‘poetic	venture’	(PF,	p.	26),	couched	in	universalisable	narrative	motifs.	Though	Jesus	delivers	the	truth	to	persons	who	are	in	‘untruth’,	this	is	understood	as	him	affecting	a	subjective,	existential	transformation	rather	than	establishing	a	norm	for	 belief	 and	 conduct.	 The	 pseudonyms	 also	 do	 not	 consider	 Jesus’	 actions	 in	relation	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 cosmos,	 salvation	 history,	 or	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	church	community.	They	either	reject	or	view	as	irrelevant	the	exclusivist	idea	of	the	 ontological	 necessity	 of	 Christ	 for	 salvation:	 God’s	 love	 is	 the	 cause	 of	salvation,	 in	 desiring	 loving	 relationships	 with	 human	 persons	 and	 Jesus	 is	understood	as	the	manifestation	of	this	love,	not	its	cause.322				
Closed	commitment	voices	a	demand	for	an	unachievable	certainty	The	pseudonyms	argue	 that	closed	commitment	voices	a	demand	 for	an	unachievable	certainty.	The	existential	basis	of	knowing	undermines	appeals	to	authorities	 in	 that	 it	 posits	 existential	 commitments	 and	 perspectival	interpretations	 as	 underpinning	 rationality	 and	 the	 appeals	 to	 authorities	themselves.	 Believing	 Y	 to	 be	 true	 because	 of	 Z	 is	 incommensurate	 with	 faith	because	relying	on	accepted	doxastic	guarantees	produces	only	intellectual	and	partial	 commitment,	 not	 the	 relational	 and	 appropriative	 passion	 of	 personal	faith	 (CUP,	 pp.	 23-59).	 Indeed,	 no	 knowledge	 can	 be	 certain	 or																																																									322	See	the	analogy	of	the	Maiden	and	the	King.	(PF,	pp.	26-30).	
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presuppositionless	 if	 an	 authority	 is	 appealed	 to,	 because	 the	 believer	 has	 to	acknowledge	his/her	prior	commitment	to	accept	Z	as	an	authority	(CUP,	p.	14).	There	 is	 a	 regress	 of	 justification	 in	 any	 reliance	 on	 an	 authority,	 making	 it	arbitrary	or	 justifiable	only	by	 further	warrants	and	authorities	 that	 legitimate	its	 status	 as	 an	 authority,	 inaugurating	 the	 Christian	 into	 an	 unending	approximation	 process	 that	 veils	 the	 groundlessness	 of	 knowing	 and	 its	perspectival	nature	as	dependent	on	decision.	(CUP,	p.	28)		Climacus	 applies	 this	 to	 a	 range	 of	 authorities	 typically	 appealed	 to	 by	Christians:	‘Just	as	previously	the	Bible	was	supposed	to	decide	objectively	what	is	essentially	Christian	and	what	is	not,	now	the	Church	was	supposed	to	be	the	secure	 objective	 stronghold.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 the	 Living	 Word	 in	 the	Church,	the	Creed,	and	the	Word	with	the	sacraments.’	(CUP,	p.37)	For	example,	if	the	bible	is	identified	as	an	authority,	 its	authenticity,	the	shape	of	the	canon,	method	of	interpretation,	a	theological	doctrine	of	revelation,	and	similar	factors	have	 to	 be	 determined,	 but	 these	 are	 reliant	 on	 the	 authority	 of	 further	discourses.323		Tensions	 inherent	 in	 exclusivism	 lead	 to	 this	 self-defeating	 logic	 as	 the	claim	 to	 exclusivity	 makes	 the	 question	 of	 legitimisation	 both	 necessary	 yet	incapable	 of	 being	 satisfied:	 legitimating	 metanarratives	 collapse	 due	 to	 their	inability	to	satisfy	their	own	demand	for	exclusive	and	legitimated	knowledge.	It	identifies	 a	 site	 as	 an	 authoritative	 revelation	 but	 veils	 the	 initial	 choice	 to	identify	 this	 as	 an	 authority,	 veiling	 the	 role	 of	 the	 subject	 in	 an	 act	 of	transference	or	‘ventriloquism’	(CUP,	p.	111).	The	exclusivist	focus	on	knowledge																																																									323	Climacus	sketches	such	attempts	in:	CUP,	pp.	23-49,	observing	that,	‘If	Scripture	is	viewed	as	the	secure	stronghold…the	important	thing	is	to	secure	Scripture	historically-critically’,	(CUP	p.	24)	and	concludes	this	is	inevitably	unsuccessful	(CUP,	p.	34).	
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and	 certainty	 makes	 faith	 a	 form	 of	 objectivity	 that	 cannot	 satisfy	 its	 own	demand	 for	 a	 rational,	 legitimating	 foundation.324	The	 result	 is	 that	 it	 becomes	increasingly	repressive	and	in	denial	about	its	own	insecure	nature	or	degrades	into	a	partial	commitment	in	conformity	with	the	degree	of	certainty.	Far	from	overcoming	these	epistemic	limitations	for	Christians,	encounter	with	 Jesus	 further	 precludes	 certainty	 about	 religious	 truth.	 Because	 the	presence	of	God	 in	 Jesus	 is	hidden,	paradoxical,	and	offensive	to	human	reason	and	expectations,	a	Christian	cannot	know	that	he	possesses	the	truth.	Such	ideas	are	 compared	 to	 a	 triumph	 of	 invention	 where,	 due	 to	 an	 inventor’s	breakthrough,	 the	discovery	of	 some	new	 truth	or	 item	 is	possessed,	 ‘here	 the	emphasis	 is	 placed	 upon	 the	 truth,	 the	 yield,	 and	 on	 the	 race,	 human	society…which	takes	over	the	truth	as	a	matter	of	course,	and	it	is	accidental	that	a	 single	 individual	 has	 discovered	 it’.	 (PiC,	 p.	 210)	 Such	 certainty	 would	 also	undermine	 the	 human	 freedom	 that	 Climacus	 claims	 motivates	 divine	hiddenness	 as	 it	would	necessitate	human	acceptance	of	 Jesus	 (PF,	 pp.	 26-32).	Anti-Climacus	 rejects	 this	view	of	 faith	as	 it	degrades	 its	 absolute	and	 life-long	task	of	 commitment.	This	directly	 refutes	 the	 interpretations	of	Rae	and	Evans	that	the	paradox	ceases	to	be	a	paradox	for	the	higher	rationality	of	Christianity.	Similarly,	 Climacus	 views	 faith	 not	 as	 a	 sequitur	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 sequence	 in	which	 capacity,	 Religiousness	 A,	 fails	 and	 incapacity	 is	 overcome	 by	 divine	initiative	 in	 Religiousness	 B;	 rather,	 the	 two	 remain	 in	 tension,	 such	 that	 the	dialectic	of	capacity-incapacity	is	never	resolved	(CUP,	p.	576).			
																																																								324	Harvey	thus	sums	up	Climacus’	argument	as	being	that,	‘the	choice	of	a	dogmatic	method	cannot	change	the	orientation	of	the	will	because	the	choice	is	subject	to	the	very	influences	of	the	will	the	method	seeks	to	overcome.’	Michael	G.	Harvey,	Skepticism,	Relativism,	and	Religious	
Knowledge	(Eugene:	Wipf	&	Stock,	2013),	p.	41.	
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To	 sum	 up,	 exclusivist	 closed	 commitment	 replaces	 the	 passionate	commitment	of	faith	in	the	real	human	situation	of	anxiety	and	uncertainty	with	a	closed	adherence	to	knowledge	that	is	in	denial	about	its	limitations.		(4.2.c.ii)	 Opposition	 and	 collision	 in	 the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 versus	exclusivism’s	denial	of	possibility	and	agency	
Faith	 requires	 a	 collision	 with	 Christ	 as	 the	 transforming	 other;	 exclusivism	
obstructs	this	Although	 the	pseudonyms	 identify	 Jesus	as	 the	site	of	divine	activity,	by	expounding	 this	 as	 ‘the	 sign	 of	 offence’	 and	 ‘Absolute	 Paradox’,	 they	 aim	 to	preclude	attempts	to	incorporate	him	into	ideological	structures	or	validate	the	‘the	Established	Order’.	Anti-Climacus	recognises	that	moral	and	rational	norms	are	 generated	 by	 social	 structures	 and	 that	 these	 tend	 to	 be	 authoritarian	metanarratives,	 presenting	 themselves	 as	 absolute,	 certain	 and	 legitimising	 all	other	structures.	The	pseudonyms’	contention	is	that	 Jesus	must	be	a	source	of	offence,	 in	conflict	with	the	Established	Order,	 in	order	 to	be	an	object	of	 faith,	which	is	appropriated	by	Christians	living	out	religiousness	in	the	same	way,	‘To	be	a	Christian…means	to	express	being	Christian	within	an	environment	that	 is	the	 opposite	 of	 being	 Christian’;	 rather	 than	 being	 in,	 ‘an	 environment	 that	 is	synonymous,	homogeneous’,	(PiC,	p.	212).	Indeed,	faith	itself	requires	a	context	of	‘opposition’;	Climacus	interprets	Fear	and	Trembling	as	positing	a	suspension	of	the	ethical	that	places	the	faithful	in	this	situation,	‘The	suspension	consists	in	the	 individual’s	 finding	 himself	 in	 a	 state	 exactly	 opposite	 to	 what	 the	 ethical	requires.’	 (CUP,	 pp.	 266-267)	 The	 pseudonyms	 thus	 locate	 the	 believer	 in	 the	area	 of	 the	 profane	 rejected	 by	 the	 established	 order,	 not	 the	 sacred,	 ‘the	
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possibility	 of	 offense	 lies	 precisely	 in	 this,	 that	 it	 is	 the	 believer	 in	 whom	 the	world	sees	a	criminal.’	(PiC,	p.	120)		Exclusivist	 attempts	 to	 establish	 the	 certainty	of	Christ	 by	 authoritarian	appeals	 to	 doctrine,	 institution,	 or	 theology	 obfuscate	 the	 offence,	 precluding	faith	and	the	encounter	with	the	absolute	paradox	(CUP,	p.	49,	PiC,	pp.	35-6),	‘In	established	Christendom,	 this	and	every	other	possibility	of	offense	 is	basically	abolished…one	 becomes	 a	 Christian	 in	 the	 most	 pleasant	 way	 of	 the	 world	without	being	aware	of	the	slightest	possibility	of	offense.’	(PiC,	p.	111)	It	results	in	 a	 fictional	 Jesus,	 created	 by	 and	 in	 support	 of	 the	 established	 order;	 a,	‘capricious	arbitrariness	that	knows	that	it	itself	has	produced	the	god’.325	(PF,	p.	45)	The	recontextualisation	of	Jesus	in	a	system	of	guarantees	that	secure	it	and	make	it	intelligible	thus	prevents	its	religious	and	transforming	efficacy	and	even	the	 need	 to	 personally	 engage	 with	 it.	 For	 example,	 communion	 appropriates	Jesus’	offensive	identification	of	himself	with	the	‘living	bread’	in	a	structure	that	makes	it	intelligible	and	normative	rather	than	offensive,	‘These	words	have	now	been	 placed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Holy	 Communion;	 a	 doctrine	 of	 the	 ubiquity	 of	Christ’s	body	has	been	advanced,	and	because	one	has	in	Christendom	a	fantastic	Christ-figure,	all	this	 is	not	 incomprehensible	and	in	no	way	does	it	contain	the	possibility	of	offence.’	(PiC,	p.	99)	As	the	Absolute	Paradox,	there	can	be	no	question	of	incorporating	Jesus	into	 a	 system	 or	 set	 of	 doctrinal	 claims:	 the	 encounter	 with	 Jesus	 is	 not	 a	comfortable	encounter	with	doctrines	 in	a	context	 that	asserts	 their	 truth;	 it	 is	the	collision	with	a	 radical	other	 that	disrupts	all	 claims	 to	authority.	Climacus																																																									325	This	is	evident	in	the	use	of	Jesus	to	support	the	status	of	Emperors,	priests,	the	church	and	Barth’s	understanding	of	Jesus	as	a	paradox	that	undermines	liberal,	humanistic	bodies	and	supports	his	own	conservative	community.	
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argues	 that	 the	 earliest	 Christians	 had	 no	 such	 institutional	 guarantees	 to	support	 their	 faith,	 such	 that	 exclusivism’s	 provision	 of,	 ‘probabilities	 and	guarantees’	presents	an	unbiblical	faith,	‘It	would	be	a	gross	injustice	if	any	later	generation	 would	 safely,	 that	 is,	 objectively,	 be	 able	 to	 insinuate	 itself	 into	Christianity	and	thus	partake	of	what	an	earlier	generation	had	purchased	in	the	utmost	 danger	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 had	 spent	 a	 lifetime	 acquiring	 in	 this	 very	danger.’	(CUP,	p.	42)	This	 demand	 for	 certainty	 expresses	 the	 desire	 for	 mastery	 over	 the	divine,	 degrading	 it	 from	being	 an	 absolute	 reality	 that	 is	 encountered	 only	 in	anxious	 and	 uncertain	 decision-making.	 Certainty	 stifles	 the	 passionate	commitment	that	is	essential	to	faith,	which	is	dependent	on	acts	of	will	and	risk,	‘as	 soon	 as	 uncertainty	 does	 not	 continually	 keep	 the	 religious	 person	hovering…as	soon	as	certainty	seals	with	lead,	as	it	were,	the	religious	person—well,	 then	 he	 is	 naturally	 about	 to	 become	 part	 of	 the	 mass.’326 	Epistemic	humility	is	a	condition	of	Climacian	faith:	 in	order	to	realise	the	necessity	of	an	existential	 commitment	 one	 must	 realise	 the	 risk	 involved,	 ‘Without	 risk,	 no	faith’,	and	the	more	awareness	of	the	risk,	the	greater	the	passion	of	faith	needed	to	commit,	 ‘the	 less	objective	reliability,	 the	deeper	 is	the	possible	 inwardness.’	(CUP,	p.	204;	p.	209)			Caputo	 supports	 this	 position,	 arguing	 that	 certainty	 about	 structures	entails	a	 fixture	and	static	adherence	to	norms,	usually	delivered	from	the	past	and	limited	to	a	particular	context,	such	that	they	convey	only	the	possible.327	He	argues	 that	 experiences	 are	 eventful,	 involving	 new	 configurations	 of																																																									326	CUP,	p.	507;	pp.	282-3.	327	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Spectral	Hermeneutics:	On	the	Weakness	of	God	and	the	Theology	of	the	Event’.	In,	Jeffrey	W.	Robbins	(ed.),	After	the	Death	of	God	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2007),	p.	47.	
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subjectivity;	they	elude	one’s	current	capabilities	of	representation,	and	initiate	unthinkable	changes	in	one’s	life:	impossibilities	that	one	can	only	venture	into.	Encounter	with	 ‘epistemological	 undecidability’	 combined	with	 future-oriented	passionate	faith	and	hope	opens	subjectivity	to	such	new	and	futural	experiences	in	 the	 absence	 of	 guarantees,	 ‘the	 very	 highest	 passion	 is	 driven	 by	 non-knowing.’328	Caputo	 attributes	 the	 same	view	 to	Kierkegaard:	 since	 the	highest	passion	 of	 faith	 is	 paradoxical,	 the	 passion	 of	 faith	 drives	 the	 individual	 to	continually	 revise,	 revolutionise,	 or	 move	 beyond	 present	 possibilities	 to	 new	ones	led	on	by	an	unending	process	of	promise	and	seeking,	‘Before	he	has	made	the	venture,	he	can	understand	it	only	as	lunacy…when	he	has	ventured	it,	he	is	no	 longer	 the	 same	 person.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 423)	 While	 Climacus	 does	 posit	 a	transformation	akin	to	metanoia,	this	is	not	to	an	elevated	epistemic	perspective	whereby	 truth	 is	 known	 with	 certainty,	 but	 rather	 the	 ability	 to	 embrace	religiousness	without	 certainty	 and	an	 impossibility	 that	 transcends	 immanent	possibilities.	Indeed,	given	the	processual	nature	of	human	existence,	the	knower	should	welcome	uncertainty	 as	 the	most	 appropriate	 expression	 of	 the	 human	situation,	remaining	open	to	possibilities	beyond	current	beliefs,	by	being,	'never	a	teacher,	but	a	learner'	(CUP,	p.	85).	Climacus’	understanding	of	religion	as	a	response	to	ultimacy	that	makes	claims	and	promises	 that	breach	 the	possibilities	conveyed	by	past	experience,	entailing	hope	and	 faith,	 requires	openness	 to	 the	 future	and	new	experiences.	Hence	 Climacus	 argues	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 human	 free	 will	 and	 the	necessity	 of	 choice	 and	 decision,	 the	 universe	 has	 to	 be	 religiously	 ambiguous	and	mysterious	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 faith,	 ‘And	why	 is	 God	 illusive?	 Precisely																																																									328	John	D.	Caputo,	On	Religion,	p.129.	
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because	he	 is	 truth	and	 in	being	 illusive,	 seeks	 to	keep	a	person	 from	untruth.’	(CUP,	 pp.	 243-244)	 This	 is	 strenuous	 and	 requires	 a	 continual	 ‘striving’	 as	humans	 find	 certainty	 comforting	 (CUP,	 p.	 92),	 but	 such	 fixture	 is	 fantasy	 and	precludes	faith	because	it	is	inappropriate	to	our	situation,	'one	continually	feels	an	 urge	 to	 have	 something	 finished,	 but	 this	 urge	 is	 of	 evil	 and	 must	 be	renounced.'	 (CUP,	 p.	 86)	Exclusivism	 is	 incompatible	with	 faith	 as	 it	 entails	 an	attachment	 to	 existing,	 paradigmatic	 structures	 and	 experiences;	 it	 demands	certainty	in	an	area	of	perpetual	uncertainty	and	thereby	precludes	faith.329		
Relying	on	authorities	obstructs	personal	commitment,	agency	and	freedom	The	 pseudonyms	 argue	 that	 doxastic	 reliance	 on	 and	 subservience	 to	authority	for	the	validation	of	knowledge	is	inimical	to	the	centrality	of	agency	in	religiousness.	 It	 makes	 believers	 passive	 in	 receiving	 something	 achieved	 by	someone	else	and	sees	truth	as	something	already	possessed:	one,	 ‘has	nothing	more	 about	 or	 for	 which	 to	 struggle.’	 (PiC,	 p.	 211)	 Seeing	 identity	 as	 secured	from	 an	 external	 source	 degrades	 the	 possibility	 of	 personal,	 subjective	appropriation,	and	obfuscates	the	personal	source	of	commitment.	Hence	he	also	
																																																								329	Indeed,	that	this	claim	occurs	immediately	after	a	discussion	of	the	Christian	paradox	is	further	evidence	that	that	Climacus	is	not	an	advocate	of	exclusivist	and	irrationalism	fideism.	The	error	of	Penelhum’s	interpretation	emerges	here:	he	sees	him	as	positing	a	consuming	and	irrational	faith	commitment	since	he	rules	out	the	approximation	process	of	scholarship	for	its	inability	to	give	certainty	but	fails	to	recognise	that	Climacus	is	not	defending	certainty,	only	commitment.	[Terence	Penelhum,	‘Fideism.’	In,	Philip	L.	Quinn	and	Charles	Taliaferro	(eds.),	A	
Companion	to	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	379].	Furthermore,	contrary	to	Evans’	interpretation	that	Climacus’	emphasis	on	human	incapacity;	that,	‘changing	himself	is	something	the	individual	cannot	do’,	(CUP,	p.	363)	as	privileging	Christian	truth	as	revealed,	Carlisle’s	interpretation	coheres	with	my	argument.	Human	incapacity	is	understood	by	Climacus	not	as	necessitating	a	reliance	on	authoritative	revelation,	as	this	could	not	replace	the	authority	of	subjectivity	and	the	need	to	decide	whether	it	constituted	a	revelation	(CUP,	p.	24),	but	as	entailing	that	subjectivity	is	constituted	through	acts	of	openness	and	a	refusal	of	attachment	to	one’s	structures	as	absolute:	subjectivity	is	formed	only	in	a	context	of	dependence.	[See:	C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript	and	Fragments:	The	Religious	Philosophy	of	Johannes	Climacus,	p.	148.	Clare	Carlisle,	‘Climacus	on	the	Task	of	Becoming	a	Christian’.	In,	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	
Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	p.	186].	
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complains	that	Christianity	confuses	the	existence	of	churches	with	people	being	Christian	(PiC,	p.	211).	By	understanding	salvation	as	adherence	to	propositions,	there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 appropriate	 and	 transcend,	 core	 aspects	 of	 faith,	 only	 to	conform	to	the	predetermined,	objective	structures,	‘When	the	matter	is	treated	objectively,	the	subject	cannot	impassionedly	relate	himself	to	the	decision,	can	least	of	all	be	impassionedly,	infinitely	interested.’	(CUP,	p.	31)		Climacus	 compares	 such	 an	 orientation	 to	 the	 lunacy	 of	 a	 person	 who	cites	 propositions	 popularly	 regarded	 as	 objective	 facts	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 his	identity,	 thereby	 failing	 to	 realise	 the	 necessity	 of	 personal	 appropriation.	 For	Climacus,	 this	 is	 dehumanising	 because	 it	 negates	 personality,	 ‘One	 does	 not	know	whether	one	dares	 to	believe	 that	 it	 is	a	human	being	with	whom	one	 is	speaking,	 or	 perhaps	 a	 “walking	 stick,”	 an	 artificial	 contrivance’.	 (CUP,	 p.	 196)	Since	 knowing	 is	 underpinned	 by	 subjective	 commitments,	 individuals	 have	inescapable	freedoms	and	active	roles	in	the	formation	of	their	beliefs	and	faith.	Relinquishing	 this	authority	 is	 impossible	because,	 in	adhering	 to	an	authority,	one	is	still	acting	as	the	authority	by	conferring	authority	upon	it.	In	response	to	the	Christian	who	claims,	‘I	rest	in	a	confidence	in	others,	in	the	authority	of	the	saints,	etc.’,	he	 thus	asserts,	 ‘This	 is	an	 illusion,	because	dialectics	merely	 turns	and	 asks…about	 what	 authority	 is	 then	 and	 why	 he	 now	 regards	 these	 as	authorities…not	 about	 the	 faith	 he	 has	 out	of	 confidence	 in	 them	 but	 about	 the	
faith	he	has	in	them.’	(CUP,	p.	24)		
Exclusivism	is	a	hegemonic	gesture	aiming	at	domination	Personhood	 lacks	 security	 and	 entails	 a	 perpetual,	 dialectical	 struggle	with	 irresolvable	 conflicts	 in	 the	 face	 of	 serious	 existential	 challenges.	 All	
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persons	can	do	in	this	situation	is	exercise	freedom	in	deciding	how	to	respond.	Climacus	identifies	pedagogic	authoritarianism	as	a	mechanism	of	interpellation	into	a	hegemonic	system	that	aims	to	veil	its	local	human	origins	and	remove	the	freedom	of	the	individual	 learner	for	the	purposes	of	 ‘domination’	(CUP,	p	 .13).	The	pseudonyms	see	this	as	entailing	calculated,	self-interested	bargaining	that	is	motivated	by	 the	 reality	of	 the	human	 situation	as	 always	uncertain,	 fearful,	and	anxious	about	its	future:	one	need	not	risk,	decide,	respond	or	be	concerned	about	one’s	 ‘evig	salighed’	(PiC,	p.	112)	because	the	site	where	one	obtains	it	is	made	obvious	and	the	institution	exists	to	deal	with	it.	Religions	that	operate	in	this	way	 exploit	 the	 anxiety	 of	 the	 human	 situation,	 the	 existential	 terror	 and	ease	 of	 existential	 cowardice	 and	 the	 desire	 for	 union;	 this	 usually	 serves	 the	purposes	of	control	by	the	promise	of	security	and	unity,	as	Zizek	observes,	‘the	Social	 is	 always	 an	 inconsistent	 field	 structured	 around	 a	 constitutive	impossibility,	traversed	by	a	central	‘antagonism’,	and	in	this	context,	ideological	fantasy	gives	the	enjoyment	that	masks	this	in	a	unity.’330		The	‘established	order’	of	Christianity	offers	such	a	vision	of	community,	which	it	presents	as	exclusive	and	‘necessary’.	The	diversity	of	the	community	is	an	 ineliminable	 remainder	 that	 threatens	 to	 undermine	 this	 fantasy	 and	 it	 is	addressed	 by	 being	 embodied	 in	 a	 scapegoat:	 the	 other	who	 is	 disrupting	 the	social	 harmony.	 Ideology	 is	 thus	 configured	 through	 exclusion	 of	 a	 particular	group	as	other,	allowing	 it	 to	admit	the	diversity	that	 is	 the	social	reality	while	simultaneously	denying	 it	 as	 the	 reality	of	 the	 community,	 ‘the	 ‘Jew’	 is	 just	 the	embodiment	 of	 a	 certain	 blockage	 –	 of	 the	 impossibility	 which	 prevents	 the	
																																																								330	Slavoj	Zizek,	The	Sublime	Object	of	Ideology	(London:	Verso,	2008),	p.	142.	
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society	 from	 achieving	 its	 full	 identity	 as	 a	 closed	 homogeneous	 totality.’331	Totalitarian	 ideology	 is	 thus	 a	metaphysics	of	 violence	and	 this	 is	 appealing	 to	individuals	precisely	because	of	 its	 totalitarianism	and	exclusionary	structures,	which	promise	unity	and	security	and	explain	agonising	fragmentation	with	the	promise	of	its	elimination.	This	gesture	is	evident	in	Barth’s	description	of	the	singular	and	tangible	boundaries	of	the	church	and	exclusion	of	human	religions	as	sinful.	Barth	uses	Jesus	 to	 construct	 the	 sacred	 as	 a	 normative	 social	 location,	 distinct	 from	 the	diverse	profane,	to	preserve	the	fictional	unity	of	the	sacred	community.	This	is	an	act	of	exclusion	that	translates	into	actual	violence	because	the	fantasy	of	the	singular,	 unified	 body	 is	 maintained	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 fractional,	 factional	reality	 by	 the	 interpretation	of	 internal	 diversity	 as	 heresy	 to	be	 eliminated	 in	the	 purification	 of	 the	 body	 and	 external	 diversity	 as	 a	 sinful	 otherness	 to	 be	conquered	through	conversion.	For	Barth,	salvation	means	the	elimination	of	the	other.	Far	 from	being	open	to	otherness,	admitting	 the	present	 fallibility	of	 the	Church	 is	 a	 means	 of	 auto-immunising	 against	 otherness:	 the	 fallibility	 is	 an	undesirable	 reality	 resulting	 from	 the	 presence	 of	 otherness	 and	 it	 will	 be	overcome	 in	 the	 eschatological	 triumph	 of	 the	 body,	 when	 others	 cease	 to	exist.332	This	 also	 endorses	 further	 acts	 of	 discrimination	 extant	 in	 the	 social	structure	 it	 supports,	 stratifying	 factors	 such	 as	 gender,	 sexuality,	 and	 social	status	 according	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 God’s	 will,	 such	 that	 it	 makes	 these	 structures																																																									331	Slavoj	Zizek,	The	Sublime	Object	of	Ideology,	p.	143.	332	Barth	asserts	the	fallibility	of	specific	congregations	as	not	undermining	the	divine	unity	of	the	Church	in:	Karl	Barth,	Dogmatics	in	Outline,	p.	142.	Derrida	claims	that	elimination	of	the	other	would	eliminate	Christianity,	as	the	other	is	an	integral	part	of	maintaining	the	fantasy,	‘It	makes	
violence	of	itself,	does	violence	to	itself	and	keeps	itself	from	the	other.	The	auto-immunity	of	religion	can	only	indemnify	itself	without	assignable	end.’	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Faith	and	Knowledge:	the	Two	Sources	of	‘Religion’	at	the	Limits	of	Reason	Alone.’	In,	Jacques	Derrida	and	Gianni	Vattimo	(eds.)	Religion,	p.	66.	
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deontologically	valid	and	thus	incapable	of	being	challenged	or	changed	as	mere	social	conventions.	As	Woodhead	puts	it,	church	authorities	are,	‘accountable	not	to	 empirical	 evidence	 but	 to	 a	 divine	 revelation	 to	 which	 they	 claim	 to	 have	privileged	access.’333		The	 pseudonyms’	 critique	 shares	 an	 ethical	 dimension	 to	 Lyotard’s	critique	of	metanarratives,	which	are	not	simply	epistemologically	misguided	but	perpetuate	 themselves	 through	 domination	 and	 violence. 334 	Exclusivism	presents	 itself	 as	 a	 metanarrative:	 a	 hegemonic	 construction	 of	 reality	 that	functions	 by	 asserting	 its	 exclusive	 truth	 as,	 ‘the	 whole	 and	 the	 one’,	 and	 its	control	of	reality	through	its	correspondence	to	it,	‘the	reconciliation	of	concept	and	 the	 sensible’;	 it	 silences	 alternative	 accounts	 as	 false	 and	 reflecting	 the	inferior	 nature	 of	 their	 adherents	 and	 suppresses	 the	 fundamentally	polyphonous	nature	of	reality:	it	‘seizes	reality’	through	‘terror’.335			Lyotard’s	solution,	of	denying	the	possibility	of	a	single	representation	of	reality,	 is	 found	 in	 the	pseudonyms’	advocacy	of	perspectivism,	 ‘The	answer	 is:	Let	 us	 wage	 a	 war	 on	 totality;	 let	 us	 be	 witness	 to	 the	 unpresentable;	 let	 us	
																																																								333	Linda	Woodhead,	‘Theology:	The	Trouble	It’s	In’.	In,	Gavin	Hyman	(ed.)	New	Directions	in	
Philosophical	Theology	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2004),	p.	174.	334	Thacker	makes	this	point,	seeing	Lyotard	as	often	being	misinterpreted	by	those	who	focus	on	metanarratives	as	primarily	epistemological	structures	aimed	at	legitimization.	Justin	Thacker,	
Postmodernism	and	the	Ethics	of	Theological	Knowledge	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2007),	p.	119.	335	Jean-Francois	Lyotard,	The	Postmodern	Condition	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1984),	p.	82.	For	the	link	with	institutional	murder	of	the	other,	see:	Jean-Francois	Lyotard,	The	
Differend	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota,	1983),	pp.	3-4.	Smith	tries	to	defend	Christianity	against	the	interpretation	of	it	as	a	metanarrative	on	the	grounds	that	it	does	not	make	scientific,	legitimising	claims.	[James	K.	A.	Smith,	‘A	Little	Story	about	Metanarratives:	Lyotard,	Religion	and	Postmodernism	Revisited.’	In,	Myron	B.	Penner	(ed.),	Christianity	and	the	Postmodern	Turn	(Grand	Rapids:	Brazos	Press,	2005)	p.	125.]	However,	he	fails	to	see	the	deeper	structure	posited	by	Lyotard	of	metanarratives:	that	they	assert	a	direct	and	total	correspondence	of	the	system	with	reality.	Hence,	Geivett	comes	closer	to	understanding	Lyotard’s	criticism	by	seeing	Christianity	as	a	metanarrative	in	that	it	claims	to	offer	a	full	account	of	reality.	R.	Douglas	Geivett,	‘Is	God	a	Story?	Postmodernity	and	the	Task	of	Theology.’	In,	Myron	B.	Penner	(ed.),	
Christianity	and	the	Postmodern	Turn,	p.	50.	
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activate	the	differences’.336	The	pseudonyms	also	assert	the	value	and	necessity	of	the	individual	person	for	meaning	and	truth.	It	is	by	ignoring	the	person	that	Barth’s	 exclusivism	 is	 able	 to	 construct	 Christianity	 ‘from	 above’,	 as	 a	 fixed,	uniform,	 timeless	 essence	 that	 exists	 in	 a	 vacuum	 and	 to	 view	 diversity	 as	 an	aberration.	 Paying	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 and	 situation	 of	 the	 person	 forces	religions	 to	acknowledge	 their	public	 contexts,	 relative,	agonistic	histories,	 and	that	 the	 people	 who	 constitute	 them	 exist	 in	 a	 diverse	 context	 of	 continued	meeting	with	others	and	the	internal	alterity	of	their	own	subjective	identities.		
Exclusivism	 equates	 faith	 with	 conformity	 to	 established	 norms	 and	 therefore	
precludes	existential	and	social	transformation	The	 pseudonyms	 argue	 that	 closed	 commitment	 disrupts	 both	 personal	and	social	activity.	The	idea	that	the	community	possesses	truth	 in	a	 final	 form	and	 that	 the	 members	 are	 recipients	 of	 this	 promotes	 passivity	 in	 the	 laity,	producing	 ‘admirers’	 rather	 than	 ‘imitators’	 (PiC,	 p.	 237)337	Moreover,	 just	 as	certainty	 precludes	 faith,	 identifying	 Jesus	 with	 the	 Church	 and	 equating	Christian	 faith	 with	 conformity	 to	 the	 social	 and	 behavioural	 norms	 of	 an	‘Established	 Order’	 precludes	 social	 transformation	 and	 praxis,	 ‘If	 everyone	around	defines	himself	as	being	a	Christian	just	like	“the	others,”	then	no	one,	if	it	is	 looked	 at	 this	 way,	 is	 really	 confessing	 Christ.’	 (PiC,	 p.	 219)	 To	 foster	 the	fantasy	 of	 unity,	 such	 groups	 promote	 visible	 observances	 that	 signify	membership	 of	 the	 group	 rather	 than	 subjective,	 ‘inward’,	 existential																																																									336	Jean-Francois	Lyotard,	The	Postmodern	Condition,	p.	82.	337	A	criticism	acknowledged	by	Dulles,	who	argues	that	the	Catholic	Church’s	pre-Vatican	II	favouring	of	an	institutional	model	of	the	church	impaired	the	ability	of	the	church	to	adapt	to	change	and	the	subjective	interpretations	and	activity	of	the	laity,	who	are	instead	seen	as	passive	recipients.	Avery	Dulles,	Models	of	the	Church	(New	York:	Doubleday,	2002	[Expanded	Edition]),	pp.	35-37.	
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transformation	 to	 a	 different	 way	 of	 being,	 	 ‘the	 relationship	 with	 God	 is	abolished;	 custom,	 ordinances,	 and	 the	 like	 are	 deified…under	 the	 guise	 of	worshipping	and	adoring	God,	they	worship	and	adore	their	own	invention’.	(PiC,	p.	92.	See	also,	PiC,	p.	225).	This	is	inimical	to	faith	because	it	translates	religious	action	and	spirituality	into	behaviour	that	contributes	to	social	function	and	the	preservation	of	the	group,	‘the	relationship	with	God	is	also	secularised;	we	want	it	to	coincide	with	a	certain	relativity,	do	not	want	it	to	be	something	essentially	different	from	our	positions	in	life,	etc.’	(PiC,	p.	91)				Barth’s	identification	of	the	church	as	a	sacred	space	might	be	thought	to	construct	 an	 external	 perspective	 against	 the	 profane	 established	 order,	empowering	 social	 action,	 but	 Anti-Climacus	 argues	 that	 the	 church	 cannot	 be	extricated	 from	 its	 social	 context,	 such	 that	 the	deification	of	 it	 also	deifies	 the	social	order	and	prevents	critique	(PiC,	p.	92),	as	Perkins	observes,	‘The	result	of	Christendom	is	that	Christianity	is	eviscerated	as	a	source	of	judgement	against	the	world	and	instead	becomes,	at	best,	just	a	part	of	the	furniture	of	the	world	or,	at	worst,	a	tool	in	the	hands	of	those	who	are	willing	[to]	exploit	humankind’s	understanding	 of	 or	 need	 for	 the	 divine	 in	 their	 private	 and/or	 political	interests.’338	The	 only	 way	 for	 Christian	 faith	 to	 empower	 personal	 and	 social	transformation	 is	 thus	 to	 resist	 being	 identified	 with	 any	 established	 order,	existing	 always	 as	 a	 prophetic,	 unrealized	 reality	 in	 response	 to	 the	transforming,	eventful	encounter	with	Christ	as	the	sign	of	offence.339	
																																																								338	Robert	L.	Perkins,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Anti-Climacus	in	His	Social	and	Political	Environment’.	In,	Perkins	(ed.),	IKCPC,	p.	284.	339	Kirmmse	interprets	Kierkegaard	as	a	‘dualist’	for	this	reason,	‘It	is	only	as	individuals	related	to	God	and	not	as	participants	in	civilization-building,	history	making	humanity,	that	human	beings	have	their	genuinely	and	essentially	human	existence.’	Bruce	Kirmmse,	Kierkegaard	in	
Golden	Age	Denmark,	p.	395.	However,	by	categorizing	it	in	this	way,	Kirmmse	fails	to	see	the	potential	for	Kierkegaard	to	engage	in	social	critique.	
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	(4.2.c.iii)	Contemporaneity	is	a	personal	relationship	The	pseudonyms	share	the	exclusivist	emphasis	on	contemporaneity	with	Jesus,	 but	 Barth	 has	 an	 opposing	 conception	 of	 what	 this	 entails.	 Barth	emphasises	that	contemporaneity	is	only	possible	with	the	resurrected	Christ	in	the	 body	 of	 the	 church,	 whereas	 Anti-Climacus	 emphasises	 contemporaneity	with	 the	 suffering,	 lowly	 historical	 Jesus	 (PiC,	 p.	 64)	 and	 identifies	contemporaneity	with	the	resurrected	Jesus	as	impossible,	‘his	loftiness	does	not	begin	until	his	ascension	to	heaven,	and	since	that	time	not	one	single	word	has	been	heard	from	him—thus,	every	word	he	said	was	said	in	his	abasement.’	(PiC,	pp.	 161-162)	He	 also	 rejects	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 presence	 is	 encountered	 in	 the	church	as,	‘the	illusion	of	a	Church	triumphant’	(PiC,	p.	209)340	Furthermore,	the	pseudonyms	have	an	individualist	conception	of	faith	as	a	 personal,	 subjective	 relationship	 that	 is	 undermined	 by	 membership	 of	 a	collective.	Anti-Climacus	sees	 this	as	part	of	 the	reason	 for	 Jesus’	collision	with	the	religious	authorities:	he	asserted	an	individual,	personal	relationship	to	God	rather	than	one	mediated	by	membership	of	a	religious	body.	Hence	he	asserts	that	the	individual	is,	‘higher	than	the	established	order’,	(PiC,	p.	85)	and	claims,	‘the	more	one	deifies	the	established	order,	 the	more	natural	 is	 the	conclusion:	ergo,	the	one	who	disapproves	of	or	rebels	against	this	divinity,	the	established	order—ergo,	 he	 must	 be	 rather	 close	 to	 imagining	 that	 he	 is	 God….	 [The]	blasphemy	 is	 actually	 a	 projection	 from	 the	 impiety	with	which	 one	 venerates	the	established	order	as	divine’.	(PiC,	pp.	88-89)																																																										340	Anti-Climacus’	opposition	to	this	is	so	strong	that	it	leads	him	to	dubious	assertions,	such	as	his	claim	that	the	gospel	spreads	itself,	rather	than	being	spread	by	the	church,		‘the	invitation	goes	out,	and	wherever	there	is	a	crossroad,	it	stands	still	and	calls	out.	It	stands	at	the	crossroad’.	(PiC,	p.16,	emphasis	added).	
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The	pseudonyms	argue	that	exclusivist	attitudes	and	prescribed	practices	are	incapable	of	mediating	this	personal	relationship	with	God.341	Climacus	sees	them	as	locating	the	religious	task	in	the	fulfilment	of	relative	ends	rather	than	in	the	 relationship	 to	 God;	 they	 are	 competitors	 to	 faith,	 such	 as	 the	 idea	 that	 a	relationship	to	God	is	achieved	by	a	muscular	display	of	gesticulated	obeisance,	‘because	the	most	decisive	outward	expression	is	only	relative’	(CUP,	p.	492;	pp.	90-91).	He	also	asserts	that	locating	the	relationship	to	God	in	specific	religious	acts	 grants	 a	 sporadic	 and	 fractious	 commitment,	 ‘Does	 “always	 to	 thank	God”	mean	that	once	a	year,	on	the	second	Sunday	in	Lent	at	Vespers,	I	bear	in	mind	that	I	am	always	to	thank	God…?	Consequently,	thanking	God,	this	simple	matter,	suddenly	assigns	me	one	of	the	most	strenuous	tasks,	one	that	will	be	sufficient	for	my	entire	life.’	(CUP,	pp.	178-179)	Exclusivist	 religion	 takes	 its	 religious	 rituals	 and	 practices	 as	guaranteeing	the	presence	of	God.	This	is	at	variance	with	a	dominant	stream	of	Christian	belief	that	asserts	the	transcendence	and	unknowability	of	the	divine;	that	 God	 eludes	 human	 rationality	 and	 comprehension.	 Like	 Heidegger,	 the	pseudonyms	claim	that	this	rational	approach	prevents	God	being	related	to	in	a	worshipful	way	because	he	is	mastered.	342	Exclusivism	is	idolatry	that	functions	by	mastering	 the	divine	 and	 translating	 it	 into	human	 categories:	 so	God	 is	 no	longer	encountered	as	subject	or	 ‘Lord’	(CUP,	p.	46;	156)	but	as	a	projection	of	human	 structures,	 ‘the	 vengeance	 that	 God	 does	 not	 exist	 for	 me	 at	 all,	 even	though	I	pray.’	(CUP,	p.	163)	Such	a	God	is	compared	to	a	corseted	actor,	‘God	is	metaphysically	laced	in	a	half-metaphysical,	half-esthetic-dramatic,	conventional																																																									341	Including	infant	baptism	(CUP,	p.	595),	liturgical	practice	(CUP,	p.	479)	and	monasticism	(CUP,	p.	415).	342	Martin	Heidegger,	Identity	and	Difference	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2002),	p.	72.	
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corset,	 which	 is	 immanent.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 156)	 Exclusivism	 is	 a	 costume	 drama	 in	which	creativity	and	freedom	on	the	part	of	 the	divine	and	human	subjects	are	replaced	by	a	restricting	costume	and	script;	the	participants	are	forced	to	play	a	regulated	role	rather	than	engaging	in	deep	relationships	as	free	subjects.		Climacus	does	not	 see	 religious	bodies	 as	 entirely	 redundant	 since	 they	can	 provide	 messages	 for	 appropriation,	 such	 as	 claims	 about	 one’s	 ‘evig	salighed’,	but	he	advocates	the	need	for	‘dialectical	intrepidity’	in	being	aware	of	and	having	 ‘admiration’	 for	religious	bodies	 from	which	one	 initially	 learns	but	then	the	necessity	of	appropriating	these	personally	and	creatively	in	one’s	own	existential	 situations.343	Religious	 practices	 can	 have	 a	 place,	 but	 this	 must	 be	determined	freely	by	the	individual	in	relation	to	God	(CUP,	pp.	157-158).	Hence,	Climacus	 contrasts	 exclusivist	 conceptions	 of	 prayer	 and	 thanksgiving	 as	observance	of	external	regulations	with	the	 life-long,	subjective	embodiment	of	these.344	They	also	require	a	comic	appreciation	of	how	they	 fail	 to	express	 the	internal	relationship	to	God,	but	which	one	simultaneously	engages	in	as	if	they	relate	one	to	God	(CUP,	pp.	505-506).		To	 summarise,	Barthian	exclusivism	 is	a	despairing,	 closed	commitment	that	is	repressive	and	in	denial	about	the	real,	 finite	human	situation	as	well	as	obstructing	 freedom,	possibility	 and	 the	 eventful,	 transforming	 encounter	with	God.	
																																																									343	CUP,	p.	12.	For	example,	Climacus’	question	about	the	nature	of	faith	is	provoked	by	the	Christian	context:	‘I	have	heard	that	Christianity	is	one’s	prerequisite	for	this	good	[an	‘evig	salighed’].	I	now	ask	how	I	may	enter	into	relation	to	this	doctrine….	It	is	Christianity	itself	that	compels	me.’	(CUP,	pp.	15-16).	344	CUP,	p.	162;	177.	His	example	is	of	the	contrast	between	one	who	takes	his	marriage	for	granted	as	constituted	by	his	possession	of	a	church	mandated	marriage	certificate	and	one	who	understands	that	this	is	irrelevant	and	that	his	marriage	is	constituted	by	his	personal	and	life-long	commitment	to	his	wife.	(CUP,	p.	162)	
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4.3.	Hick’s	Pluralist	Christology		 Section	 3.5.b	 claimed	 that	 pluralism	 advocates	 a	 form	 of	 Quixotic	commitment	 by	 knowingly	 embracing	 its	 own	 fantasies	 and	 disengaging	 from	the	 real	 existential	 situations	 of	 persons.	 Insofar	 as	 it	 presents	 a	 competitor	thesis	 to	 religions,	 it	 can	also	be	 seen	as	 advocating	a	 type	of	 closed	or	partial	commitment	 to	 religions,	 as	 these	 are	 reinterpreted	 or	 rejected	 in	 the	 light	 of	pluralism.		(4.3.a)	The	Central	Features	of	Hick’s	Christology	The	 pseudonyms’	 existential	 and	 heuristic	 foci	 could	 suggest	 that	 they	advocate	Christological	antirealism,	Jesus	serving	as	a	mythological	symbol	that	expresses	 religious	 experience	 and	 elicits	 existential	 transformation.	Representative	of	 this	approach,	Hick	 interprets	Christology	as,	 ‘a	mythological	or	 poetic	 way	 of	 expressing	 his	 significance	 for	 us.’ 345 	Hick	 understands	Christological	 language	 as	 being	 a	 symbolic	 expression	 of	 human	 experiences,	rather	 than	 a	 factual	 description	 of	 Jesus	 or	 God,	 such	 that	 it	 must	 be	demythologised	 to	 uncover	 its	 experiential	 and	 moral	 messages,	 ‘The	 mythic	story	expresses	the	significance	of	a	point	in	history	where	we	can	see	human	life	lived	 in	 faithful	 response	 to	God	 and	 see	God’s	 nature	 reflected	 in	 that	 human	response.’346	Jesus,	and	other	religious	figures,	express	experiences	of	God’s	will,	love,	 and	 the	 ideal	 life;	 they	 effect,	 ‘human…transformation’,	 from	 ‘self-centredness’	 to	 ‘Reality-centeredness’	 or	 altruism,	 ‘Love,	 compassion,	 self-
																																																								345	John	Hick	(ed.)	The	Myth	of	God	Incarnate.	For	Hick,	a	myth	is	a	more	elaborate	form	of	metaphor,	‘A	myth,	so	defined,	is	a	much	extended	metaphor.’	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	
Incarnate,	p.	105.	346	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate,	pp.	105-106.	
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sacrificing	concern	for	the	good	of	others,	generous	kindness	and	forgiveness’.347	Different	religions	are	comparable	to	poetic	works	in	that	they	are	fictions	that	express	different	peoples’	experience	of	a	singular	reality,	though	the	reality	also	transcends	their	fictions.		This	entails	that	Hick	is	able	to	make	some	minimal	claims	about	the	Real,	and	 that	 these	 can	 de	 derived	 from	 sources	 that	 are	 not	 prone	 to	 the	 cultural	conditioning	of	all	other	religious	knowing,	whether	that	 is	 from	a	comparative	analysis	that	allows	certain	features	of	the	Real	to	be	perceived	by	the	scholar	or	because	these	are	somehow	innate	or	transcend	the	contextually	limited	human	perspective.348 	The	 core	 truth	 that	 he	 identifies,	 transformation,	 is	 seen	 as	escaping	 this	 because	 it	 is	 the	 development	 of	 an	 immanent	 potential	 of	humanity	 itself;	 it	 is	 an	 intensification	 of	 humanity’s	 benign	 characteristics	against	 its	 selfish	 drives.	 Its	 independence	 from	 religious	 traditions	 is	necessitated	by	Hick’s	thesis	that	it	provides	the	normative	‘criterion’	for	judging	the	validity	of	religious	traditions	and	view	that	religions	are	human	responses	to	 the	 divine	 rather	 than	 grounded	 in	 divine	 revelation,	 ‘not	 an	 alien	 ideal	imposed	 by	 supernatural	 authority	 but	 one	 arising	 out	 of	 our	 human	 nature	(though	always	in	tension	with	other	aspects	of	that	nature),	reinforced,	refined	and	elevated	to	new	levels	within	the	religious	traditions.’349		Hick	 sees	 this	pluralism	as	providing	 a	basis	 for	 a	 global	 community	by	equalising	religions	and	seeing	their	core	as	a	universal	commitment	to	equality	and	 altruism,	 ‘a	 non-traditional	 Christianity	 based	 upon	 this	 understanding	 of																																																									347	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate,	p.	105.	And,	John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	240;	309;	325.	348	He	is	building	on	the	modernist,	essentialist	concept	of	religion	outlined	in	Chapter	3,	particularly	with	its	origins	in	Schleiermacher’s	experiential-expressive	view	and	Lessing’s	commitment	to	a	simple,	moral-rational	core	of	religion.	349	John	Hick,	An	Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	325.	
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Jesus	can	see	itself	as	one	among	a	number	of	different	human	responses	to	the	ultimate	 transcendent	 Reality	 that	 we	 call	 God,	 and	 can	 better	 serve	 the	development	of	a	world	community	and	world	peace’.350	Christ	is	not	unique	and	provides	 no	 privileged	 view	 of	 God,	 only	 dispensable	 symbols	 obtainable	 in	 a	range	of	 religions	 and	 in	need	of	 demythologisation	 to	uncover	 their	universal	ethical	meaning.	It	 is	 because	of	 this	 tension	between	providing	 a	 single,	 true	 account	of	the	Real	and	a	universal	set	of	moral	principles,	and	its	assertion	of	the	relativity	and	contextuality	of	religious	knowing	that	it	is	seen	by	many	critics	as	offering	a	conflicted	message	as	both	a	first	order	discourse	about	the	Real	that	competes	with	religions	and	a	second	order	discourse	that	simply	seeks	to	provide	a	model	of	religion	that	emerges	from	comparison	of	religions.351	If	Hick’s	pluralism	is	interpreted	as	a	first	order	discourse	that	asserts	its	own	ability	 to	 transcend	 the	 limited	perspective	of	 religions,	 his	pluralism	 is	 a	form	of	closed	commitment.	However,	closed	commitment	does	not	provide	the	best	 model	 for	 understanding	 Hick’s	 way	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world,	 particularly	interpreted	from	the	perspective	of	Christology,	because	he	does	not	commit	to	the	central	features	of	exclusivism:	he	does	not	believe	God’s	presence	is	located	in	 a	 hegemonically	 defined	 space,	 nor	 does	 he	 ascribe	 particular	 doctrines	 or	truths	to	religions	that	are	thought	to	correspond	directly	to	reality.																																																										350	John	Hick,	The	Metaphor	of	God	Incarnate,	ix;	see	also	pp.	103-4.	And,	John	Hick,	An	
Interpretation	of	Religion,	p.	246.	351	See	Chapter	3	for	further	discussion	of	this	ambiguity	of	whether	it	is	advocating	a	‘change	of	status’	or	‘change	of	content’	and	on	whether	it	is	offering	a	competitor	religion	or	theory	of	religion.	Cheetham	sums	up	the	range	of	tones	with	which	pluralism	can	speak,	‘Pluralists	are	sending	out	a	confused	message.	Pluralism	can	be	portrayed	as	a	second-order	philosophical	explanation	or	empirical	observation	which	sits	behind-the-scenes	(Hick);	or	as	an	agonistic	or	sceptical	attitude	(Byrne),	or	as	heralding	a	bold	crossing	of	the	Rubicon	which	calls	for	doctrines	to	be	altered	for	the	sake	of	justice	and	for	profound	re-examination	of	theological	claims	(Kaufman,	Knitter).’	[Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	45.]	
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Quixotic	commitment	maps	onto	Hick’s	religiousness,	in	conformity	with	the	 unstable	 nature	 of	 his	 position,	 which	 functions	 by	 ‘speaking	 quietly’,	 but	ultimately	 having	 to	 adopt	 a	 ‘loud’	 first-order	 speech.352	Quixotic	 commitment	emphasises	the	inwardness	and	agency	of	the	subject:	he	is	genuinely	engaged	in	appropriating	 the	 object	 of	 his	 devotion.	 However,	 the	 object	 is	 something	known	by	the	pluralist	to	be	a	fiction.	Hence	he	displays,	‘the	subjective	lunacy	in	which	 the	 passion	 of	 inwardness	 grasps	 a	 particular	 fixed	 finite	 idea.’	 (CUP,	 p.	195)	 Quixotic	 commitment	 is	 tragi-comic	 because	 it	 involves	 the	 complete	commitment	of	the	person	to	his	own	fantasy	(CUP,	p.	196;	SuD,	p.	32).	Similarly,	Hick’s	pluralistic	Christology	entails	a	self-contradictory	commitment	to	living	a	reality-centred	 life	 through	 religions	 that	 fail	 to	 correspond	 to	 this	 reality.	 Its	pluralism	is	also	 insufficiently	pluralist	because	 it	 fails	 to	apply	pluralism	to	 its	own	 theory;	 hence	 it	 is	 in	 despair	 through	 its	 repressive	 denial.353	Various	further	 features	 that	 mark	 pluralism	 out	 as	 Quixotic	 commitment	 will	 be	explored	below,	including	a	reliance	on	the	immanence	of	moral	transformation	that	is	inappropriate	in	the	human	situation	just	as	Don	Quixote’s	life	as	a	knight	does	 not	 reflect	 his	 real	 capabilities,	 and	 its	 eliminative	 Christology,	 which	fictionalises	the	objects	of	faith	and	its	relationships.		(4.3.b)	Pluralistic	Interpretations	of	the	Pseudonyms	Rejected	The	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 share	 some	 features	 with	 Hick’s:	 the	experiential	 exposition	 of	 Christological	 language,	 the	 soteriological	 and	heuristic	view	of	Jesus	as	a	catalyst	in	existential	transformation	and	the	critique																																																									352	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	58.	353	See	my	criticism	in	Chapter	3	that,	from	the	perspective	of	my	existential	epistemology,	pluralism	is	insufficiently	pluralist	by	failing	to	apply	its	hermeneutical	principles	to	itself.	
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of	doctrinally	focused	and	exclusivist	Christologies	as	inimical	to	the	religious	life	and	 impossible	 given	 the	 hiddenness	 of	 God.	 This	 postmetaphysical	 approach	also	invites	the	antirealist	view	that	Christological	language	expresses	features	of	subjectivity	 that	 can	 be	 found	 in	 a	 plurality	 of	 religions.	 However,	 it	 will	 be	argued	 that	 the	 pseudonyms	 construct	 postmetaphysical	 but	 not	 antirealist	Christologies	because	 the	central	 features	of	 their	Christologies	are	opposed	 to	the	 eliminative,	 immanentist	 and	 pluralist	 theses;	 they	 view	 pluralism	 as	 a	Quixotic,	tragi-comic	commitment.		(3.b.i)	The	Eliminative	Thesis	The	eliminative	claim	is	that	language	about	Jesus	must	be	interpreted	as	symbolising	 features	 of	 consciousness	 and	 an	 ethico-religious	 message	 rather	than	 as	 describing	 real	 truths	 about	 Jesus.	 Realism	 is	 here	 defined	 as	 (R1)	 a	commitment	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 mind-independent	 reality	 and/or	 (R2)	 a	commitment	 to	objective	 truth	as	determined	by	correspondence	of	 thought	 to	reality.354	The	 pseudonyms	 have	 been	 interpreted	 as	 antirealists	 because	 their	existential	approach	rejects	(R2).	Cupitt	 interprets	 Kierkegaard	 as	 an	 antirealist	 about	 God	 in	 that	 his	existential	 understanding	 of	 religious	 language	 is	 eliminative:	 a	 way	 of	describing	 human	 aspiration	 that	 does	 not	make	 any	 descriptive	 claims	 about	God,	 ‘the	 doctrine	 of	 God	 is	 an	 encoded	 set	 of	 spiritual	 directives.’355	Climacus	
																																																								354	I	follow	the	definition	offered	in:	C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Realism	and	antirealism	in	Kierkegaard’s	
Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript’.	In,	Alastair	Hannay	and	Gordon	D.	Marino	(eds.),	The	
Cambridge	Companion	to	Kierkegaard	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	p.	155.	355	Don	Cupitt,	Taking	Leave	of	God	(London:	SCM,	1980),	p.	101.	Evans	argues	that	Climacus	is	a	realist	about	(R2),	citing	Climacus’	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	truth	as	indicating	that	objective	truths	exist	as	‘an	ideal	to	be	approximated’,	and	his	incorporation	of	an	‘objective	pole’	or	‘content’	in	Christian	appropriation,	entailing	that	what	is	appropriated	must	
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agrees	with	 the	antirealists’	denial	of	 (R2):	 structures	of	understanding	cannot	correspond	directly	to	reality	and	project	a	fictional	schema	and	metaphysics	of	presence	 that	 equates	 reality	with	 its	 own	 structures,	 ‘Objectively	 understood,	thinking	is	pure	thinking,	which	just	as	abstractly-objectively	corresponds	to	its	object,	 which	 in	 turn	 is	 therefore	 itself,	 and	 truth	 is	 the	 correspondence	 of	thinking	with	 itself.	This	objective	truth	 is	 the	correspondence	of	 thinking	with	itself.	 This	 objective	 truth	 has	 no	 relation	 to	 the	 existing	 subjectivity…[which]	evaporates	more	and	more.’	(CUP,	p.	123)		Cupitt	argues	that	realist	positions	structure	the	world	linguistically	into	‘asymmetrical	 binary	 opposites’	 that	 impose	 a	 discriminatory	 schema	 onto	existence	 under	 the	 pretence	 of	 describing	 reality. 356 	A	 ‘real’	 God	 is	 the	foundation	of	 this	schema	as	the	discriminatory	binaries	correspond	to	his	will	and	 sacred/profane	 organisation	 of	 the	 cosmos,	 ‘God	 is…the	 Great	Discriminator.’357	Cupitt	 thus	 equates	 realism	 and	 religious	 exclusivism	 with	discrimination,	 claiming	 that	 the	 rejection	 of	 realist	metaphysics	 opens	 up	 the	path	for	an	immanentist	faith	focused	on	human	life.		In	rejecting	(R2),	the	pseudonyms	are	aligned	with	the	postmetaphysical	critique	of	ontotheology.	By	identifying	God	with	the	specific	person	of	Jesus,	the	idea	 of	 God	 as	 the	 knowable	 causa	 sui	 that	 provides	 an	 explanatory,	 external	perspective	on	reality	as	a	totality	is	opposed.	Instead	of	describing	the	nature	of																																																																																																																																																															be	objectively	true.	[C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Realism	and	antirealism	in	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	
Unscientific	Postscript’.	In,	Alastair	Hannay	and	Gordon	D.	Marino	(eds.),	The	Cambridge	
Companion	to	Kierkegaard,	p.	171.	See	also:	CUP	p.	380.]	However,	Evans’	interpretation	fails	to	acknowledge	Climacus’	argument	that	ethico-religious	truths	are	always	subjective.		356	He	follows	Derrida	in	identifying	a	preference	for	presence	in	Western	rationality,	such	that	the	male	is	elevated	above	the	female,	white	above	black	and	sameness	over	otherness.	Don	Cupitt,	‘Anti-Discrimination.’	In,	Graham	Ward	(ed.),	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	Postmodern	
Theology	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2001),	p.	484.	357	Don	Cupitt,	‘Anti-Discrimination.’	In,	Graham	Ward	(ed.),	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	
Postmodern	Theology,	p.	485.	
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reality	 through	God,	humans	can	only	talk	about	 the	 life	and	person	of	 Jesus	 in	relation	 to	 their	 experience	 of	 immanent	 life,	 forgiveness	 and	 empowerment;	Jesus	grants	no	privileged	information	about	the	cosmos,	nor	the	ability	to	adopt	the	‘view	from	nowhere’.		Caputo	interprets	Climacus	as	defending	an	antirealist	subjectivism:	faith	as	passionate	commitment	to	structures	one	knows	to	be	objectively	false.358	He	sees	 this	 as	 entailing	 the	 rejection	 of	 realist	 thesis	 (R1).	 Caputo	 identifies	 this	position	as	pluralistic,	since	it	asserts	that	all	singular	religious	claims	are	false;	he	sees	alterity	and	equality	as	 integral	 to	religious	 faith.359	This	equality	relies	on	 the	 falsehood	of	 religions,	because	 it	 requires	 that	no	 facts	can	be	acquired,	‘The	faithful	need	to	concede…that	it	is	“true”	in	the	same	way	that	a	novel	can	be	deeply	true	even	though	it	is	rightly	classified	as	“fiction”	not	“fact”.’360	This	even	precludes	 gaining	 any	 benefit	 from	 fictional	 structures	 that	 are	 believed	 to	 be	true:	openness	and	creativity	requires	the	awareness	that	they	are	untrue.		This	 antirealist,	 eliminativist	 interpretation	 of	 the	 pseudonyms	must	 be	rejected.	 The	 pseudonyms	 subscribe	 to	 realist	 claim	 (R1),	 defending	 a	postmetaphysical	conception	of	the	transcendent	reality	of	God	and	Jesus:	these	are	not	anthropological	constructs.	The	pseudonyms’	antirealist	 language	(CUP,	p.	138;	p.	163)	asserts	only	the	inaccessibility	of	God	through	human-generated	structures,	 such	 as	 cognition,	 without	 the	 existential	 relationship	 to	 God	 as	 a	personal	being	through	faith	(CUP,	p.	320).	The	shared	error	of	antirealists	and	
																																																								358	Caputo	interprets	Kierkegaard	as	engaged	in	a	similar	project	to	himself	in:	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Looking	the	Impossible	in	the	Eye:	Kierkegaard,	Derrida,	and	the	Repetition	of	Religion’.	In	Niels	Jørgen	Cappelørn,	Hermann	Deuser	and	Jon	Stewart	(eds.)	Kierkegaard	Studies	Yearbook	2002	(Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	2002),	pp.	1-25.	359	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Spectral	Hermeneutics:	On	the	Weakness	of	God	and	the	Theology	of	the	Event’.	In	Jeffrey	W.	Robbins	(ed.)	After	the	Death	of	God,	p.	77.		360	John	D.	Caputo,	On	Religion,	p.	112.	
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realists	 is	 their	 equation	 of	 the	 rejection	 of	metaphysics,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	correspondence	between	thought	and	reality,	with	antirealism	about	 the	mind-independence	of	reality:	they	both	totalise	thought	in	that	they	cannot	conceive	of	the	possibility	of	a	reality	(R1)	that	is	incapable	of	corresponding	to	it	(R2).		In	 contrast,	 the	 pseudonyms’	 denial	 of	 (R2)	 results	 from	 their	 realism	about	 (R1):	 existence	 is	 such	 that	 it	 can	 only	 be	 encountered	 existentially,	 in	actual	 existence;	 not	 cognitively,	 ‘who	 then	 is	 able	 to	 know	what	 lives	 within	him—the	only	actuality	that	does	not	become	a	possibility	by	being	known	and	cannot	 be	 known	 only	 by	 being	 thought’.	 (CUP,	 p.	 320)	 For	 Caputo,	 the	contingency	 of	 religious	 structures	 results	 from	 the	 grounding	 of	 religious	knowing	 in	 language	 and	 the	 inexpressibility	 of	 the	 flux;	 for	 Climacus	 it	 is	ontological:	 the	 finitude	 and	 processual	 nature	 of	 human	 persons	 leads	 to	existential	 questions	 and	 structures	 of	 subjectivity	 that	 conjoin	 the	undecidability	 of	 religion.	 For	 Climacus,	 the	 truth	 cannot	 be	 known	 and	 so	humans	 must	 determine	 how	 they	 are	 to	 respond	 to	 their	 existential	 crises,	whereas	for	Caputo	there	is	no	truth	to	be	known	and	nothing	to	be	described	by	language	 so	 all	 human	 responses	 are	 equally	 fictional	 interpretations	 of	 the	unobtainable.		Underlying	thought	 is	an	embodied	activity	 through	which	the	person	 is	in	 existential	 contact	 and	 potentially	 relationships	 with	 mind-independent	realities	 that	 elude	 the	 linguistic	 and	 cognitive	 and	 gives	 meaning	 to	 these	second	order	activities.	This	explains	Kierkegaard’s	anachronistic	incorporation	of	an	‘objective	pole’:	it	misleadingly	expresses,	in	the	language	of	objectivity,	his	
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commitment	 to	 a	 reality	 beyond	 pure	 subjectivism.361	An	 existential	 discourse	that	 is	 attentive	 to	 the	 concrete	 actuality	 of	 the	 person	 can	 convey	 this	 reality	indirectly	 insofar	 as	 it	 enables	 an	 encounter	 with	 first-person,	 subjective	embodiment	and	thereby	with	reality	itself	(CUP,	pp.	320-321);	this	is	what	their	existential,	postmetaphysical	Christologies	aim	to	do.	From	 this	 perspective,	 pluralist,	 eliminative	 Christologies	 are	 forms	 of	Quixotic	 commitment.	 Faith,	 though	 animated	 by	 passionate	 uncertainty,	 is	 a	tragic-comic	self-deception	because	it	asserts	that	there	is	no	reality	to	which	it	is	 responding.	 There	 is	 also	 no	 reason	 to	 privilege	 the	ways	 of	 being	 found	 in	religions	 in	 the	 way	 that	 Hick	 and	 Caputo	 do,	 as,	 ‘forms	 of	 life	 that	 uniquely	instruct	 us	 about	 the	 meaning	 of	 our	 lives’,	 because	 many	 hermeneutical	structure	could	be	capable	of	the	same.362	Indeed,	pluralist	moral	considerations	should	lead	to	a	rejection	of	religious	ways	of	being:	given	the	oppressive	nature	of	 religious	 structures,	 which	 seem	 to	 entail	 the	 policing	 of	 boundaries	 and	asymmetrical	 binary	 opposites,	 Cupitt’s	 assertion	 that	 religion	 is	 always	discriminating	suggests	that	non-religious	structures	are	preferable.363	Climacus	 retains	 a	 fuller	 role	 for	 critical	 and	 self-critical	 reflection,	 as	humans	have	to	decide	how	to	respond	to	the	issues	they	face.	Whereas	critical	reflection	would	be	a	pointless	exercise	for	Caputo	except	in	deconstructing	the	authoritarian	 claims	 of	 others,	 Climacus	 recognises	 that	 commitment	 to	 a	particular	 religious	 structure	 emerges	 from	 a	 personal	 decision	 that	 is																																																									361	Gouwens	offers	a	similar	interpretation,	claiming,	‘While	Christianity	is	not	a	doctrine,	Christianity	has	doctrines….	Yet…the	“what”	is	a	human	being,	“the	actuality	of	another	person,”	not	a	teaching.’	David	J.	Gouwens,	Kierkegaard	as	Religious	Thinker,	p.	126	(citing	CUP,	p.	580).	362	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Spectral	Hermeneutics:	On	the	Weakness	of	God	and	the	Theology	of	the	Event’.	In	Jeffrey	W.	Robbins	(ed.)	After	the	Death	of	God,	p.	77.		363	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Spectral	Hermeneutics:	On	the	Weakness	of	God	and	the	Theology	of	the	Event’.	In	Jeffrey	W.	Robbins	(ed.)	After	the	Death	of	God,	p.	77.	Don	Cupitt,	‘Anti-Discrimination’.	In,	Graham	Ward	(ed.)	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	Postmodern	Theology,	pp.	482-489.	
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existential,	 critical,	 and	 dialectically	 faithful,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 process	 of	 existential	development,	experimentation,	and	exploration.		Climacus	 offers	 a	more	 cogent	 account	 of	 the	 diversity	 and	 integrity	 of	religions	 and	 their	 relation	 to	 passion:	 they	 develop	 as	 genuinely	 distinct	alternatives,	 configured	 in	 response	 to	 quasi-universal,	 existential	 encounters	and	 genuinely	 make	 claims	 about	 the	 real	 human	 situation	 and	 matters	 of	ultimate	existential	import.	Passion	is	the	response	such	a	precarious	position	on	vital	 undecidable	 issues	 would	 elicit.	 As	 hermeneutical	 bodies	 that	 interpret	reality,	 such	 bodies	 still	 provide	 perspectives	 on	 reality	 whereas	 narratives	known	 to	 be	 fictional,	 entailing	 a	 suspension	 of	 disbelief,	 lack	 the	 existential	purchase	 to	 be	 objects	 of	 religious	 commitment.364 	Given	 the	 definition	 of	authenticity	 as	 living	 out	 a	 response	 to	 the	 human	 situation,	 the	 denial	 of	 a	human	 situation	 obstructs	 authentic	 being.	 Like	 Don	 Quixote,	 antirealists	 are	play-acting	 roles	 known	 to	 be	 fictitious,	 aesthetically	 toying	 with	 masks	 as	opposed	to	living	in	the	existential	struggle	of	life.		The	pseudonyms	also	retain	the	integrity	and	heterogeneity	of	the	other	that	Caputo	praises	but	 fails	 to	 achieve.	Passion	 results	 from	engagement	with	forces	 in	 tension,	 not	 by	 the	 annulment	 of	 difference	 by	 equality	 or	 sameness.	Caputo	 indicates	 the	need	 for	 individuals	 to	 navigate	 through	 the	 tensions	 but	his	 levelling	 of	 religions	 as	 equally	 fictitious	 annuls	 the	 tensions.365	Climacus	interprets	religions	as	genuinely	competing	alternatives,	not	as	various	 fictions	that	 have	 the	 same	 moral,	 and	 faith	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 processual,	
																																																								364	Geivett	makes	this	distinction.	R.	Douglas	Geivett,	‘Is	God	a	Story?	Postmodernity	and	the	Task	of	Theology.’	In,	Myron	B.	Penner	(ed.)	Christianity	and	the	Postmodern	Turn,	pp.	38-9.	365	John	D.	Caputo,	Radical	Hermeneutics:	Repetition,	Deconstruction,	and	the	Hermeneutic	Project	(Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1987),	p.	282.	
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appropriative	 way	 these	 are	 navigated.366	By	 avoiding	 antirealism,	 Climacus	 is	able	 to	 see	 religious	 structures	 as	 providing	 distinct	 and	 vital	 orientations	 on	human	existence	rather	than	homogenising	them	as	antirealism	does:	they	posit	the	real	possibility	of	an	‘evig	salighed’.			Hick’s	pluralism	is	also	unable	to	posit	an	intersubjective	relationship	as	the	 core	 of	 religiousness:	 human	 beings	 cannot	 relate	 directly	 to	 God	 as	 a	personal	being.	Such	a	God	 is	mythological;	 remembered	as	a	 lost	 relationship,	not	as	a	present	relationship,	as	Cupitt	admits	by	comparing	it	to	the	memory	of	a	 departed	 loved	 one.	 Hence	 Michener	 refers	 to	 this	 position	 as,	 ‘Theological	Necrophilia’.367	This	 is	 another	way	 in	which	 the	 real	 tensions	and	 struggles	 at	the	core	of	Christian	faith	are	negated	by	Quixotic	pluralism:	there	is	no	struggle	to	 relate	 to	an	Other	 that	 exists	 in	opposition	 to	myself	 and	 that	decentres	me	because	it	is	simply	a	projection	of	my	situation.	This	is	in	complete	opposition	to	the	pseudonyms’	advocacy	of	religious	faith	as	a	personal	relationship	with	God	through	Jesus	as	a	real	person.	It	is	because	God	is	a	personal	being	that	he	can	only	be	encountered	in	interpersonal	relationships,	not	apprehended	in	a	set	of	objective,	metaphysical	claims.	Hence	Climacus	explains	his	seemingly	antirealist	language	about	God	as	expressing	the	idea	that	a	relationship	to	God	is	the	only	possible	 basis	 for	 knowing	 God,	 comparing	 it	 to	 a	 relationship	 of	 marriage	without	which,	‘God	does	not	exist	for	me	at	all’.	(CUP,	pp.	162-163)		(4.3.b.ii)	The	Immanentist	Thesis	
																																																								366	For	Caputo,	this	‘moral’	is	the	call	to	love.	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Spectral	Hermeneutics:	On	the	Weakness	of	God	and	the	Theology	of	the	Event’.	In	Jeffrey	W.	Robbins	(ed.)	After	the	Death	of	
God,	p.	78.	367	Ronald	T.	Michener,	Engaging	Deconstructive	Theology	(Ashgate,	2007),	p.	141.	
	189	 	
The	 immanentist	 thesis	 is	 that	 religion	 should	 actualise	 benign	 traits	inherent	 in	 the	person	and	empower	 their	 immanent	 life.	Antirealists	 interpret	assertions	of	divine	incarnation	as	affirming	the	immanence	of	God	to	all	human	beings	and	life	as	opposed	to	positing	an	otherworldly	transcendence.368	As	was	argued	above,	Hick	has	to	commit	to	the	immanence	of	access	to	moral	values	as	the	criterion	for	interpreting	and	judging	the	validity	of	religions.	Caputo	argues	that	 realist,	 eschatological	 Christologies	 configure	 transcendence	 through,	 ‘a	celestial	being	[who]	comes	down	to	earth	in	order	to	rescue	mortals	from	flesh,	to	 ferry	 them	 off	 to	 heaven’,	 and	 that	 this	 disempowers	 life	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	Christology	 of,	 ‘the	 becoming-flesh	 of	 God’,	 which	 affirms	 immanence. 369	According	to	Altizer,	the	experience	of,	‘God’s	death	in	Christ’,	combined	with,	‘a	fully	 incarnate	 Christ’,	 rejects	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 life-denying	 transcendence,	understood	 as	 a	 relation	 to,	 ‘the	 inhuman	 authority	 and	power	 of	 an	 infinitely	distant	 Creator	 and	 Judge’,	 and	 promotes	 the	 immanent	 realm	 of	 this-worldly	human	agency	as	 the	proper	environment	of	humanity,	with	an	autonomy	and	freedom	 from	guilt	 through	 the	divine	acceptance	and	 forgiveness	of	humanity	present	in	Jesus.370		Cupitt	 interprets	 Climacus	 as	 asserting	 that	 the	 objective	 reality	 of	 God	obstructs	authentic	faith	and	the	collision	necessary	for	it:	if	God	is	an	objective	reality,	only	conformity	 to	 the	Christian	pattern	 is	demanded,	not	a	passionate,	subjective	 and	 creative	 spirituality,	 ‘Kierkegaard…is	 approaching	 a	 fully	 non-																																																								368	Thomas	J.	J.	Altizer,	‘A	Wager,	from	The	Gospel	of	Christian	Atheism’.	In,	Thomas	J.	J.	Altizer	(ed.),	Toward	a	New	Christianity:	Readings	in	the	Death	of	God	Theology	(New	York:	Harcourt,	Brace	and	World,	1967),	p.	307.	369	John	D.	Caputo,	‘Bodies	without	Flesh:	Overcoming	the	Soft	Gnosticism	of	Incarnational	Theology’.	In,	Katharine	Sarah	Moody	and	Steven	Shakespeare	(eds.),	Intensities:	Philosophy,	
Religion	and	the	Affirmation	of	Life	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2012),	p.	87.	370	Thomas	J	J	Altizer,	‘A	Wager,	from	The	Gospel	of	Christian	Atheism’.	In,	Thomas	J	J	Altizer	(ed.),	
Toward	a	New	Christianity:	Readings	in	the	Death	of	God	Theology,	p.	306,	p.	303	and	p.	312.	
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cognitivist	 and	voluntarist	philosophy	of	 religion….	Objectified	Christianity	 is	 a	contradiction	in	terms,	for	Christianity	 is	 that	one	is	called	to	a	certain	mode	of	existence.	Faith	is	not	an	affirmation	that	something	is	descriptively	the	case,	but	an	infinite	passion	of	inwardness.’371	Cupitt	also	sees	Kierkegaardian	spirituality	as	 an	 innate	 potential	 that	 has	 an	 immanent	 life	 of	 free,	 autonomous,	 and	creative	 spirituality	 as	 its	 aim;	 Christological	 language	 expresses	 this	poetically.372	The	pseudonyms	concur	that	a	relationship	with	Jesus	effects	this-worldly	transformation	and	empowers	creative	ways	of	being,	particularly	enabling	one	to	confront	challenges	that	are	central	to	human	life,	such	as	suffering	and	guilt.	Transcendence	occurs	in	life,	not	an	eschatological	event	at	its	end.	However,	the	heuristic	 function	 of	 Jesus	 is	 dependent	 on	 a	 collision	 and	 divine	 intervention	that	 entails	 his	 transcendent	 reality.	 The	 inassimilable	 otherness	 of	 Jesus	 as	 a	real	and	external	object	is	necessary	to	generate	the	dissonance	for	offence	and	faith.	Offence	is	generated	by	the	paradoxical	claim	that	God	is	really	present	in	Jesus;	 it	 is	offensive	because	 it	undermines	expectations	about	where	God	 is	 to	be	 found.	 The	 specificity	 and	 exclusivity	 of	 this	 presence	 of	 God	 as	 a	 specific	human	being	(PiC,	p.	82),	including	its	uniqueness	in	human	history	(PiC,	p.	34),	and	the	fact	that	God	is	made	present	in	its	opposite,	are	the	sources	of	offence	and	are	thus	integral	to	Jesus	presenting	the	opportunity	for	faith	(PiC,	p.	82).373			Climacus	 argues	 that	 if	 it	 does	 not	 really	 exist	 but	 is	 simply	 a	 way	 of	describing	immanent	human	structures,	then	it	is	not	genuinely	other	but	simply	a	 projection	 and	 affirmation	 of	 the	 relative	 structures	 that	 it	 is	 meant	 to																																																									371	Don	Cupitt,	The	World	to	Come,	p.	47.	372	Don	Cupitt,	Taking	Leave	of	God,	p.	107,	139	and	p.	167.	373	‘Essentially	offence	is	related	to	the	composite	of	God	and	man,	or	to	the	God-man.’	(PiC,	p.81)	This	is	offensive	due	to	the	‘infinite	chasmic	difference	between	God	and	man’	(PiC,	p.63).	
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challenge	and	transform,	‘[a]	capricious	arbitrariness	that	knows	that	it	itself	has	produced	 the	 god.’	 (PF,	 p.	 45)	 Cupitt	 recognises	 the	 relational	 nature	 of	transformation,	 proposing	 the	model	 of	 a	 relationship	 to	 a	departed	 loved-one	who	 remains	 an	 inspiring	 presence	 even	 though	 he/she	 no	 longer	 exists.	However,	 such	 a	 relationship	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	 memory	 that	 they	 were	once	a	living	person.	Acting	‘as	if’	one	is	in	relation	to	a	real	God	when	one	is	not	is	 a	 form	 of,	 ‘play-acting’.374	Such	 a	 passionate	 relation	 to	 a	 non-reality	 is	 the	essence	of	Quixotic	madness	because	it	is	out	of	touch	with	reality	and	fixated	on	a	fictional	‘finite	idea’	knowingly	generated	by	the	person	(CUP,	p.	195).		This	 is	 also	 ‘fixed’	 in	 that	 it	 precludes	 encounters	 with	 any	 religious	realities	by	denying,	prima	facie,	that	such	realities	exist.	Utilising	self-generated	structures	appropriates	the	unknown	into	familiar	structures,	thereby	reducing	mystery	 to	a	 consciously	 self-generated	sameness,	 ‘in	defining	 the	unknown	as	the	different	the	understanding	ultimately	goes	astray	and	confuses	the	different	with	 likeness’.	 (PF,	p.	46)	Pluralist	Christologies	motivated	by	a	desire	 to	make	Jesus	 credible	 in	 a	 context	 of	RD	are	misguided,	 because	 they	disempower	 the	efficacy	 of	 Jesus	 as	 a	 source	 of	 offence	 and	 transforming	 faith,	 relinquishing	 a	medium	 through	 which	 otherness	 can	 be	 encountered	 and	 understood.	 Rae	suggests	that	a	Kierkegaardian	interpretation	of	eliminative	Christologies	is	that	their	fictionalisation	is	generated	by	offence	as	a	strategy	of	disengagement	from	an	 unacceptable	 reality,	 something	 admitted	 as	 a	 motive	 by	 Hick.375	Only	 a	personal	encounter	with	a	really	existing	other	that	disrupts	the	ability	of	human	
																																																								374	This	criticism	of	Cupitt	is	offered	in:	Ronald	T.	Michener,	Engaging	Deconstructive	Theology.	375	Murray	A.	Rae,	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	the	Incarnation,	p.	192.	For	example:	‘From	our	point	of	view	today	it	is	less	easy	to	accept	stories	of	a	physical	resurrection,	particularly	when	they	refer	to	an	event	nearly	twenty	centuries	ago	and	when	the	written	evidence	is	in	detail	so	conflicting’.	John	Hick,	‘Jesus	and	the	World	Religions’.	In,	John	Hick	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	God	Incarnate,	p.	171.	
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structures	 to	 appropriate	 and	 assimilate	 it	 and	 that	 mediates	 the	 mysterious	reality	of	God	to	human	persons	can	effect	their	transformation.		Furthermore,	 the	 pseudonyms	 assert	 that	 the	 condition	 and	 pattern	 of	faith	 is	not	a	development	of	 immanent	structures	possessed	by	 the	person,	as	Hick	 claims,	 because	 transformation	 must	 be	 initiated	 by	 an	 external	 reality.	They	 argue	 that	 human	 sinfulness,	 existing	 in	 ‘untruth’,	 necessitates	 divine	intervention	 in	 the	 transformation	 (PF,	 p.	 14-15,	 CUP,	 p.	 207,	 PiC,	 p.	 67).	Authenticity	is	made	possible	only	by	particular	relationships	to	others.	From	the	pseudonyms’	 perspective,	 Hick	 adheres	 to	 the	 ‘Socratic’	 fallacy	 that	 human	beings	 possess	 the	 religious	 truth,	 which	 simply	 has	 to	 be	 actualized	 through	recollection,	with	the	symbol	or	teaching	of	Jesus	being	one	catalyst	for	this;	they	thereby	eliminate	Jesus’	reality	in	a	way	that	precludes	his	salvific	function.	(PF,	p.	11,	CUP,	p.	221,	PiC,	p.	29,	and	pp.	63-4)	Like	Don	Quixote,	 they	 fail	because	their	aspirations	are	unachievable	in	their	existential	situation.		(4.3.b.iii)	The	Pluralist	Thesis	The	 pluralist	 thesis,	 that	 a	 pluralistic	 conception	 of	 religion	 is	 the	 best	way	 of	 achieving	 the	 objective	 of	 religions,	 a	 global	 ethic,	 is	 supported	 by	antirealists	who	see	 Jesus	as	a	victim	of	an	exclusivist	metaphysics	of	violence.	Jesus	serves	as	a	symbol	that	exposes	and	condemns	such	violence	as	is	inherent	in	 religious	 structures	 by	 their	 denial	 of	 alternative	 perspectives.	 Vattimo	interprets	 Jesus’	 violent	 death	 as	 opening	 up	 the	 possibility	 for	 a	 religious	experience	that	reverses,	 ‘the	original	violence	of	the	sacred’,	by	deconstructing	religious	boundaries	 and	exclusivism,	 ‘God	 calls	us…to	desacralize	 the	violence	and	 dissolve	 the	 ultimacy	 and	 peremptoriness	 claimed	 by	 objectivist	
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metaphysics.’376	Like	Hick,	Cupitt	sees	Jesus	as	delivering	an	ethical	message	that	is	 inherently	 pluralistic:	 that	 the	 kingdom	 of	 God	 is	 immanent,	 worldly	 and	universal	and	so	the	divine	is	accessible	within	the	public	sphere,	and	thus	to	all,	rather	 than	manifested	 in	 the	 private	 structures	 of	 a	 religious	 institution;	 this	promotes	 equality	 and	 human	 flourishing,	 ‘postmodern	 culture,	 with	 its	ubiquitous,	scattered	religiosity	and	its	opposition	to	discrimination,	is	a	secular	realisation	 of	 the	 traditional	 kingdom	 of	 God….	 I	 do	 see	 in	 our	 postmodern	humanitarian	 ethics	 the	 best	 realisation	 of	 the	 Christian	 ideal	 yet	 seen	 on	earth.’377		Kierkegaard	 accepts	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 violence:	 the	violent	 rejection	 of	 Jesus	 indicts	 exclusivist	 religious	 establishments	 and	 their	self-deification.	 However,	 the	 soteriological	 aim	 of	 authentic	 Christianity,	 as	conceived	of	 by	 the	pseudonyms,	 is	 a	 transforming,	 personal	 relationship	with	God,	 not	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 pluralistic	 ethic	 or	 community;	 hence	 the	recurring	use	of	the	idea	of	‘inwardness’	as	integral	to	the	character	of	faith.	The	pseudonyms’	 contention	 is	 that	 pluralism’s	 prioritising	 a	 global	 ethic	 occludes	the	 authentic	 relationship	 with	 God	 and	 other	 persons	 that	 is	 necessary	 to	provide	a	basis	for	personal	transformation,	loving	relationships	to	others	and	a	wholesome,	just	society.	
																																																								376	Gianni	Vattimo,	‘Heidegger	and	Girard:	Kenosis	and	the	End	of	Metaphysics.’	In,	Gianni	Vattimo,	Rene	Girard	and	Pierpaolo	Antonello	(ed.),	Christianity,	Truth,	and	Weakening	Faith:	A	
Dialogue	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010),	pp.	86-87.	See	also	Caputo’s	claim	that	this	equates	God’s	kingdom	with	victims	of	exclusion	and	human	and	religious	violence,	‘For	over	and	against	the	glorifying	of	violence…[it]	is	thus	to	slumdogs	everywhere	that	Jesus	brings	good	news,	among	whose	bodies	his	own	sacred	body	circulates,	and	among	whom	his	own	crucified	body	is	finally	to	be	numbered.’	[John	D.	Caputo,	‘Bodies	without	Flesh:	Overcoming	the	Soft	Gnosticism	of	Incarnational	Theology’.	In,	Katharine	Sarah	Moody	and	Steven	Shakespeare	(eds.),	
Intensities:	Philosophy,	Religion	and	the	Affirmation	of	Life,	p.	90.]	377	Don	Cupitt,	‘Anti-Discrimination.’	In,	Graham	Ward	(ed.),	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	
Postmodern	Theology,	p.	488.	
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It	 is	 in	 this	 regard	 that	 pluralism’s	 claim	 to	 accurately	 interpret	 other	religions	 and	 to	 possess	 a	 true,	 normative	 moral	 code	 breaks	 from	 Quixotic	commitment	and	becomes	an	authoritative,	closed	commitment.	Hick’s	pluralism	breaches	 the	 locatedness	 of	 religious	 knowing	 by	 failing	 to	 acknowledge	 the	relative	 and	partial	 nature	 of	 its	 own	moral	 principles.378	Climacus	 argues	 that	extracting	 from	 or	 interpreting	 Christianity	 as	 a	 rhetorical	 expression	 of	philosophical-moral	truth	‘annuls’	(CUP,	p.	222)	the	specificity	of	Christian	faith	for	 its	 adherents	 (CUP,	 p.	 224).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 Hick’s	 pluralism	 is	 a	totalising	 imposition	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 global	 ideology,	 ‘he	 belittles	 the	otherness	 of	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 and	 the	 otherness	 of	 other	 traditions,	 in	accordance	with	the	demands	of	universal	ethical	religion’.379	The	 ethical	 challenge	 of	 the	 encounter	with	 others	 is	 always	 situational	and	 specific	 to	 one’s	 relationships.	 Because	 it	 imposes	 theoretical,	 objective,	explanatory	 schema	 onto	 intersubjective	 situations,	 pluralism	 pre-empts	 the	meaning	of	the	religious	other	and	precludes	a	genuine,	transforming	existential	encounter	with	them:	scholars,	‘have	already	found	a	“solution”	to	the	problem	of	RD	in	advocating	a	particular	position	within	the	threefold	typology’,	and	do	not	need	to	engage	with	the	specifics	of	different	religions.380	This	is	a	demoralising	approach	 in	which	 the	 normative	morality	 of	 pluralism	 obstructs	 a	 situational	morality	that	is	sensitive	to	the	needs,	opportunities,	and	situations	of	persons.																																																									378	Dell’Olio	argues	this	in:	Andrew	J.	Dell’Olio,	‘Between	Exclusivity	and	Plurality:	Toward	a	Postmodern	Christian	Philosophy	of	Other	Religions’.	In,	Merold	Westphal	(ed.),	Postmodern	
Philosophy	and	Christian	Thought	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	1999),	p.	275.	379	Graham	Adams,	Christ	and	the	Other:	In	Dialogue	with	Hick	and	Newbigin	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2010),	p.	48.	See	also:	John	Hick,	‘Jesus	and	the	World	Religions’.	In,	John	Hick	(ed.),	The	Myth	of	
God	Incarnate,	p.	181.		380	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin,	‘The	Question	of	Theological	Truth	in	a	Multireligious	World:	Reflections	at	the	Interface	of	Continental	Philosophy	and	Interreligious	Studies’.	In,	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin	(eds.),	The	Question	of	Theological	
Truth,	p.	279.	Cheetham	makes	the	same	point	in:	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	75.	
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Climacus	 similarly	 notes	 that	 objectivity	 assumes	 the	 matter	 is	 already	decided	 in	 its	 ‘illusory	 results’,	 such	 that	 this	 closed	 commitment	 immunises	pluralists	 from	 having	 moral	 demands	 placed	 on	 their	 existence	 by	 actual	encounter	with	others	(CUP,	p.	81).	Interreligious	encounters	in	particular	times	and	 places	 between	 specific	 persons	 are	 seen	 as	 instances	 of	 the	 intellectual	problem	 of	 RD	 rather	 than	 as	 relationships	 experienced	 personally,	 from	 the	inside,	 and	 carrying	unique	moral	 obligations,	 ‘the	particular,	 the	 accidental,	 is	indeed	a	constituent	of	the	actual	and	in	direct	opposition	to	abstraction’.	(CUP,	pp.	301-302)381	In	particular,	 it	 is	 the	 inability	of	onto-theological	 structures	 to	permit	 the	 irresolvable	 differends	 that	 subjective	 individuals	 represent	 that	leads	 to	 the	 violent	 incorporation	 of	 others	 into	 the	 conceptual	 field	 of	 the	thinker,	appropriated	according	to	his	own	organising	principles,	‘Existence,	like	motion,	is	a	very	difficult	matter	to	handle.	If	I	think	it,	I	cancel	it,	and	then	I	do	not	 think	 it.’	 (CUP,	p.	309)	From	this	perspective,	 a	 truly	universal	ethic	 is	one	that	 is	situational	and	respects	difference,	rather	 than	 imposing	a	single	vision,	‘The	pluralism	of	being	is	not	produced	as	a	multiplicity	of	a	constellation	spread	out	before	a	possible	gaze,	for	thus	it	would	be	already	totalized,	 joined	into	an	entity.’382		
	
	
	
	
																																																								381	Where	the	person	is	considered,	this	is	often	in	relation	to	epistemological	questions,	such	as	whether	belief	is	warranted	in	a	context	of	diversity.	For	example:	David	Basinger,	Religious	
Diversity:	A	Philosophical	Assessment.	382	Emmanuel	Levinas,	Totality	and	Infinity	(Pittsburgh:	Duquesne	University	Press,	1969),	p.	306.	
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4.4.	Conclusion	Exclusivism	and	pluralism	have	been	shown	to	be	totalising,	authoritarian	visions	that	objectify	religiousness	as	closed	commitment	or	endorse	a	sporadic,	Quixotic	commitment	to	fictions;	in	both	cases,	religions	are	configured	so	as	to	preclude	 transformative	 encounters	 with	 them	 and	 eliminate	 the	 reality	 and	moral	weight	of	the	other.	These	approaches	are	undesirable	and	unachievable,	obstructing	 the	 passionate,	 subjective	 appropriation	 that	 is	 the	 essence	 of	authentic	 religiousness.	 Subsequent	 chapters	develop	 a	 further	position	within	the	existential	 typology	of	commitment:	unbounded	commitment.	This	position	prioritises	 the	 subjective	 and	 existential	 and	 aims	 to	 present	 a	 type	 of	commitment	that	 is	 integral	to	authentic	selfhood	and	religiousness.	It	will	also	incorporate	 the	 pseudonyms’	 Christologies	 and	 argue	 that	 a	 deep	 engagement	with	 otherness	 is	 possible	 for	 Christians	 and	 is	 demanded	 by	 central	Christological	motifs.													
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CHAPTER	5	
UNBOUNDED	COMMITMENT:		
AN	EXISTENTIAL	POSITION	ON	RELIGIOUS	DIVERSITY	
5.1.	Argument	in	Brief	This	 chapter	 utilises	 my	 existential	 approach	 and	 typology	 of	commitment	 to	problematize	RD,	describing	 the	 issues	diversity	presents	 for	a	Kierkegaardian	 theology	 of	 religions	 (5.2.a).	 Building	 on	 the	 pseudonyms’	existential	phenomenology	of	authentic	Christian	religiousness,	an	alternative	to	closed	and	Quixotic	commitment	is	developed:	unbounded	commitment	(5.2.b).	It	is	argued	that	this	configuration	of	religiousness	presents	a	way	of	being	that	is	particularly	 apposite	 in	 a	 context	 of	 RD,	 providing	 a	 range	 of	 meaningful	 and	constructive	 ways	 in	 which	 Christians	 can	 engage	 with	 alterity.	 Unbounded	commitment	 is	 compared	 and	 contrasted	 with	 inclusivism	 to	 unpack	 its	contribution	 to	 the	 debate	 and	 because	 significant	 affinities	 between	 the	 two	approaches	are	identifiable,	such	as	their	soteriological	focus	and	their	attempts	to	provide	a	middle	ground	between	exclusivism	and	pluralism	(5.2.c.i).	It	will	be	shown,	however,	that	unbounded	commitment	provides	a	superior	approach	in	several	ways	(5.2.c.ii-iii),	particularly	because	it	avoids	the	objective	approach	of	CV	that	underpins	many	inclusivist	positions.	UC’s	relation	to	religions	is	explored	as	a	grounding	orientation	for	living	out	religious	identity	in	a	context	of	RD,	and	the	features	of	the	thin	theology	of	religions	 that	emerges	 from	 this	approach	are	described	 (5.3).	Two	 theological	contributions	 of	 UC	 to	 engagements	 with	 diversity	 are	 identified.	 Existential	situationism	 (5.3.a)	 accounts	 for	RD	as	 arising	 from	 the	diversity	of	 existential	situations,	and	asserts	the	reality	of	specific	religious	encounters	but	denies	the	
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ability	 of	 the	 person	 to	 legislate	 about	 religious	 truth.	 It	 also	 posits	 alterity	 as	integral	to	religious	identity.	UC’s	Christology	(5.3.b)	understands	divine	activity	as	universal	and	correlating	to	structures	of	the	human	situation,	yet	specific	and	located	 in	 particular	 ways,	 providing	 reasons	 for	 Christians	 to	 assume,	 even	given	the	limits	imposed	by	existential	situationism,	that	the	divine	is	operative	beyond	their	boundaries.		The	 chapter	 concludes	 by	 considering	 the	 criticism	 that	 an	 appropriate	response	to	the	religious	uncertainty	of	the	human	situation	is	one	of	suspension	of	 judgement	 or	 partial	 commitment,	 and	 that	 the	 pseudonyms’	 advocacy	 of	absolute	 religious	 commitment	 is	 thus	 incoherent.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	human	situation	forces	existential	decisions	about	commitment,	of	which	deep	religious	commitment	 is	 a	 valid	 type	 (5.4).	 Throughout,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 unbounded	commitment	provides	resources	for	revivifying	Christian	devotion	and	theology	in	 the	 context	 of	 RD	 by	 embracing	 faith	 as	 a	 tension	 between	 passionate	commitment	 to	 religious	 encounters	 and	 their	 transcendent,	 transforming	nature.						
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5.2.	Unbounded	Commitment	(UC)	(5.2.a)	The	Questions	for	an	Existential	Theology	of	Religions		 It	 has	 been	 established	 that	 CV’s	 problematization	 of	 RD	 is	 a	 blunt,	objective	description	of	the	situation:	it	conceives	of	RD	as	an	objective	problem	and	proposes	positions	that	adopt	objective	stances	on	it.	To	avoid	these	errors,	RD	 should	 not	 be	 approached	 as	 an	 objective	 problem	 raising	 intellectual	questions	 about	 the	 propositional	 truth-claims	 of	 religions	 or	 the	 relationship	between	religious	institutions;	 it	should	not	be	seen	as	a	problem	that	requires	and	is	capable	of	theoretical,	philosophical,	or	theological	resolutions.			 An	 alternative	 to	 these	 approaches	 is	 provided	by	 types	 of	 comparative	theology	that	prioritise	thorough	empirical	engagement	with	a	range	of	religions,	constructing	theological	reflection	a	posteriori	rather	than	seeking	to	impose	an	a	 priori	 theoretical	 system	 or	 understand	 religions	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	particular	religion.383	For	this	reason,	they	aim	to	be,	‘not	ultimate	or	decisive	but	tentative	 and	 exploratory.’ 384 	My	 rejection	 of	 CV	 similarly	 prioritises	interreligious	 encounters	 rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 predetermine	 their	outcomes	 through	 a	 theoretical	 model,	 providing	 an	 approach	 that	 enables	meetings	between	the	various	ways	of	being	religious	that	are	involved	and	that	is	exploratory	in	conformity	with	the	open,	processual	nature	of	the	person.			However,	 while	 comparative	 theology	 entails	 a	 more	 neutral	 approach	that	brackets	 the	perspective	of	 the	researcher	 in	 the	preliminary	stages	of	 the	encounter,	 the	 pseudonyms	 favour	 an	 existential	 engagement	 that	 rejects	 the	
																																																								383	For	this	understanding	of	comparative	theology,	see:	Francis	X.	Clooney,	Comparative	
Theology:	Deep	Learning	Across	Religious	Borders	(Oxford:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2010),	p.	14.	384	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	75.	
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value	 of	 neutrality	 and	 passive	 receptivity. 385 	Furthermore,	 comparative	theologies	often	emphasise	religious	encounter	as	primarily	a	matter	of	learning,	gaining	 insights,	 and	 reading,	 locating	 their	 approach	 within	 the	 objective	problematization	 of	 RD.386	Instead	 an	 existential	 theology	 of	 religions	must	 be	formulated,	grounded	in	an	existential-phenomenological	account	of	the	human	situation	 and	 ways	 of	 being,	 that	 emphasises	 encounter	 as	 interpersonal,	 not	inter-textual,	and	asserts	that	IE	must	be	value-laden	because	religious	questions	are	not	neutral	questions	and	a	neutral	response	to	them	misunderstands	them:	they	 are	 occasions	 for	 passionate	 appropriation	 or	 offence	 (CUP,	 p.	 31).	 A	theology	must	not	be	an	abstract	discourse	that	sterilises	encounters	with	others	and	occludes	their	existential	and	transformative	potential.	As	an	existential	issue,	the	debate	over	RD	should	be	reconfigured	around	the	 more	 fundamental	 questions	 of	 commitment,	 how	 persons	 embody	religiousness	 in	a	context	of	diversity,	and	how	they	relate	 to	 the	 task	of	 living	out	authentic	selfhood,	‘subjectively,	one	speaks	about	the	subject…the	question	is	about	the	subject’s	acceptance	of	it’	(CUP,	p.	129),	rather	than	whether	groups	and	their	truth-claims	correspond	to	reality,	‘The	objective	issue,	then,	would	be	about	 the	 truth	 of	 Christianity.	 The	 subjective	 issue	 is	 about	 the	 individual’s	relation	to	Christianity.’	(CUP,	p.	17)	Various	existential	questions	are	raised	by	RD.	What	does	the	existence	of	other	religious	ways	of	being,	and	the	existence	of																																																									385	Clooney	does	not	deny	the	role	of	the	theologian	as	bringing	his/her	existential,	cultural	and	religious	background	and	interests	to	the	engagement,	but	he	asserts	the	necessity	of	minimising	this	as	far	as	possible	for	the	sake	of	achieving	a	neutral	understanding,	particularly	in	the	early,	data	gathering	stage	of	learning,	‘While	we	cannot	permanently	suspend	our	modern	sensitivities…learning	does	require	that	we	do	more	listening	and	less	judging.	Interreligious	learning	requires	all	the	more	that	we	not	rush	to	impose	our	values	on	their	theological	traditions	before	long	and	patient	study	makes	us	able	to	speak	to	some	good	purpose.’	[Francis	X.	Clooney,	Comparative	Theology:	Deep	Learning	Across	Religious	Borders,	p.	61.]	386	As	an	example,	see:	Francis	X.	Clooney,	Comparative	Theology:	Deep	Learning	Across	Religious	
Borders,	pp.	57-64.	
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diversity	itself,	mean	for	one’s	own	way	of	being	and	how	should	one	commit	in	the	 light	 of	 this?	 What	 possibilities	 do	 other	 religious	 ways	 of	 being	 present,	what	 existential	 demands	 are	 encountered	 in	 them,	 and	 how	 should	 one	respond?	 Questions	 of	 how	 religions	 relate	 to	 one’s	 own	 subjectivity,	 wider	human	 capacities	 for	 being	 in	 the	world	 and	 confronting	 existential	 situations,	and	of	what	possibilities,	demands,	and	ways	of	being	they	present	in	themselves	are	central.387		For	 Christians,	 the	 theological	 question	 also	 arises:	 how	 is	 God’s	revelation	perceived	and	related	to	in	the	context	of	diversity?	To	be	persuasive	to	Christian	theologians,	my	theology	of	religions	draws	on	Christological	themes	emphasised	 by	 the	 pseudonyms	 and	 shows	 how	 these	 demand	 a	 deep	engagement	 with	 alterity	 from	 Christians.	 Central	 Christological	 commitments	provide	an	impetus	for	Christians	to	engage	in	interreligious	encounter	because	they	 assert	 that	 God	 is	 to	 be	 found	 beyond	 Christian	 boundaries,	 in	 the	 least	expected	locations.	Christians	are	called	to	engage	with	religious	others	because	of	God’s	revelation	in	Jesus;	fidelity	to	the	Christian	revelation	can	exist	alongside	and,	indeed,	motivate	deep	engagement	across	religious	boundaries.			(5.2.b)	A	Preliminary	Sketch	of	Unbounded	Commitment		 An	 alternative	 form	 of	 religious	 commitment	 to	 closed	 and	 Quixotic	commitment	 that	prioritises	existential	 factors,	 inspired	by	 the	pseudonyms,	 is	faith	as	unbounded	commitment	(UC).	This	way	of	committing	is	‘dialectical’	and	strenuous	 in	 that	 it	sustains	a	 ‘pathos-filled’	relation	and	absolute	commitment	
																																																								387	A	related	question	is	how	there	can	be	communication	and	meeting	between	different	perspectives	about	matters	of	ultimate	importance.	This	is	explored	in	Chapter	6.	
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to	 the	absolute	but	which	 is	 ‘paradoxical’	because	 it	 is	 conscious	of	 its	 finitude	and	limitations.		The	pseudonyms’	focus	is	how	the	universal	features	of	Christian	identity	can	 be	 appropriated	 authentically	 in	 the	 local,	 existential	 situations	 of	 each	person	(CUP,	p.	73)	and	the	infinite	capacities	and	finite	features	integrated	into	authentic	selfhood.	RD	is	a	fundamental	feature	of	the	situation	of	necessity	and	finitude,	 also	 presenting	 a	 range	 of	 possibilities	 for	 infinitude,	 such	 that	 the	pseudonyms	provide	a	strong	impetus	for	engagement	with	diversity	in	relation	to	 questions	 of	 how	 to	 live	 out	 authentic	 selfhood.	 Thus,	 while	 the	 term	dialectical	pathos	describes	an	authentic	religious	relationship	of	 the	person	to	his/her	own	evig	salighed,	UC	will	be	used	 to	characterise	 this	way	of	being	 in	relation	to	the	wider	context	of	RD.			Authentic	 religiousness	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 diversity	 is	 unbounded	 in	 two	ways.	First,	it	is	a	passionate,	total	commitment	in	a	context	of	anxiousness	and	uncertainty,	 lacking	 any	 exclusivist	 guarantees	 and	 security;	 it	 is	 unbounded	because	 its	 commitment	 is	 unconditional	 and	 limitless,	 ‘Faith	 is	 the	 objective	uncertainty	 with	 the	 repulsion	 of	 the	 absurd,	 held	 fast	 in	 the	 passion	 of	inwardness’.	 (CUP,	p.	611)	Second,	 it	 is	expressed	 in	horizontally	 transcendent,	boundary-crossing,	 deep,	 and	 open	 engagements	 with	 others	 that	 aim	 to	transcend	 any	 structures	 and	 limitations;	 it	 is	 unbounded	 in	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	contained	 in	 boundaries.	 Hence	 it	 is	 described	 as	 breaking	 with	 immanence	(CUP,	 p.	 572)	 and	never	 finds	 fixture	 or	 definitive,	 exclusive	 expression	 in	 any	religious	structures	or	boundaries.	Dialectical	pathos	entails	a	deeply	passionate,	venturing,	 boundary-crossing	 orientation,	 aware	 of	 its	 own	 finitude	 and	
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uncertainty	and	acknowledging	the	transcendent	nature	of	the	divine	as	always	eluding	it	and	manifesting	in	unexpected	places.		The	 idea	 of	 faith	 as	 unbounded	 commitment	 is	 described	 in	 Climacus’	image	that	contrasts	it	with	sawing	wood:		‘In	sawing	wood,	one	should	not	press	down	too	hard	on	the	saw….	If	one	presses	down	with	all	one’s	might,	one	will	never	manage	to	saw	at	all….	[But]	 whoever	 is	 impassionedly,	 infinitely	 interested	 in	 his	 eternal	happiness	makes	himself	as	subjectively	heavy	as	possible.’	(CUP,	p.	57)		Climacus’	 contention	 is	 that	 faith	 can	 be	 sustained	 as	 a	 total	 existential	commitment,	and	part	of	this	entails	a	refusal	to	cling	to	epistemic	guarantees.		UC’s	commitment	is	expressed	in	relationships	wherein	one	is	committed	absolutely	 to	 the	 other,	 but	 ‘open’,	 not	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 noncommittal	 or	having	 competing	 commitments,	 but	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 retaining	 the	 freedom	 of	both	parties,	 refusing	 to	objectify	 the	other	 in	acts	of	domination	and	realising	that	the	other	person	spills	over	one’s	representation	of	him/her,	having	infinite	depth,	just	as	the	face	of	the	other	elicits	a	relationship	but	veils/communicates	an	 inassimilable	 depth.	 Hence	 Climacus	 compares	 the	 openness	 and	 fragility	entailed	 by	 genuine	 commitment	 to	 the,	 ‘weak	 hope	 of	 being	 loved	 by	 the	beloved’	 (CUP,	 p.	 202).	 Like	 all	 relationships,	 faith	 lacks	 any	 guarantees	 and	 is	dependent	on	hope	and	fidelity	(CUP,	p.	202);	this	is	heightened	beyond	human	relationships	by	 virtue	 of	 being	ultimately	 important	 and	having	 a	 paradoxical	object	 that	 cannot	 be	 secured	 but	 related	 to	 only	 in	 inwardness	 and	 through	reliance	on	grace.		Chapters	6	and	7	develop	the	idea	that	engaging	with	alterity	is	integral	to	the	 deep	 openness	 of	 UC.	 This	 is	 expounded	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	
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Christological	 imagery	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 persuasiveness	 within	 a	Christian	framework:	the	object	of	Christian	faith	subverts	religious	expectations	by	 its	 identification	 of	 God’s	 presence	 in	 the	 most	 unexpected	 and	 offensive	places:	 in	relationships	with	 inassimilable	others.	The	encounter	with	diversity	permits	a	revelatory,	boundary-crossing	encounter	that	is	integral	to	unbounded	commitment.			(5.2.c)	Unbounded	Commitment	and	Inclusivism	Inclusivism	makes	a	number	of	similar	gestures	to	UC.	It	seeks	a	balance	between	 the	 extremes	 of	 exclusivism	 and	 pluralism,	 for	 example,	 by	 asserting	that	 salvation	 can	 extend	 beyond	 religious	 boundaries	 and	 focusing	 on	orthopraxy	over	orthodoxy.	Comparison	of	 the	 two	positions	demonstrates	 the	insights	and	superiority	of	UC.	
	(5.2.c.i)	The	Central	Features	of	Inclusivism	Netland’s,	 Griffiths’,	 and	 McKim’s	 identification	 of	 inclusivist	 theses	provides	a	definition	of	inclusivism.388	I1-I3	are	theses	about	religious	truth,	I4-I7	are	theses	about	salvation.	Inclusivism	asserts:	(I1)	one	religion	incorporates	more	true	beliefs	than	others,	and,	(I2)	‘Others	do	fairly	well	overall	in	terms	of	truth’.389	They	 do	well	 in	 that	 they	may	 share	 some	 true	 beliefs	 with	 the	 true	religion	 and/or	 have	 their	 own	 true	 beliefs	 that	 do	 not	 conflict	 with	 the	 true	religion.	This	may	also	entail	‘Open	Inclusivism’:	(I3)	others	can	be	learned	from,	
																																																								388	This	list	is	indicative	and	not	comprehensive.	It	acknowledges	Heim’s	and	Morgan’s	claim	that	inclusivist	positions	can	develop	in	nuanced	ways	that	attempt	to	overcome	the	limitations	of	CV.	[Heim,	STDR,	p.	4.	Christopher	W.	Morgan,	‘Inclusivisms	and	Exclusivisms’.	In,	Christopher	W.	Morgan	and	Robert	A.	Peterson	(eds.),	Faith	Comes	by	Hearing:	A	Response	to	Inclusivism,	p.	22.]	389	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.36.	
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possessing	 new	 truths	 or	 insights. 390 	(-I3)	 ‘Closed	 inclusivism’	 rejects	 this,	asserting	 that	 adherents	 of	 the	 true	 religion	 cannot	 learn	 from	 others,	 as	 they	possess	most	fully	all	the	truths	possessed	by	others.		 Regarding	 the	 salvific	 effects	 of	 religion,	 inclusivism	 asserts:	 (I4)	 the	teleological	 thesis	 that	 only	 one	 religion	 possesses	 and	 fully	 expresses	 the	normative	 way	 of	 salvation;	 and	 (I5)	 the	 universality	 thesis	 that,	 ‘Salvation	 is	available	to	outsiders’.391	This	may	also	entail	(I6)	the	privilege	thesis,	‘Outsiders	are	not	as	well	situated	with	respect	to	salvation	as	we	are.’392	How	(I6)	is	true	leads	 to	 a	 range	 of	 different	 inclusivist	 positions.	 The	 fulfilment	 analysis	 (I6a)	asserts	 that,	 ‘Outsiders	can	achieve	salvation	but	only	via	our	 tradition.’393	This	could	 include	 a	 universalist	 eschatological	 event	 in	which	 others	 achieve	 this;	this	is	a	‘fulfilment’	in	the	sense	that,	for	example,	‘Christ	is…the	fulfilment	of	the	yearning	of	all	 the	world’s	religions	and,	as	such,	he	 is	 their	sole	and	definitive	completion.’394	The	 ‘anonymous	membership’	 analysis	 (I6b)	 asserts	 that,	 ‘Some	outsiders	 belong	 to	 our	 group	 without	 knowing	 that	 they	 do	 so,	 where	 this	involves	 their	 achieving	 salvation	 because	 they	 so	 belong.’395	Analogous	 to	 a	drowning	man	being	 saved	 by	 a	mysterious	 stranger	 he	 knows	nothing	 about,	Rahner,	 for	 example,	 asserts	 that,	 ‘all	grace	is	Christ’s	grace’.396	The	 ‘best	 route’																																																									390	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	37.	As	further	examples	of	what	can	be	learned,	D’Costa	cites	the	fresh	perspectives	others	grant	on	the	true	religion;	‘narratives	of	oppression’,	through	which	one	learns	from	the	criticisms	offered	by	others;	‘narratives	of	holiness’,	through	which	one	learns	how	to	apply	moral	messages;	and	‘indigenization’,	where	the	true	religion	is	appropriated	to	its	local	contexts.	[Gavin	D’Costa,	‘Christ,	the	Trinity	and	Religious	Plurality’.	In,	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	Uniqueness	Reconsidered,	pp.	24-25.]	391	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	72.	Morgan	distinguishes	various	positions	on	how	this	is	achieved,	including	through	general	revelation,	world	religions	and	postmortem	evangelism.	[Christopher	W.	Morgan,	‘Inclusivisms	and	Exclusivisms’.	In,	Christopher	W.	Morgan	and	Robert	A.	Peterson	(eds.),	Faith	Comes	by	Hearing:	A	Response	to	Inclusivism,	p.	36.]	392	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	72.	393	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	72.	394	Paul	F.	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	Religions,	p.	86.	395	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	79.	396	Paul	F	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	Religions,	p.	72.	
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analysis	 (I6c)	 asserts	 that	 one	 tradition	 is	 more	 efficacious	 in	 producing	salvation	 or	 produces	 a	 fuller	 quality	 of	 soteriological	 transformation	 but	salvation	is	still	present	elsewhere.397	I1,	 I2,	 I4	 and	 I5	 are	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 features	 of	 inclusivist	positions.	 The	 core	 of	 the	 inclusivist	 position	 is	 that	 one	 religion	 is	 true	 and	saving,	 but	 that	 many	 located	 outside	 the	 boundaries	 of	 this	 religion	 are	‘included’,	 having	 access	 to	 degrees	 of	 truth	 and	 salvation.	 It	 thus	 asserts	 a	substantial	overlap	in	the	beliefs	and	soteriological	status	of	many	insiders	and	outsiders,	 ‘the	 home	 religion	 teaches	 more	 religious	 truths,	 or	 teaches	 them	more	 fully,	 than	 does	 any	 alien	 religion…the	 home	 religion	 is	 at	 the	 top	 of	 a	hierarchy	of	truth-teaching	religions’.398		D’Costa	provides	an	influential	model	of	Christian	inclusivism.	He	claims	that	the	two	central	Christian	claims	are	the	universality	of	God’s	salvific	agency	(I2,	I5)	and	the	specificity	of	this	as	only	known	through	Christ	and	the	Spirit	(I1,	I4,	I6).399	He	argues	that	exclusivism	neglects	the	former,	pluralism	neglects	the	latter,	 and	 that	 only	 inclusivism	 incorporates	 both.	 He	 argues	 for	 a	 Christian	‘Trinitarian	 Christocentric’	 inclusivism	 that	 acknowledges	 the	 universality	 of	divine	activity	beyond	the	boundaries	of	Christianity,	throughout	the	world	and	human	 history,	 through	 the	 Spirit,	 ‘Pneumatology	 allows	 the	 particularity	 of	
Christ	to	be	related	to	the	universal	activity	of	God	in	the	history	of	humankind.’400	Yet	this	grace	is	necessarily	embodied	in	religious	structures	(I3),	and	embodied	most	fully	in	Christ,	‘Jesus	is	the	normative	criteria	for	God,	while	not	foreclosing																																																									397	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	87.	398	Paul	J.	Griffiths,	Problems	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.	57.	399		Gavin	D’Costa,	‘Christ,	the	Trinity	and	Religious	Plurality’.	In,	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	
Uniqueness	Reconsidered,	p.	17.	400	Gavin	D’Costa,	‘Christ,	the	Trinity	and	Religious	Plurality’.	In,	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	
Uniqueness	Reconsidered,	p.	19.	
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the	 on	 going	 self-disclosure	 of	 God	 in	 history,	 through	 the	 Spirit.’401	Hence	dialogue	cannot	 replace	mission.402	With	 this	proviso,	he	 claims	 that	Christians	must	 be	 open	 to	 new	 expressions	 of	 Christian	 faith	 and	 practice	 as	 these	 are	inculturated	in	the	local	contexts	in	which	the	spirit	is	active,	such	that	Christians	can,	 to	 some	 extent,	 learn	 from	 others	 (I3).403	There	 can	 be	 no	 assumptions	about	 other	 religions,	 leaving	 Christianity	 open	 to	 exploration,	 ‘change,	challenge,	 and	 questioning.’404	He	 also	 proposes	 practice,	 such	 as	 prayer	 and	charity,	as	a	means	of	facilitating	such	learning	and	encounter.405		(5.2.c.ii)	Comparison	of	Inclusivism	with	Unbounded	Commitment	Connell	identifies	a	number	of	affinities	between	the	Climacian	view	and	inclusivism:	 the	 example	 of	 the	 authentic	 idolater	 and	 inauthentic	 Christian	presents	 the	 idea	 that	 salvation	 extends	 beyond	 the	 borders	 of	 true	 religious	beliefs,	 such	 that	 one	 can	 have	 an	 authentic	 religious	 life	 without	 possessing	religious	truth,	‘Climacus	makes	the	characteristic	inclusivist	gesture	of	asserting	that	genuine	worship	reaches	the	true	God	despite	the	misguided	beliefs	of	 the	worshipper	 about	 God.’406	Climacus	 does	 not	 challenge	 the	 truth	 of	 central	Christological	 beliefs,	 but	 rather	 the	 Christians’	 views	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 religious	others	as	being	excluded.407		The	 pseudonyms'	 approach	 rejects	 the	 attempt	 to	 place	 religions	 into	 a	hierarchy	 of	 truths	 because	 religions	 are	 subjective	 configurations	 of	 faith-																																																								401	Gavin	D’Costa,	‘Christ,	the	Trinity	and	Religious	Plurality’.	In,	Gavin	D’Costa	(ed.),	Christian	
Uniqueness	Reconsidered,	p.	23.	He	also	claims	that	this	entails	‘discernment’	to	determine	whether	the	Spirit	is	active.	[D’Costa,	MRT,	pp.	128-129.]	402	D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	132.	403	D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	131.	404	D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	133.	405	D’Costa,	MRT,	p.	150.	406	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	75.	407	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	76.	
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commitments.	However,	 the	pseudonyms	are	committed	to	certain	 truths,	such	as	theological	realism,	and	presuppose	elements	of	a	Christian	understanding	of	the	 human	 situation	 as	 characterised	 by	 mortality,	 finitude,	 and	 anxiety	 (I1);	insofar	as	perspectives	incorporate	such	insights	and	enable	authentic	responses	to	 these,	 they	 possess	 significant	 truths	 (I2	 and	 I3).	 The	 religious	 truths	 the	pseudonyms	 affirm	 are	 soteriological	 and	 existential	 (I4):	 they	 posit	 a	 real	relationship	between	the	person	and	Jesus,	in	which	Christians	experience	divine	grace	 and	 love	 and	 are	 transformed.	 These	 truths	 are	 ‘weak’,	 in	 that	 they	 are	second	 order,	 relative	 interpretations	 of	 prior	 existential	 commitments	 and	experiences. 408 	Nevertheless,	 the	 truth	 of	 religions	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	possibility	of	those	religions	effecting	existential	transformation	and	facilitating	authentic	selfhood	and	collision	with	the	Absolute	Paradox	facilitates	the	fullest	realisation	of	this,	‘The	“how”	can	fit	only	one	thing,	the	absolute	paradox’	(CUP,	p.	610).	Thus,	they	accept	versions	of	I4,	I5	and	I6.			Their	soteriological	focus	is	further	comparable	to	inclusivism	because	it	prioritises	 orthopraxy	 over	 orthodoxy,	 distinguishing	 between	 knowing	 the	truth	and	having	salvation	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	possible	that	a	person	outside	the	 true	 religion	 could	 have	 authentic	 faith	 without	 possessing	 true	 religious	beliefs	(I5),	as	in	the	case	of	the	authentic	idol-worshipper	(CUP,	p.	201).			
	(5.2.c.iii)	The	Spectre	of	Exclusivism																																																									408	This	may	seem	to	be	incoherent	with	the	preceding	rejection	of	objectivity	and	the	ability	of	theory	to	describe	actuality.	However,	Climacus	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	of	describing	actuality;	CUP	and	the	Kierkegaardian	authorship	are	attempts	to	do	this	(CUP,	p.	630).	Rather,	the	Kierkegaardian	contention	is	that	this	must	be	done	through	existential	engagement	and	with	the	proviso	that	this	endeavour	is	dialectical,	interpretative	and	always	inconclusive.	There	is	a	major	difference	between	a	systematic	metaphysics	and	the	fragmented	observations	on	the	nature	of	some	existential	commitments	offered	by	Kierkegaard,	even	if	these	observations	are	underpinned	by	certain	claims	about	the	human	situation.	
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	 However,	 UC	 cannot	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 type	 of	 inclusivism	 for	 several	reasons.	 Inclusivism	 leads	 to	passivity	with	 regards	 to	other	 religions:	 one	 can	rest	content	that	one	has	the	highest,	in	the	case	of	(I6),	or	sufficient,	in	the	case	of	 (I3),	 access	 to	 salvific	 truth.	 Inclusivism	 rejects	 the	necessity	of	 engagement	with	other	religions:	at	most,	other	religions	can	be	learned	from	and	add	to,	in	a	syncretistic	 manner,	 one’s	 religious	 position;	 they	 do	 not	 present	 vital	configurations	 of	 identity	 in	 which	 one’s	 ‘evig	 salighed’	 is	 at	 stake.	 Hence,	 for	example,	 D’Costa	 sees	 their	 contribution	 as	 being,	 at	 most,	 to	 reveal	 how	Christian	 religiousness	 can	 be	 expressed	 and	 developed	 in	 different	 cultural	contexts,	measured	by	discernment	 in	accordance	with	Christian	norms,	 ‘There	can	be	no	question	of	“other	revelations”’.409	This	silences	their	otherness	in	the	same	way	as	closed	commitment	and	is	incompatible	with	the	claims	of	religions	themselves	to	mediate	vital	messages.		Interpreted	as	inclusivism,	UC	is	also	prone	to	Goodchild’s	objection	that	it	is	a	form	of	exclusivist,	closed	commitment.	Goodchild	argues	that	any	view	of	subjectivity	 as	 configured	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 singular	 conviction	 expresses,	 ‘The	logic	of	monotheism’,	which	is,	‘re-enacted	whenever	religious	identity	is	formed,	in	covenant	with	and	in	the	image	of	a	single	God,	by	means	of	the	exclusion	of	other	identities.’410	Inclusivist	theses	(I1),	(I4)	and	(I6)	are	guilty	of	this	and	if	UC	is	understood	as	asserting	a	paradigmatic	superiority	over	other	ways	of	being,	it	appears	 to	 offer	 a	 case	 of,	 ‘devotion	 [which]	 passes	 a	 threshold	 of	 intensity	where	it	begins	to	exclude	all	other	devotions.’411		
																																																								409	D’Costa,	MRT,	pp.	129-131.	410	Philip	Goodchild,	‘Politics,	Pluralism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Religion:	an	Essay	on	Exteriority’.	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	197.	411	Philip	Goodchild,	‘Politics,	Pluralism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Religion:	an	Essay	on	Exteriority’.	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	197.	
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Connell	makes	a	 similar	point	 in	 rejecting	an	 inclusivist	 reading	of	CUP,	noting	 that	 the	 inclusivist	 must	 assume	 their	 ability	 to	 accurately	 identify	 the	location	of	religious	truth,	something	denied	by	CUP,	which,	 ‘calls	 into	question	an	implicit	objectivism	in	the	inclusivist’s	judgement	of	the	superior	truth	of	her	own	faith.	It	simultaneously	renders	dubious	the	whole	enterprise	of	speculating	about	whether	people	outside	one’s	own	faith	are	saved	or	not.’412	Inclusivism	is	in	danger	of	 ‘forgetting	 finitude’	 in	an	exclusivist	self-confidence,	and	 its	closed	commitment	 is	 incompatible	 with	 the	 anxious,	 boundary	 crossing	 pursuit	 of	authentic	selfhood	in	a	paradoxical,	dialectical	process	of	becoming.	Connell’s	 solution	 is	 to	 interpret	 Kierkegaard	 as	 offering	 a	 ‘parallelist’	alternative.413	This	embraces	humour	as	a	means	of	de-intensifying	collision	and	lives	out	religiousness	in	a	paradoxical	way	that	involves	openness	to	the	other	because	 of,	 ‘our	 own	 tentative,	 incomplete,	 fallible	 hold	 on	 the	 very	 truth	 we	acknowledge’,	 counterbalanced	 by,	 ‘deep	 fidelity	 to	 one’s	 own	 faith’.414	This	shares	a	number	of	features	with	UC	and	highlights	the	danger	of	UC	collapsing	into	exclusivism	or	pluralism,	as	Connell’s	own	interpretation	does.		Connell	 admits	 that	 Kierkegaard	 tends	 towards	 the	 ‘serious’	 mood	 of	particularism	 in	 his	 view	 of	 faith	 as	 total,	 certain	 commitment	 and,	 ‘going	 “all	in.”’ 415 	He	 compares	 this	 to	 Plantinga’s	 particularism,	 ‘Like	 Plantinga,	Kierkegaard	 describes	 faith	 as	 full,	 unqualified	 commitment	 (subjective	certainty)	to	a	belief	that	is	acknowledged	as	objectively	uncertain.’416	The	result,	Connell	 admits,	 is	 that	 Kierkegaard	 fails	 to	 achieve	 the	 paradoxical	 ‘double	
																																																								412	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	80.	413	Connell,	KPRD,	pp.	6-7.	414	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	105.	415	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	105.	416	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	102.	
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vision’	 that	 Connell	 defends,	 and	 he	 proposes	 a	 fuller	 incorporation	 of	 self-effacing	humour	that	includes	the	antidote	of	a	‘laid	back’	attitude	to	questions	of	ultimacy,	taking	them,	 ‘with	a	grain	of	salt’,	and,	 ‘in	a	manner	that	qualifies	and	moderates	the	sense	of	urgency	that	naturally	attends	to	ultimate	issues.’417		Although	 Chapter	 6	 identifies	 humour	 is	 important,	 Connell’s	 de-intensified	reformulation	of	Kierkegaardian	faith	contradicts	my	elaboration	of	it	as	 an	 absolute	 commitment	 in	 which	 the	 individual	 ventures	 everything.	Connell’s	approach,	as	he	admits,	diverges	from	Kierkegaard	on	this	key	point.	It	also	 succumbs	 to	 the	 partial	 commitment	 that	 characterises	 some	 forms	 of	pluralism.	 A	 partial	 or	 cool	 commitment	 is	 seen	 by	 Climacus	 as	 a	 quantitative	calculation	that	has	failed	to	make	the	qualitative	movement	of	faith	and	is	mired	in	the	apportioning	of	subjective	commitment	to	objective	certainty	(CUP,	p.	21).	Connell’s	approach	can	also	collapse	into	forms	of	exclusivism	and	fails	to	provide	 a	 basis	 for	 motivating	 the	 engagement	 with	 religious	 others	 that	 he	advocates.	 His	 parallelism	 depicts	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 individuals	 tolerate	outsiders	 because	 they	 view	 themselves	 with	 a	 self-distancing	 and	 cooling	humour,	but	this	provides	no	motive	for	engaging	with	others.	Indeed,	to	retain	the	humour,	all	commitments	must	be	seen	as	finite,	human	perspectives	that	fall	short	 of	 the	 absolute,	 such	 that	 one	 can	 take	 the	 deep	 commitments	 of	 others	with	no	more	seriousness	than	one	takes	one’s	own.	Connell’s	parallelism	leads	to	quietism	about	religious	others,	with	individuals	occupying	mutually	exclusive	paths,	and	the	best	it	can	hope	for	is	‘coexistence’	with	and	wry	tolerance	of	the	other	when	it	presents	itself.418		
																																																								417	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	100.	418	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	182.	
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Chapters	6	and	7	demonstrate	that	UC	avoids	Connell’s	errors,	the	pitfalls	of	 pluralism	 and	 exclusivism,	 and	 inclusivism’s	 ‘logic	 of	 monotheism’,	 while	offering	 a	 more	 Kierkegaardian	 approach.419	UC	 is	 a	 total	 commitment	 that	requires	and	motivates	full	engagement	with	religious	and	non-religious	others	as	integral	to	the	emergence	of	authentic	subjectivity	itself;	although	singular,	it	is	open	and	transcendent.	It	is	a	way	of	being	that	is	open	to	the	encounter	with	God	 in	 the	 other	 and	 involves	 boundary-crossing	 in	 which	 one’s	 identity	 is	endangered	yet	 formed	through	the	struggle.	This	enables	a	conception	of	 faith	as	 passionate,	 unbounded	 commitment	 that	 requires	 relationships	 with	inassimilable	others,	rather	than	the	passivity	of	inclusivism	and	parallelism.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								419	This	is	also	grounded	more	firmly	than	Connell’s	parallelism	on	two	points.	Whereas	Connell’s	position	is	forced	to	assume	the	normative	value	of	tolerance	as	its	basis,	UC	is	grounded	in	an	ontology	and	elaboration	of	the	nature	of	subjectivity	itself,	which	accounts	for	the	value	of	openness,	tolerance,	and	full	engagement.	It	also	achieves	this	not	by	moving	away	from	the	resources	of	Christianity	but	by	specifically	focusing	on	the	central	Christian	symbol,	Jesus,	thereby	providing	a	compelling	case	for	Christians	to	engage	with	diversity.	Connell	agrees	that	Kierkegaard	demonstrates	the	usefulness	of	the	resources	provided	by	the	Christian	faith	for	engaging	with	religious	diversity	(p.	182),	but	he	does	not	make	use	of	Kierkegaard’s	Christology,	beyond	a	tantalizing	comment	about	the	tensions	in	the	specificity/universality	of	Jesus’	invitation	in	PiC.	[Connell,	KPRD,	p.	6.]	
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(5.3)	The	Central	Features	of	Unbounded	Commitment	as	a	Way	of	Being	in	
Relation	to	Diversity	Chapter	2	identified	three	features	of	religious	spheres	of	existence:	they	offer	 universal	 possibilities	 for	 responding	 to	 the	 human	 situation	 and	constituting	personhood;	they	are	expressed	in	the	finite	situations	and	through	the	 finite	 resources	 of	 individual	 lives;	 they	 can	 be	 lived	 out	 authentically	 or	inauthentically.	UC	 corresponds	 to	 the	 third	 feature,	 offering	a	way	of	being	 in	which	 the	 universalised	 possibilities	 presented	 by	 religion	 are	 subjectively	appropriated	 in	 the	 local,	 human	 situation	 to	 facilitate	 authentic	 religiousness.	The	 resources	 provided	 by	 UC’s	 existential	 situationism	 and	 the	 Christological	challenge	will	be	outlined	in	this	chapter;	the	next	chapter	will	outline	how	UC	is	a	transcendent,	transforming	way	of	being,	facilitated	by	deep	engagement	with	alterity.			(5.3.a)	Existential	Situationism	(5.3.a.i)	 Religious	 diversity	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 diversity	 of	 specific	 existential	
situations	and	subjective	responses	within	the	wider	human	situation	Understanding	religions	as	spheres	of	existence	allows	them	to	be	seen	as	ways	 of	 expressing	 and	 navigating	 the	 conflicts	 of	 local	 and	 quasi-universal	features	and	challenges	of	 the	human	situation	 in	relation	 to	absolute	religious	demands,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 constituting	 authentic	 selfhood	 in	 response	 to	 these	situations.	This	accounts	for	pervasive	and	deep	RD	in	a	number	of	ways.	Religions	are	autonomous,	distinct	ways	of	being	that	are	bound	up	with	and	provide	possibilities	for	the	identities,	choices,	and	experiences	of	those	who	inhabit	 them.	 They	 differ	 due	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 existential	 challenges	 and	
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situations	 in	which	they	emerge	and	to	which	they	are	responding.	The	objects	and	commitments	taken	as	ultimate	by	religions,	and	how	these	are	interpreted,	give	rise	 to	diversity.	Even	 if	 they	are	responses	 to	revelation,	 their	expression	will	 be	 inextricably	 contextual	 to	 the	 local	 situations	 in	 which	 they	 are	encountered.	 The	 determinate	 social	 and	 cultural	 structures	 of	 their	 relative	contexts	will	further	shape	these	in	diverse	ways	by	how	they	shape	and	direct	the	 existential	 situations.	 They	 also	 provide	 the	 resources	 through	 which	existential	 responses	 are	 expressed	 and	 lived	 out.	 Diversity	 of	 religions	 is	expected	 as	 part	 of	 the	 necessary,	 local	 socio-cultural	 contexts	 in	 which	subjectivity	 emerges,	 both	passively	 in	what	 it	 receives	 and	 actively	 in	what	 it	uses,	 as	 Gupta	 observes,	 ‘the	 social	 world	 provides	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	Kierkegaardian	 self.	 Necessity	 and	 possibility	 only	 make	 sense	 in	 a	 social	context’.420	Most	 importantly,	 given	 UC’s	 emphasis	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 agency,	diversity	 emerges	 from	 free,	 subjective	 responses	 and	 appropriations	 in	 the	unique	 existential	 situation	of	 each	person.	This	will	 further	diversify	 forms	of	religiousness	 in	 the	 same	 context,	 such	 that	 intrareligious	 diversity	 is	 to	 be	expected	alongside	 interreligious	diversity.	Moreover,	 the	diversity	of	 religious	expression	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 marker	 of	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 commitment,	because	 this	 indicates	 subjective	 appropriation,	 ‘as	 existing	 in	 his	 thinking,	 as	acquiring	 this	 in	 inwardness,	he	becomes	more	and	more	subjectively	 isolated’	(CUP,	p.	73).		
																																																								420	Anoop	Gupta,	Kierkegaard’s	Romantic	Legacy:	Two	Theories	of	the	Self	(University	of	Ottawa	Press,	2005),	p.	109.	
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In	short,	RD	is	a	result	of	different	ways	of	being,	the	different	existential	situations	 in	 which	 people	 find	 themselves,	 and	 personal,	 subjective	appropriations	 in	 these	 situations.	 That	 such	 diversity	 is	 evident	 globally	 and	historically,	both	between	and	within	religions,	provides	strong	support	for	this	existential	view	of	religions:	pervasive	RD	is	integral	to	human	ways	of	being	in	the	world,	 a	 phenomenon	 observed	 by	 Caputo,	 ‘the	 uncontainable	 diversity	 of	“religion”	 is	 itself	 a	 great	 religious	 truth	 and	 a	 marker	 of	 what	 religion	 is	 all	about.’421	In	 contrast	 to	 cultural-linguistic	 models,	 which	 understand	 diversity	 as	irrevocable	 because	 resulting	 from	 different,	 untranslatable	 cultural	 contexts,	and	 cognitive-propositional	 models,	 which	 understand	 it	 as	 doxastic	disagreement	resulting	from	differing	accounts	of	reality,	this	existential	account	explains	 it	as	resulting	 from	different	ways	of	being,	 incorporating	cultural	and	cognitive	 elements	 as	 secondary	 to	 the	 agent’s	 choices.	 This	 also	 escapes	 the	impasse	 generated	 by	 the	 other	 models’	 assertion	 of	 the	 untranslatability	 or	incompatibility	of	different	 religions:	while	differing	accounts	may	be	mutually	exclusive,	 exclusivism	 is	 not	 entailed	 in	 the	 decision	 to	 commit	 oneself	 in	 a	particular	way	of	being	in	the	world.		Significant	 intersection	 and	 correlation	 between	 religions	 is	 to	 be	expected	because	they	express	various	ways	of	being	 in	response	to	existential	struggles	within	the	human	situation.	Hence	Climacus	regards	religiousness	as	a	universal	 potential,	 as	 it	 is	 a	way	 of	 responding	 to	 and	 configuring	 features	 of	human	existence,	and	claims	that	all	human	beings	have	a	capacity	for	faith,	‘the	
																																																								421	John	D.	Caputo,	On	Religion,	p.1.	
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highest	 is	 common	 for	all	human	beings’	 (CUP,	p.	156;	p.	294).422	Religions	are	engaged	in	continual	acts	of	meeting,	collision,	and	intersection	with	one	another	in	the	lives	of	their	adherents.			(5.3.a.ii)	Each	religious	sphere	can	facilitate	authentic	existence	but	cannot	make	
exclusive	claims	to	this	Existential	 situationism	asserts	 that	 persons	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 extricate	themselves	from	their	situation	to	achieve	a	view	that	is	not	interpretative.	The	human	 situation	 lacks	 any	 knowable,	 objective	 conditions	 that	 resolve	 the	existential	challenges	facing	human	persons.	
																																																								422	An	error	of	interpretation	could	emerge	from	this	distinction:	viewing	it	as	making	substantive	claims	about	religions	or	religious	diversity.	Hughes	interprets	Religiousness	A	as	a	variation	of	Schleiermacher’s	claim	that	religion	is	a	universal,	innate	feeling	that	finds	concrete	expression	in	particular	religions,	‘The	distinctiveness	of	a	revealed	religion	such	as	Christianity…is	derived	from	the	particular	concepts	through	which	it	gives	expression	to	universal	religious	feeling.’	[Carl	S.	Hughes,	‘The	Constructive	Value	of	The	Book	on	Adler	for	Christian	Theology	in	the	Age	of	Religious	Pluralism’.	In,	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	
Kierkegaard	Commentary:	The	Book	on	Adler	(Macon:	Mercer	University	Press,	2008),	p.	212.]	Evans	interprets	Religiousness	A	as	‘natural’	in	the	same	way,	though	he	sees	it	as	annulled	in	Religiousness	B,	which	is	revealed	over	and	against	this	nature.	[C.	Stephen	Evans,	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript	and	Fragments:	The	Religious	Philosophy	of	Johannes	Climacus,	pp.	46-47.]	This	interpretation	suggests	an	underlying	core	of	religiousness,	as	either	an	inauthentic	response	that	must	be	rejected	by	Christianity	(Evans)	or	that	is	universal	and	shaped	by	Christian	revelation	(Hughes).	This	imperialising	view	either	supports	Christian	exclusivism	or	universalises	Christian	experience	as	the	basis	for	pluralism	and	inclusivism.	This	interpretation	is	rejected.	Religiousness	A	provides	a	particular	way	of	configuring	human	subjectivity	in	the	human	situation	of	uncertainty,	finitude,	yet	having	to	decide	whether	and	what	one	will	commit	to	as	having	ultimate	importance	for	one’s	life.	This	is	universal	to	the	human	situation,	insofar	as	human	beings	are	free,	mortal,	temporal	and	incapable	of	extricating	themselves	from	this	limited	context	and	perspective;	hence,	Climacus	is	not	arbitrarily	imposing	a	universalised	religious	experience	by	claiming	that	it	involves	passion	and	renunciation	because,	instead,	he	sees	these	as	sequiturs	of	the	nature	of	the	human	condition:	if	one	is	going	to	respond	to	something	as	ultimate	and	decisive	for	one’s	existence,	this	will	involve	it	being	made	more	important	than	anything	else	and	pursuing	it	passionately.	Climacus	offers	a	thin	account	of	religion	as	maintaining	an	absolute	relation	to	the	absolute	and	a	relative	relation	to	the	relative’,	but	the	identification	of	Religiousness	A	as	immanent	should	not	lead	to	a	view	of	it	as	natural	or	innate.	Rather	than	positing	specific	religions	as	derivations	from	an	original	religious	essence	that	is	a	distinct	and	innate	faculty,	Climacus	argues	rather	that	structures	of	subjectivity,	such	as	commitment	and	passion,	are	the	only	structures	that	predate	specific	forms	of	religiousness	and	that	these	are	to	be	characterised	as	religious	when	they	reach	a	particular	threshold	and	type	of	commitment.	
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As	a	result,	RD	is	insurmountable.	Commitment	is	unbounded	rather	than	total:	it	signifies	a	complete	commitment	to	something	as	ultimate,	but	does	not	regard	 itself	 as	 having	 a	 total	 grasp	 of	 this	 ultimate	 beyond	 its	 limited	perspective.	 Indeed,	 given	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 religious	 devotion,	 it	 is	 to	 be	expected	 that	 the	 more	 religious	 devotion	 is	 found,	 the	 more	 diversity	 will	abound.	Religious	perspectives	are	inescapably	contextual,	so	one	can	only	speak	personally,	 from	 one’s	 situation,	 about	 one’s	 commitments,	 experiences,	 and	encounters,	 and	 cannot	 make	 global	 pronouncements	 about	 God’s	 presence,	truth,	or	salvation,	‘Nature,	the	totality	of	creation,	is	God’s	work,	and	yet	God	is	not	there….	Is	it	not	as	if	an	author	wrote	166	folio	volumes	and	the	reader	read	and	read,	 just	 as	when	someone	observes	and	observes	nature	but	does	not	discover	the	meaning	of	this	enormous	work	lies	in	himself.’423		The	criteria	of	legitimisation	is	itself	dependent	on	these	commitments	such	that	there	is	no	external	perspective	from	which	a	global	perspective	can	be	achieved	or	competing	narratives	arbitrated,	only	local,	micronarrative	interpretations.		Christians	can	be	transformed	by	an	encounter	with	God	in	Jesus	and	can	partly	narrate	this	encounter,	but	they	lack	the	epistemic	perspective	necessary	to	 make	 global	 pronouncements	 about	 meaning,	 salvation,	 and	 truth	 in	 other	religions.	They	can	make	absolute	claims	about	their	experience	of	Jesus	but	not	exclusive	claims.	Even	instances	where	other	religions	contradict	their	views	do	not	allow	them	to	assert	the	falsehood	of	other	religions:	these	could	be	a	result	of	 the	 different	 interpretations	 generated	 by	 different	 existential	 contexts,																																																									423	CUP,	pp.	246-247.	Shakespeare	similarly	interprets	Kierkegaard	as	claiming,	‘religious	language	is	inextricably	tied	to	existential	possibilities	which	the	believer	is	called	to	live	out.’	Steven	Shakespeare,	Kierkegaard,	Language	and	the	Reality	of	God	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2001),	p.	141.	
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particularly	given	the	agonistic,	fractured	nature	of	existence	and	the	paradoxical	incomprehensibility	of	the	divine.		Assessing	the	truth	of	others	is	not	only	impossible,	but	is	to	be	avoided	because	it	reflects	a	hubristic	attempt	to	secure	certainty	that	is	inimical	to	faith,	‘The	believer	 cares	 so	 little	 for	probability	 that	he	 fears	 it	most	of	 all,	 since	he	knows	very	well	that	with	it	he	is	beginning	to	lose	his	faith.’	(CUP,	p.	233)424	As	an	 authentic	 way	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world,	 faith	 entails	 acknowledging	 the	unbounded	 and	 insecure	 nature	 of	 the	 commitment	 as	 derived	 from	 the	ambiguous	human	 situation,	 ‘Faith	has,	 namely,	 two	 tasks:	 to	watch	 for	 and	 at	every	moment	to	make	the	discovery	of	improbability,	the	paradox,	in	order	then	to	hold	it	fast	with	the	passion	of	inwardness.’	(CUP,	p.	233)		The	lack	of	objective	resolutions	means	that	persons	can	only	respond	to	the	 human	 situation	 by	 deploying	 the	 resources	 of	 their	 contexts,	 in	 this	 case	various	 forms	 of	 religiousness,	 in	 order	 to	 create	 meaning	 and	 value.	 The	measure	 of	 religious	 truth	 is	 whether	 it	 is	 appropriated	 and	 lived	 out	authentically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 human	 situation,	 ‘Objectively,	what	 is	 reflected	upon	is	that	this	is	the	true	God;	subjectively,	that	the	individual	relates	himself	to	a	something	in	such	a	way	that	his	relation	is	in	truth	a	God-relation.’	(CUP,	p.	199)	This	is	because,	‘The	passion	of	the	infinite,	not	its	content,	is	the	deciding	factor.’	(CUP,	p.	203)	Climacus	asserts	that	the	core	of	a	religious	position	is	 its	subjective	configuration	of	 faith	and	draws	the	conclusion	that	a	person	can	be	said	to	be	in	the	truth	even	if	their	beliefs	are	objectively	false,	as	in	the	case	of	
																																																								424	McLeod-Harrison	makes	the	similar	point	that	Christian	exclusivism	is	unchristian,	‘seeking	for	(further)	knowledge	of	which	religion	is	the	true	one	may	be	bad,	once	one	is	a	Christian	and	from	within	the	Christian	point	of	view,	because	the	attempt	puts	us	in	the	role	of	epistemic	judge	over	matters	that	we	ought	not	(because	we	cannot)	judge	or	know.’	[Mark	S.	McLeod-Harrison,	
Repairing	Eden:	Humility,	Mysticism	and	the	Existential	Problem	of	Religious	Diversity,	p.70.]	
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the	 authentic	 idol	worshipper	whose	 faith	 is	 a	passionate	 commitment,	 ‘If	only	
the	how	of	this	relation	is	in	truth,	the	individual	is	in	truth,	even	if	he	in	this	way	
were	to	relate	himself	to	untruth.’	(CUP,	p.	199).	The	truth	of	the	idol	worshipper	is	 explicitly	 contrasted	 with	 the	 untruth	 of	 the	 exclusivist	 Christian,	 ‘The	 one	prays	 in	 truth	 to	 God	 although	 he	 is	 worshipping	 an	 idol;	 the	 other	 prays	 in	untruth	 to	 the	 true	God	and	 is	 therefore	 in	 truth	worshipping	an	 idol.’	 (CUP,	p.	201)		 Authentic	existence	entails	 responding	 to	 these	situations	and	 living	out	human	potential	 to	 its	 fullest	by	 constituting	 selfhood	 through	 these	 resources	with	 absolute	 commitment	 that	 remains	 open	 and	 anxious	 in	 relation	 to	encounters	about	which	they	can	know	nothing	with	certainty.	Each	religion	can	have	 its	 own	 authentic	 expressions	 in	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 identities,	 making	authenticity	 pluralistic;	 whether	 an	 approach	 is	 authentic	 cannot	 be	predetermined	and	only	explored	from	the	inside	by	those	who	attempt	to	live	it	out.	 The	 human	 situation	 may	 be	 intrinsically	 polyphonous	 and	 capable	 of	authentic	expression	in	numerous	distinct	structures.			(5.3.a.iii)	Peer	diversity	and	alterity	are	internal	to	every	religious	sphere;	religious	
spheres	are	open	and	their	boundaries	permeable	The	 agonistic	 nature	 of	 all	 spheres	 entails	 that	 external	 alterity	 is	prefigured	 in	 the	agony	and	diversity	of	possibilities	 internal	 to	every	religious	sphere.	Identity	is	never	secure	or	static,	but	is	rather	in	process	and	open	to	a	range	 of	 subjective	 appropriations.	 While	 the	 spheres	 are	 autonomous,	 their	agonistic	 nature	 and	 dialectical	 openness	 means	 that	 there	 are	 numerous	possibilities	 for	 intersection	 between	 them,	 particularly	 in	 pursuing	 authentic	
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selfhood.	Indeed,	as	Westphal	observes,	Climacus’	analysis	shows	how	exploring	a	sphere	leads	one	inevitably	to	its	insufficiency	and	to	an	encounter	with	other	spheres.425	Hence	 Climacus	 and	 the	 Kierkegaardian	 authorship	 explore	 liminal	encounters	between	religious	and	non-religious	ways	of	being:	how	they	relate,	collide	or	 intersect	 in	 the	 struggle	of	 an	 individual	 and	how	 tensions,	 conflicts,	and	 confrontations	 within	 and	 between	 them	 open	 up	 new	 possibilities	 or	transform	each	other.	For	example,	a	sphere	can	throw	fresh	light	on	a	struggle	within	another	sphere	or	open	up	new	possibilities,	solutions,	and	struggles.426		This	 internal	 fragmentation	 and	 alterity	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	pervasive	peer	diversity	of	religions	and	in	the	vacillation	of	individual	religious	persons.	Piette	reports	a	number	of	examples	of	such	vacillation	with	regards	to	religiousness:	incomprehension	(“I	don’t	understand	[the	resurrection].”);	doubt	and	 hope	 (“I	 think	 there’s	 something,	 maybe.	 I	 hope	 so.”);	 irony	 (‘usually	expressed	through	 laughter’);	 rejection	of	past	beliefs	(“I	used	to	believe	 in	 the	physical	 resurrection,”);	 appeals	 to	 theological	 doctrines	 as	 a	 means	 of	distancing	oneself	from	the	belief;	and	metaphorical	interpretations.427	Religious	spheres	cannot	provide	a	secure	perspective	from	which	to	assess	others.		
																																																								425	Merold	Westphal,	‘Kierkegaard’s	Teleological	Suspension	of	Religiousness	B’.	In,	George	B.	Connell	and	C.	Stephen	Evans	(eds.),	Foundations	of	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	Community:	Religion,	
Ethics	and	Politics	in	Kierkegaard,	p.	111.	426	This	is	evident,	for	example,	in	his	elaboration	of	the	intersections	between	the	spheres	in,	‘A	Glance	at	a	Contemporary	Effort	in	Danish	Literature’	(CUP,	pp.	251-300)	and	in	his	interest	in	boundary	spheres,	such	as	humour	and	irony.	For	example,	‘irony’	signifies	a	new	possibility	that	emerges	when	one	combines	the	universal	demands	of	the	ethical	and	the	specific	life	of	the	individual	(CUP,	pp.	503-504)	and	‘comedy’	signifies	a	disparity	between	the	inner	commitment	and	external	expressions	(CUP,	p.	504).	427	Albert	Piette,	‘Existence,	Minimality,	and	Believing’.	In,	Michael	Jackson	and	Albert	Piette	(eds.),	What	is	Existential	Anthropology?,	pp.	195-196.	
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(5.3.a.iv)	The	authentic	religiousness	of	UC	 is	open	to	and	engaged	with	religious	
others		This	 could	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 tragic	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 as	perpetually	 destabilised	 and	 unable	 to	 achieve	 the	 security	 for	which	 it	 longs.	However,	 UC	 sees	 this	 situation	 as	 the	 condition	 for	 authentic,	 passionate	selfhood	in	embracing	the	beauty	and	terror	of	the	human	situation.	UC	thrives	on	 alterity	 and	 open	 encounter	with	 and	 between	 the	 spheres	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways,	 living	 out	 identities	 authentically	 by	 appropriating	 them	 uniquely	 and	subjectively	in	response	to	existential	challenges.	First,	 authentic	 Christian	 religiousness	 entails	 an	 absolute	 commitment,	without	 limits,	 to	 an	 absolute.	 Far	 from	achieving	 the	 illusory	unity	posited	by	exclusivism	 and	 thereby	 escaping	 existential	 struggles,	 Christian	 religiousness	entails	 an	 active	 embrace	 of	 struggle.	 The	 central	 struggle	 of	 Christian	religiousness	is	to	sustain	a	passionate	relationship	to	the	eternal	in	the	context	of	 time,	 when	 such	 a	 relationship	 cannot	 be	 sustained	 due	 to	 sin;	 and	 to	encounter	 the	relationship	to	God	as	a	gift	 that	subverts	attempts	 to	control	or	legislate	the	encounter.	This	struggle	is	the	source	of	the	dialectical	passion	that	makes	UC	an	authentic	response	to	the	human	situation.	Furthermore,	given	that	this	entails	a	collision	with	the	paradox	and	between	one’s	relative	 life	and	the	absolute	commitment,	 living	this	out	will	entail	a	movement	to	the	limits	of	the	sphere	 and	 what	 is	 possible	 within	 it	 as	 well	 as	 encounter	 with	 liminal	situations.428		
																																																								428	For	example,	how	one	navigates	this	absolute	commitment	through	their	various	relative	commitments	of	being	a	son,	a	father,	having	a	career	and	playing	cricket	will	leave	decisive	marks	and	present	unique	struggles	for	the	person.	
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Second,	in	Climacus’	understanding	of	the	spheres,	the	more	one	deepens	oneself	in	a	commitment,	the	more	the	inherent	conflict	and	tensions	will	emerge	and	one	will	be	led	inexorably	towards	the	permeable	boundaries	of	the	way	of	being	 and	 its	 openness	 to	 other	 possibilities.429 	Deepening	 within	 religious	identities	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 secure	 way	 of	 being	 but	 rather	 intensifies	 the	struggles	and	conflicts	within	 the	sphere:	 the	more	one	commits,	 the	more	 the	conflicts	emerge	and	the	more	one	is	lead	to	a	specific,	subjective	expression	of	religiousness.	 Internal	 diversity	 is	 thus	 an	 inescapable	 and	 valuable	 reality	 of	religious	 existence-possibilities,	 and	 the	 more	 fully	 a	 religious	 identity	 is	appropriated,	the	more	subjective,	unique,	and	paradoxical	this	will	be.	Inner	 deepening	 within	 a	 particular	 religious	 sphere	 also	 leads	 one	inexorably	 toward	 boundary	 encounters.	 The	 more	 one	 deepens	 one’s	commitments,	 the	more	one	will	 experience	 the	defining	 conflict	 of	 the	 sphere	and	the	more	one	will	be	impelled	by	this	to	the	boundaries	of	the	sphere	as	one	seeks	 to	 resolve	 the	 existential	 struggle.430	Internal	 collisions	 drive	 the	 person	towards	 the	 boundary	 of	 their	 sphere	 and	 to	 new	possibilities	 and	 insights	 on	their	struggles;	thus	encounter	with	external,	alternative	possibilities	will	be	an	
																																																								429	A	range	of	Kierkegaard’s	texts	explore	what	happens	when	an	existential	commitment	is	pushed	to	its	most	extreme	expressions	and	the	‘existence-relationships’	between	the	spheres	in	their	internal	conflicts,	collisions,	failures	and	facilitating	of	new	possibilities	provides	the	basis	for	Climacus’	interpretation	of	the	authorship	(CUP,	pp.	251-300).	Examples	from	the	Kierkegaardian	corpus	include	the	desperation	of	the	Seducer	who	practices	all	the	strategies	honed	throughout	EOI	and	the	encounter	with	the	completely	incomprehensible	and	inexpressible	faith	of	de	Silentio’s	Abraham	in	FaT.		430	For	example,	in	Climacus’	interpretation	of	the	aesthetic	sphere	in	EOI,	the	conflict	is	between	the	depression	and	the	pursuit	of	enjoyment	that	it	provokes:	the	more	one	flees	depression	in	diversionary	pleasure,	the	more	one	is	disappointed	by	the	pleasure	and	becomes	detached	from	long-term	commitments,	leading	to	increasing	depression.	The	aesthetic	thereby	leads	to	a	confrontation	with	depression	and	a	decision	to	live	out	long-term	relationships,	despite	the	threat	of	suffering	and	loss	and	this	possibility	is	found	in	the	ethical	sphere	and	its	‘openness’	(CUP,	pp.	253-254).	
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integral	component	of	religiousness.431	Hence	the	deepest	religious	commitment	will	be	marked	by	passionate	openness.	Climacus	 identifies	 the	 navigation	 of	 these	 existence-relations	 as	facilitating	 ‘upbuilding’	 (CUP,	 p.	 256),	 which	 he	 uses	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 range	 of	processes	of	existential	development	aimed	at	developing	authentic	selfhood,	not	just	 Christian	 religiousness	 (CUP,	 p.	 256).	 This	 affirms	 that	 Christian	engagements	 with	 alternative	 religions	 will	 provide	 fresh	 insight	 and	 be	upbuilding	 for	 the	 Christian	 in	 achieving	 authentic	 selfhood;	 it	 also	 invites	 an	exploration	of	the	liminal	encounters	that	are	possible	between	religions	and	the	boundary	situations	occasioned	by	such	encounter.			(5.3.a.v)	Engagement	with	religious	diversity	should	prioritise	personal	encounter		 Authenticity	 is	 defined	 by	 how	 it	 responds	 to	 the	 existential	 situations	facing	 human	 persons.	 Pervasive	 diversity	 is	 a	 primary	 challenge	 and	 defining	feature	 of	 the	 existential	 situation	 of	 many	 persons	 in	 the	 West,	 such	 that	 it	demands	 an	 authentic,	 existential	 response.	No	 comfortable	 resolution	 is	 to	be	expected	of	 this,	 any	more	 than	 there	 could	be	a	 comfortable	 resolution	of	 the	challenges	 posed	 by	 human	mortality,	 but	 this	 does	mean	 that	 diversity	 is	 an	opportunity	 for	existential	action	and	authentic	 responsiveness	 in	applying	 the	resources	of	one’s	way	of	being	to	it.	The	debate	over	diversity	cannot	be	resolved	 through	 the	production	of	general	 theories	 or	 with	 certainty,	 but	 only	 existentially,	 in	 the	 lives	 of	individuals.	On	 this	model,	 interreligious	encounter	has	 the	aim	of	 illuminating	
																																																								431	In	the	same	way,	the	ethical	addresses	and	develops	struggles	within	the	aesthetic,	and	the	religious	emerges	as	an	absolute	demand	that	collides	with	the	ethical	(CUP,	p.	262).	
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different	 ways	 of	 being,	 and	 facilitating	 authentic	 responses	 to	 these.	 This	escapes	 the	 objection	 cited	 against	 the	 objective	 typology	 that	 it	 precludes	genuine	engagement	by	predetermining	 the	meaning	of	other	perspectives	and	entails	 that	 dialogue	 and	 personal	 interaction	 are	 integral	 to	 Christian	engagements	with	diversity.432		The	conclusion	of	 this	outline	of	existential	situationism	is	 that	religions	have	parity	with	regards	to	authenticity	and	the	human	situation	to	which	they	respond,	but	must	also	be	open	to	their	 internal	alterity	and	place	in	the	wider	situation	of	diversity;	this	will	be	a	marker	of	their	authenticity.			(5.3.b)	The	Christological	Horizon	of	Divine	Activity:	Beyond	Boundaries	Christological	 commitments	 further	 incentivise	 Christian	 openness	 to	religious	others.	The	 insight	 that	 identities	negotiate	 central	 agonies	generated	by	their	situation	and	their	commitments	allows	for	a	healthy	appreciation	of	the	inescapable	 conflict	 of	 responding	 to	 Jesus	 as	 having	 decisive	 religious	significance	 alongside	 the	 diversity	 of	 human	 responses	 and	 religious	alternatives.	 The	 Christian	 struggle	 with	 RD	 alongside	 the	 uniqueness	 and	particularity	of	Jesus	is	a	part	of	the	paradoxical	situation	that	the	pseudonyms	see	as	the	occasion	for	genuine	faith	and	authentic	selfhood.		It	will	 now	 be	 argued	 that,	without	 annulling	 this	 tension,	 Christian	UC	entails	 an	 expectation	 to	 find	 God	 outside	 the	 boundaries	 of	 Christianity	 that	incentivises	 encounter	 with	 religious	 others.	 Although	 existential	 situationism	prohibits	Christians	from	making	global	pronouncements,	the	pseudonyms	offer	reasons	for	Christians	to	expect	that	God	is	operative	beyond	the	boundaries	of																																																									432	The	nature	of	such	dialogue	is	explored	in	Chapter	6.	
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Christian	religiousness	and	to	seek	God	there.	This	is	central	to	the	Christological	commitment	 of	 Christian	 faith	 as	 paradoxical	 rather	 than	 immanent:	 God	 is	encountered	 outside	 one’s	 boundaries	 and	 in	 opposition	 to	 one’s	 expectations.	The	pseudonyms	express	 and	 justify	 this	position	on	 the	universality	of	divine	activity	and	specificity	of	the	human	encounter	with	it	in	three	ways.	
	(5.3.b.i)	Correlation	Between	the	Human	Situation	and	Divine	Activity	Religions	 are	 engagements	 with	 existential	 situations,	 so	 Christological	themes	 correlate	 to	 existential	 struggles	 with	 personhood	 and	 the	 attempt	 to	relate	 to	 an	 absolute	 through	 the	 quasi-universal	 potential	 and	 immanent	features	of	Religiousness	A.433	Climacus’	central	question	of	becoming	a	Christian	identifies	religious	commitments	as	occurring	 in	a	shared	temporal	and	human	context	 that	 is	dependent	on	 the	relative	historical	 situations	 in	which	persons	find	 themselves,	 ‘The	 individual’s…[evig	 salighed]	 is	 decided	 in	 time	 through	 a	relation	to	something	historical’	(CUP,	p.	385).	Even	outside	of	religions,	persons	have	 to	 commit	 to	 particular	 identities	 in	 a	 context	 of	 uncertainty	 about	 the	future	and	their	own	inability	to	master	the	world,	particularly	in	relation	to	an	existential	transformation	that	can	seem	impossible.	All	existential	decisions	are	risky	 ventures	 analogous	 to	 subjective	 acts	 of	 faith,	 such	 that	 religion,	 which	takes	 anxious	 faith	 as	 its	 central	 truth,	 has	 a	 deep	 affinity	 with	 the	 human	condition	 and	 human	 activities.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 Climacus	 asserts	 that	faith	 is	 the	 highest	 truth	 and	 expression	 of	 the	 human	 condition,	 ‘the	 highest	truth	 there	 is	 for	 an	 existing	 person.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 203)	 Climacus’	 description	 of																																																									433	Correlation	is	here	used	in	conformity	with	Tillich’s	definition	as	asserting,	‘the	independence	and	interdependence	of	existential	questions	and	theological	answers’.	Paul	Tillich,	Systematic	
Theology,	Volume	2	(Welwyn:	James	Nisbet	and	Company,	1968),	p.	14.	
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Religiousness	 A	 also	 presents	 the	 idea	 that	 many	 non-Christians	 are	 engaged	with	such	religious	activities	and	have	religious	pathos	(CUP,	p.	560).	As	 a	 deep	 expression	 of	 this	 paradoxical,	 agonistic	 situation,	 the	relationship	 to	 Jesus	 correlates	 to	 human	 struggles:	 Christians	 must	 commit	absolutely	 without	 any	 certainty.	 Even	 though	 paradoxical-religiousness	 is	 a	response	 to	 an	 external	 claim	of	 revelation,	 it	 is	 pre-empted	by	 and	 correlates	with	the	paradoxes	and	collisions	of	the	human	situation,	such	as	the	paradox	of	love	(PF,	p.	39).	Moreover,	the	Christian	struggle	correlates	to	other	struggles	in	that	they	never	possess	a	privileged	ability	to	achieve	security,	‘each	individual	in	quiet	 inwardness	 before	God	 is	 to	 humble	 himself	 under	what	 it	means	 in	 the	strictest	sense	to	be	a	Christian,	is	to	confess	honestly	before	God	where	he	is	so	that	 he	 still	might	worthily	 accept	 the	 grace	 that	 is	 offered	 to	 every	 imperfect	person—that	is,	to	everyone.’	(PiC,	p.	67)			(5.3.b.ii)	The	Universality	of	Divine	Activity	Climacus	 offers	 a	 thin	 theological	 account	 of	 divine	 activity,	 in	 the	universalisable	 terms	 of	 the	 ‘god’s	 poem’,	where	 God’s	 kenosis	 or	 ‘descent’	 in,	‘the	 form	of	a	 servant’	 (PF,	p.	33),	 is	explained	as	motivated	by	God’s	desire	 to	establish	free,	 loving	relationships	with	all	people	by	being	among	them	(PF,	p.	55).	 This	 necessitates	 the	 religious	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 human	 situation,	 divine	hiddenness,	and	the	unknowability	of	God	through	exclusive	structures.434	Anti-Climacus	 similarly	 asserts	 the	 universality	 of	 intent	 and	 grace	 in	 the	 salvific	activity	of	Jesus,	‘The	only	thing	he	is	concerned	about	is	that	there	might	be	one																																																									434	Kierkegaard	offers	a	similar	description	of	religiousness,	claiming,	‘I	cannot	make	my	God-relationship	public…since	it	is	neither	more	nor	less	than	the	universally	human	inwardness,	which	every	human	being	can	have	without	any	special	call’.	(PoV,	p.	26)	
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single	person…who	does	not	hear	his	invitation’,	(PiC,	p.	14)	and	it	achieves	this	end,	(PiC,	p.	151)	insofar	as	people	allow	themselves	to	be	 ‘drawn’	to	 it	(PiC,	p.	181).	This	is	linked	with	God’s	omnipresence	and	omnipotence	(PiC,	p.	155)	and	is	 not	 confined	 to	 Christianity,	 as	 Jesus’	 contemporaneity	 is	 coterminous	 with	human	 history.	 Anti-Climacus	 even	 sees	 reunification	 and	 the	 annulment	 of	discriminating	 distinctions	 as	 part	 of	 the	 transformation	 achieved	 by	 grace,	‘Separation	 forced	 its	way	 in	 everywhere	 to	bring	pain	 and	unrest;	 but	here	 is	rest…with	him	who	eternally	reunites	the	separated	ones’	(PiC,	p.	18)		How	 divine	 activity	 in	 Christ	 is	 universal	 yet	 specific	 is	 problematic.	 It	could	 endorse	 inclusivist	 thesis	 (I5):	 that	 Christ	 may	 be	 integral	 in	 religious	encounter	but	not	known	as	such,	 in	 the	same	way	as	an	unknown	person	can	rescue	a	drowning	man.435	However,	retaining	a	role	 for	 Jesus	 in	these	terms	is	problematic.		Jesus	seems	neither	ontologically	nor	epistemologically	necessary	for	the	pseudonyms’	 religiousness.	 The	 pseudonyms	 do	 not	 see	 salvation	 as	 achieved	through	a	change	in	the	cosmos,	the	most	likely	explanation	of	how	Jesus	could	save	 a	 person	 without	 that	 person	 knowing	 about	 him.	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	disparity	 between	 the	 universality	 of	 Jesus’	 significance	 and	 its	 limited	 global	effects	 in	 effecting	 religious	 transformation:	 not	 all	 people	 encounter	 religious	realities.	 If	 Jesus’	 nature	 is	 such	 that	 he	 is	 contemporaneous	 with	 all	 people,	contemporaneity	 seems	vacuous	because	contentless;	 this	 is	 incompatible	with	
																																																								435	This	could	be	interpreted	as	a	strategy	for	establishing	a	hierarchy	in	which	Christianity	is	superior:	Pojman’s	proposal	is	that	the	primary	existential	work	in	liminal	encounters	is	that	of	synthesis,	fusion	and	appropriation	until	the	highest,	Christianity,	incorporates	all	of	the	lower,	‘Each	stage	incorporates	the	previous	stage	within	itself.’	[Louis	Pojman,	Kierkegaard’s	
Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	43.]	As	with	the	supersessionist	interpretations	rejected	in	Chapter	2,	this	fails	to	grasp	the	nature	of	the	liminal	encounter	as	driven	by	conflict	and	collision	and	of	which	no	synthesis	or	‘mediation’	is	possible	(CUP,	p.	405).	
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the	 pseudonyms’	 emphasis	 on	 the	 relationship	 as	 being	 between	 two	 persons.	Rae’s	solution	is	that	Kierkegaard	adheres	to	the	universalist	position	that	all	will	be	saved	in	an	eschatological	reality	because	salvation	is	dependent	upon	God’s	initiative	 and	 grace. 436 	This	 is	 an	 implausible	 interpretation	 because	 the	pseudonyms	 do	 not	 discuss	 post-mortem	 existence	 in	 relation	 to	 salvation.	Climacus	and	Anti-Climacus	do	not	solve	the	problem	of	how	Jesus	is	unique	in	the	 process	 of	 salvation	 yet	 universally	 active	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 people	 and	religions,	 being	 content	 to	 affirm	 this	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 existential	situationism.		
	(5.3.b.iii)	The	Specificity	of	the	Christological	Presence	Beyond	Boundaries		 UC	 proposes	 the	 solution	 that	 this	 tension	 between	 universality	 and	particularity	is	itself	the	core	agony	of	the	Christian	sphere	and	that	the	inability	to	 locate	 the	divine	activity	 in	 Jesus	 is	a	result	of	his	contemporaneousness:	 its	location	 cannot	 be	 determined	 in	 advance	 of	 the	 personal	 encounter	 and,	additionally,	 the	presence	of	divine	activity	 in	other	ways	of	being,	outside	 the	boundaries	of	the	awareness	of	Jesus,	is	itself	the	Christological	presence.	This	is	in	conformity	with	the	pseudonyms’	claim	that	religious	structures	are	incapable	of	 objectifying	 the	 person	 of	 Jesus:	 he	 is	 operative	 outside	 of	 the	 Christian	identification	of	God’s	presence	itself.	The	 paradoxical	 collision	 with	 Jesus	 is	 generated	 by	 the	 person	encountering	God’s	presence	in	a	site	where	his/her	understanding	indicates	this	
																																																								436	Rae	claims	this	is	how	it	differs	from	Hick’s	pluralism,	which	is	still	dependent	on	personal	effort.	Murray	A.	Rae,	Kierkegaard’s	Vision	of	the	Incarnation,	p.	241.		
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to	be	impossible.437	This	interpretation	is	supported	by	Climacus’	explanation	of	the	paradox	as	 entailing,	 ‘two	dialectical	 contradictions—the	 first,	 basing	one’s	eternal	 happiness	 on	 the	 relation	 to	 something	 historical,	 and	 then	 that	 the	historical	is	constituted	contrary	to	all	thinking’.	(CUP,	p.	579)	It	is	for	this	reason	that	offence	at	the	paradox	is	described	as	an	‘acoustical	illusion’	(PF,	p.	49):	the	understanding	 thinks	 it	 has	 generated	 the	 paradox	 by	 identifying	 a	 logical	contradiction	in	the	doctrine	of	the	Incarnation	but	actually	it	is	God’s	presence	here	 that	 is	paradoxical	 in	 that	God	chooses	 to	be	active	 in	a	site	 that	subverts	the	 expectations	 of	 the	 person,	 ‘Everything	 it	 says	 about	 the	 paradox	 it	 has	learned	 from	 the	 paradox’.	 (PF,	 p.	 53)438	Anti-Climacus	 develops	 this	 point	further	by	asserting	that	the	location	of	the	eternal	itself	is	repelling,	‘the	sign	of	offence’	 (PiC,	 p.	 139),	 because	 it	 is	 found	 in	 a	 location	 socially,	 intellectually,	morally,	and	religiously	opposed	to	one’s	own.	Climacus	understands	the	immanence	annihilated	by	the	paradox	as	any	relationship	to	the	divine	that	is	thought	to	be	possessed	without	‘contradiction’	or	 conflict,	 such	 as	 in	 Religiousness	 A’s	 assertion	 of	 an,	 ‘underlying	 kinship	between	 the	 temporal	 and	 the	eternal’	 (CUP,	p.	573),	 and	Socratic	 recollection,	wherein	the	individual	is	conceived	of	as	already	possessing	the	truth	(PF,	p.	9).	Exclusivist	closed	commitment	is	a	form	of	immanentism	because	it	is	reliant	on	the	 assertion	 that	 religious	 truth	 is	 possessed	 by	 a	 particular	 religious	 site,	participation	 in	which	 conveys	 it	 to	 its	participants.	God’s	presence	 in	 Jesus	as																																																									437	This	is	comparable	to	the	idea	in	Fear	and	Trembling	that	faith	contravenes	or	teleologically	suspends	rational,	moral	and	social	norms.	438	This	resolves	the	problem	identified	by	Walsh	of	how	offence	misrepresents	the	paradox	without	utilising	her	solution	that	the	paradox	is	only	apparent	and	that	Christian	faith	is	a	higher	rationality,	a	claim	denied	by	the	pseudonyms	(CUP,	pp.	580-581).	Sylvia	Walsh,	‘Echoes	of	Absurdity:	The	Offended	Consciousness	and	the	absolute	Paradox	in	Kierkegaard’s	Philosophical	
Fragments’.	In,	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	Philosophical	
Fragments	and	Johannes	Climacus,	p.	39	and	p.	45.	
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the	absolute	paradox	or	sign	of	offence	subverts	attempts	to	use	 it	as	 the	basis	for	the	exclusive	status	of	Christianity	among	religions.	Similarly,	pluralisms	that	assert	 the	 accessibility	 of	 the	 divine	 in	 multiple	 religions	 postulate	 an	immanence	 of	 the	 divine	 that	 is	 incompatible	 with	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	Incarnation,	‘the	eternal	is	ubique	et	nusquam	[everywhere	and	nowhere]…in	the	paradoxical-religious,	 the	 eternal	 is	 present	 at	 a	 specific	 point,	 and	 this	 is	 the	break	 with	 immanence.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 571)	 Pluralism	 thus	 cannot	 provide	 the	occasion	for	the	collision	that	elicits	paradoxical-religiousness.		In	 contrast	 to	 immanence,	 Climacus	 understands	 the	 ‘paradoxical-religious’	as	presenting	an	existence-possibility	in	which	one	is	able	to	relate	to	the	absolute	only	in	a	context	of	collision,	‘the	existing	individual	in	time	does	not	come	to	relate	himself	to	the	eternal	or	to	collect	himself	in	his	relation	(this	is	A)	but	 in	 time	 comes	 to	 relate	 himself	 to	 the	 eternal	 in	 time.’	 (CUP,	 p.	 570)	 The	pseudonyms	do	not	apply	this	to	RD,	but	encounter	with	different	religions	can	generate	a	conflict	analogous	to	the	encounter	with	the	Absolute	Paradox.		In	the	context	of	RD,	UC	seeks	to	encounter	divine	activity	not	in	religious	sites	with	which	 it	has	affinity	but	 rather	 in	places	 that	subvert	and	offend	 the	person’s	 expectations,	 particularly	 their	 core	 existential	 and	 religious	sensibilities.	 This	 necessitates	 a	 willingness	 to	 push	 to	 and	 beyond	 one’s	 own	religious	boundaries	 and	 identities	 to	 encounter	God	 in	 locations	beyond	 their	limits,	 including	 other	 religions	 and	 ways	 of	 being,	 particularly	 sites	 of	opposition,	where	the	presence	of	God	seems	impossible	or	offensive,	and	also	in	the	act	of	boundary-crossing	itself:	God	is	encountered	in	the	fear	and	trembling	at	 the	 limits	 of	 what	 one	 considers	 possible	 and	 impossible.	 In	 response	 to	Goodchild’s	‘logic	of	monotheism’	objection,	paradoxical-religiousness	presents	a	
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religiousness	that	is	absolute	without	claiming	to	possess	in	any	definitive	form	a	relationship	to	the	divine	and	which	requires	the	subversion	of	closed	identities.	To	sum	up,	the	pseudonyms’	interpretation	of	the	central	relationship	of	Christian	religiousness,	the	relationship	to	the	divine	presence	in	Jesus,	is	that	it	demands	 that	 the	Christian	seek	God	precisely	where	he	believes	he	cannot	be	found:	 at	 and	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 Christianity	 in	 religious	 and	 non-religious	others.	This	provides	an	alternative	between	the	excesses	of	pluralism	and	exclusivism	while	energising	Christian	faith	and	its	encounter	with	religious	others	by	embracing	the	tension	at	its	core	between	universality	and	specificity.																
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5.4.	An	Objection	to	Unbounded	Commitment:	The	Religious	Ambiguity	of	
the	Human	Situation	An	exclusivist	riposte	to	UC	is	that	the	human	situation	it	describes	does	not	warrant	 the	 commitment	 that	 it	 advocates.	 Geivett	 and	 Phillips	 argue	 that	certainty	is	necessary	and	desirable	as	a	strong	basis	for	religious	commitment:	the	person	needs	a	clear	set	of	truths	to	inform	their	moral	and	religious	actions;	God,	as	a	loving	creator,	has	a	duty	to	provide	such	clarity.	Uncertainty,	far	from	leading	to	passionate	commitment,	leads	to	an	insipid	faith	that	undermines	the	ability	 of	 the	 person	 to	 act	 morally	 and	 religiously	 with	 confidence,	‘Particularism	 is	 not	 scandalous	 to	 the	 spiritually	 needy	 person	who	 has	 been	looking	for	God’s	precise	remedy	to	the	specific	ills	of	humanity.’439		Basinger’s	 rule,	 that	 one	 should	 not	 commit	 to	 an	 option	 in	 a	 context	where	there	are	competing	options	that	have	parity	unless	one	can	demonstrate	the	 superiority	 of	 the	 chosen	 option,	 seems	 to	 obtain	 here	 and	 expresses	 the	common	view	 that	 a	 commitment	 in	a	 context	of	uncertainty	must	be	weak.440	This	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence	 that	 the	 encounter	with	 RD	 has	 an	 inimical	effect	on	commitment	and	leads	to	disengagement	from	religion,	‘because	of	the	claims	of	other	religions,	some	Christians	find	themselves	believing	the	claims	of	the	 Christian	 faith	 less	 strongly…or…not	 believing	 Christian	 claims	 at	 all.’441	Awareness	of	a	range	of	options	undermines	the	value	of	such	options.442																																																										439	R.	Douglas	Geivett	and	W.	Gary	Phillips,	‘A	Particularist	View:	An	Evidentialist	Approach’.	In,	John	Hick,	Clark	H.	Pinnock,	Alister	McGrath,	R.	Douglas	Geivett	and	W.	Gary	Phillips	(eds.),	Four	
Views	on	Salvation	in	a	Pluralistic	World	(Grand	Rapids:	Zondervan,	1995),	p.	218.	440	David	Basinger,	Religious	Diversity:	A	Philosophical	Assessment,	p.	11.	441	Mark	S.	McLeod-Harrison,	Repairing	Eden:	Humility,	Mysticism	and	the	Existential	Problem	of	
Religious	Diversity,	p.	14.	442	For	evidence	of	the	link	between	religious	diversity	and	secularisation,	see	Davie’s	research	and	assertion	that,	‘If	there	is	more	than	one	sacred	canopy	present	in	society…they	cannot	both	(or	indeed	all)	be	true….	The	next	question	is	unavoidable:	could	it	be	that	there	is	no	ultimate	truth	at	all...?	[P]luralism	erodes	the	plausibility	structures	generated	by	monopolistic	religious	
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This	 highlights	 a	 major	 existential	 problem	 of	 RD:	 whether	 one	 can	remain	committed	 in	a	context	of	diversity	 in	 the	passionate	and	absolute	way	UC	advocates.	The	pseudonyms	admit	 that	 this	 is	one	of	 the	struggles	 faced	by	faith:	why	one	should	choose	Christian	faith	when	faced	with	alternatives.	There	are	more	appealing	options	 intellectually,	due	 to	 the	offence	one	encounters	 in	Christian	faith	(PF,	p.	49;	CUP,	p.	585),	and	pragmatically,	as	Christian	faith	leads	to	suffering	and	persecution	(CUP,	p.	433;	PiC,	p.	179).	McKim’s	 conception	 of	 the	 religious	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 human	 situation	offers	a	response	in	support	of	UC.	McKim	argues	that	religious	commitment	can	be	valid	in	a	context	defined	by	‘extremely	rich	ambiguity’,	as	distinct	from	one	that	is	‘uncertain’.	A	context	has	‘extremely	rich	ambiguity’	if:	no	interpretation	is	overwhelmingly	obvious,	there	is	compelling	evidence	for	a	range	of	competing	interpretations	and	there	is	so	much	evidence	that	no	person	can	see	all	of	it.443	If	this	condition	obtains,	it	can	be	valid	to	commit	to	a	particular	interpretation,	as	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 one	 of	 the	 interpretations	 is	 true	 but	 the	 issue	 is	undecidable.444		A	 situation	 is	 not	 ambiguous	 if	 there	 is	 no	 compelling	 evidence;	 in	 this	case,	 it	 is	 simply	 uncertain	 and	 an	 appropriate	 response	 is	 suspension	 of	judgement.	UC	seems	to	be	asserting	this	view:	that	the	situation	is	uncertain;	it	thus	 warrants	 agnosticism.	 However,	 by	 focussing	 on	 subjective	 commitment,	the	position	is	able	to	overcome	this	problem.		
																																																																																																																																																														institutions	in	so	far	as	it	offers	alternatives.’	Grace	Davie,	The	Sociology	of	Religion,	p.	53.	See	also:	Peter	L.	Berger,	‘Secularization	and	De-Secularization’.	In,	Linda	Woodhead,	Paul	Fletcher,	Hiroko	Kawanami	and	David	Smith	(eds.),	Religions	in	the	Modern	World,	p.	296.	443	‘there	being	a	significant…amount	of	evidence	for	more	than	one	hypothesis	and	there	not	being	a	proof	of	any	relevant	hypothesis’.	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	134	and	p.	138.	444	Robert	McKim,	On	Religious	Diversity,	p.	159.	
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UC	 defines	 the	 situation	 as	 ambiguous	 in	 a	 different	 way	 to	 McKim:	religious	 and	 non-religious	 commitments	 are	 forced	 choices	 because	 persons	have	 to	 decide,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 uncertainty,	 how	 they	 will	 live	 and	 therefore	commit	to	different	structures,	for	example,	whether	they	will	live	as	if	there	is	a	God.	 The	 underlying	 existential	 commitments	 also	 entail	 that	 religions	 emerge	from	 a	 situation	 that	 is	 richly	 ambiguous:	 human	 experience	 is	 shaped	 by	existential	commitments	that	cause	the	world	to	appear	in	a	particular	way;	the	commitments	 also	 gain	 existential	 and	 experiential	 traction	 and	plausibility	 by	facilitating	responses	to	the	situations	humans	encounter.	Furthermore,	persons	live	 in	 complex	 situations,	with	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 and	 experiences	 bearing	 on	their	 decisions,	 and	 their	 commitments	 are	 processual	 and	 the	 result	 of	 long	processes	of	existential	development	in	relation	to	major	life-events;	they	cannot	adopt	an	external	perspective	or	see	all	of	the	relevant	information,	but	have	to	decide	 how	 to	 respond	 to	 these	 situations.	 Climacus	 also	 sees	 God	 as	 ‘richly	ambiguous’:	 because	 the	 encounter	 is	 personal	 and	 paradoxical,	 there	 is	 no	single	 way	 God	 can	 be	 described	 and	 local	 experiences	 of	 God	will	 always	 be	partial,	 elusive,	 and	 subvert	 attempts	 to	describe	or	 circumscribe	God’s	nature	and	activity.	(CUP,	p.	156)	UC	 thrives	 on	 uncertainty	 and	 anxiousness	 because	 they	 destabilise	secure	 grasps	 on	 reality	 in	 an	 area	 where	 one	 must	 still	 exercise	 agency.	Climacus	provides	an	explanation	of	why	the	encounter	with	diversity	degrades	inauthentic,	exclusivist	commitment,	but	causes	the	authentic	religiousness	of	UC	to	 thrive.	For	human	valuation,	 the	existence	of	a	plurality	of	options	evidently	devalues	 each,	 as	 in	 a	 surfeit	 of	 a	 commodity,	 but	 this	 inheres	 in	 a	 deeper	structure	 of	 valuation:	 persons	 value	 things	 that	 are	 deeply	 connected	 with	
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agency	 and	 are	 chosen;	 things	 that	 are	 obtained	 through	 effort	 rather	 than	received	 passively	 or	 with	 ease.	 Hence	 de	 Silentio	 observes	 that	 the	universalising	 of	 faith	 as	 a	 given,	 passively	 inherited	 condition	 has	 the	 result	that,	 ‘Everything	can	be	had	at	such	a	bargain	price	 that	 it	becomes	a	question	whether	there	is	 finally	anyone	who	will	make	a	bid.’	(FaT,	p.	5)	The	value	of	a	thing	is	that	 it	has	to	be	sought	out,	chosen,	willed	in	strenuousness	and	that	 it	makes	existential	demands:	it	is	in	these	ways	that	meaning	is	generated	because	agency	is	at	the	core	of	the	human	person.445	Climacus	 makes	 this	 clear	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 man	 concerned	 about	 his	salvation,	 ‘Now,	 if	 someone	 were	 to	 say,	 plainly	 and	 simply,	 that	 he	 was	concerned	 about	 himself,	 that	 it	 was	 not	 quite	 right	 for	 him	 to	 call	 himself	 a	Christian…his	 wife	 would	 tell	 him,	 “Hubby	 darling….	 How	 can	 you	 not	 be	 a	Christian?	 You	 are	 Danish,	 aren’t	 you?....	 You	 aren’t	 a	 Jew,	 are	 you,	 or	 a	Mohammedan?	What	else	would	you	be	then?”’	(CUP,	p.	50)	In	this	case,	religion	is	seen	as	a	passive	and	inherited	cultural	identity:	the	individual	does	not	have	to	 passionately	 appropriate,	 choose,	 or	 even	 worry	 about	 it,	 because	 it	 is	determined	 for	 him	 by	 external	 forces.	 In	 such	 a	 situation,	 exposure	 to	 other	religious	 cultural	 identities	 emphasises	 that	 these	 are	 passively	 inherited	 and	thereby	devalues	all	of	them.	Closed	religious	commitment	is	often	undermined	by	 diversity	 because	 it	 is	 a	 closed	 commitment	 that	 relies	 on	 a	 conception	 of	religion	as	 supported	by,	 for	example,	 inherited	cultural	 identities,	 institutions,	and	authoritative	claims,	and	diversity	undermines	such	supports.																																																									445	This	is	reflected	in	Kierkegaard’s	advocacy	of	truth	that	is	actively	found	and	chosen	by	the	individual	and	translates	into	existential	activity,	‘What	I	really	need	to	be	clear	about	is	what	I	
am	to	do…to	find	a	truth	which	is	truth	for	me,	to	find	the	idea	for	which	I	am	willing	to	live	and	die….	That’s	what	I	lacked	for	leading	a	completely	human	life	and	not	just	a	life	of	
knowledge…something	which	is	bound	up	with	the	deepest	roots	of	my	existence.’	[Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Notebooks,	Volume	1,	AA-DD.	AA:12,	pp.	19-20].	
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In	 contrast,	 understanding	 religious	 identity	 as	 a	 way	 of	 being	 that	 is	passionately	 chosen	 and	 that	 expresses	 and	 navigates	 one’s	 most	 important	commitments	and	struggles	prevents	it	from	being	imperilled	in	this	way.	Rather	than	 devaluing	 religious	 perspectives,	 a	 religiously	 diverse	 situation	 can	make	persons	aware	of	 the	possibility	of	relating	 themselves	 to	an	absolute	and	thus	elicit	 creative	 appropriative	 responses.	 This	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 ability	 of	person-centred	 religiousness	 to	 thrive	 in	 a	 context	 of	 RD.	Heelas,	 for	 example,	offers	 such	 an	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 RD	 and	secularisation:	that	the	process	provoked	by	RD	involves	the	decline	of	religious	institutions	 and	 the	 emphasis	 of	 individual,	 agency-centred	 religiousness,	focussed	 on	 personal	 faith,	 development,	 and	 commitment,	 ‘The…spiritually-informed,	 personal,	 intimate,	 experiential,	 existential,	 psychological,	 self	 and	relational-cum-self	depths	of	what	it	is	to	be	alive’.446		RD	contributes	 to	 this	person-centred	 transition	as	 it	demonstrates	 that	there	is	no	single	religion	that	has	a	prima	facie	fit	with	human	experience	and,	moreover,	that	many	people	exist	within	a	range	of	different	interpretations	that	emerge	 from	 their	 subjective	 responses	 to	 their	 situations,	 such	 that	 there	 is	 a	need	 to	 decide,	 for	 the	 person,	 how	 they	 will	 creatively	 integrate	 the	 various	insights	 provided	 by	 religions	 into	 a	 cohesive	 whole.	 UC	 has	 synergy	 with	 a	context	of	RD	and	the	fragmented,	postmodern	situation	as	well	as	going	to	the	heart	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	person	in	any	situation:	an	anxious	person,	struggling	with	 the	 terrors	 of	 existence	 in	 passionate,	 agency	 driven	 ways	 that	 produce	meaning	and	selfhood.																																																									446	This	is	measured	by	the	growth	of	the	‘betwixt	and	the	between’	who	do	not	define	themselves	as	atheists	or	members	of	a	religious	institution.	Paul	Heelas,	‘The	spiritual	revolution:	from	‘religion’	to	‘spirituality’’.	In,	Linda	Woodhead,	Paul	Fletcher,	Hiroko	Kawanami	and	David	Smith	(eds.),	Religions	in	the	Modern	World,	pp.	358-359	and	p.	358.	
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5.5.	Conclusion		 This	chapter	outlined	the	 features	of	UC	as	an	authentic	way	of	being	 in	the	situation	of	RD.	UC	was	described	as	an	unbounded	faith:	a	passionate,	total	commitment	 in	 a	 context	 of	 anxiety	 and	 uncertainty,	 that	 embraces	 the	precariousness	 of	 its	 human	 situation.	 It	 was	 also	 described	 as	 unbounded	because	 it	 is	 a	 perpetual	 movement	 beyond	 boundaries:	 authentic,	 venturing	faith	 is	never	 identical	with	a	 religious	structure	but	always	 finds	revelation	 in	encounters	 at	 its	 boundaries	 and	 beyond.	 It	 is	 a	 free	 and	 open,	 yet	 total	commitment.	 The	 chapter	 also	 offered	 a	 minimalist,	 existential	 theology	 of	religions	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 key	 theological	 features	 of	 this	 approach.	 It	advocated	existential	situationism,	viewing	religious	options	as	having	parity	in	relation	 to	 authenticity,	 and	 drew	 on	 Christological	 themes	 to	 argue	 for	 the	openness	of	Christians	to	God’s	activity	in	others.							
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CHAPTER	6	
PERFORMING	TRANSCENDENCE:		
THE	EXISTENTIAL	DYNAMICS	OF	INTERRELIGIOUS	ENCOUNTER	
	
(6.1)	Argument	in	Brief	Previous	 chapters	 advocated	 an	 existential	 approach	 to	 interreligious	encounter	(IE),	in	which	theory	is	bracketed	or	seen	as	minimal	and	secondary	to	the	interpersonal	relationships	made	possible	in	IE.	For	this	reason,	this	chapter	will	 prioritise	 the	practical	 implementation	of	 IE,	providing	a	model	 (UCM)	 for	applying	unconditional	commitment	to	IE.	To	do	this,	it	draws	on	Climacus’	and	Kierkegaard’s	theories	of	communication,	with	a	particular	focus	on	how	indirect	communication	can	facilitate	deep	religious	encounter.	UCM	faces	challenges	from	the	dominant	paradigm	that	underpins	many	models	 of	 interreligious	 dialogue.	 The	 problems	 posed	 by	 this	 paradigm	 are	outlined	 and	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 UCM	 provides	 a	 superior	 approach	 to	 some	dominant	alternatives	by	incorporating	their	insights	while	avoiding	their	errors.		My	thesis	is	that	UCM	provides	for	genuine	encounter	and	exchange,	contrary	to	particularist	views,	and	that,	contrary	to	secularist	views,	this	is	best	achieved	by	the	 authentic	 faith	 of	 UC.	 UCM	 is	 a	 good	 fit	 for	 IE	 because	 IE	 involves	 the	encounter	 of	 participants	 with	 each	 other’s	 fundamental	 and	 incommensurate	commitments,	in	which	alterity	is	already	at	play,	in	a	shared	existential	context.		The	 chapter	 then	 explores	 two	different	models	 for	 communicating	 and	facilitating	 encounter	 between	 religious	 spheres	 that	 are	 considered	 by	 the	authorship.	 Indirect	 communication,	 which	 is	 embodied	 by	 the	 ‘subjectively	existing	 thinker’,	 invites	 participants	 to	 empathic,	 experimental,	 appropriative	performance	of	 the	ways	of	being	encountered,	underpinned	by	a	humour	 that	
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subverts	 claims	of	 authority	without	degrading	 the	 importance	of	 the	different	ways	of	being.	Direct	communication,	practised	by	the	‘honourable	gentleman’,	is	argued	 to	 be	 objective	 and	 inauthentic	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 obstructs	 the	relationships	 necessary	 for	 genuine	 communication.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	dominant	 models	 of	 IE	 favour	 direct	 communication	 and	 that	 indirect	communication	 provides	 a	 superior	 approach	 for	 facilitating	 IE	 that	 is	 in	conformity	with	the	principles	of	UC.	Three	central	problems	and	questions	are	identified	as	facing	models	of	IE	and	the	positions	are	outlined	in	relation	to	these	as	a	means	of	identifying	their	key	 features.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 indirect	 communication	 advocated	 by	 UCM	differs	 from	 the	 alternative	 approaches	 on	 each	 point	 and	 provides	 a	 superior	approach	 (See	 Table	 6.2).	 (i)	 The	 aim	 of	 IE	 is	 to	 facilitate	 transcendence	 and	authentic	ways	of	being	in	response	to	the	shared	existential	situation	and	other	ways	of	being	encountered.	The	method	 for	 achieving	 this	 is	bringing	 together	different	people	and	their	ways	of	being,	particularly	through	encounter	with	the	ultimate	 claims	 of	 religions.	 (ii)	 The	 space	 in	 which	 participants	 are	 brought	together	 in	 IE	 is	 their	 shared,	 existential	 situations.	 To	 present	 a	 genuine	encounter	that	addresses	these	situations	and	facilitates	transcendence,	IE	must	stress	 synergistically	 energized	 collisions	 and	 conflicts	 between	 the	 ultimate	commitments	 of	 the	 participants.	 (iii)	 The	 attitudes	 and	 ways	 of	 being	 of	 the	participants	 must	 facilitate	 IE	 through	 empathy	 and	 experimentation	 that	nevertheless	 allows	 them	 to	 retain	 their	 fidelity	 to	 their	 commitments;	 for	Christians,	IE	is	motivated	by	this	faithfulness	in	entrusting	oneself	to	God.		
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(6.2)	Table	comparing	the	responses	of	indirect	and	direct	communication	
to	key	questions	facing	interreligious	encounter		Question/Problem			 Interreligious	encounter	through	indirect	communication:	The	Subjectively	Existing	Thinker	
Interreligious	encounter	through	direct	communication:	The	Honourable	Gentleman	i.	The	Problem	of	Encounter	and	Communication:	what	are	the	aims	of	IE?	Is	such	IE	possible	and	what	method	should	be	used	in	order	to	achieve	it?	
The	aim	of	encounter	is	to	facilitate	a	transcendent	way	of	being	through	encounters	with	ways	of	being.		The	method	is	existential	encounter	between	any	people.	
The	aim	of	encounter	is	to	achieve	conversion,	theological	understanding	or	ethical-practical	goals.			The	method	is	dialogue:	the	objective	transfer	of	information	in	text,	speech	or	practice	by	authorities	or	representatives	of	religious	identities.	ii.	The	Problem	of	the	Liminal	Space:	How	should	the	space	of	encounter	be	configured?	
The	space	is	the	shared	existential	situation,	in	which	encounter	is	existentially	charged	and	synergistically	energised.	
There	is	no	shared	space	(Lindbeck)	or	no	shared	religious	space	(Cheetham).	The	space	of	the	dialogue	is	intended	to	deflect	existential	transformation	and	de-intensify	confrontation.	iii.	The	Problem	of	Participants’	Attitudes:	What	attitudes	can	and	should	participants	adopt?	
Participants’	attitudes	include	openness,	humour	and	humility;	they	are	without	authority.	Fidelity	animates	the	encounter.	
The	attitude	of	participants	is	constructed	around	protectionism.	Fidelity	as	loyalty	to	one’s	religious	tradition	is	prioritized	(Lindbeck)	or	fidelity	is	bracketed	because	it	is	seen	to	be	in	conflict	with	openness	(Cheetham).	Dialogue	occurs	in	spite	of	fidelity	rather	than	because	of	it.		 			
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6.3.	Unconditional	Commitment	as	a	Model	for	Interreligious	Encounter		Chapter	5	argued	 that	existential	engagement	with	alterity	 is	 integral	 to	authentic	 selfhood.	 IE	 is	 a	 fertile	 form	 of	 this	 because	 it	 engages	 with	inassimilable	 others	 whose	 radical	 commitments	 equal	 and	 are	 irreducible	 to	one’s	own.	 	The	Kierkegaardian	corpus	presents	 indirect	communication	as	the	primary	 means	 of	 facilitating	 such	 encounter	 between	 the	 different	 ways	 of	being	 presented	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 existence.447	Climacus	 (CUP,	 p.	 252)	 and	Kierkegaard	(CUP,	pp.	629-630)	 interpret	 the	authorship	as	aiming	 to	 facilitate	such	communication	for	the	purpose	of	deep	existential	reflection	and	exchange.	Because	 religions	 are	 understood	 as	 distinct	 spheres,	 this	 theory	 of	communication	 will	 be	 utilised	 as	 providing	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 IE	 and	strategies	for	implementing	it.		
	
																																																								447	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	the	rest	of	this	chapter	will	attribute	this	theory	of	communication	to	Kierkegaard,	but	this	should	not	be	taken	as	asserting	that	the	views	are	his	own	or	that	his	views	do	not	change.	The	theory	of	communication	presented	in	this	chapter	draws	on	several	main	sources:	the	Climacus	and	Anti-Climacus	writings,	particularly	Climacus’	interpretation	of	the	authorship,	in	‘A	Glance	at	A	Contemporary	Effort	in	Danish	Literature’	(CUP,	pp.	251-300);	his	advocacy	of	Lessing’s	indirect	style	(CUP,	pp.	61-125);	and	his	discussion	of	subjective	and	objective	approaches	to	Christianity	(CUP,	p.	587-616).	Anti-Climacus	also	develops	related	ideas,	incorporating	Christological	themes	(PiC,	pp.	123-144)	and	the	concept	of	indirect	communication	through	witnessing.	It	also	draws	on	Kierkegaard’s	statements	in	his	lectures	on	communication	[Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	648-657,	pp.	267-308],	‘Forklaring’	(CUP,	pp.	625-630)	and	PoV.	This	should	not	be	taken	as	suggesting	that	the	corpus	possesses	only	one	view	of	communication.	Turnbull,	for	example,	notes	that	it	develops	in	significant	ways	as	well	as	varying	in	different	texts.	[Jamie	Turnbull,	‘Communication/Indirect	Communication’.	In,	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	William	McDonald	and	Jon	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concepts,	Tome	
II:	Classicism	to	Enthusiasm,	p.	17.]	These	texts	have	been	utilised	as	their	theories	of	communication	present	guidelines	that	can	be	expressed	in	a	coherent	way	for	implementing	IE.	
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6.4.	Interreligious	Encounter	(IE)	(6.4.a)	Questions	for	IE	UCM	will	be	located	in	relation	to	three	questions	posed	by	the	literature	on	IE	and	two	positions	that	take	different	approaches	to	these	questions.448			(6.4.a.i)	The	Problem	of	Encounter	and	Communication.		What	is	the	aim	of	IE	and	is	IE	achievable	to	the	extent	that	the	religious	other	 can	 be	 encountered	 in	 the	 deep	 ways	 necessary	 for	 UCM?	 Cornille	 and	Swidler	identify	this	as	a	serious	issue	given	the	prevalent	scepticism	about	the	possibility	of	extricating	oneself	from	one’s	context;	it	is	a	problem	for	UCM	given	that	 its	 perspectivism	 similarly	 prioritises	 existential	 context. 449 	Further	obstacles	 include	 assertions	 of	 the	 incommensurability	 of	 religions,	 social-constructivist	critiques	of	the	category	of	religion,	and	criticisms	of	translation	as	serving	the	imperialist	agenda	of	mastering	otherness.450			(6.4.a.ii)	The	Problem	of	the	Liminal	Space.		How	 should	 the	 liminal	 space	 of	 the	 encounter	 be	 configured?451	This	connects	 with	 questions	 about	 whether	 and	 how	 religious	 structures	 aid	 or	
																																																								448	Such	questions	are	identified	in:	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Introduction:	On	Hermeneutics	in	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	and	Christopher	Conway	(eds.),	Interreligious	Hermeneutics	(Eugene:	Wipf	&	Stock,	2010),	ix-xxi.	See	also:	David	Cheetham,	‘Religion	and	the	Religious	Other’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.),	UIR,	pp.	15-36.	449	Leonard	Swidler,	‘The	History	of	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	
Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	p.	12.	See	also:	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Introduction:	On	Hermeneutics	in	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	xiii.	450	Kevin	Schilbrack,	Philosophy	and	the	Study	of	Religions:	A	Manifesto,	p.	88.	See	also:	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Introduction:	On	Hermeneutics	in	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	xiii.	451	David	Cheetham,	‘Religion	and	the	Religious	Other’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.),	UIR,	p.	30.		
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hinder	dialogue	and	whether	a	neutral	 space,	which	equalises	participants	and	brackets	beliefs,	is	possible	and	preferable.452			(6.4.a.iii)	The	Problem	of	Participants’	Attitudes.		Who	should	be	the	participants	in	IE	and	what	attitudes	are	possible	for	participants	 to	 approach	 each	 other	 so	 as	 to	 preserve	 openness	 to	 the	 other	alongside	fidelity	to	their	commitments?453	For	example,	should	they	be	religious	authorities	and	are	characteristics	like	empathy	possible	and	desirable?454	Also,	how	should	they	navigate	the	tension	between	evangelism	and	dialogue?		(6.4.b)	Typology	of	Approaches	to	IE	Hedges	and	Moyaert	categorise	approaches	to	IE	into	two	main	groups	in	relation	 to	 such	 questions. 455 	Social-practical	 approaches	 aim	 to	 facilitate																																																									452	The	former	is	the	contention	of	scriptural	reasoning	approaches	to	IE.	See,	for	example:	Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Scriptural	Reasoning	as	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	
The	Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	pp.	64-86).	The	latter	is	the	contention	of	Habermas	and	his	liberal	supporters.	See,	for	example,	Habermas’	claim	that	meaningful	public	exchange	can	only	occur	between	religious	and	secular	citizens	if	all	participants	respect,	‘the	priority	of	secular	reasons	and	the	institutional	translation	proviso.’	(Jurgen	Habermas,	Between	Naturalism	and	Religion,	trans.	Ciaran	Cronin	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2008)	p.	139).		453	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Conditions	for	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	
Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	pp.	20-33.	454	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Introduction:	On	Hermeneutics	in	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	xv.		455	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions	,	pp.	60-61.	Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	202.	Their	typologies	incorporate	earlier	typologies,	such	as	Sharpe’s	identification	of	‘discursive’	(theological),	‘secular’	(social-practical)	and	‘interior’	(religious/experiential)	approaches.	[Eric	J.	Sharpe,	‘The	Goals	of	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	John	Hick	(ed.),	Truth	and	Dialogue	in	World	
Religions	(Philadelphia:	Westminster,	1974),	pp.	77-95.]	However,	these	typologies	omit	the	‘human’	approach	identified	by	Sharpe.	[Eric	J.	Sharpe,	‘The	Goals	of	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	John	Hick	(ed.),	Truth	and	Dialogue	in	World	Religions,	pp.	77-95.]	This	approach	emphasises	the	interactions	and	relationships	between	human	persons.	It	is	absorbed	or	ignored	in	later	typologies,	demonstrating	their	movement	away	from	person-centred	approaches.	While	relationships	are	a	concern	of	a	range	of	the	approaches	identified	in	recent	typologies,	they	are	seen	as	secondary	and	dependent	upon	the	primary	objective	of	theological	learning,	ethical	action,	or	participation	in	ritual.	Netland	rejects	‘human’	approaches	on	the	grounds	that	they	overlook	the	centrality	of	religious	beliefs	and	worldviews	for	participants.	[Harold	A.	Netland,	
Dissonant	Voices:	Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Question	of	Truth	(Vancouver:	Regent	College	
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dialogue	through	action	and	interaction,	particularly	in	relation	to	shared	social	and	ethical	concerns.	Such	approaches	are	evident	in	secular	models	that	utilise	a	neutral	or	public	space	as	a	place	of	encounter	 to	circumvent	 the	problem	of	translation;	 they	 focus	 on	 interpersonal	 encounter	 rather	 than	 knowledge.	Theological-religious	 approaches	 are	 focussed	 on	 exposing	 participants	 to	religious	 worldviews,	 beliefs,	 texts	 and	 practices	 through	 the	 exchange	 of	knowledge	 or	 practice.	 Such	 approaches	 are	 advocated	 by	 particularist	theologies	that	stress	the	necessity	of	emic	understanding.		(6.4.c)	Alternative	Positions	to	UCM	In	 order	 to	 position	 UCM,	 an	 alternative	 will	 be	 considered	 as	 a	representative	of	each	group	of	approaches.	The	alternative	positions	considered	understand	 the	problem	of	 IE	 as	 a	 problem	of	 interreligious	dialogue	 (ID)	 and	exchange:	 how	 understanding	 is	 best	 achieved.	 This	 leads	 to	 an	 emphasis	 on	problems	 of	 language	 and	 translation.456 	The	 dominant	 approaches	 of	 both	groups	 are	 also	 committed	 to	 context-dependent	 epistemologies,	 asserting	 the	contextual	nature	of	language	to	practice,	as	in	many	social-practical	approaches,	or	to	wider	interpretations	mediated	by	culturally	bound	worldviews,	as	in	many	theological-religious	approaches.	Swidler	identifies	this	‘perspectival’,	‘relational’	and	‘interpretative’	paradigm	as	the	main	theoretical	commitment	underpinning																																																																																																																																																															Publishing,	1991),	p.	287.]	As	will	be	shown	below,	religious	commitments	cannot	be	excluded	from	IE	because	these	are	central	to	the	identities	of	their	adherents.	However,	the	existential	view	of	religion	has	addressed	Netland’s	criticism	by	arguing	that	religiousness	is	fundamentally	subjective	and	beliefs	can	only	be	understood	as	they	are	lived	out	subjectively	in	the	shared	human	context.	An	objective	of	this	chapter	will	be	to	reinstate	the	necessity	of	‘human’	approaches	that	incorporate	the	subjective,	relational	nature	without	excluding	religious	commitment.	456	Thus	Hedges,	for	example,	even	refers	to	practical	approaches,	which	stress	action	over	communication,	as	forms	of	dialogue.	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	
the	Theology	of	Religions,	pp.	59-61.	
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most	models	 of	 dialogue	 and	 attributes	 it	 to	 the	 influence	 of	Wittgenstein	 and	Gadamer.457	These	 theoretical	 commitments	 lead	 the	 alternative	 approaches	 to	give	 negative	 answers	 to	 the	 three	 questions:	 (i)	 translation,	 substantial	communication,	and	deep	encounter	between	religions	is	not	possible;	(ii)	there	is	no	benign,	religious,	liminal	space	for	encounter;	and	(iii)	a	healthy	balance	of	openness	 and	 fidelity	 cannot	 be	 easily	maintained,	 such	 that	 one	must	 choose	between	 them	 with	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 fidelity	 given	 the	 inextricably	contextual	nature	of	understanding.		(6.4.c.i)	Gadamer	and	Cultural-Linguistic	Theological	Approaches	Gadamer’s	 hermeneutics	 have	 been	 influential	 over	 theological	 views,	particularly	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 approach.458 	Gadamer	 identifies	 culturally	bound	language	as	the	basis	for	understanding,	experience	and	life;	it	is,	‘the	real	medium	 of	 human	 being…the	 realm	 of	 human	 being-together,	 the	 realm	 of	common	 understanding’.459 	Central	 features	 of	 language	 are	 that	 it	 is,	 ‘all-encompassing’,	 and,	 ‘I-less’.460 	Language	 is	 not	 a	 tool	 used	 by	 autonomous	subjects	to	express	understanding	and	experience	but	rather	is	determinative	of	
																																																								457	Leonard	Swidler,	‘The	History	of	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	
Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	pp.	12-13.	458	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	2.	And:	David	Tracy,	‘The	Other	of	Dialectic	and	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	109.	Even	those	who	look	to	Ricoeur	rather	than	Gadamer	encounter	a	similar	approach,	which	aims	to	correct	Gadamer’s	omission	of	a	hermeneutics	of	suspicion	rather	than	challenge	it	at	a	fundamental	level.	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	12.		459	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	‘Man	and	Language’.	In,	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	David	E.	Linge	(ed.,	trans.),	Philosophical	Hermeneutics	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1976),	p.	68.	460	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	‘Man	and	Language’.	In,	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	David	E.	Linge	(ed.,	trans.),	Philosophical	Hermeneutics,	pp.	66-67.	
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subjects,	 their	 understanding,	 and	 interface	 with	 reality,	 constructing	 the	‘enclosed’,	‘linguistic	world	in	which	we	live’.461		Moreover,	language	emerges	from	a	communal	situation,	further	ensuring	the	determinative	nature	of	language	for	the	subject.462	The	result	is	that	persons	are	 unable	 to	 extricate	 themselves	 from	 this	 context;	 the	 pre-history	 of	 the	language	 for	 the	 historically	 located	 subject	 provides	 the	 ‘motivational	background’	for	all	questions	asked	and	the	answers,	concepts	and	ideas	given;	prejudice	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 all	 understanding	 and	 meaning,	 ‘That	 is	 why	 the	
prejudices	of	the	individual,	far	more	than	his	judgements,	constitute	the	historical	
reality	 of	 his	 being.’463	Gadamer	 argues	 that	 the	 romantic	 focus	 on	 subjectivity	and	empathy	 is	 a	 ‘distorting	mirror’	because	 the	 subject	 is	not	 an	autonomous	agent.	 Subjectivity	 is	 merely	 a,	 ‘flickering	 in	 the	 closed	 circuits	 of	 historical	life.’464	Instead,	he	demands	a	focus	on	the	determinative	exteriority	of	language	as	fixing	the	possible	moves,	experiences,	and	their	meaning.465		While	Gadamer	views	translation	as	possible,	Lindbeck’s	and	MacIntyre’s	theological	 appropriations	 deny	 it,	 leading	 them	 to	 answer	 negatively	 to	 the	three	questions	for	IE.	Lindbeck’s	cultural-linguistic	model	conceives	of	religions	as,	 ‘comprehensive	 interpretative	 schemes…which	 structure	human	experience	and	understanding	of	self	and	world’.466	Since	they	are	producers	of	experience,	
																																																								461	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	‘Man	and	Language’.	In,	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	David	E.	Linge	(ed.,	trans.),	Philosophical	Hermeneutics,	p.	63.	462	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	‘Man	and	Language’.	In,	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	David	E.	Linge	(ed.,	trans.),	Philosophical	Hermeneutics,	p.	66.	463	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	trans.	by	Joel	Weinsheimer	and	Donald	G.	Marshall	(London:	Sheed	and	Ward,	1989	[Second,	Revised	Edition]),	pp.	276-277.	See	also:	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	‘Man	and	Language’.	In,	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	David	E.	Linge	(ed.,	trans.),	Philosophical	
Hermeneutics,	p.	67.	464	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	p.	276.	465	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	2.	466	George	A.	Lindbeck,	The	Nature	of	Doctrine:	Religion	and	Theology	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	p.	32.		
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intelligibility	 and	 value,	 no	 liminal	 space	 exists	 between	 them	where	 dialogue	can	take	place:	outside	and	between	such	structures	there	are	no	shared	values,	experiences,	models	of	 rationality	or	 rules	 for	discourse	because	 these	 emerge	only	from	within	the	hermeneutical	regimes.467	Furthermore,	as	‘comprehensive’	interpretative	structures,	religions	are	understandable	only	as	part	of	the	whole	by	 insiders	 of	 the	 community;	 meanings	 and	 values	 are	 also	 unique	 to	 each	cultural	 location.468	Religions	 are	 uninterpretable	 because	 all-interpreting	 and	the	 other	 is	 insurmountably	 incomprehensible	 because	 incommensurate	 with	one’s	own	location.469	MacIntyre	argues	that	this	is	particularly	true	of	religions,	because	their	language	is	belief/value-laden	and	only	those	who	share	the	values	will	understand	the	meaning.	Translation	out	of	this	context	will	fundamentally	alter	the	meaning	in	that	the	beliefs	into	which	the	language	is	translated	will	be	incompatible,	 incommensurate	 or	 simply	 different	 to	 the	 source	 language,	 ‘To	understand	 the	 translation-plus-explanation	 into	 B	will	 entail	 for	 those	whose	language	is	B	rejecting	the	beliefs	so	explained.’470		On	this	view,	ID	cannot	 involve	translation	or	exchange:	there	can	be	no	cross-cultural	 understanding;	 attempts	 to	 achieve	 this	 will	 result	 in	misunderstanding	 or	 the	 imposition	 of	 one	 set	 of	 beliefs	 on	 another.471	The																																																									467	George	A.	Lindbeck,	‘The	Gospel’s	Uniqueness:	Election	and	Untranslatability.’	In	George	A.	Lindbeck,	James	J.	Buckley	(ed.)	The	Church	in	a	Postliberal	Age.	MacIntyre	concurs	that	meaning	is	relative	to	each	‘linguistic	community’,	‘as	it	is	used	in	and	by	a	particular	community	living	at	a	particular	time	and	place,	with	particular	shared	beliefs,	institutions	and	practices.’	[Alasdair	MacIntyre,	Whose	Justice?	Which	Rationality?,	pp.	372-373.]	468	George	A.	Lindbeck,	The	Nature	of	Doctrine:	Religion	and	Theology	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	p.	34.		469	George	A.	Lindbeck,	‘The	Gospel’s	Uniqueness:	Election	and	Untranslatability.’	In	George	A.	Lindbeck,	James	J.	Buckley	(ed.)	The	Church	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	p.	231.	Cornille	asserts	the,	‘incomprehensibility	of	the	other’	for	this	model.	[Catherine	Cornille,	‘Introduction:	On	Hermeneutics	in	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	xiii.]		470	Alasdair	MacIntyre,	Whose	Justice?	Which	Rationality?,	p.	380.	471	George	A.	Lindbeck,	The	Nature	of	Doctrine:	Religion	and	Theology	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	pp.	30-32.	Lindbeck	claims	this	is	evident	in	the	focus	of	ID	on	the	Christian	concept	of	salvation.	George	A.	Lindbeck,	‘The	Gospel’s	Uniqueness:	Election	and	Untranslatability.’	In	George	A.	Lindbeck,	James	J.	Buckley	(ed.)	The	Church	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	p.	227.	
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‘tradition-constituted’	nature	of	understanding	 also	denies	 the	possibility	of	 ID	occurring	in	a	neutral	space:	this	will	be	in	denial	about	its	own	culturally	bound	understanding,	which	 it	will	 impose	 on	 participants,	 ‘in	 a	way	 that	 neutralizes	the	 conceptions	of	 truth	 and	 rationality’,	 because	 it	 denies	 the	 cultural	 context	that	is	necessary	for	the	perception	of	truth	and	value.472	The	model	of	ID	proposed	by	Lindbeck	is	intratextual.	It	seeks	to	facilitate	ID	 through	 maintaining	 the	 differences,	 integrity,	 scriptures	 and	 traditions	 of	religions. 473 	He	 claims	 this	 enables	 dialogue	 because	 it	 acknowledges	 the	necessity	of	 immersing	oneself	and	coming	to	the	dialogue	 from	an	established	worldview,	 with	 its	 own	 wealth	 of	 resources	 and	 meaning. 474 	This	 allows	participants	 to	 retain	 fidelity	 to	 their	 religion,	 which	 is	 the	 only	 basis	 for	openness,	MacIntyre	argues,	because	it	preserves	the	faith	of	all	participants	and	their	unique	viewpoints	rather	 than	striving	to	appropriate	and	translate,	 ‘only	those	 traditions	whose	 adherents	 recognize	 the	 possibility	 of	 untranslatability	
																																																								472	Alasdair	MacIntyre,	Whose	Justice?	Which	Rationality?,	p.	384.	According	to	Gadamer,	this	is	part	of	the	Enlightenment	‘prejudice	against	prejudice’.	He	concurs	with	MacIntyre	that	this	prevents	all	understanding,	which	is	dependent	on	a	historical	context	as	its	horizon	of	meaning.	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	p.	272.	473	As	an	example,	‘scriptural	reasoning’	approaches	attempt	to	facilitate	ID	through	the	close	reading	of	scriptures	from	within	a	tradition	alongside	members	of	other	traditions.	This	is	seen	as	facilitating	‘thick	description’	through	immersion	in	the	worldview	expressed	in	them,	combined	with	highlighting	the	participants’	shared	reverence	for	scriptures.	[Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Scriptural	Reasoning	as	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	Wiley-
Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	p.	66;	77.]	Although	disagreement	and	misunderstanding	are	inevitable,	they	are	prepared	for	and	protected	from	being	destructive	through	the	relationships	established	by	the	participants.	[Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	179.]	Moreover,	disagreement	is	seen	as	a	creative	possibility	that	produces	opportunities	for	new	meanings	from	the	different	worldviews	that	are	brought	into	dialogue	with	the	texts;	this	is	to	be	expected	if	religions	are	producers	of	experience,	‘after	thorough	study,	the	texts	from	the	various	scriptural	traditions	begin	to	affect	one	another,	leading	to	astonishing,	powerful,	and	sometimes	very	surprising	new	insights.’	[Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Scriptural	Reasoning	as	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	p.	68.]	474	Each	religion	can	provide	its	own	resources	for	encounter	because	of	its	centrality	in	world	construction,	‘its	assimilative	powers…[and]	its	ability	to	provide	an	intelligible	interpretation	in	its	own	terms	of	the	varied	situations	and	realities	adherents	encounter.’	George	A.	Lindbeck,	The	
Nature	of	Doctrine:	Religion	and	Theology	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	p.	131.		
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into	 their	 own	 language-in-use	 are	 able	 to	 reckon	 adequately	 with	 that	possibility.’475		This	 approach	 to	 ID	 thus	 sees	 exchange	 as	 impossible,	 denies	 a	 liminal	space,	 and	 prioritises	 fidelity.	 Understanding	 and	 empathy,	 if	 possible	 at	 all,	require	 an	 intractable	 grounding	 in	 one’s	 own	 tradition	 rather	 than	 a	transforming	engagement	with	other	 traditions.	 It	 focuses	on	 retaining	what	 is	unique	 to	 each	 religion	 through	 intramural	 dialogue,	 inviting	 the	 other	 inside	one’s	religious	space	and	vice	versa	through	an	approach	of	‘faithful	witness’.476					(6.4.c.ii)	Wittgenstein,	Cheetham	and	Social-Practical	Approaches	In	 opposition	 to	 this	 prioritisation	 of	 language,	 many	 social-practical	approaches	 appropriate	 Wittgenstein’s	 subordination	 of	 language	 to	 practice.	Wittgenstein	stresses	that	language	is	contextual	to	specific	activities	and	‘forms	of	life’,	that	determine	the	rules	of	the	language	game	and	in	turn	the	meaning	of	the	 specific	 expressions,	 ‘the	 term	 “language-game”	 is	 meant	 to	 bring	 into	prominence	the	fact	that	the	speaking…is	part	of	an	activity,	or	of	a	form	of	a	life	form.’477	Because	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 words	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 contextual	activity	 and	 expresses	 certain	 commitments,	 for	 example,	 of	 prescribing	 or	prohibiting	 an	 action,	 this	 cannot	 be	 translated	 out	 of	 its	 active	 context.478	
																																																								475	Alasdair	MacIntyre,	Whose	Justice?	Which	Rationality?,	p.	388.	476	George	A.	Lindbeck,	‘The	Gospel’s	Uniqueness:	Election	and	Untranslatability.’	In	George	A.	Lindbeck,	James	J.	Buckley	(ed.)	The	Church	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	pp.	228-229.		477	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Philosophical	Investigations,	trans.	G.	E.	M.	Anscombe	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2001	[Third	Edition]),	23,	p.	10.	See,	for	examples	of	this	interpretation:	Fergus	Kerr,	Theology	
After	Wittgenstein	(London:	SPCK,	1997	[Second	Edition]),	p.	149;	Alan	Keightley,	Wittgenstein,	
Grammar	and	God	(London:	Epworth,	1976),	p.	32;	Genia	Schoenbaumsfeld,	‘Ludwig	Wittgenstein’.	In,	Graham	Oppy	and	N.	N.	Trakakis	(eds.),	Twentieth-Century	Philosophy	of	
Religion	(Durham:	Acumen,	2009),	p.	163.	478	Hence	Wittgenstein	claims	that	attempts	to	understand	anyone	in	different	forms	of	life	inevitably	fail,	‘We	learn	this	when	we	come	into	a	strange	country	with	entirely	strange	traditions;	and	what	is	more,	even	given	a	mastery	of	the	country’s	language.	We	do	not	
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Religions	 provide	 prime	 cases	 of	 this,	 because	 they	 are	 seen	 as	 essentially	expressing	 commitments	 and	 values,	 ‘Faith,	 like	 hope	 and	 much	 else,	 is	embedded	in	human	life,	 ‘in	all	of	the	situations	and	reactions	which	constitute	human	life.’’479		The	 implication	 for	 social-practical	 approaches	 is	 that	 practical	cooperation	between	religious	adherents	is	achievable	and	understanding	is	only	possible	 in	 this	 context.	 ID	 must	 focus	 on	 a	 practical	 understanding	 of	 the	demands	 and	 commitments	 expressed	 by	 religions,	 achieved	 through	 practical	interaction	 and	 cooperation	 in	 the	 situations	 that	 provide	 the	 meaning	 for	religious	language.	Liberal	social-practical	approaches	may	also	seek	to	identify	a	shared	social,	neutral	space	in	which	participants	in	ID	can	meet	and	that	foster	social	 action	 and	 cooperation.	 Deeply	 held	 religious	 convictions,	 because	 they	appeal	 to	 purportedly	 metaphysical	 realities	 that	 are	 inaccessible	 and	uncontestable,	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 obstacles	 to	 dialogue	 that	 need	 to	 be	bracketed	in	a	transition	to	a	postmetaphysical	dialogue	focused	on	this-worldly	issues	and	activities:	meaningful	public	exchange	can	only	occur	 if	participants	respect,	 ‘the	 priority	 of	 secular	 reasons	 and	 the	 institutional	 translation	proviso.’480	
																																																																																																																																																														
understand	the	people….	We	cannot	find	our	feet	with	them….	If	a	lion	could	talk,	we	could	not	understand	him.’	[Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Philosophical	Investigations,	p.	190.]	This	is	true	particularly	of	religions,	where,	‘Reasons	look	entirely	different	from	normal	reasons’.	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Lectures	and	Conversations	on	Aesthetics,	Psychology	and	Religious	Belief,	ed.	Cyril	Barrett	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1966),	p.	56.	This	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein	as	leading	to	the	impossibility	of	such	exchange	is	offered,	for	example,	by:	Genia	Schoenbaumsfeld,	‘Ludwig	Wittgenstein’.	In,	Graham	Oppy	and	N.	N.	Trakakis	(eds.),	Twentieth-Century	Philosophy	of	
Religion,	p.	169.	479	Fergus	Kerr,	Theology	After	Wittgenstein,	p.	150.	See	also:	Genia	Schoenbaumsfeld,	‘Ludwig	Wittgenstein’.	In,	Graham	Oppy	and	N.	N.	Trakakis	(eds.),	Twentieth-Century	Philosophy	of	
Religion,	pp.	167-168.	480	Jurgen	Habermas,	Between	Naturalism	and	Religion,	p.	139.	
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Building	on	 this	conviction,	Cheetham	argues	 that	 the	 focus	on	ultimate,	theological	 questions,	 such	 as	whether	 outsiders	 have	 truth	 and	 salvation,	 has	impeded	 ID	 by	 occluding	 the	 numerous,	 smaller	 points	 of	 intersection	 and	 by	making	participants	 fearful	of	 their	positions	being	undermined.481	Instead,	 the	space	 of	 ID	 is	 best	 constructed	 as	 a,	 ‘neutral	 territory’,	 or,	 ‘exteriority’,	 ‘to	 de-intensify	the	debate…and	lower	the	stakes’.482	Meeting	in	a	de-intensified	space	with	bracketed	commitments	can	achieve	a	meeting	 in	which	what	divides	and	disrupts	meeting	is,	‘suspended	or	bracketed	out.’483	This	may	involve	mundane	daily	 meetings	 or	 the	 shared	 context	 of	 having	 to	 address	 global	 issues.484	In	these	cases,	 ID	 facilitates	deep	meeting,	 in	conformity	with	the	 importance	and	depth	of	religion	for	people’s	identities,	but	through	non-religious	activities	and	issues	that	bracket	the	divisive	commitments,	‘finite	profundities’,	‘that	are…not	obviously	 religious	 but	 are	 nonetheless	 deep.’485	To	 facilitate	 this,	 Cheetham	argues	 that	 participants	 should	 adopt	 an,	 ‘aesthetic	 attitude’,	 which	 includes	‘imaginative	 playfulness’,	 ‘disinterestedness’,	 empathy,	 and	 humour,	 which	facilitate	 respect	 and	 understanding.486	In	 relation	 to	 the	 three	 questions,	 such	approaches	(i)	focus	on	practical	cooperation;	(ii)	deny	shared	religious	spaces,	though	 arguing	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 neutral,	 secular	 liminal	 space;	 and	 (iii)	affirm	the	possibility	of	deep	emotional	connection	between	participants.		
																																																								481	‘only	ultimate	theological	reference	points	are	placed	onto	the	horizon	of	the	meeting	between	religions.’	Cheetham,	WMTR,	pp.	73-74.	482	David	Cheetham,	‘Religion	and	the	Religious	Other’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	30.	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	64	and	p.	2.	483	David	Cheetham,	‘Religion	and	the	Religious	Other’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	36.	484	David	Cheetham,	‘Religion	and	the	Religious	Other’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	30.	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	80.	Philip	Goodchild,	‘Politics,	Pluralism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Religion:	an	Essay	on	Exteriority’.	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	pp.	200-206.	485	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	91;	p.	5.	486	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	6;	p.	64.	
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6.5	The	Question	of	Deep	Encounter	 and	Translation:	Direct	 and	 Indirect	
Communication		UCM	will	 now	be	developed	 in	 relation	 to	 these	 alternative	positions.	 It	will	 be	 shown	 that	Kierkegaard’s	 theory	 of	 communication	 provides	 resources	for	 facilitating	 existential	 encounter	 in	 IE	 and	provides	 a	 superior	 approach	 to	the	alternative	models,	 incorporating	their	insights,	particularly	on	the	context-dependence	 of	 rationality,	 and	 necessity	 of	 a	 liminal	 space	 and	 faith,	 but	overcoming	their	limitations	to	offer	a	fuller	conception	of	what	is	possible	in	IE.	It	will	address	the	three	questions	 facing	IE:	 (i)	how	encounter	with	existential	possibilities	and	the	 inwardness	of	religiousness	can	be	 facilitated,	 (ii)	how	the	liminal	 space	 is	 best	 configured,	 and	 (iii)	 what	 attitudes	 participants	 should	adopt.	In	relation	to	these,	UCM	avoids	the	objectivism	in	the	method	and	aims	of	the	alternatives,	posits	a	shared	existential	situation	in	which	meeting	is	possible	while	 accepting	 the	 contextual	 nature	 of	 understanding,	 and	 strikes	 a	 balance	between	fidelity	and	openness.		Furthermore,	UCM	sees	the	irresolvable	tensions	and	conflicts	of	IE	not	as	precluding	 deep	 encounter,	 as	 in	 the	 alternative	 approaches,	 but	 rather	 as	valuable	in	motivating	and	energising	full,	personal	engagement.	The	alternative	approaches	see	dialogue	as	extraneous	to	religious	identity:	it	is	something	one	is	forced	to	engage	in	and	has	to	adopt	strategies	to	protect	certain	parts	of	the	identity	as	 sacred,	whether	 this	 is	 in	a	neutral	 space	or	one’s	own	 tradition.	 In	contrast,	 for	UCM,	 fidelity	 and	openness	 in	 encountering	others	 are	 integral	 to	the	passionate,	unbounded	venture	of	religiousness.	
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Kierkegaard’s	 theory	 of	 communication	 advocates	 a	 policy	 of	communicative	praxis	focused	on	the	form	of	the	communication	rather	than	the	content	(CUP,	p.	76).	A	central	contention	is	that	communication	is	performative,	that	 is,	 it	 is	 performed	 through	 the	 character	 traits	 and	 ways	 in	 which	communicators	 live	 out	 their	 own	 identities	 and	 relate	 to	 others.	 This	acknowledges	 the	 contextuality	 asserted	 by	 both	 alternative	 models:	communication	 occurs	within	 the	 embodied,	 cultural,	 practical,	 and	 existential	situation	 of	 the	 person,	 which	 are	 key	 to	 facilitating	 it.	 Climacus	 depicts	 it	 in	relation	to	two	characters:	the	honourable	gentleman	(CUP,	p.	610-616)	and	the	subjectively	existing	 thinker	 (CUP,	pp.	72-126);	Anti-Climacus	adds	a	 third:	 the	witness	who	communicates	existentially	by	imitating	Christ	(PiC,	p.	254).	These	characters	correspond	to	Kierkegaard’s	distinction	between,	‘the	communication	
of	 knowledge’,	 which	 is	 direct	 communication,	 and	 ‘the	 communication	 of	
capability’,	which	is	indirect	communication487			(6.5.a)	Direct	Communication	in	the	Alternative	Approaches	Direct	communication	aims	for	the	endowment	of	understanding	through	an	accurate,	direct	transmission	of	factual	knowledge,	such	as	a	set	of	facts	about	the	afterlife	(CUP,	pp.	165-171),	 ‘If	 it	 is	the	object	which	is	reflected	upon,	then	we	 have	 the	 communication	 of	 knowledge.’488	Its	 focus	 is	 on	 correspondence	between	the	content	of	the	communication	and	its	object,	the	‘what’,	in	order	to	enable	 its	 reduplication	 in	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 recipient.	 It	 takes	 an	 objective	
																																																								487	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	657,	p.	308.	488	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	657,	p.	306.	
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approach	 to	 the	 content	 of	 the	 communication	 and	 to	 recipients,	 who	 are	regarded	as	passive	recipients	who	learn	it	by	rote	(CUP,	p.	74).	The	 ‘honourable	 gentleman’	 (CUP,	 pp.	 610-616)	 depicts	 this	 way	 of	communicating	 religion	 as	 a	 set	 of	 doctrines	 or	 beliefs:	 declaring	 his	 religious	position	in	language,	‘loudly	and	solemnly’,	imparting	a	set	of	facts,	doctrines	and	behaviours	 in	 a	 one-way	 dissemination	 (CUP,	 p.	 614).	 He	 need	 not	 be	dispassionate,	‘An	orthodox	defends	Christianity	with	the	most	terrible	passion;	with	perspiring	face	and	the	most	worried	gestures,	he	maintains	that	he	accepts	Christianity	pure	and	unadulterated;	he	will	live	and	die	in	it’	(CUP,	p.	613),	but	he	 fails	 to	 appreciate	 the	 irony	 that	 in	 expressing	 his	 religiousness	 objectively	and	 with	 passionate	 certainty,	 he	 demonstrates	 his	 lack	 of	 religiousness	 and	misrepresents	 it	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 ‘what’	 of	 Christianity	 rather	 than	 ensuring	his	subjective,	agonistic	way	of	being	is	encountered	by	others,		‘He	does	everything	in	the	name	of	Jesus	and	uses	Christ’s	name	on	every	occasion	 as	 a	 sure	 sign	 that	 he	 is	 a	 Christian	 and	 is	 called	 to	 defend	Christendom	 in	 our	 day—and	 he	 has	 no	 intimation	 of	 the	 little	 ironic	secret	that	a	person,	 just	by	describing	the	“how”	of	his	 inwardness,	can	indirectly	 indicate	 that	 he	 is	 a	 Christian	 without	 mentioning	 Christ’s	name.’	(CUP,	p.	613)	The	 alternative	 approaches	 conceptualise	 IE	 as	 occurring	 in	 this	 direct	way.	Theological	models	focus	on	spoken	or	written	information	exchange	as	the	primary	 vehicle	 of	 encounter,	 with	 the	 aim	 being	 the	 communication	 of	knowledge.	 Gadamer’s	 prioritisation	 of	 language	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 all	understanding	 and	 experience	 is	 objectifying	 because	 it	 entails	 that	 the	world	must	 be	 represented	 in	 linguistic	 structures	 that	 make	 it	 intelligible	 and	 an	
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object	 of	 knowledge;	 no	 aspect	 of	 reality	 escapes	 this,	 ‘man’s	 relation	 to	 the	world	is	absolutely	and	fundamentally	verbal	in	nature,	and	hence	intelligible’.489	Even	cultural-linguistic	models,	which	attempt	thick	description	and	exposure	to	the	 worldviews	 or	 structures	 underlying	 the	 specific	 claims,	 understand	 it	 as	involving	 linguistic	 and	 hermeneutical	 interaction	 between	 different	 sets	 of	descriptions	and	hermeneutical	regimes.	Hence	the	primary	problem	considered	by	 Lindbeck	 and	 MacIntyre	 is	 the	 translation	 of	 meaning	 across	 different	linguistic	 contexts	 and	 a	 method	 proposed	 for	 addressing	 this,	 scriptural	reasoning,	involves	reading	and	discussing	texts.490		Ethical-practical	 approaches	 are	 less	 objective.	 As	 an	 example,	 Maraldo	argues	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 practice	 provides	 a	 fuller	 alternative	 to	 direct	communication.491	Despite	 affinities	 between	 this	 approach	 and	 UCM,	Maraldo	fails	 to	 address	 the	 underlying	 objectivism	 of	 social-practical	 approaches.	 The	practices	he	identifies,	such	as	prayer	and	meditation,	remain	direct	in	that	they	aim	to	make	the	objects	of	religious	devotion	directly	accessible	through	episodic	involvement	 in	 the	 assigned	 activities.	 For	 Climacus,	 these	 are	 direct	 because	they	 do	 not	 convey	 the	 whole	 way	 of	 being	 of	 religious	 adherents	 and	 fall	comically	short	of	the	absolute,	inward	commitment	at	the	core	of	religiousness.	First,	participating	in	a	practice	is	occasional	and	short-term,	with	the	encounter																																																									489	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	pp.	475-476.	490	Moyaert	identifies	learning	through	reading	as	an	influential	model	for	dialogue.	[Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Scriptural	Reasoning	as	Inter-Religious	Dialogue’.	In,	Catherine	Cornille	(ed.),	The	
Wiley-Blackwell	Companion	to	Inter-Religious	Dialogue,	p.	64.]	Clooney	similarly	sees	reading	religious	scriptures	as	a	significant	component	of	learning	about	the	religious	other.	[Francis	X.	Clooney,	Comparative	Theology:	Deep	Learning	Across	Religious	Borders,	pp.	57-64.]	For	a	similar	emphasis	on	verbal	exchange,	see:	Martin	Forward,	Inter-religious	Dialogue:	A	Short	Introduction	(Oxford:	Oneworld,	2001),	p.	12.	Maraldo	argues	that	this	is	a	weakness	of	a	range	of	approaches	to	IE.	[John	C.	Maraldo,	‘A	Call	for	an	Alternative	Notion	of	Understanding	in	Interreligious	Hermeneutics’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	89.]	491	On	the	grounds	that	there	are,	‘aspects	of	religion	that	have	nothing	to	do	with	texts	and	little	to	do	with	language’.	[John	C.	Maraldo,	‘A	Call	for	an	Alternative	Notion	of	Understanding	in	Interreligious	Hermeneutics’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	89.]	
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ending	 with	 the	 end	 of	 the	 activity,	 in	 contrast	 to	 which	 Climacus	 asks,	 ‘Does	“always	 to	 thank	God”	mean	 that	once	a	year,	on	 the	second	Sunday	 in	Lent	at	Vespers,	I	bear	in	mind	that	I	am	always	to	thank	God…?	Consequently,	thanking	God,	 this	 simple	matter,	 suddenly	 assigns	me	one	of	 the	most	 strenuous	 tasks,	one	 that	will	 be	 sufficient	 for	my	 entire	 life.’	 (CUP,	 pp.	 178-179)	 Furthermore,	this	 does	 not	 require	 emotional	 connection	 in	 relation	 to	 deep	 religious	commitments	and	thus	fails	to	communicate	the	core	of	religious	commitment	as	a	 long-lasting,	 inward	 reality	 with	 implications	 for	 the	 full	 range	 of	 life	 and	experience	 of	 the	 adherent.	 Climacus	 compares	 it	 to	 a	 ‘Herculean	 man’,	 who,	‘while	 praying	 and,	 in	 order	 to	 indicate	 the	 inwardness	 of	 prayer,	 twisted	 and	turned	 in	 forceful	 poses	 that	 would	 be	 instructive….	 The	 inwardness	 and	 the	unutterable	sighs	of	prayer	are	incommensurate	with	the	muscular.’	(CUP,	p.	91)		UCM’s	 contention	 is	 that	 people’s	most	 important	 religious	 experiences	and	 commitments	 are	 inward	 and	 subjective;	 they	 are	 thus	 inexpressible	 by	direct	 communication,	 ‘Objective	 thinking	 is	 completely	 indifferent	 to	subjectivity	and	thereby	to	inwardness	and	appropriation’	(CUP,	p.	75;	see	also:	CUP,	pp.	409-410).	Climacus	argues	that	direct	communication	is	 inadequate	to	facilitate	 IE	 for	 three	 reasons,	 ‘direct	 communication	 is	 a	 fraud	 toward	 God	(which	possibly	defrauds	him	of	the	worship	of	another	person	in	truth),	a	fraud	toward	 himself	 (as	 if	 he	 had	 ceased	 to	 be	 an	 existing	 person),	 a	 fraud	 toward	another	 human	 being	 (who	 possibly	 obtains	 only	 a	 relative	 God-relationship)’	(CUP,	p.	75).492		
																																																								492	Turnbull	sees	indirect	communication	as	necessitated	by	a	fourth	factors:	the	impossibility	of	a	direct	relation	with	God,	which	can	be	mediated	only	by	Christ,	such	that	a	person	communicates	it	indirectly	by	communicating	facts	about	Christ,	which	then	communicates	it.	[Jamie	Turnbull,	‘Communication/Indirect	Communication’.	In,	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	William	
	257	 	
First,	it	is	described	as,	‘a	fraud	toward	another	human	being’,	because	it	effaces	 the	 inwardness	 that	 is	 the	 core	 of	 religiousness.	 The	 inwardness	 of	religiousness	 includes	 its	 experiential	 and	 excessive	 nature:	 it	 is	 compared	 to	erotic	 love,	which	can	be	 felt	but	not	expressed	without	 losing	 its	 reality	as	an	inward,	overwhelming	state	(CUP,	pp.	73-74).	Hence,	Climacus	and	Kierkegaard	contrast	it	with	various	assertions	that	contradict	themselves	by	virtue	of	being	made	(CUP,	p.	78),	 in	the	same	way	that	Mars	cannot	be	painted	in	the	armour	that	made	him	invisible,	because	it	is	an,	‘essential	secret’	(CUP,	pp.	79-80).493	This	 is	 more	 than	 the	 assertion	 that	 an	 affective	 state	 can	 only	 be	understood	when	experienced:	it	can	only	be	apprehended	existentially	because	understanding	 it	 and	 responding	 to	 it	 are	 synonymous.	 Because	 religious	knowing	 is	 subjective	 and	 appropriative	 the	 most	 important	 things	 to	communicate	in	IE	are	things	that	pertain	to	human	existence	in	such	a	way	that	they	elicit	existential	 transformation	and	appropriative	responses,	 ‘All	essential	knowing	pertains	to	existence,	or	only	the	knowing	whose	relation	to	existence	is	essential	is	essential	knowing.’	(CUP,	p.	197)	In	particular,	encounter	requires	a	‘second	 reflection’	 in	which	 the	 core	 religious	 commitment	 is	 internalised	 and	lived	 out	 in	 the	 life	 of	 the	 person	 (CUP,	 p.	 76)	 either	 in	 sympathetic	 or	antipathetic	responses.			As	 examples,	 Climacus	 cites	 attempts	 to	 directly	 communicate	information	 about	 death	 and	 the	 afterlife	 that	 misunderstand	 their	 existential	reality	 as	 having	 profound,	 transforming	 implications	 for	 human	 persons,	 and	replace	 this	with	 factual	description	(CUP,	pp.	165-171).	Direct	communication																																																																																																																																																															McDonald	and	Jon	Stewart	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concepts,	Tome	II:	Classicism	to	Enthusiasm,	p.	19.]	This	is	partly	true	of	Anti-Climacus’	position	(PiC,	p.	125).		493	See	also:	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	649,	p.	272.	
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fails	 to	 convey	 existential	 relevance	 and	 facilitate	 response.	 The	 existential	reality	 of	 death	 has	 not	 been	 communicated	 if	 it	 has	 not	 had	 an	 effect	 on	 the	recipient’s	way	of	being,	 ‘when	dying	is	to	be	placed	in	relation	to	the	subject’s	whole	 life’	 (CUP,	 pp.	 169-170).	 Comparably,	 a	 religious	 other	 has	 only	 been	encountered	 insofar	 as	 it	 elicits	 transforming	 responses	 like	 appropriation	 or	offence.494	Direct	 communication	 is	 also	 inattentive	 to	 the	 agency	 of	 recipients.	Climacus	 lists	 a	 number	 of	 examples	 in	 which	 relationships	 to	 others	 are	damaged	 because	 of	 a	 direct,	 objective	 approach	 that	 aims	 for	 conversion,	persuasion,	 or	mastery	 (CUP,	 pp.	 77-78).	 This	 is	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 centrality	attributed	 by	 Gadamer	 and	 Lindbeck	 to	 cultural-linguistic	 structures	 and	 their	marginalising	of	agency:	their	equation	of	context	with	culture	omits	the	context	of	 local,	 relative,	 subjective	appropriation.	Focusing	on	a	 canonical	 text	 further	perpetuates	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 an	 authoritative	 essence	 of	 each	 religion,	located	 in	a	 fixed	repository	of	knowledge,	a	claim	rejected	by	Climacus	on	the	grounds	that	subjective	appropriation,	not	‘the	bible	theory’,	has	priority	(CUP,	p.	23).	The	use	of	images	of	spaces	and	tents	in	the	discourses	of	ID	focuses	on	an	external,	 objectively	 fixed	 environment	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 transcendent,	subjective,	 malleable	 interactions	 between	 people	 with	 porously	 configured	identities	 and	 possible	 ways	 of	 being.	 Rather	 than	 aiming	 for	 dissemination	through	 dialogue,	 IE	 must	 facilitate	 a	 personal,	 subjective	 appropriation,	 ‘the	subjective	 individuals	must	be	held	devoutly	apart	 from	one	another	and	must	not	run	coagulatingly	together	in	objectivity.’	(CUP,	p.	79).		
																																																								494	This	is	why	Climacus	praises	the	critics	who	take	offence	at	Christianity	as	having	a	fuller	understanding	of	it	than	its	objective	defenders	(CUP,	p.	65).	
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Second,	 it	 is	 a,	 ‘fraud	 toward	 God’,	 because	 it	 reduces	 God’s	 revelatory	presence	 to	 a	 set	 of	 doctrinal	 propositions	 or	 cultural	 structures.	 Direct	communication	 is	 misguided	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 ‘what’	 rather	 than	 the	 ‘how’	(CUP,	 p.	 610).	 It	 removes	 the	 eventful,	 ‘miracle’	 through	 which	 God	 is	experienced	as	a	subject	of	worship	rather	 than	an	object	of	 intellectual	assent	(CUP,	 p.	 605).	 	 Anti-Climacus	 further	 emphasises	 this	 in	 conformity	 with	 his	focus	on	imitating	Jesus	as	the	primary	way	of	witnessing	(PiC,	p.	86).	Third,	direct	communication	is,	‘a	fraud	toward	himself’,	because	it	fails	to	acknowledge	 that	 the	 communicator	 himself	 is	 in	 a	 process	 of	 appropriative	development.	 His	 religiousness	 could	 never	 be	 stated	 in	 a	 clear	 form	 even	 for	himself;	as	soon	as	it	was,	it	would	become	fixed	and	represent,	at	best,	a	version	of	his	prior	religious	convictions,	not	those	as	they	are	developing	in	the	anxious	and	 uncertain	medium	of	 actuality.	 This	would	 also	 preclude	 the	 possibility	 of	being	transformed	in	the	encounter,	‘Just	because	he	himself	is	continually	in	the	process	of	becoming	in	an	inward	direction...he	can	never	communicate	himself	directly,	since	the	movement	here	is	the	very	opposite.'	(CUP,	pp.	73-74).	Hence,	the	 ‘honourable	 gentleman’	 is	 undermined	 by	 his	 unwitting	 variation	 of	explanations	(CUP,	p.	615).		To	 sum	 up,	 the	 alternative	 approaches	 focus	 on	 direct	 communication.	They	are	objective,	 descriptive,	 and	occasional	 exercises,	 focused	on	 the	 ‘what’	and	 content	 of	 belief	 and	practice	 (CUP,	 p.	 601).	 This	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	existential	nature	of	religiousness	as	inward	and	appropriative	commitment	that	occurs	 in	 an	 embodied	 context	 of	 existential	 activity	 alongside	 others	 and	 in	 a	process	of	subjective	appropriation.				
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(6.5.b)	Indirect	Communication		Climacus’	 figure	 for	 indirect	 communication	 is	 the	 subjectively	 existing	thinker	(SET)	(CUP,	pp.	72-126).	The	SET	is	sensitive	to	the	fact	that	he	is	trying	to	communicate	a	way	of	being	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	factual	descriptions	or	practices;	he	aims	to	communicate	its	inwardness,	pathos,	and	uncertainty	so	as	to	elicit	existential	responses.	The	SET	communicates	indirectly	in	several	main	ways.	Specific	strategies	for	applying	this	to	IE	are	discussed	in	the	final	section.	
	
The	SET	aims	to	facilitate	existential	encounter	with	ways	of	being	through	ways	of	
being	(Lessing’s	first	thesis).		The	SET	aims	to	facilitate	existential	encounter	between	people	and	their	ways	of	being.495	This	encounter	must	occur	 in	ways	 that	are	 sensitive	 to	 their	inward	nature	(CUP,	p.	77)	as	total	commitments	and	also	facilitate	leaps	(CUP,	p.	93),	 transformations,	 and	 appropriative	 responses	 from	 participants,	 engaging	participants	‘non-discursively’	rather	than	providing	information	or	material	for	debate.496	In	 conformity	 with	 the	 two	 elements	 of	 the	 spheres	 of	 existence,	possibility	 and	 necessity,	 the	 communication	 aims	 to	 communicate	 a	 general	religious	identity,	such	as	Christianity,	in	a	way	that	makes	it	a	possibility	for	the	person	to	subjectively	appropriate	it	and	live	it	out	in	their	subjective	situation,	moving	from	universality	to	being,	‘more	and	more	existentially	isolated’,	as	it	is	appropriated	and	responded	to	in	specificity	(CUP,	p.	73).	Hence	it	 is	described	
																																																								495	Following	Levinas,	Tracy	suggests	the	term	‘exposure	to	the	other’	rather	than	‘encounter	with	the	other’,	as	the	meeting	is	destabilising	of	the	participants.	This	is	avoided	because	‘exposure’	suggests	a	laying	bare	that	is	impossible	for	UCM,	given	the	inward	and	inexpressible	nature	of	the	commitments	that	are	at	stake	in	the	encounter.	[David	Tracy,	‘The	Other	of	Dialectic	and	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond	(eds.),	Dynamics	of	Difference:	
Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	113.]	496	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	649,	p.	272.	
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as	 communicating	 ethical	 capability	 rather	 than	 knowledge,	 ‘In	 regard	 to	 the	ethical	 and	 the	 ethical-religious,	 the	 genuine	 communication	 and	 instruction	 is	
training	or	upbringing.’497			
The	SET	has	pathos	and	the	comic	in	equal	proportions	(Lessing’s	Second	Thesis).		The	 religious	 situation,	 shared	 by	 all	 participants	 in	 IE,	 is	 defined	 by	 a	comic	disparity	between	their	absolute	passionate	commitment	to	an	excessive	revelation	and	total	lack	of	certainty	(CUP,	pp.	81-82),	‘The	perpetual	process	of	becoming	 is	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 earthly	 life,	 in	 which	 everything	 is	 uncertain.’	(CUP,	 p.	 86)	 The	 SET	 must	 acknowledge	 this	 comic	 disparity	 by	 avoiding	authoritarian	 claims;	 he,	 ‘always	 keeps	 open	 the	wound	 of	 negativity’	 (CUP,	 p.	85).	This	 requires	 that	 all	 participants,	 including	 the	SET	are,	 ‘never	 a	 teacher,	but	 a	 learner’	 (CUP,	 p.	 85).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 absolute	 nature	 of	 the	passionate	 commitment	must	not	be	 seen	as	 irrational	 or	 to	be	 abandoned	 for	the	 sake	 of	 dialogue,	 such	 that	 the	 participants	 must	 foster	 a	 situation	 of	passionate	 openness,	 ‘The	 truly	 comic	 is	 that	 the	 infinite	 can	 be	 at	 work	 in	 a	human	being,	and	no	one,	no	one	discovers	it	by	looking	at	him.’	(CUP,	p.	91)	
	
The	 SET	 sees	 communication	 as	 always	 unfinished	 because	 it	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	
process	of	becoming	that	is	coterminous	with	life	(Lessing’s	third	and	fourth	theses)		In	IE,	communication	is	an	activity	of	people	who	are	involved	in	on	going	existential	development	coterminous	with	their	lives	as	subjective	beings	in	the,	
																																																								497	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	650,	p.	279.	Turnbull	notes	that	this	is	in	conformity	with	the	Danish	verb	‘meddele’,	communicate,	which	signifies	‘sharing	with’	and	can	also	refer	to,	‘the	process	whereby	a	particular	property…is	transferred	from	one	person…to	another.’	Jamie	Turnbull,	‘Communication/Indirect	Communication’.	In,	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	William	McDonald	and	Jon	Stewart	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concepts,	Tome	II:	Classicism	to	Enthusiasm,	p.	17.	
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‘ever-striving	drive	for	truth’	(CUP,	p.	106).	No	decisive	resolutions	are	expected	from	 such	 communications,	 though	 they	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 punctuations,	significant	moments,	or	‘leaps’		(CUP,	p.	93)	in	the	perpetual	process	of	subjective	formation	and	striving	to	live	out	an	authentic	life.		Such	 a	 communication	 opens	 a	 new	 type	 of	 existence	 for	 the	 recipient;	even	 if	 they	 reject	 it	 and	 are	 repelled	 by	 offence,	 it	 alters	 or	 transforms	 their	subjectivity	 by	 touching	 it	 and	becoming	 a	 part	 of	 their	 life-history.	A	 primary	way	of	communicating	this	is	in	living	out	the	way	of	being	(CUP,	p.	73).	Because	subjectivity	is	essentially	relational,	interpersonal	relationships	and	interactions	overcome	the	problem	of	translation:	people	are	transformed	in	relating	to	one	another	and	this	is	the	communication	of	their	ways	of	being.	This	also	requires	openness	on	the	part	of	 the	communicator,	as	 the	 transformation	 is	dependent	on	 full	 participation	 and	 interaction	 between	 the	 participants,	 who	 must	recognise	 the	 excessive	 eventfulness	 and	 importance	 of	 the	 encounter.	 As	demonstrated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 this	 requires	 the	 prioritisation	 of	 the	agency	 of	 the	 other	 and	 of	 the	 destabilising	 effects	 of	 encounter	 on	 all	participants.		
Application	to	IE:	The	Possibility	of	Indirect	Communication	Applied	 to	 IE,	 indirect	 communication	 presents	 the	 possibility	 of	 deep	encounter,	 defeating	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 denial	 of	 communication	 on	 two	points.	 UCM	 accepts	 the	 impossibility	 of	 translation	 asserted	 by	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 model	 because	 religions	 are	 whole	 ways	 of	 being	 that	 cannot	 be	
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extricated	 from	 their	 existential	 contexts	 to	 be	 directly	 communicated. 498	However,	 the	 error	 of	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 approach	 is	 to	 rule	 out	 encounter	because	of	its	equation	of	encounter	with	direct	communication	and	translation.	In	 contrast,	 indirect	 communication	 aims	 to	 facilitate	 existential	 encounter	rather	 than	 translation.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 involve	 an	 experience	 of	 the	excessiveness	 of	 the	 other,	 as	 impossible,	 paradoxical,	 or	 offensive.	 This	impossibility	does	not	indicate	a	failure	but	rather	an	achievement	of	IE,	because	it	indicates	that	one	is	in	the	presence	of	an	inassimilable	other	that	one	cannot	understand	 but	 only	 respond	 to;	 it	 signifies	 the	 saturation	 of	 intuition	 beyond	intentionality	in	revelatory	and	epiphanic	ways.			The	cultural-linguistic	model’s	argument	against	encounter	on	the	basis	of	linguistic	determinism	 is	also	based	on	a	 faulty	conception	of	agency.	Gadamer	recognises	that	persons	are	not,	like	animals,	confined	to	a	single	habitat	but	are	capable	 of	 learning	 new	 languages	 and	 thus	 adapting	 and	 broadening	 their	horizon	 through	agency.	He	refers	 to	 this	adaptive	capability	as,	 ‘the	 infinity	of	beings.’499	This	is	incoherent	given	his	assertion	of	linguistic	determinism.500	The	reason	 for	 this	 incoherence	 is	 a	 result	 of	 a	 binary	 conception	 of	 agency:	 it	 is	either	 ‘infinite’	 because	 endlessly	 adaptable,	 with	 priority	 given	 to	 the	autonomous	agent	who	exercises	it	through	negation,	or	completely	determined	and	 thus	 incapable	 of	 extricating	 itself	 from	 subordination	 to	 the	 cultural	
																																																								498	Tracy	notes	that	Kierkegaard’s	concept	of	God	as	‘the	Impossible’	serves	to	provide	a	fundamental	reason	for	untranslatability	and	the	impossibility	of	direct	communication.	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	22.	499	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	p.	453.	500	This	incoherence	is	noted	by:	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	8.	
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context.	Cultural-linguistic	approaches	deny	the	possibility	of	encounter	because	they	affirm	the	latter.	Indirect	 communication	 posits	 agency,	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 respond	 to	 and	appropriate	 the	 communication,	 as	 necessary	 for	 and	 central	 to	 IE.501	UCM	provides	a	superior	model	of	agency	to	the	binary	conception.	As	outlined	in	the	spheres	of	existence,	agency	is	a	dialectical,	relational	process	that	incorporates	both	 autonomy	 and	 the	 deterministic	 context.	 Subjectivity	 emerges	 because	 of	the	 agonistic	 relation	 between	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 subject	 and	 their	 situation	(SuD,	 pp.	 13-14)	 or,	 as	 mapped	 out	 by	 Climacus,	 as	 a	 ‘synthesis’	 (CUP,	 p.	 82)	brought	about	by	the	instantiation	of	the	infinite	possibilities	(CUP,	p.	82)	in	the	specificity	of	finite	existence.		This	 provides	 a	 porous	 conception	 of	 the	 person	 and	 affirms	 the	possibility	 of	 agential	 encounter.502	Agency	 is	 involved	 in	 shaping,	 inhabiting,	rejecting,	 and	 interpreting	 cultural	 structures	 through	 its	 commitments	 and	activities.	The	socio-cultural	context,	particularly	as	provided	by	the	network	of	relationships	 with	 others,	 presents	 the	 horizon	 of	 options	 and	 existential	possibilities	 for	 the	 person,	 though	 not	 in	 a	 deterministic	 way,	 ‘Agentival	capacity	 is	 entailed	 not	 only	 in	 those	 acts	 that	 resist	 norms	 but	 also	 in	 the	multiple	ways	in	which	one	inhabits	norms’.503																																																										501	Pattison	claims	that	the	core	feature	of	indirect	communication	that	unifies	its	various	methods	is	its	aim	to	retain	the	freedom	of	the	recipient	to	respond	in	unique,	subjective	ways,	‘it	honours,	affirms	and	in	the	process	of	communication	itself	ensures	and	nurtures	the	freedom	of	the	recipient	of	the	message,	or,	more	precisely	the	mutual	freedom	of	all	participants	in	the	process.’	George	Pattison,	Kierkegaard:	The	Aesthetic	and	the	Religious	(London:	SCM,	1999	[Second	Edition]),	p.	93.	502	I	owe	the	terms	‘porous’	to:	Charles	Taylor,	A	Secular	Age	(London:	The	Belknap	Press,	2007),	p.	539.	503	Saba	Mahmood,	Politics	of	Piety	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005	[Revised	Edition]),	p.	15.	
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6.6.	The	Question	of	the	Liminal	Space:	Deep	Collisions	in	Shared	Situations	(6.6.a)	The	Alternative	Approaches	on	the	Liminal	Space	The	 two	 alternative	 approaches	 to	 IE	 conceive	 of	 the	 liminal	 space	differently	 but	with	 the	 same	 consequences	 for	 religiousness.	 Lindbeck	 denies	that	 there	 is	 a	 liminal	 space	between	 religions.	The	 space	of	 IE	 is	 a	 temporary	space	 or	 ‘tent’	 created	 within	 a	 religion	 when	 outsiders	 are	 invited	 in	 to	participate	 in	 the	 prescribed	 activities.	 Cheetham’s	 approach	 is	 more	 open,	positing	a	shared	social	space	in	which	participants	can	connect	and	cooperate,	but	 to	 achieve	 this	 the	 deepest	 religious	 commitments	 of	 participants	must	 be	bracketed.	 For	 both,	 the	 space	 is	 inert,	 designed	 to	 negate	 the	 destabilizing	effects	 of	 encounter	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 religious	 collision,	 conflict,	 and	transformation	by	denying	any	possibility	of	intersection	or	bracketing	anything	that	 could	 shock	 and	 destabilize.	 They	 conceive	 of	 fidelity	 and	 openness	 as	binary	opposites	that	can	coexist	only	in	these	de-intensified	situations.		UCM	accepts	the	impossibility	of	extricating	meaning	from	the	existential	context	 but,	 with	 Cheetham,	 affirms	 that	 IE	 can	 occur	 in	 the	 lived	 interaction	between	 people.	 However,	 for	 UCM,	 the	 centrality	 of	 religiousness	 in	 the	participants’	 identities	 and	 absolute	 commitments	 cannot	 be	 bracketed.504	The	neutral	space	advocated	by	Cheetham	facilitates	meeting	and	friendship,	but	this	is	 not	 a	 religious	 meeting	 because	 it	 omits	 what	 is	 decisive	 to	 the	 religious	identities	of	the	participants.		UCM	posits	a	shared	yet	destabilising	 liminal	space	that	 is	 transforming	and	 provocative	 yet	 nevertheless	 energises	 the	 participants’	 deep	 encounters.																																																									504	Moyaert	identifies	the	same	feature	of	IE,	particularly	because	religions	posit	certain	of	the	commitments	as	more	important	than	anything	else.	Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	211.	
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From	this	perspective,	the	alternative	approaches	preclude	deep	transformation	and	 true	 dialogue	 by	 neutralising	 the	 encounter	 or	 shoring	 up	 the	 distinct	perspectives,	whereas,	‘‘dia-logue’	signifies	worldviews	being	argued	through	to	significant	and	potentially	transformative	conclusions’.505				(6.6.b)	UCM	on	the	Liminal	Space:	Deep	Collisions	Religions	 revolve	 around	 core	 commitments	 and	 struggles	 that	 make	absolute	claims	on	the	lives	and	identities	of	their	adherents;	persons	living	out	religious	 identities	 may	 be	 deeply	 committed	 and	 passionate	 about	 their	commitments.	 Because	 religions	make	 ultimate	 and	 transforming	 demands	 on	the	 person,	 the	 religious	 other	 is	 only	 encountered	 if	 the	 engagement	 with	 it	includes	‘immediacy	and	ultimacy’:	the	immediacy	of	being	confronted	by	it	and	ultimacy	 in	 that	 it	 makes	 absolute,	 transforming	 demands.506	One	 has	 only	encountered	the	other	insofar	as	one	has	encountered	the	ultimate	commitments	of	the	other	in	a	destabilising	collision.		Climacus	 describes	 such	 a	 ‘moment’	 in	 the	 encounter	 (PF,	 p.	 19)	 as	 a	‘collision’,	 ‘what	 is	 this	unknown	against	which	 the	understanding	 collides	 and	which	even	disturbs	man	and	his	self-knowledge?	It	is	the	unknown.’	(PF,	p.	39)	This	 is	 a	 collision	 in	 which	 the	 core	 commitment	 of	 the	 other	 cannot	 be	assimilated	or	translated	into	one’s	own	sphere,	such	that	it	is	experienced	as	an	excessive	 or	 offensive	 paradox,	 which	 can	 only	 be	 responded	 to	 in	 passionate	ways,	such	as	by	an	existential	transformation	of	faith	or	offence	(PF,	p.	49).	This	
																																																								505	Martin	Forward,	Inter-religious	Dialogue:	A	Short	Introduction,	p.	12.	506	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel,	Transformation	by	Integration:	How	Inter-faith	Encounter	Changes	
Christianity	(London:	SCM,	2009),	p.	174.	Schmidt-Leukel	also	cites:	Joseph	Cahill,	Mended	Speech:	
The	Crisis	of	Religious	Studies	and	Theology	(New	York:	Crossroad,	1982).	
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is	experienced	as	a	shock	so	radically	disturbing	and	destabilising	of	identity	(PF,	p.	39)	that	is	it	compared	to	being	born	(PF,	p.	20).		IE	must	 seek	 to	 facilitate	such	collisions	between	participants.	This	may	seem	to	set	a	high	and	dangerous	task	for	 IE,	but	this	acknowledges	that	every	meeting	 is	 potentially	dangerous	 and	 transforming	 in	 this	way,	 and	a	 religious	encounter,	by	providing	an	encounter	with	an	ultimate	should	be	more	so,	‘There	must	 be	 no	 bargaining,	 no	wanting	 to	 change	 Christianity;	 there	must	 neither	 be	 any	 going	 out	 of	 bounds	 by	 exercising	 a	 restraining	influence	at	 the	wrong	place,	but	only	a	watchfulness	 so	 that	 it	 remains	what	it	was,	an	offense	to	the	Jews	and	foolishness	to	the	Greeks,	and	not	some	fatuous	something	that	offends	neither	Greeks	nor	Jews—they	smile	at	it	instead’.	(CUP,	p.	605)		This	should	not	take	the	form	of	an	authoritarian	direct	communication	in	which	doctrines	are	communicated	and	the	decision	forced	upon	recipients	of	whether	to	 believe	 or	 reject	 them.	 Rather,	 participants	 should	 aim	 at	 painful	 self-revelatory	 activity	 in	which	 the	 excessive	depth	 of	 their	 commitments	 and	 the	precariousness,	internal	fragmentation	and	agony	of	their	positions	are	unveiled.	They	 should	 communicate	 so	 as	 to	 subvert	 and	 challenge	 the	ways	of	 being	of	recipients	and	communicators	alike,	unveiling	the	tensions	and	struggles	within	the	identities,	both	internal	to	them	and	in	the	tensions	exposed	when	seen	from	the	perspective	of	other	identities.	IE	 should	 not	 shy	 away	 from	 the	 core,	 contentious	 aspects	 of	 religious	conviction. 507 	Cheetham	 is	 right	 that	 one	 should	 not	 construct	 theological	structures	 that	 predetermine	 the	 encounter,	 but	 it	 is	 vital	 that,	 for	 Christians,																																																									507	This	view	is	shared	by:	Martin	Forward,	Inter-religious	Dialogue:	A	Short	Introduction,	p.	84.	
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their	commitment	to	Christ	is	stressed	and	explored	in	their	encounter	with	the	other.	 Participants	 should	 stress	 the	 struggles	 they	 face	 themselves	 in	 their	religious	commitment.	Such	 IE	 is	 frightening,	 because	 it	 threatens	 the	 security	 of	 religious	identity	and	unveils	 its	 fragility.	However,	 fleeing	 from	this	 fails	 to	address	 the	real	depths	made	possible	in	the	encounter:	that	an	entire	life	and	‘evig	salighed’	is	 at	 stake.	 Indeed,	 as	 a	 feature	of	unbounded	 commitment,	 this	 insecurity	 is	 a	deeply	religious	 insight	 that	unveils	 the	 fundamental	conditions	of	 identity	and	religiousness:	a	fragile,	anxious	construction	in	the	face	of	our	finitude.	Humans	commit	to	structures	as	having	ultimate	importance	that	can	be	lost	in	a	moment.	The	 faith	 of	 unbounded	 commitment	 is	 able	 to	 risk	 its	 destruction	 in	 the	encounter,	 and	 thus	 to	engage	 in	 it	 fully	 and	authentically,	 because	 it	 relies	on	divine	grace.	Engagement	in	IE	is	itself	an	act	of	faith	with	the	potential	to	reveal	a	deeper	understanding	of	faith	and	every	such	encounter	is	potentially	anxious,	strenuous,	vitally	important,	decisive	and	world-shattering.		UCM	provides	a	 realistic	view	of	RD	as	 frightening,	but	 it	also	 facilitates	deeper	IE	for	two	reasons.	First,	it	removes	some	of	the	obstacles	to	IE.	It	unveils	the	anxious	nature	of	all	 religious	commitments,	precluding	exclusivism,	and	 it	also	identifies	comparable	features	in	the	ways	of	being	of	participants:	that	they	are	committed	to	something	that	makes	absolute	claims	on	their	existence	 in	a	situation	of	uncertainty,	rather	than	demanding	that	they	bracket	what	they	take	to	 be	 most	 important.508	Focus	 on	 the	 core	 commitments	 also	 prevents	 the	ephemera	of	 religion,	 such	as	protectionist	and	divisive	 ideas	of	 sacred	spaces,	
																																																								508	Hence	Forward	clams	that	another’s	faith	is	most	easily	understood	by	those	who	have	faith.	[Martin	Forward,	Inter-religious	Dialogue:	A	Short	Introduction,	p.	57.]	
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objects	 and	 activities,	 from	 providing	 obstacles	 to	 IE.	 Hence	 the	 pseudonyms’	rejection	of	 the	 importance	of	phenomena	associated	with	Christianity,	 such	as	the	 sacraments	 and	 Church	 practice,	 ‘because	 the	 most	 decisive	 outward	expression	is	only	relative’,	ensures	that	these	do	not	provide	obstacles	to	non-Christians	(CUP,	pp.	90-91).	Whether	participants	have	adopted	respectful	attire	or	postures	is	inconsequential	when	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	the	absolute	commitments	of	participants.	Second,	deeper	and	more	energised	encounters	are	offered	by	recognising	the	radical	differences	and	collisions	in	the	encounter	and	the	new	 light	 shed	on	 the	 identities	 of	 participants	by	 these	new	perspectives.	Such	meeting	can	be	dangerous,	costly	and	involve	a	lifetime	of	struggle	with	the	other	in	substitutionary	and	loving	acts,	but	this	is	the	nature	of	human	existence	itself	as	fragile	and	mortal.	Moreover,	since	identities	themselves	revolve	around	core	conflicts,	collision	is	an	opportunity	rather	than	a	threat,	as	it	opens	one	up	to	 the	 tensions,	 struggles,	 and	 new	 possibilities	 that	 religions	 represent.	 IE	 is	made	possible	through	passionate	commitments,	not	in	spite	of	them.			(6.6.c)	UCM	on	the	Liminal	Space:	Shared	Situations	While	 the	 liminal	 space	 created	 by	 UCM	 is	 existentially	 charged	 and	agonistic,	 it	 is	 also	 shared	 and	 open	 in	 ways	 that	 provide	 fertile	 points	 of	intersection	 and	 meeting	 between	 participants.	 Davidson	 identifies	 two	prerequisites	 for	 a	 situation	 to	 provide	 for	 meaningful	 exchange.509	First,	 it	requires	a	shared	world	or	features	of	experience,	as	one	learns	the	meaning	of	
																																																								509	Donald	Davidson,	Inquiries	into	Truth	and	Interpretation	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001	[Second	Edition]).	For	a	summary	of	Davidson’s	position,	see:	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin,	‘The	Question	of	Theological	Truth	in	a	Multireligious	World:	Reflections	at	the	Interface	of	Continental	Philosophy	and	Interreligious	Studies’.	In,	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin	(eds.),	The	Question	of	Theological	Truth,	pp.	290-293.	
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words	by	exposure	to	their	referents:	one	learns	the	meaning	of	the	word	‘rain’	by	hearing	it	frequently	used	by	others	when	it	is	raining.	Second,	it	requires	an	assumption	 of	 some	 validity	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 other:	 if	 completely	meaningless	statements	are	being	made,	there	will	be	nothing	to	translate,	 ‘It	is	only	by	assuming	that	the	other	is	trying	to	say	something	about	the	world	as	it	is	and	generally	succeeding	in	doing	so	that	we	are	able	to	discover	what	he	or	she	 means.’510	Although	 UCM	 does	 not	 see	 religions	 as	 sets	 of	 claims	 to	 be	translated,	it	fulfils	both	of	these	prerequisites	in	aiming	to	engage	with	the	other	in	 a	 shared	 existential	 situation	 that	 religions	 interpret	 in	 subjectively	meaningful	ways.		
The	Shared	Situation	of	the	Encounter	First,	the	encounter	itself	is	a	shared	situation	for	all	participants	in	which	existential	 possibilities	 are	 made	 available.	 This	 is	 in	 conformity	 with	Wittgenstein’s	identification	of	meaning	as	arising	from	specific	activities	such	as	promising,	 hoping,	 feeling	 certain,	 measuring,	 and	 giving	 orders. 511 	All	participants	 will	 be	 involved	 in	 such	 activities	 suggesting	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 the	encounter,	they	will	share	some	common	experiences	and	deep	questions	about	fidelity	and	openness,	as	well	as	the	encounter	occurring	at	a	point	in	each	of	the	participants’	 lives,	 in	which	they	will	be	 involved	 in	activities	of	striving	to	 live																																																									510	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin,	‘The	Question	of	Theological	Truth	in	a	Multireligious	World:	Reflections	at	the	Interface	of	Continental	Philosophy	and	Interreligious	Studies’.	In,	Frederiek	Depoortere	and	Magdalen	Lambkin	(eds.),	The	Question	of	Theological	
Truth,	p.	291.	511	These	passages	indicate	that	Wittgenstein	does	not	identify	‘forms	of	life’	with	reified	cultural	entities,	in	the	way	the	cultural-linguistic	approach	does.	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Philosophical	
Investigations,	23,	p.	10.	See	also:	Alan	Keightley,	Wittgenstein,	Grammar	and	God,	p.	33.	Even	individual	words	operate	in	specific	contexts	that	vary	depending	on	individual	activities;	a	person	may	participate	in	numerous	such	contexts	on	a	daily	basis.	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	
Philosophical	Investigations,	23,	p.	11	and	p.	127.	
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out	their	religiousness	authentically,	constituting	their	identity,	making	choices,	and	having	relationships.	Goodchild	makes	this	point,	observing	that,	‘Encounter	involves	mutual	attention	during	time	spent	together’,	 in	which,	 ‘events	happen	to	 us.	 Our	 attention	 is	 demanded.	Where	 we	 differ…we	may	 share	 a	 common	experience	 that	 attracts	 our	 attention.’512	However,	 while	 Goodchild	 identifies	contingent	ethical	concerns,	such	as	environmental	and	economic	catastrophes,	UCM’s	 interpretation	 of	 religiousness	 as	 emerging	 in	 the	 human	 situation	proposes	a	more	fundamental	shared	space.		
The	Shared	Existential	Situation	UCM	asserts	that	religions	are	responding	to	shared	existential	situations	and	 the	 human	 condition	 itself.	 While	 not	 all	 may	 be	 asking	 the	 same	 deep	existential	 questions,	 those	 seeking	 to	 reflect	 deeply	 on	 their	 human	 situation	are	 likely	 to	 raise	 similar	 questions,	 for	 example,	 about	 suffering,	 mortality,	emotions,	 choices,	 values,	 and	 relationships,	 as	 these	 are	 posed	 by	 the	 human	situation	 itself.513	This	 is	 a	minimalist	 claim	 that	 does	 not	 assert	 universalised	experiences	or	questions	underpinning	 the	different	 religions.	On	 the	contrary,	the	other	may	present	questions	and	responses	that	one’s	own	religiousness	has	
																																																								512	Philip	Goodchild,	‘Politics,	Pluralism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Religion:	an	Essay	on	Exteriority’.	In,	Philip	Goodchild	(ed.),	Difference	in	Philosophy	of	Religion,	p.	202.	513	As	was	pointed	out	in	Chapter	2,	this	is	why	the	role	of	world-shattering	experiences,	such	as	death	and	suffering	are	important	as	they	disrupt	worldly	immersion	and	raise	such	ultimate	questions.	While	this	may	appear	reductive,	Cheetham	observes	that	religions	themselves	often	aspire	to	speak	in	more	universal	terms	about	religion	and	religiousness	and	that	the	idea	that	they	are	in	dialogue	about	something	that	exists	beyond	their	relative	linguistic	structures	is	a	component	of	their	realist	view	of	their	objects.	[David	Cheetham,	‘Religion	and	the	Religious	Other’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	15.]	In	contrast,	there	is	an	antirealist	strand	in	cultural-linguistic	theologies	that	is	opposed	to	religious	views	of	their	own	realities.	Hence	Lindbeck	admits	that,	‘intratextuality	seems	wholly	relativistic’,	religions	being,	‘self-enclosed	and	incommensurable	intellectual	ghettoes’	with	choice	between	religions,	if	possible	at	all,	being,	‘purely	arbitrary,	a	matter	of	blind	faith.’	[George	A.	Lindbeck,	The	Nature	of	Doctrine:	
Religion	and	Theology	in	a	Postliberal	Age,	p.128].	
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overlooked	or	 is	 incapable	of	 expressing;	 it	 is	because	others	present	 radically	different	 visions	 that	 engaging	 with	 them	 is	 valuable.	 Nevertheless,	 religious	boundaries	 meet	 and	 are	 blurred	 in	 the	 shared	 human	 situations	 of	 their	adherents.514	Indeed,	 because	 religions	 are	 human	 ways	 of	 being,	 it	 is	 natural	that	 humans	 should	 be	 able	 to	 engage	 with	 them.	 Even	 a	 revelation	 will	 be	affected	by	the	human	situation	when	people	respond	to	it.			Misunderstanding	this	point	could	lead	to	obstacles	in	IE	or	an	advocacy	of	 direct	 communication.	 Participants	 could	 accept	 such	 shared	 questions,	 but	present	 their	 religious	 position	 as	 the	 exclusive,	 authoritative	 answer.	 UCM	avoids	 this	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 and	excessive	 nature	 of	 revelation	 precludes	 any	 decisive	 answers;	 individuals	simply	have	to	work	with	the	resources	provided	by	religions	in	deciding	how	to	respond	 authentically	 to	 the	 challenges	 they	 face	 and	 this	 task	 is	 always	incomplete.	More	 importantly,	 the	 ‘essential	 knowing’	 about	 which	 existential	questions	ask	is	qualitatively	different	from	factual,	doctrinal	answers.	These	are	not	discrete	puzzles	to	be	solved	piecemeal,	as	is	evident	in	Climacus’	rejection	of	objective	 answers	being	 given	 to	questions	 about	death	 and	 the	 afterlife	 (CUP,	pp.	 165-171).	 Dealing	 with	 specific	 problems	 is	 a	 way	 of	 evading	 the	 more	fundamental	need	 to	 live	out	 authentic	 selfhood	 in	 the	human	situation.515	The	human	situation	is	excessive	in	that	it	raises	absolute	questions	about	how	one	is																																																									514	This	supported	by	a	large	body	of	evidence	in	the	cognitive	science	of	religion.	Atran	and	Norenzayan,	for	example,	observe	that	exposure	to	extreme	situations,	such	as	death	and	intense	suffering,	produce	comparable	existential	and	religious	responses,	even	after	filtering	for	cultural	and	religious	difference.	[Scott	Atran	and	Aran	Norenzayan,	‘Religion’s	evolutionary	landscape:	Counterintuition,	commitment,	compassion,	communion’.	Behavioural	and	Brain	Sciences,	27,	(2004),	p.	723.]	515	This	argument	is	inspired	by:	Martin	Heidegger,	‘On	the	Essence	of	Truth	(1930)’.	In,	Martin	Heidegger,	William	McNeill	(ed.),	Pathmarks	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	pp.	148-149.	
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to	respond	to	the	situation	as	a	whole,	which	cannot	be	answered	because	they	relate	to	 the	whole	and	can	only	be	responded	to	subjectively	 in	how	one	 lives	out	one’s	situations.	While	different	answers	may	be	given	to	the	questions,	the	focus	in	IE	should	be	on	the	ways	of	being	that	produce	these	answers.		These	shared	situations	satisfy	Davidson’s	first	criterion	and	in	a	way	that	allows	 dialogue	 to	 move	 beyond	 dealing	 with	 the	 conflicting	 truth-claims	 of	religions	 to	 address	 more	 fundamental,	 existential	 issues,	 providing	 a	 fertile,	shared	space	for	exploratory	IE.		
The	Validity	of	the	Other		 Chapter	 5	 argued	 that	 engagement	 with	 the	 other	 as	 a	 site	 of	 divine	revelation	 is	 a	 central	 Christological	 commitment.	 This	 satisfies	 Davidson’s	second	 criterion,	 because	 it	 asserts	 that	 there	 is	 meaning	 and	 value	 to	 be	encountered	 in	 the	 other.	 Indeed,	 by	 asserting	 that	 IE	 is	 integral	 to	transcendence,	UCM	incentivizes	IE	where	the	alternative	models	view	dialogue	as	a	necessary	evil	imposed	by	a	pluralistic	context.		 These	features	of	the	liminal	space	of	IE	show	it	to	be	a	shared	space	that	is	 existentially	 charged	 yet	 synergistically	 energized	 in	 a	 way	 that	 facilitates	deep,	transforming	encounter	with	religious	others.					
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6.7.	 The	 Performance	 of	 Indirect	 Communication	 in	 the	 Character	 of	
Participants	Given	 existential	 situationism	 and	 the	 need	 to	 prioritise	 subjective	relationships,	 the	 strategies	 for	 implementing	 IE	 vary	depending	on	 the	needs,	capabilities,	 and	 situations	 of	 the	 recipients,	 requiring	 creative,	 ‘art	 and	 self-control’	(CUP,	p.	77).	There	are	no	clear	rules	for	indirect	communication	in	IE,	but	a	number	of	transferrable	principles	emerge	from	the	authorship’s	practice	of	 it.	 Its	devices	disrupt	a	direct	exchange	while	 facilitating	personal	encounter	and	appropriation	in	the	lives	of	participants.	Speech	and	writing	play	a	role	 in	the	communication,	but	these	must	be	used	to	facilitate	personal	interaction.			(6.7.a)	Praxis	One:	Participants	facilitate	IE	in	their	ways	of	being.		 Indirect	 communication	 facilitates	 encounter	 through	 how	 participants	relate	to	one	another.	Although	the	term	communication	is	used,	it	is	understood	as	 involving	 the	 whole	 being	 of	 participants,	 ‘The	 communication	 is	 to	 be	understood	as	a	whole	made	up	of	the	participation	from	both	sides	contributing	to	 and	 reflecting	 a	 set	 of	 consequences.’516 	Since	 subjectivity	 is	 shaped	 by	relationships,	 this	 will	 involve	 how	 participants’	 personalities,	 attitudes,	 and	interactions	are	configured.517	This	approach	is	subject-centred,	situational,	and	improvisational,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 participants	 and	 their	 contexts,	 but	 some																																																									516	Ronald	J.	Manheimer,	Kierkegaard	as	Educator,	p.	163.	517	This	is	in	conformity	with	Mooney’s	interpretation	of	CUP:	that	it,	‘maps	out	and	embodies	the	drama	of	realising	personality’;	its	aim	is	to	depict	various	aspects	of	personality	and	stages	in	its	development.	[Edward	F.	Mooney,	On	Søren	Kierkegaard:	Dialogue,	Polemics,	Lost	Intimacy,	and	
Time,	p.	179.]	Mooney	argues	that	this	is	why	CUP	has	the	form	it	takes:	its	aim	is	to	present	personality	and	continually	remind	the	reader	that	it	is	a	drama	of	personality	being	acted	out,	‘Climacus	is	like	a	comic	who	doesn't	just	tell	the	funny	story.	He	constantly	reminds	you	that	he’s	telling	it,	and	that	nothing	would	be	happening	is	he	weren’t	happening’.	[Edward	F.	Mooney,	On	
Søren	Kierkegaard:	Dialogue,	Polemics,	Lost	Intimacy,	and	Time,	p.	188.]	This	is	also	the	strategy	used	by	Connell,	who	discusses	the	‘moods’	of	participants	in	IE	[Connell,	KPRD].	My	approach	will	be	distinguished	from	his	in	what	moods	are	incorporated	and	how	these	are	understood.		
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general	features	are	evident	and	are	described	below.518	It	incorporates	artistic,	creative	elements	in	how	one	lives	out	and	interacts	with	others	(CUP,	p.	277).519	A	 feature	of	 the	 theory	 is	 that	encounter	 is	not	guaranteed	and	must	be	produced	 by	 its	 participants.	 Authentic	 ways	 of	 being	 will	 facilitate	 this	 and	inauthentic	 ways	 of	 being	 will	 obstruct	 it.	 There	 is	 a	 perpetual	 threat	 that	religious	 identities	 can	 become	 closed	 or	 authoritarian	 as	 persons	 seek	 to	insulate	 themselves	 against	 the	 anxiety	 of	 the	 human	 situation	 and	 perpetrate	acts	 of	 domination	 and	 exclusion	 (CUP,	 p.	 85).	 Approaches	 that	 deny	 the	possibility	 of	 communication,	 such	 as	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 approach,	 will	prevent	it	through	the	ways	of	being	they	inculcate	and	are	likely	to	be	motivated	by	despair.520	Even	if	meaningful,	deep	encounter	is	an	ideal	never	fully	achieved	and	 only	 aspired	 to,	 the	 commitment	 to	 trying	 will	 enable	 participants	 to	progress	toward	openness:	unachievable	ideals	can	provide	hope	that	is	a	basis	for	authentic	action,	whereas	denial	results	most	readily	in	hopeless	despair.		(6.7.b)	Praxis	Two:	Fidelity	and	Openness	A	central	problem	for	IE	is	how	participants	orient	themselves	in	relation	to	 fidelity	and	openness.	The	concern	for	many	commentators	 is	 that	openness	will	 destroy	 the	 fidelity.	 Forward,	 for	 example,	 sees	 ‘rootedness’	 as	 being	 as	
																																																								518	Pattison	points	out	that	it	is	based	on	a	theory	of	communication	that	provides	a	number	of	such	features	and	prevents	it	from	being	relativistic.	[George	Pattison,	Kierkegaard:	The	Aesthetic	
and	the	Religious,	p.	65.]	Even	Poole,	who	stresses	the	total	fragmentation	of	the	corpus	and	interprets	it	as	deconstructing	itself	identifies	a	coherent	strategies	of	indirect	communication	that	underpin	this.	[Roger	Poole,	Kierkegaard:	The	Indirect	Communication.]	519	Hence	Walsh	see	it	as	incorporating	features	of	aesthetic	and	poetic	existence,	though	this	is	embodied	in	actuality	in	a	way	that	the	aesthetic	evades.	[Sylvia	Walsh,	Living	Poetically:	
Kierkegaard’s	Existential	Aesthetics	(University	Park,	Pennsylvania:	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	1994),	pp.	223-242.	520	Tracy	claims	this	is	evident	in	approaches	that	close	borders	to	evade	encounter.	[David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	19.]	
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important	as	 ‘empathy’.521	Knitter	and	Moyaert	similarly	assert	 the	necessity	of	navigating	 the	extremes	of,	 ‘total	 commitment’,	 to	one’s	 religion	and,	 ‘complete	openness’,	to	the	other.522	Cheetham	speculates	that	these	may	be	irreconcilable	because	passionate	commitments	obstruct	openness	and	receptivity.523		UCM	accepts	that	deep	fidelity	to	religious	commitments	and	unbounded	openness	to	a	transforming	encounter	with	others’	commitments	are	in	tension.	It	acknowledges	this	more	fully	than	alternative	models,	seeing	such	struggles	as	inherent	 to	 religiousness	 and	 subjectivity,	 rather	 than	 minimizing	 the	 role	 of	openness,	as	in	cultural-linguistic	models,	or	minimizing	the	role	of	fidelity,	as	in	Cheetham’s	model.	The	success	of	indirect	communication	requires	maintaining	this	dialectic	and	navigating	its	tensions	in	IE.	Fidelity	and	openness	cannot	be	brought	into	a	balance,	but	they	are	both	incorporated	in	the	dialectical	passion	described	by	Climacus:	faith	is	the	highest	type	of	passion	(CUP,	p.	132)	and	passion	is	essentially	open	(PF,	p.	39);	indeed,	both	 are	 mutually	 enriching. 524 	Furthermore,	 passion	 is	 necessary	 to	acknowledge	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 event	 that	 is	 taking	 place	 and	 of	 the	 deep	commitments	being	shared	in	IE.	Passion	is	not	to	be	equated	with	emotion,	but	rather	 the	 deep	 existential	 interest	 and	 commitment	 of	 UC.	 Passion	 is	 thus	 a	central	characteristic	required	of	participants	in	IE.	Passion	is	not	expressed	in	closed	commitment	and	‘fervent’	authoritarian	communication	 (CUP,	 p.	 255).	 Climacus	 sees	 the	 passion	 of	 the	 ‘honorable																																																									521	Martin	Forward,	Inter-religious	Dialogue:	A	Short	Introduction,	p.	76.	522	Paul	F	Knitter,	Introducing	Theologies	of	Religions,	p.	103;	110.	Marianne	Moyaert,	‘Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cheetham,	Pratt,	and	Thomas	(eds.)	UIR,	p.	193.		523	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	83.		524	The	term	itself	signifies	its	agonistic	nature,	passion,	‘Lidenskab’,	being	linked	with	suffering,	‘Lidelse’.	[Jacobo	Zabalo,	‘Passion/Pathos’.	In,	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	William	McDonald	and	Jon	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concepts,	Tome	V:	Objectivity	to	Sacrifice	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2015),	p.	55.]	
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gentleman’	as	an	example	of	‘officiousness’,	‘noisiness’,	and	‘flatulence’,	‘because	the	 good	man	 has	 concentrated	 on	 bellowing	 it	 out,	 less	 on	 having	 it	 within.’	(CUP,	p.	615)	Anti-Climacus	similarly	rejects	‘earnestness’	(PiC,	p.	140).	Climacus	links	 it	with	 defending	 (CUP,	 p.	 604)	 and	 preaching	 (CUP,	 p.	 605).	 This	 forced	expression	 of	 religiousness	 serves	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 encounter	 and	 may	mistranslate	a	position	into	authoritarian	objective	speech	and	beliefs	(CUP,	pp.	614-615).	This	equates	passion	with	closed	religious	fervour	and	security.		In	contrast,	Climacus	likens	passion	to	erotic	love	because	it	wills	its	own	downfall	 (PF,	 p.	 48).	 That	 is,	 it	 is	 drawn	 to	 the	 other	 and	 fulfilled	 in	 a	commitment	that	destroys	the	expectations	of	the	person	and	their	secure	grasp	themselves.	 It	 is	 a	willingness	 to	 be	 surprised,	 undermined,	 opened	 up	 by	 the	event	 of	 encounter	 with	 the	 excessive	 other,	 ‘A	 person	 lives	 undisturbed	 in	himself,	and	 then	awakens	 the	paradox	of	self-love	as	 love	 for	another,	 for	one	missing.’	 (PF,	 p.	 39)	 Passion	 is	 itself	 a	 transcendent	 commitment	 that	 is	 the	opposite	 of	 the	 secure	 self-satisfaction	 of	 the	 honourable	 gentleman’s	 fervour.	The	 constitution	 of	 the	 subject,	 as	 emerging	 in	 a	 fundamental	 desire	 for	 the	inassimilable	other	(6.2),	indicates	that	the	highest	passion	emerges	in	contexts	of	self-transcendence	and	insecurity.525	Passion	 also	 involves	 openness	 and	 imperilment.526	Tracy	 notes	 that	 an	implication	of	Gadamer’s	hermeneutics,	 in	which	 the	dialogue	of	 the	encounter																																																									525	Westphal	interprets	it	as	transcendent	in	a	similar	way.	[Merold	Westphal,	Kierkegaard’s	
Concept	of	Faith,	p.	150.]	526	Openness	should	not	be	equated	with	passive	obedience	in	accepting	all	claims	of	others.	On	the	basis	of	H.	H.’s	position	in	‘Two	Ethical	and	Religious	Essays’	and	the	argument	of	BA,	that	revelations	cannot	be	confirmed	but	only	responded	to	in	obedience	as	authorities,	Hughes	claims	that	a	revelation	has	to	be,	‘assumed	to	be	authentic’	and	that	the	reason	for	this	is	because	there	is	no,	‘neutral	vantage	point	from	which	to	evaluate	claims	to	religious	truth’.	[Carl	S.	Hughes,	‘The	Constructive	Value	of	The	Book	on	Adler	for	Christian	Theology	in	the	Age	of	Religious	Pluralism’.	In,	Robert	L.	Perkins	(ed.),	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	The	Book	
on	Adler,	p.	206.]	However,	Hughes	fails	to	see	that	openness-as-acceptance	fails	to	challenge	
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itself	 is	 determinative	 of	 the	 subjects,	 is	 that	 subjects	 must	 accept	 their	imperilment	in	the	dialogue.527	The	fear	of	particularists,	that	this	openness	may	impair	fidelity,	is	addressed	by	UCM.	UCM	agrees	that	deepening	in	a	tradition	is	the	most	fecund	way	of	facilitating	dialogue	but	this	is	because	deepening	leads	one	 to	 an	 increasing	 appreciation	of	 the	 excessive,	 uncontainable	 revelation	 to	which	 it	 is	 responding.	 Furthermore,	 this	 openness	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	distinguishing	between,	‘the	true	prejudices,	by	which	we	understand’,	and,	‘the	false	 one’s,	 by	which	we	misunderstand,’	 in	 a	way	 that	 allows	 for	 critical,	 self-reflexive	 dialogue	 rather	 than	 passive	 obedience	 to	 received	 religious	structures.528		The	Absolute	Paradox	ensures	 this	 for	Christianity:	 it	 precludes	passion	as	 closed	 commitment	 because	 it	 eludes	 the	 Christian’s	 grasp	 and	 provokes	existential	responses	of	 faith	or	offence	to	its	absolute	claim,	while	maintaining	the	 freedom	 for	 persons	 to	 decide	 which	 of	 these	 they	 choose	 and	 how	 they	subjectively	appropriate	their	choice	(CUP,	p.	611).	Moreover,	the	passion	is	also	directed	at	finding	revelation	in	the	encounter	with	the	other;	its	fidelity	is	aimed	beyond	 its	own	borders.	The	defining	characteristic	of	Christian	 fidelity	 is	 thus	that	it	is	open	and	venturing	across	boundaries.	This	Christological	component	of	
																																																																																																																																																														individuals	at	the	fundamental	level	necessary	for	transformation.	BA	emphasises	that	the	recipient	of	a	revelation	is	always	in	collision	with	the	‘universal’	and	the	‘established	order’	(BA,	p.	29),	such	that	a	revelation	is	offensive	(BA,	p.	33),	just	as	UCM	has	argued	from	that	willingness	to	collide	with	the	absurd	is	necessary	in	IE:	although	‘frightful’,	offence	is	necessary	to	allow	for	‘choice’	(PiC,	p.	14).	Something	that	could	simply	be	assumed	to	be	true	would	not	be	a	revelation,	such	that	openness-as-acceptance	is	incompatible	with	unbounded	commitment,	which	involves,	rather,	a	more	agonistic	encounter	with	the	other	as	making	radical	and	often	offensive	demands	that	are	nevertheless,	in	some	way,	possibilities	for	transcendence	and	revelation.	527	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	pp.	4-5.	528	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	pp.	298-299.	Sinnett	interprets	Kierkegaard	and	Gadamer	as	being	in	agreement	on	the	need	to	distinguish	true	and	false	prejudices.	[Sinnett,	M.W.	Restoring	the	Conversation:	Socratic	Dialectic	in	the	Authorship	of	Søren	Kierkegaard,	p.	32.	
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UCM	 incorporates	 the	 movements	 of	 fidelity	 and	 openness	 in	 the	 dialectical	passion	of	unbounded	commitment	and	 fulfils	Forward’s	assertion	of	 the	need,	‘for	 exponents	of	dialogue	 to	be	 rooted	within	 their	 traditions,	where	 they	 can	find	resources	for	their	openness	towards	others.’	529				(6.7.c)	Praxis	Three:	Passivity	Without	Authority	IE	requires	that	participants	be	open	and	passive,	prioritising	the	freedom	and	agency	of	the	other.	To	preserve	the	freedom	and	openness	of	participants	in	IE,	it	is	requisite	that	they	are	given	equality.530	This	is	achieved	in	various	ways.		First,	 the	 participants	must	 be	 individuals	 engaging	 with	 individuals	 in	the	context	of	their	lives,	lacking	religious	authority.	Climacus	argues	that	a	focus	on	 groups	 and	 institutions	 is	 a	 ‘demoralising’,	 ‘world-historical’	 approach	 that	diminishes	the	value	and	agency	of	the	participants	(CUP,	pp.	142-143).	IE	is	thus	likely	to	be	more	fruitful	the	more	local	and	less	global	and	institutional	it	is.	This	focus	 on	 personal	 meeting	 addresses	 Hedges’	 concern	 that	 interreligious	dialogue	 can	 serve	 hegemonic	 purposes,	 often	 being	 conducted	 my	institutionally	 appointed	 male	 authorities	 who	 represent	 world	 religions;	Climacus	 is	 similarly	 sceptical	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 motives	 behind	 direct,	authoritative	communication	(CUP,	p.	76).531	For	UCM,	IE	can	occur	in	a	meeting	between	any	people,	anywhere;	it	is	about	religiousness,	not	between	religions.	Second,	 the	 recipient’s	 own	 agency	 must	 be	 prioritised,	 ‘the	 secret	 of	communication	 specifically	hinges	on	 setting	 the	other	 free’	 (CUP,	p.	74);	Anti-																																																								529	Martin	Forward,	Inter-religious	Dialogue:	A	Short	Introduction,	p.	46.	530	In	support	of	this	claim,	Tracy	notes	various	examples	in	which	the	superiority	of	one	voice	overwhelms	the	others,	thereby	negating	the	dialogue.	David	Tracy,	‘The	Other	of	Dialectic	and	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	of	Difference:	Christianity	and	
Alterity,	pp.	108-109.	531	Paul	Hedges,	Controversies	in	Interreligious	Dialogue	and	the	Theology	of	Religions,	p.	65.	
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Climacus	similarly	asserts,	‘the	art	consists	in	making	oneself,	the	communicator,	into	a	nobody’	(PiC,	p.	133).	This	involves	the	communicator	viewing	him/herself	as	a	learner,	‘he	must	always	express	that	he	himself	is	not	a	master-teacher	but	an	apprentice’.532	To	prioritise	 the	agency	of	 the	other,	 the	communicator	must	learn	where	they	are	in	order	to	know	how	to	facilitate	appropriation.	The	aim	is	to	 facilitate	 full	 subjective	 appropriation	but	not	determine	what	 the	nature	of	this	will	be.	These	 points	 fit	 the	 subjective	 and	 specific	 yet	 received	 and	 normative	nature	of	religious	identities	for	adherents.	Religious	identities	are	not	timeless	essences	 invested	 in	groups	but	are	 subjective	and	relative	 to	 specific	persons,	yet	 they	 are	 also	more	 than	 any	 individual’s	 expression	 of	 them	 because	 each	individual	is	measured	by	their	religion	as	an	external,	normative	ideal	to	which	they	commit.	Religion	thus	has	a	dialectical	relationship	to	its	adherents	as	only	expressed	in	their	lives,	but	as	transcending	any	such	local	expression.	While	IE	involves	 personal	 encounter,	 there	 is	 thus	 an	 impersonal	 element	 to	 it:	 the	communicator	must	distance	him/herself	so	as	to	not	predetermine	the	response	of	 the	 recipient	 and	 so	 that	 a	 religiousness	 is	 not	 equated	 with	 a	 person	mimicking	 the	 communicator	 (PiC,	 pp.	 142-143).	 This	 function	 is	 served	 by	revocation:	by	revoking	the	communication,	the	communicator	emphasizes	that	this	is	simply	his	perspective,	thereby	inviting	recipients	to	take	up	their	own.533		Third,	because	one	is	always,	‘in	the	process	of	becoming’	(CUP,	p.	73),	no	exclusivist	or	authoritarian	claims	can	be	made,	even	about	the	meaning	of	one’s	own	 religion.	The	nature	of	 faith	 entails	 an	 admission	 that	one’s	 own	 religious	
																																																								532	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	I	649,	p.	273.	533	Edward	F.	Mooney,	On	Søren	Kierkegaard:	Dialogue,	Polemics,	Lost	Intimacy,	and	Time,	p.	190.	
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identity	 is	 anxious,	 provisional,	 and	 falls	 short	 of	 one’s	 ideals.	 Participants	 are	‘without	authority’	in	that	they	lack	the	ability	to	make	decisive	pronouncements	about	the	value	and	truth	of	alternative	perspectives	as	well	as	their	own.	They	remain	human	and	 lack	 the	 vantage	point	 that	would	make	 this	 possible,	 such	that	IE	cannot	take	the	form	of	evangelism,	‘Thereupon	they	[the	apostles]	turn	their	 attention	 outward	 to	 converting	 others,	 but	 here	 again	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	analogy	to	a	poor	individual	human	being,	who	has	only	the	task	of	existing	as	a	Christian.’	(CUP,	p.	605)534		The	idea	that	equality	can	be	achieved	in	IE	seems	naïve	and	to	veil	over	rather	 than	 circumvent	 inequalities:	 complex	 power	 relations	 will	 be	 present,	bound	up	with	the	backgrounds	of	participants	and	the	situation	of	IE,	including,	for	example,	the	abilities	and	status	of	participants	or	geo-political	and	economic	factors.	 Indeed,	 UCM	 admits	 that	 participants	 bring	 their	 irrevocable,	 prior	existential	 situations	 to	 the	 dialogue.	 The	 encounter	 is	 a	 powerful	 opportunity	for	 domination,	 because	 one	 is	 addressing	 the	 fundamental	 commitments	 of	people’s	lives.		
																																																								534	This	presents	a	dilemma	for	those	who	feel	they	should	use	IE	as	an	opportunity	for	evangelism	and	how	they	are	fulfil	the	call	to	evangelise	in	such	fertile	moments	of	intersection.	[See,	for	example,	Netland’s	discussion	of	their	relationship.	Harold	A.	Netland,	Dissonant	Voices:	
Religious	Pluralism	and	the	Question	of	Truth,	p.	282.]	Emmanuel	notes	this	tension	in	Kierkegaard’s	view	of	communication,	arguing	that	there	are	two	levels	of	communication	in	the	authorship:	indirect,	maieutic	communication	and	direct	Christian	witnessing.	[Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	Kierkegaard	and	the	Concept	of	Revelation,	pp.	141-142.]	Anti-Climacus	seems	to	differ	from	Climacus’	prescription	against	evangelism,	asserting	that	failure	to	provoke	appropriation	through	witnessing	fails	to	be	a	genuine	Christian	communication.		(PiC,	p.	257)	However,	his	concept	of	witnessing	is	comparable	to	Climacus’	approach	in	that	both	aim	to	retain	the	agency	of	the	recipient,	to	facilitate	subjective	response	and	appropriation	and	to	be	without	authority	in	this:	Christ	is	the	prototype	for	Christian	religiousness,	not	the	Christian	witnessing.	Hence,	both	reject	the	idea	of	evangelism	as	a	direct	communication	akin	to	the	honourable	gentleman’s	approach.	The	most	that	both	will	allow	is	that	the	communicator	serve	as	an	occasion	for	an	event	of	encounter	with	the	recipient.	
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Indirect	communication	could	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	control	the	other	because	it	aims	to	elicit	responses	in	a	propagandic	way.535	However,	Daise	notes	that	 propagandic	 strategies,	 ‘aim	 at	 shaping	 the	world	 in	 a	way	 chosen	 by	 the	communicator.’536	In	contrast,	he	notes	that	indirect	communication	aims	at	the	opposite,	 ‘shaping	 the	 world	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 each	 recipient	 of	 the	communication	 is	 fundamentally	 free	 to	choose	to	shape	the	world	as	one	sees	fit.	In	fact…the	receiver	comes	to	see	that	one	must	choose’.537	In	propaganda,	the	person	 assumes	 mastery	 of	 the	 object,	 the	 other,	 and	 himself:	 that	 he	 knows	what	 is	 best	 and	 can	 shape	 the	 other	 into	 that	 model.	 Contrastingly,	 UCM	acknowledges	the	incapability	of	the	communicator:	they	do	not	have	mastery.		In	order	to	address	the	problem	of	power,	it	is	necessary	that	participants	aim	to	identify	and	disarm	all	power	structures	that	are	present	in	IE,	including	the	drive	 to	 control,	 gain	 security,	 and	 exert	 influence	 over	 self	 and	other.	 For	Christians,	the	Christological	conception	of	divine	power	as	suffering	and	present	in	the	victim	demands	that	they	engage	in	self-critique	of	their	own	power	and	potential	to	exclude	or	control.538		Tracy	argues	for	the	necessity	of	deep	critique,	not	focused	on	critiquing	the	manifest	claims	but	rather	on	unveiling	underlying	obstacles	to	the	dialogue,	‘If	we	suspect	some	deadly	unconscious	systematic	“distortions,”…are	disrupting	the	 conversation,	 we	 must	 stop	 the	 conversation	 and	 use	 some	 appropriate	
																																																								535	Benjamin	Daise,	Kierkegaard’s	Socratic	Art	(Macon:	Mercer	University	Press,	1999),	p.	21.	536	Benjamin	Daise,	Kierkegaard’s	Socratic	Art,	p.	25.	537	Benjamin	Daise,	Kierkegaard’s	Socratic	Art,	pp.	25-26.	538	A	comparable	argument	on	the	need	for	a	deconstruction	of	ecclesiological	power	in	the	light	of	the	crucified	other	is	made	by:	Anne-Louise	Eriksson,	‘The	Other	on	the	Cross’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond	(eds.),	Dynamics	of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	178.		
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critical	 theory	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 suspicion	 is	 justified	 or	 not.’539	UCM	concurs	 with	 this	 scepticism	 about	 the	 commitments	 of	 persons:	 Climacus’	understanding	of	the	spheres’	interactions	includes	an	appreciation	of	the	veiled	omissions	 and	 repressions	 that	 they	 expose	 in	 one	 another,	 such	 as	 the	aesthete’s	 aversion	 to	 responsibility	 and	 relationships,	 as	 well	 as	 how	inauthentic	relationships	provide	a	primary	way	of	harming	others	and	oneself.	Its	 view	 on	 the	 centrality	 of	 agency	 does	 not	 posit	 a	 naïve	 view	 of	 it	 as	incorrigible	 and	 benign.	 For	 UCM,	 such	 critique	 is	 not	 accidental	 to	 IE:	 it	 is	integral	to	it	as	it	aims	to	open	up	new	possibilities	and	lead	participants	to	their	boundaries	and	beyond;	indeed,	it	is	to	be	expected	that	the	participants	will	be	clinging	 to	 their	 identities	 in	 despairing	 and	 anxious	 ways	 and	 authenticity	entails	 facing	 up	 to	 this.	 IE	 also	 requires	 ethical	 integrity,	 humility	 and	sensitivity,	such	that	participants	will	be	focused	on	unveiling	these	weaknesses	in	 themselves	 rather	 than	 others;	 participants	 will	 also	 have	 an	 ironic	 and	humorous	view	of	themselves,	as	outlined	below.	Participants	in	IE	should	prefer	personal	confession	over	evangelism.		(6.7.d)	Praxis	Four:	Participants	are	Funny;	Humour	is	Serious		Sigurdson	 observes	 that	 humour	 has	 often	 been	 seen	 as	 hostile	 to	Christianity,	 as	 in	 the	 blasphemous	 mockery	 of	 Jesus,	 particularly	 the	‘superiority	 theory’	 that	 views	 the	 humourist	 as	 superior	 to	 the	 person	 being	
																																																								539	David	Tracy,	‘Western	Hermeneutics	and	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Cornille	and	Conway	(eds.),	IH,	p.	13.	As	examples,	he	includes	secular,	liberal	distortions,	such	as,	‘sexism,	racism,	anti-Semitism,	repressed	hostile	feelings,	elitism,	classism,	homophobia,	Eurocentrism,	
ressentiment,	Islamophobia,	colonialism,’	(p.	13)	as	well	as	blockages	and	violence	within	religions	themselves		(p.	17).	
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laughed	at.540	This	is	evident	in	exclusionary	and	objectifying	stereotyping	and	in	some	 secular	 uses	 of	 humour	 to	 bond	 and	mobilise	 groups	 against	 religion.541	For	Climacus,	humour	can	be	a	non-religious	way	of	being,	which	fixes	on	 ‘jest’	rather	 than	 faith	 and	 may	 be	 a	 nihilistic	 humour	 that	 has	 despaired	 of	 its	possibility	 of	 achieving	 selfhood.542	Such	 humour	 is	 inimical	 to	 encounter	 as	 it	devalues	and	objectifies	others.		However,	 humour	 can	 also	 be	 an	 attitude	 adopted	 within	 an	 authentic	religious	way	of	being.	Climacus	defines	humour	as	a	response	to	contradiction	(CUP,	 p.	 514)	 and	 the	 ‘incongruity’	 between	 expectation	 and	 reality.543	This	 is	evident	 in	authentic	religiousness,	which	sees	 faith	as	an	absolute	commitment	in	a	situation	of	irrevocable	insecurity.	In	Christian	life,	Evans	claims,	it	perceives	the	 incongruity	 of	 its	 own	 sin	 and	 failure	 alongside	 the	 forgiveness	 found	 in	grace.544	It	 is	 also	 found	 in	 the	disparity	 between	 its	 striving	 for	 and	 failure	 to	achieve	the	ideal	of	Christ,	which	involves,	‘a	unity	of	jest	and	earnestness’	(PiC,	p.	125).545	As	in	religiousness	itself,	all	participation	in	IE	must	involve	as	much	humour	as	passion	(CUP,	p.	87).		
																																																								540	Ola	Sigurdson,	‘Laughing	at	the	Other’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	
of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	147.	541	Ola	Sigurdson,	‘Laughing	at	the	Other’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	
of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	147.	542	Evans	refers	to	it	as	nihilistic.	[C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Kierkegaard’s	View	of	Humor:	Must	Christians	Always	Be	Solemn?’	In,	C.	Stephen	Evans	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	on	Faith	and	the	Self:	
Collected	Essays,	p.	90.]	For	this	distinction,	see	also:	Alejandro	Gonzalez,	‘Humor’.	In,	Steven	M.	Emmanuel,	William	McDonald	and	Jon	Stewart	(eds.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concepts,	Tome	III:	Envy	to	
Incognito	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2014),	p.	180.	543	C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Kierkegaard’s	View	of	Humor:	Must	Christians	Always	Be	Solemn?’	In,	C.	Stephen	Evans	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	on	Faith	and	the	Self:	Collected	Essays,	p.	83.	544	C.	Stephen	Evans,	‘Kierkegaard’s	View	of	Humor:	Must	Christians	Always	Be	Solemn?’	In,	C.	Stephen	Evans	(ed.),	Kierkegaard	on	Faith	and	the	Self:	Collected	Essays,	pp.	87-88.	545	All	of	these	sources	of	humour	relate	to	disparities	in	the	human	situation.	While	it	may	be	an	act	of	despair	aimed	at	dismissing	revelation,	God	and	his	revelation	can	also	be	sources	of	humour,	as	similar	disparities	are	encountered	here.	This	line	is	not	pursued	further	as	the	pseudonyms	do	not	consider	it	except	in	relation	to	despair.	
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A	positive	use	of	humour	in	IE,	identified	by	Lippitt,	is	that,	since	humour	is	 rooted	 in	 the	 contradictions	 and	 tensions	 of	 life	 itself	 (CUP,	 pp.	 513-514),	 it	acts	as	a	‘confinium’,	a	liminal	perspective	that	can	perceive	and	open	up	new	and	creative	possibilities	 in	 the	existential	situation	(CUP,	p.	462).	For	example,	 the	humorous	 perception	 of	 incongruities	 allows	 one	 to	 imagine	 oneself	 in	 a	different	or	ideal	way	of	being,	rather	than	one’s	present	way	of	being.546	Negatively,	 the	 use	 of	 humour	 disrupts	 claims	 of	 authority	 and	 enables	encounter	by	reminding	participants	that	their	knowledge	and	lives	fall	short	of	the	divine,	'The	pathos	that	is	not	safeguarded	by	the	comic	is	an	illusion’	(CUP,	p.	87).	This	prevents	the	communicator	from	serving	as	a	teaching	authority	and	as	 a	 religious	 paradigm	 and	 thus	 helps	 to	 prevent	 objective	 and	 direct	communication.	Thus,	 self-effacing	humour	 is	 a	way	or	preserving	 the	equality	and	shared,	subjective	human	context	of	the	participants.		Humour	 should	 be	 primarily	 self-directed,	 as	 it	 is	 aimed	 to	 undermine	one’s	 own	 claims	 to	 mastery,	 but	 it	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 challenge	 the	authoritarian	 claims	 of	 others,	 as	 in	 Climacus’	 critiques	 of	 Christendom	 and	Hegelianism.547	A	 benefit	 of	 the	 latter	 is	 that	 it	 can	 enter	 into	 critical	 dialogue	with	the	other	despite	the	lack	of	shared	criteria	of	legitimisation	or	rationality,	by	 identifying	 internal	 incongruities	 or	 comical	 clashes	 with	 the	 human	situation.548	It	 must	 be	 destabilising	 of	 the	 identities	 and	 authorities	 of	 all	participants	in	IE:	self	and	others.	
																																																								546	John	Lippitt,	‘Humour	and	irony	in	the	Postscript’.	In,	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	pp.	162-163.	547	Hence	Climacus	praises	Lessing’s	‘polemical	tone’	as	a	feature	of	indirect	communication	(CUP,	p.	69).		548	John	Lippitt,	‘Humour	and	irony	in	the	Postscript’.	In,	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	p.	164.	
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While	 humour	 prevents	 the	 dialogue	 from	 turning	 into	 a	 struggle	 for	domination	 of	 the	 other,	 it	 should	 not	 devalue	 the	 importance	 attributed	 to	irreconcilable	 commitments.	Hence	Climacus	warns	 that	 it	 should	not	 supplant	commitment	 and	 passion	 ‘the	 comic	 that	 is	 not	 safeguarded	 by	 pathos	 is	immaturity.'	(CUP,	p.	87)	On	the	contrary,	humour	is	a	response	to	the	disparity	of	 the	 human	 person	 in	 the	 situation	 as	 having	 to	 decide	 about	 ultimate	questions	 in	a	mundane	and	uncertain	worldly	 context.	Humour	 should	not	be	seen	 as	 degrading	 the	 seriousness	 of	 religious	 matters:	 they	 are	 humorous	because	of	their	seriousness,	not	in	spite	of	it.	Connell’s	 interpretation	of	Kierkegaardian	humour	misunderstands	 this.	Connell	 sees	humour	as	 cooling	 the	 seriousness	of	 religious	 commitment,	 such	that	 it	 is	 made	 safer	 by	 achieving	 a	 distanced	 perspective	 from	 which	 the	commitment	 can	 be	 taken,	 ‘with	 a	 grain	 of	 salt.’549	He	 claims	 that	 this	 is	 the	meaning	of	Climacus’	claim	that,	 ‘humour	involves	not	just	contradiction	but,	as	Climacus	 puts	 it,	 a	 “way	 out,”	 a	 resolution	 of	 or	 escape	 from	 the	 contradiction	(CUP	 1:520).’550	In	 contrast	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 Climacus	 claims	 that	 the	absolute	commitment	cannot	be	reconciled	with	the	humour	but	rather	must	be	lived	out	in	tension	with	it,	heightening	rather	than	cooling	both.	When	humour	is	not	dialectical	 in	 this	way,	 it	offers	a	 ‘way	out’	 from	commitment	 that	makes	the	 person	 unable	 to	 perceive	 religious	 commitment:	 authentic	 religiousness	posits	 such	 commitments	 as	 permanent,	 absolute	 tasks	 that	 can	 never	 be	brought	to	an	end,	even	as	it	acknowledges	that	they	fall	short,		
																																																								549	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	100.	550	Connell,	KPRD,	p.	100.	
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‘This	 is	why	 the	 religious,	 even	when	 it	 interprets	 the	 esthetic	 suffering	with	a	certain	touch	of	the	comic,	nevertheless	does	it	gently	because	it	is	recognised	 that	 the	 suffering	 will	 have	 its	 day.	 Repentance,	 however,	viewed	religiously,	will	not	have	its	day	and	then	be	over;	the	uncertainty	of	faith	will	not	have	its	day	and	then	be	over’	(CUP,	p.	524).		(6.7.e)	Praxis	Five:	Agency,	Empathy,	and	Theatricality	
Agency	A	central	 feature	of	 indirect	communication	 is	 that	 it	 is	maieutic,	aiming	to	 facilitate	 the	 recipient’s	 own	 development	 rather	 than	 impose	 ideas	 or	 a	particular	 direction	 on	 this	 development.	 Pattison	 notes	 this	 is	 problematic	because	it	does	not	fit	with	the	specificity	of	information	required	to	engage	with	a	religion.	To	overcome	this	difficulty,	Pattison	interprets	the	maieutic	method	as	aiming	simply	to	remind	the	individual	of	their	responsibility	to	become	a	unique	self,	 ‘to	make	them	take	note	of	their	responsibility	for	their	own	comportment	towards	the	truth’.551	Climacus	makes	this	clear	by	comparing	it	to,	‘having	to	say	something	to	a	passerby	in	passing,	without	standing	still	oneself	or	delaying	the	other,	without	wanting	to	induce	him	to	go	the	same	way,	but	just	urging	him	to	go	 his	 own	 way’	 (CUP,	 p.	 277).	 The	 maieutic	 strategy	 is	 intended	 to	 awaken	recipients	to	their	ability	and	responsibility	to	respond.	Maieutics	is	stressed	because	of	the	subjective	nature	of	religious	identity:	IE	 is	 not	 achieved	 in	 the	 production	 of	 copies	 of	 the	 religious	 identity	 but	 in	
																																																								551	George	Pattison,	Kierkegaard:	The	Aesthetic	and	the	Religious,	p.	79.	Similarly,	Strawser	claims,	‘the	point	of	Kierkegaard’s	Socratic	maieutics	is	to	show	readers	their	responsibility	with	regard	to	the	truth.	In	this	way	readers	are	deceived,	teased	and	perplexed	into	seeking	a	relationship	with	the	truth.’	[Michael	Strawser,	Both/And:	Reading	Kierkegaard	From	Irony	to	Edification,	p.153.]	
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diverse,	subjective,	 local	appropriation.552	It	 is	the	process	of	engagement	itself,	not	the	end	result,	that	is	the	marker	of	a	successful	encounter,		‘that	of	inwardness,	of	possession,	whereby	it	belongs	to	the	subject	and	to	no	one	else.	Whereas	objective	thinking	invests	everything	in	the	result	and	assists	all	humankind	to	cheat	by	copying	and	reeling	off	the	results	and	 answers,	 subjective	 thinking	 invests	 everything	 in	 the	 process	 of	becoming	and	omits	the	result’.	(CUP,	p.	73)		Inwardness	 signifies	 that	 a	meeting	with	another	only	becomes	 real	when	 it	 is	allowed	to	penetrate	to	the	core	of	one’s	being	and	affect	one’s	personhood.	However,	 the	 maieutic	 strategy	 can	 play	 a	 fuller	 role	 in	 IE	 when	 the	agonistic	nature	of	religious	identity	is	acknowledged.	Deeper	engagement	with	one’s	own	personhood	unveils	 its	deeper	tensions	as	well	as	the	fuller	range	of	possibilities	 for	human	 subjectivity	 and	 thus	 the	permeability	 and	openness	of	selfhood	 to	 others	 and	 other	ways	 of	 being.553	IE	 entails	 developing	 oneself	 as	well	as	others.				
Empathy	and	Imagination	UCM	requires	that	participants	in	IE	must	encounter	the	inward	quality	of	religiousness,	which	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	experience,	 and	 this	 suggests	 the	need	for	empathy.554	The	possibility	of	empathy	has	been	strongly	challenged	by	 the	
																																																								552	It	is	for	this	reason	that	it	is	compared	to	the	Socratic	maieutic	approach	despite	Climacus’	contention	that	the	human	being	does	not	possess	the	truth:	the	way	of	being	of	the	recipient	is	a	matter	of	his/her	subjective	appropriation	and	agency;	it	is	between	him/her	and	God.	The	communicator	cannot	play	any	role	in	shaping	this	beyond	presenting	the	provocation.	553	Ronald	J.	Manheimer,	Kierkegaard	as	Educator,	p.	163.		554	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Empathy	and	Otherness	in	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	223.	
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dominant	 paradigm	 of	 IE,	 because	 experience	 is	 culturally	 bound.555	There	 is	insufficient	space	to	refute	this	position	fully,	but	I	follow	Cornille	identifying	the	possibility	 of	 empathy	 as	 dependent	 on	 sympathy,	 experience,	 and	imagination.556		The	description	of	subjectivity	in	previous	chapters	affirms	the	possibility	of	all	 three.	The	shared	existential	situation	provides	the	basis	 for	sympathy	as	human	 persons	 can	 see	 themselves	 as	 engaged	 in	 comparable	 existential	struggles;	 the	 internal	 alterity	 of	 identity,	 relational	 nature	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	dependence	 of	 consciousness	 on	 the	 other	 also	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	sympathy	and	experience.557	The	two	poles	of	consciousness	highlighted	in	SuD	also	assert	the	capacity	for	experience	and	imagination.	Imagination	is	one	pole	that	 possesses	 the	 capability	 of	 conceiving	 of	 idealised	 ways	 of	 being.558	The	other	pole	lives	them	out	through	appropriation	that	facilitates	experience.559	IE	thus	requires	hospitality	at	 the	deepest	 levels	of	 identity:	being	sympathetic	 to	and	 willing	 to	 experience	 the	 world	 from	 another’s	 perspective	 and	 to	 be	affected	 by	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 other.	 This	 requires	 sensitivity,	 creativity	 and	imagination	in	conceiving	of	the	ways	of	being	encountered.	
																																																									555	Moreover,	as	Cornille	puts	it,	‘it	risks	projecting	one’s	own	inner	life	onto	the	other,	thereby	erasing	the	challenges	and	the	possibilities	of	genuine	otherness.’	[Catherine	Cornille,	‘Empathy	and	Otherness	in	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	
of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	222.]	See	also:	Merold	Westphal,	Whose	Community?	
Which	Interpretation?	(Grand	Rapids:	Baker	Academic,	2009),	p.	30.	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	
and	Method,	p.	250.	Gavin	Flood,	Beyond	Phenomenology:	Rethinking	the	Study	of	Religion	(London:	Cassell,	1999),	p.	162.	556	Catherine	Cornille,	‘Empathy	and	Otherness	in	Interreligious	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	225.	557	As	Zahavi	puts	it,	‘my	encounter	with	the	other,	my	ability	to	interact	with	and	recognise	another	embodied	subject	as	a	foreign	subjectivity,	is	pre-empted	by	and	made	possible	through	the	very	structure	of	my	own	embodied	subjectivity.’	[Dan	Zahavi,	Subjectivity	and	Selfhood:	
Investigating	the	First-Person	Perspective,	p.	156.]	558	I	follow	Jothen	on	this	view	of	imagination.	Peder	Jothen,	Kierkegaard,	Aesthetics	and	Selfhood:	
The	Art	of	Subjectivity,	p.	134.	559	Sylvia	Walsh,	Living	Poetically:	Kierkegaard’s	Existential	Aesthetics,	pp.	228-229.	
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Theatricality:	Experimentation	and	Appropriation	The	 Kierkegaardian	 authorship	 explores	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 a	 literary	format.	 Other	 ways	 of	 being	 are	 imagined	 and	 depicted	 through	 their	embodiment	 in	 fictional	 characters	 as	 a	 means	 of	 entering	 into	 empathic	 and	appropriative	relationships	with	them	and	their	commitments.560	Climacus’	term	for	 this	 is,	 ‘imaginary	 psychological	 construction’,	 in	 which	 one	 is	 invited	 to	imagine	 the	 other	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 activities	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 core	struggles	 in	 order	 to	 encounter	 their	way	 of	 being	 (CUP,	 p.	 263).	 Placing	 their	life-views	against	the	backdrop	of	a	range	of	existential	contexts	provides	points	of	 contact	 and	 intersection	 with	 readers	 who	 may	 be	 struggling	 in	 similar	existential	situations.		These	imagined	characters	are	often	engaged	in	attempting	to	imagine	a	further	 possibility	 that	 they	 cannot	 grasp	 themselves,	 such	 as	 de	 Silentio	struggling	to	express	an	 inexpressible	 faith	he	does	not	have	(CUP,	p.	262)	and	the	 non-Christian	 Climacus	 attempting	 to	 understand	 how	 he	 can	 become	 a	Christian	(CUP,	p.	617),	with	the	result	that	they	mirror	the	reader’s	situation	in	encountering	the	possibility	they	themselves	present	and	also	open	up	a	range	of	existential	possibilities.	As	a	whole,	the	authorship	itself	presents	the	situation	of	IE,	 placing	 competing	 perspectives	 in	 dialogue	 about	 dilemmas,	 agonies,	transcendent	 and	 liminal	 questions	 without	 any	 conclusion	 on	 what	 position	they	should	adopt	and	in	the	absence	of	any	criteria	beyond	their	own	subjective	experimentation.561			
																																																								560	Kierkegaard	explains	that	this	necessitated	the	creation	of	the	pseudonyms	as	actual	persons	(CUP,	p.	625).	For	example,	‘to	have	such	a	doubter	come	into	existence	in	existence-inwardness	so	that	one	could	see	down	to	the	slightest	detail	how	he	goes	about	doing	it’	(CUP,	p.	255).	561	The	role	of	the	pseudonyms	and	their	multiple	perspectives	in	facilitating	indirect	communication	is	noted	in:	Nerina	Jansen,	‘Deception	in	Service	of	Truth:	Magister	Kierkegaard	
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Experimentation	 is	 similarly	 emphasised	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	communication.	 The	 playfulness,	 irony,	 supplement,	 ‘oscillation	 of	 terms’,	 and	variation	of	meaning	gives	the	texts	a	polyphonic,	perspectival,	and	fragmented	form	 that	 mirrors	 the	 situation	 of	 IE,	 lacking	 an	 authoritative	 perspective	 or	resolution	 and	 thereby	 presenting	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 different	 perspectives	 that	draw	 readers	 into	 creative	 participation	 in	 the	 dialogue.562	Furthermore,	 this	variation-in-repetition	 of	 themes	 facilitates	 experimentation	 with	 interpreting	them	through	recontextualisation	in	different	discussions	and	also	invites	a	fuller	comprehension	 of	 the	 ways	 of	 being	 by	 seeing	 them	 at	 work	 in	 a	 range	 of	situations.563	A	string	of	possible	meanings	is	set	up,	such	that	the	free,	subjective	participation	 of	 the	 reader	 is	 enabled	 in	 creating	 their	 own	meaning.	 It	 is	 the	refusal	 of	 the	 text	 to	 communicate	 this,	 while	 still	 sketching	 around	 the	personalities,	 ways	 of	 being	 and	 their	 existential	 struggles,	 that	 provides	 the	creative	space	of	a	writable	text	that	draws	the	reader	in	by	allowing	them	to	fill	in	the	blanks	and	imagine	it	for	themselves.		Modelled	on	Kierkegaard’s	authorial	strategies,	IE	can	be	understood	as	a	type	of	hermeneutical	performance	that	builds	from	one’s	irrevocable	existential	context	but	uses	empathetic,	imaginative,	and	experimental	resources	to	engage	with	 religious	 others.	 Communication	 in	 IE	 can	 also	 model	 itself	 on	 a	 fractal	engagement	 to	encourage	unique	and	subjective	expression,	 appropriation	and	participation;	 rather	 than	 positing	 a	 specific	 liminal	 space,	 it	 will	 require	
																																																																																																																																																														and	the	Problem	of	Communication’.	In	R.L.Perkins	(ed.)	International	Kierkegaard	Commentary:	
Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript	to	‘Philosophical	Fragments’,	p.	121.	562	Tracy	sees	such	fragmentation,	as	in	Bakhtin’s	hermeneutics,	as	motivated	by	the	aim	of	making	dialogue	open-ended.	David	Tracy,	‘The	Other	of	Dialectic	and	Dialogue’.	In,	Ulrich	Schmiedel	and	James	G.	Jeanrond,	Dynamics	of	Difference:	Christianity	and	Alterity,	p.	106.	563	Jacob	Howland,	‘Lessing	and	Socrates	in	Kierkegaard’s	Postscript’.	In,	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	(ed.),	Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	p.	113.		
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interaction	with	a	range	of	very	different	people	living	out	religious	identities	in	a	wide	range	of	situations,	such	that	a	religious	identity	is	not	presented	as	fixed	but	as	infinitely	adaptable.	This	invites	a	comparison	with	theatre.564	Like	the	pseudonyms,	IE	should	enable	participants	to	experiment	with	a	range	of	ways	of	being,	seeing	how	they	would	interact	and	configure	their	 identities	 in	relation	to	various	features	and	crises	 of	 the	 human	 situation.	 IE	 could	 incorporate	 the	 use	 of	 storytelling,	personal	 narrative,	 and	 experimentation	 with	 other	 ways	 of	 being,	 with	 a	particular	focus	on	stimulating	imagination.	Participants	in	IE	may	also	engage	in	imagining,	roleplaying,	and	acting	out	each	other’s	roles	as	a	means	of	facilitating	engagement,	considering	how	others	live	out	the	central	conflicts	and	obligations	in	different	 scenarios.	This	use	of	 fiction,	as	 in	 the	pseudonymous	 texts,	 allows	for	 imagination	 and	 participation	 without	 requiring	 of	 participants	 that	 they	distance	 themselves	 from	 their	 own	 existential	 history	 in	 ways	 that	 are	impossible	 for	 persons.	 Acting	 a	 part	 need	 not	 be	 inauthentic:	 identities	themselves	 are	 narratives	 one	 acts	 out;	 even	 a	 fictional	 identity	 can	 be	transforming,	 just	 as	 a	 person	 who	 has	 played	 Hamlet	 will	 always	 carry	something	of	Hamlet	with	him.		Theatrical	 performance	 also	 occurs	 at	 a	 specific	 moment	 in	 time;	 each	performance	is	a	unique	performance.	Participants	should	not	approach	IE	with	a	plan,	but	rather	it	should	be	sensitive	to	the	unique	situation	and	eventfulness	of	 each	 encounter.	 This	 involves	 creativity,	 improvisation,	 and	 spontaneity;	protracted	monologues	and	planned	addresses	are	unlikely	to	be	helpful.																																																										564	Mooney	similarly	advocates	a	theatrical	reading	of	IC	as	acting	out	the	drama	of	the	personalities.	Edward	F.	Mooney,	On	Søren	Kierkegaard:	Dialogue,	Polemics,	Lost	Intimacy,	and	
Time,	p.	188.	
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Cheetham	 advocates	 a	 similar	 ‘aesthetic	 attitude’	 that	 emphasises	‘imaginative	 playfulness’	 as	 a	 means	 of	 encountering	 other	 identities. 565	However,	 UCM	 goes	 further	 in	 that	 it	 also	 incorporates	 the	 necessity	 of	appropriation.	 For	 UCM,	 theatre	 is	 a	 serious	 matter	 and	 its	 figures	 present	existential	 possibilities	 that	 are	 whole	 ways	 of	 being;	 they	 are	 not	 simply	characters	one	can	imagine	and	discard.	Similarly,	one	can	only	understand	the	religious	other	at	the	deepest	level	insofar	as	one	subjectively	appropriates	and	expresses	 a	 relationship	 to	 his/her	 commitments.	 The	 aesthete,	 for	 all	 his	imagination,	cannot	understand	the	religious	until	he	has	committed	in	religious	ways.	Imagining	what	one’s	life	would	be	like	as	a	Buddhist	is	different	from	the	existential	struggle	to	embody	and	live	it	out	in	the	medium	of	actuality.	Priority	in	the	performance	must	thus	be	given	to	encountering	the	whole	ways	of	being	that	 the	 participants	 possess,	 and	 ensuring	 that	 it	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	existential	situations	of	the	participants.	Thus,	the	interaction	must	also	include	emic,	existential	participation,	appropriation,	and	 life-application.	This	will	also	require	long-term	engagement,	extending	far	beyond	IE.	While	 IE	 uses	 aesthetic	 and	 theatrical	 devices	 to	 facilitate	 encounter,	these	have	a	serious	aim	and	require	passion.	IE	is	the	passionate	encounter	with	deep	 commitments	 in	 a	 serious	 existential	 context.	 If	 one	 is	 able	 to	 meet	 the	other	 in	 a	 dispassionate	 or	 merely	 playful	 way,	 one	 has	 misunderstood	 the	challenges	and	opportunities	IE	presents.	
	
	
																																																									565	Cheetham,	WMTR,	p.	6.	
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6.8.	Conclusion	This	chapter	has	argued	for	an	approach	to	IE	that	is	person-centred	and	aims	 to	 facilitate	 deep	 encounter	 with	 religious	 commitments	 in	 a	 shared	existential	situation.	In	conformity	with	the	agonistic	nature	of	all	identities,	it	is	dialectical	 in	 that	 it	 incorporates	 passionate	 fidelity	 and	 venturing	 openness,	humour	and	seriousness,	active	participation	and	 imaginative	experimentation.	It	places	particular	demands	on	the	communicators	to	act	without	authority	and	avoid	domination.	UCM	thus	incorporates	features	of	the	alternative	approaches	while	 avoiding	 their	weaknesses,	 such	 that	 it	 allows	 for	 fidelity	 and	 openness,	meeting	 and	 difference.	 A	 further	 feature	 demanded	 of	 participants	 in	 their	practice	of	IE	but	not	expounded	in	the	chapter	is	love.	Kierkegaard’s	exposition	of	 its	 practical	 implementation	 in	 WoL	 and	 the	 full	 details	 of	 the	 practical	implementation	 of	 IE	 are	 beyond	 the	 remit	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Nevertheless,	 the	necessity	of	substitutionary	love,	in	which	the	other	is	prioritised	and	the	agent	imperilled,	is	part	of	the	ethics	of	IE	and	it	is	expressed	in	many	of	the	features	demanded	of	participants	by	 this	chapter,	such	as	preserving	 the	agency	of	 the	other,	 avoiding	 domination,	 and	 acting	 with	 good	 humour.	 The	 motivation	behind	all	of	these	features	for	participants	is	to	express	and	keep	alive	the	love	of	others.							
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CHAPTER	7	
CONCLUSION:	UNCERTAIN	FUTURES	
	
7.1	Summary	of	Thesis		This	thesis	aimed	to	achieve	four	primary	objectives.	(a)	First,	it	aimed	to	critique	 the	 dominant	 way	 in	 which	 RD	 is	 conceptualised	 in	 philosophy	 of	religion	 (CV)	 and	 the	 positions	 on	 diversity	 developed	 within	 this	 typology.	These	were	criticised	for	taking	an	objective	approach	to	diversity,	and	viewing	it	through	a	Christian-philosophical	lens	as	a	set	of	metaphysical	accounts,	truth-claims,	 and	practices	 grounded	 in	 the	 authority	 of	 specific	 institutional	 bodies.	They	 view	 diversity	 as	 presenting	 an	 intellectual	 problem	 requiring	 an	explanatory	 solution	 that	 determines	 the	 location	 of	 truth	 and	 salvation	 in	relation	 to	 these.	 This	 blunt	 approach	 misrepresents	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 RD,	occluding	the	important	challenges	and	opportunities	it	presents	and	precluding	full	engagement	with	it.	The	positions	within	CV	were	also	accused	of	harbouring	an	 exclusivist	 ontology	 that	 skewed	 the	 debate	 in	 favour	 of	 exclusivism	 and	omitted	 the	 subjective	 and	 existential	 features	 of	 religion	 that	 are	 vital	 in	understanding	 religion,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 RD.	 The	 conclusion	 reached	was	that	different	approaches	must	be	developed	within	philosophy	of	religion	that	 are	more	 sensitive	 to	 the	 realities	 and	 challenges	of	diversity,	 particularly	the	existential	dimensions	most	consistently	overlooked	by	extant	approaches.	(b)	 Second,	 it	 aimed	 to	 provide	 an	 alternative,	 existential	 approach	 and	typology	 of	 commitment,	 informed	 by	 a	 Kierkegaardian	 interpretation	 of	religions	 as	 spheres	 of	 existence	 and	 ways	 of	 configuring	 identity	 around	fundamental	 commitments	 that	 negotiate	 central	 struggles	 of	 the	 human	
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condition.	This	focused	on	how	religious	commitment	is	configured	in	a	context	of	diversity.	The	ways	in	which	commitments	are	appropriated	and	lived	out	by	people	can	be	authentic	or	inauthentic,	judged	primarily	by	how	they	respond	to	the	struggles	of	the	human	situation	in	constructing	selfhood	and	responding	to	despair.	 Types	 of	 inauthentic	 commitment,	 expressing	 forms	 of	 despair,	 were	identified	and	extant	positions	on	diversity	were	interpreted	in	the	light	of	this	existential	 typology.	Christian	pluralism	and	exclusivism	were	critiqued	on	this	basis,	 with	 these	 positions	 identified	 as	 forms	 of	 despairing,	 inauthentic	commitment	that	fail	to	acknowledge	the	realities	of	the	human	situation.		(c)	Third,	having	opened	up	possibilities	 for	different	positions	 to	 those	offered	by	CV,	the	thesis	aimed	to	develop	an	authentic,	Kierkegaardian	position	on	diversity:	unbounded	commitment.	This	type	of	commitment	is	unbounded	in	that	 it	has	an	absolute	commitment	and	deep	fidelity	to	seeking	and	relying	on	divine	 revelation	 and	 grace,	 yet	 also	 entails	 a	 venturing,	 boundary-crossing,	radical	openness	to	religious	others.	This	made	two	theological	claims,	offering	a	minimalist	 theology	 of	 religion:	 the	 shared,	 existential	 situation	 of	 human	persons	was	posited	as	providing	common	ground	that	did	not	negate	religious	difference;	Christological	themes	developed	by	the	pseudonyms	were	drawn	on	to	argue	that	the	Christological	horizon	of	divine	activity	posits	the	presence	of	the	 divine	 in	 the	 inassimilable	 and	 offensive	 other,	 necessitating	 deep	engagement	 with	 others	 in	 living	 out	 Christian	 faith.	 UC	 entails	 a	 dialectic	 of	radical,	unbounded	fidelity	with	radical,	unbounded	openness.		The	struggles	experienced	by	Christians	in	a	religiously	diverse	situation	exist	in	a	dialectical	tension	that	never	finds	resolution.	Far	from	hampering	the	engagement	 with	 diversity,	 which	 virtually	 all	 positions	 within	 CV	 see	 as	 a	
	297	 	
necessary	evil	forced	upon	the	believer,	this	tension	energises	the	passion	of	the	commitment:	 committed	 faith	 is	expressed	 in	 risky	acts	of	 substitutionary	 love	and	openness,	 in	which	one’s	own	identity	is	imperilled,	motivated	by	the	hope	to	find	God’s	revelation	where	one	least	expects	it.	Simultaneously,	this	opening	up	to	others	is	the	means	through	which	agency	is	awoken	and	selfhood	found.		(d)	 Finally,	 my	 thesis	 offered	 practical	 resources	 for	 implementing	 this	position	 so	 as	 to	 facilitate	 interreligious	 encounter.	 In	 conformity	 with	 the	dialectical	tension	of	UC,	this	 involves	strategies	of	communication	that	respect	fidelity	and	radical	openness.	To	respect	the	seriousness	of	their	commitments,	it	was	argued	that	participants	in	encounter	must	be	honest	about	their	deep,	often	radically	 different,	 religious	 commitments.	 Yet	 this	 is	 counter-balanced	 by	 the	need	 to	admit	one’s	own	uncertainties	and	 to	develop	characteristics	 including	empathy	 and	 humour.	 Interreligious	 encounter	 requires	 artful	 communication	and	 the	 development	 of	 characteristics	 that	 embrace	 the	 tensions	 of	 the	situation,	 including	 passionate	 fidelity	 and	 venturing	 openness,	 humour	 and	seriousness,	active	participation	and	imaginative	experimentation.		I	 have	 justified	 my	 position	 by	 demonstrating	 its	 superiority	 over	competing	 approaches	 to	 RD,	 particularly	 by	 prioritising	 the	 existential	 and	subjective	dimensions	of	religious	commitment.	This	fits	with	the	experience	of	those	engaged	in	deep	reflection	about	their	religion	and	how	they	navigate	their	commitments	 in	 a	 context	 of	 diversity.	 I	 have	 further	 aimed	 to	 convince	Christians	 by	 drawing	 on	 Christological	 themes,	 particularly	 the	 site	 and	experience	of	revelation,	and	values	of	love	and	respect.	I	grounded	these	values	in	an	ontology	that	posits	relationships	to	others	as	integral	to	the	emergence	of	authentic	 selfhood.	 I	 showed	 the	 value	 of	 my	 approach	 in	 facilitating	 and	
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motivating	 deep	 encounter	 with	 religious	 others.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	Kierkegaardian	sources,	 I	have	aimed	to	provide	a	recognisably	Kierkegaardian	approach	 to	RD	 that	 is	 informed	by	 their	 central	 themes	 and	 insights,	without	being	 slavishly	 obedient	 to	 any	 theological	 system	 that	 is	 discernable	 in	 them.	This	 is	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 Kierkegaard’s	 desire	 to	 provoke	 subjective	 engagement	with	vitally	important	existential	questions	(CUP,	pp.	629-630).	
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7.2	Limitations	of	My	Argument	and	Future	Developments	My	 existential	 conception	 of	 religion	 identified	 religiousness	 as	irrevocably	 subjective	 and	 bound	 up	 with	 human	 responses	 to	 existential	challenges.	This	approach	is	rejected	by	some	of	the	dominant	interpretations	of	religion,	 such	 as	 the	 cultural-linguistic	 view.	 It	 might	 also	 conflict	 with	 how	adherents	 view	 their	 own	 religions,	 as	 sacred,	 divinely	 revealed	 bodies,	 for	example,	 rather	 than	 human	 responses.	 This	 is	 problematic	 as	 my	 approach	could	 be	 viewed	 as	 imposing	 an	 outsider	 perspective	 that	 claims	 superior	knowledge	of	the	meaning	of	religions	over	those	within.		I	have	tried	to	pre-empt	such	criticisms	by	viewing	religion	as	referring	to	particular	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world	 and	 making	 minimal	 pronouncements	about	what	else	might	be	involved.	I	have	aimed	to	be	non-reductive	by	focusing	on	description	over	explanation	and	by	making	minimal	metaphysical	 claims.	 I	have	 also	 tried	 to	 respect	 the	 centrality	 of	 religions	 to	 the	 identities	 of	 their	adherents	by	viewing	them	as	absolute,	defining	commitments.	Religions	may	be	divinely	revealed,	 involve	social	bodies,	or	simply	be	a	way	of	grouping	certain	human	 activities,	 but	 it	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 human	 beings	 make	 absolute	commitments	 and	 respond	 to	 various	 claims	 of	 revelation	 or	 transcendent	experiences	 in	 how	 they	 appropriate	 such	 claims.	 Future	 research	 could	 build	upon	 and	 defend	 this	 conception	 of	 religion	 as	 grounded	 in	ways	 of	 being,	 re-appropriating	 the	 approaches	 of	 existential	 theology	 to	 better	 understand	 the	existential	dimensions	of	religions	overlooked	by	the	dominant	views	of	religion.	The	 ontology	 of	 personhood	 that	 grounds	my	 approach,	 particularly	 its	claim	 that	 relationships	 to	 others	 are	 integral	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 subjectivity	and	selfhood,	also	needs	 further	 justification.	 I	have	 tried	 to	avoid	 theologising	
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consciousness,	 presenting	 the	 engagement	with	 religious	 others	 as	 simply	 one	way	 in	 which	 such	 relationships	 can	 occur.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 prioritisation	 of	alterity	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 theological	 gesture	 and	 needs	 further	 support.566	Further	research	could	explore	this	ontology,	seeking	to	support	and	expound	it	more	 fully	 as	 well	 as	 considering	 whether	 consciousness	 has	 theological	dimensions	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 religions	 can	 present	 the	 fullest	 expression	 of	authentic	 selfhood.	 In	 particular,	 the	 role	 of	 love	 and	 desire	 in	 constituting	personhood	and	the	wealth	of	theological	literature	exploring	these	needs	to	be	considered.	My	 approach	 entails	 a	 different	 conception	 of	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 to	that	which	dominates	analytical	philosophy.	Swinburne,	for	example,	argues	that	religious	 claims	 are	 philosophically	 significant	 only	 if	 they	 are	 claims	 about	reality	 and	 that	 the	 philosophical	 task,	 particularly	 when	 faced	 with	 different	options,	 is	 to	 verify	 or	 falsify	 these.567	By	 rejecting	 the	 value	 and	 possibility	 of	approaching	 religion	 and	 RD	 in	 this	 way,	 my	 approach	 suggests	 more	 fruitful	lines	of	inquiry	for	the	philosopher	of	religion.		More	 important	 are	 existential	 explorations	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	religiousness	shapes	and	is	shaped	by	subjectivity	and	how	it	relates	to	issues	of	selfhood	 in	 the	 real-world	 context.	 Indeed,	 religions	 are	 to	 be	 expected	 to	 be	repositories	of	existential	 insights	and	responses	to	the	struggles	 facing	human																																																									566	Janicaud	criticises	the	emphasis	on	alterity	as	having	a	theological	origin,	contrasting	the	purity	of	phenomenological	method	with	this	imposition	of	metaphysical	and	theological	concepts,	‘the	directly	dispossessing	aplomb	of	alterity	supposes	a	nonphenomenological,	metaphysical	desire;	it	comes	from	“a	land	not	of	our	birth.”	It	supposes	a	metaphysico-theological	montage,	prior	to	philosophical	writing….	All	is	acquired	and	imposed	from	the	outset,	and	this	all	is	no	little	thing:	nothing	less	than	the	God	of	the	biblical	tradition….	Must	philosophy	let	itself	be	thus	intimidated?’	[Dominique	Janicaud,	‘The	Theological	Turn	of	French	Phenomenology’.	In,	Dominique	Janicaud	et	al.	(ed.),	Phenomenology	and	the	“Theological	Turn”	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2000),	p.	27.	567	Richard	Swinburne,	‘The	Value	and	Christian	Routes	of	Analytical	Philosophy	of	Religion.’	In	Harriet	Harris	and	Christopher	Insole	(eds.)	Faith	and	Philosophical	Analysis,	p.	34.	
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beings.	Conceiving	of	religions	as	responses	to	meaning,	finitude,	mortality,	and	transcendence	 justifies	 philosophical	 interest	 in	 them:	 religions	 might	 offer	unique	 insights	 on	 the	 human	 situation	 and	ways	 of	 responding	 to	 it.	 Critique	remains	 an	 important	 part	 of	 this	 philosophical	 enterprise:	 positions	 can	 be	evaluated	 by	 how	 they	 respond	 to	 the	 human	 situation	 and	 constitute	personhood;	 they	may	 offer	more	 authentic	 responses	 to	 this	 or	 they	may	 be	expressions	 of	 despair,	 attempting	 to	 insulate	 the	 person	 and	 secure	 their	identity	through	repression	and	denial.		My	position	has	only	considered	IE	at	a	theoretical	level	and	in	relation	to	religions,	 but	 it	 calls	 for	 a	 real	 engagement	 with	 religious	 people	 and	 for	 an	expansion	of	IE	to	include	non-religious	others.	UCM	indicates	the	need	to	enter	into	encounter	with	radical	others,	and	there	is	no	prima	facie	reason	to	exclude	non-religious	 or	 anti-religious	 positions	 such	 as	 atheism.	 Indeed,	 as	 radically	other	 to	 religions,	 these	 may	 provide	 deep	 possibilities	 for	 encounter.	 Like	religions,	 they	 may	 be	 responding	 to	 shared	 existential	 situations,	 making	overriding	commitments,	and	may	be	participating	in	this-worldly	acts	of	faith	as	they	exercise	agency	and	open	themselves	up	to	mundane	acts	of	transcendence.		The	 engagement	 with	 diversity	 advocated	 by	 my	 thesis	 asks	 much	 of	participants.	They	are	required	to	admit	the	anxiety,	uncertainty,	provisionality,	and	groundlessness	of	their	religious	commitments.	They	are	asked	to	admit	the	paradoxes,	conflicts,	and	agonies	they	face	in	navigating	the	human	situation	and	their	 religious	 identities,	 particularly	 in	 how	 they	 fail	 and	 are	 led	 to	 the	boundaries	 of	 possibility.	 They	 are	 asked	 to	 embrace	 the	 conviction	 that	what	they	 seek	 most	 is	 present	 outside	 of	 the	 boundaries	 with	 which	 they	 are	comfortable	and	 to	 find	 the	divine	 in	 the	places	 they	 find	most	offensive.	They	
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are	 asked	 to	 embrace	 others	 in	 acts	 of	 substitutionary	 love	 that	 imperil	 their	identity	and	everything	they	value	most.	And	they	are	asked	to	do	all	of	 this	 in	hope	 and	 exuberant,	 passionate	 faith;	 to	 be	 excited	 and	 empowered	 by	 what	terrifies	them.	It	is	not	certain	that	anyone	would	want	to	engage	with	others	in	these	ways.		However,	 the	 desire	 for	 relationships,	 for	 an	 authentic	 response	 to	 the	human	 situation,	 and	 to	 become	 a	 self	 through	 these	 is	 present	 at	 the	 birth	 of	consciousness	 and	 provides	 its	 animus,	 even	 alongside	 the	 despair	 that	 drives	people	 to	 insulate	 themselves	 against	 others.	 While	 UCM	 asks	 much	 of	participants,	 it	 is	 only	 through	 such	 relationships	 that	 human	 persons	 achieve	their	 highest	 potential	 for	 selfhood	 and	 can	 become	 what	 they	 are.568	Their	deepest	desire	and	greatest	fulfilment	is	for	and	in	such	encounter.	If	the	despair	is	faced,	as	it	is	in	faith,	there	can	be	no	stronger	incentive	to	IE.		Regarding	 the	 threat	 of	 such	 encounter,	 this	 is	 what	 Christian	 faith	demands:	 in	 faith	 one	 risks	 one’s	 life	 and	 sacrifices	 everything	 to	 commit	absolutely	to	something	without	guarantees.	UCM	requires	a	costly	commitment,	coterminous	with	 the	 life	 of	 the	 person	 and	 never	 completed.	 This	makes	 it	 a	transcendent,	 passionate	 activity.	 While	 fear	 can	 be	 paralysing,	 Kierkegaard	claims	that	risky,	venturing	faith	has	its	own	certainty	that	empowers	passionate	engagement.	People	face	existential	terrors	like	death	and	conflict	regardless	of	whether	they	engage	deeply	with	other	people,	but	since	the	venture	of	 faith	is	coterminous	with	life,	it	can	never	be	disappointed	in	the	way	other	ventures	can	and,	moreover,	as	a	transforming	act	that	opens	one	up	to	finding	oneself	in	the																																																									568	This	point	is	indebted	to	Söderquist’s	view	of	learning	as	innately	desirable	in	Kierkegaard’s	account,	‘An	often	overlooked	premise	for	human	development	is	that	people	love	learning….	[The]	desire	to	learn	can	be	seen	as	arising	from	within’.	[Anna	Strelis	Söderquist,	Kierkegaard	on	
Dialogical	Education:	Vulnerable	Freedom	(Lanham:	Lexington	Books,	2016),	p.	1.]	
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relationship	 to	 the	 other,	 it	 heightens	 the	 life	 of	 the	 person	 into	 a	meaningful	narrative,	 even	 as	 it	 is	 perpetually	 groundless	 and	 incomplete.	 Hence	Kierkegaard	 compares	 being	 enervated,	 ‘with	 multifarious	 expectancy’,	 to	 the	‘victory’	achieved	through	the,	‘expectancy	of	faith’,	which	can	never	disappoint,	since	it	has	no	end,	and	which	can	satisfy	to	the	deepest	core	of	the	person,	‘Many	an	expectancy	will	be	disappointed—experience	has	taught	me	this.	But	there	is	one	expectancy	that	will	not	disappoint—experience	has	not	taught	me	this,	but	neither	has	 it	ever	had	the	authority	 to	deny	 it—this	 is	 the	expectancy	of	 faith,	and	this	is	victory.’	(EUD,	p.	28)																
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